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PREFACE
DIVERSITY IN ACTION: 
LOCAL PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OF MULTI-ETHNIC COMMUNITIES
Anna-Mária Bíró and Petra Kovács
Reform of Public Administration and Ethnic Identity Protection
The establishment of new political institutions and the reform of public administration
are key events in the process of transition in the post-communist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE). In this process, the effective management of multi-ethnic com-
munities has become relevant at both the central and local levels of government.  Minorities
raised their voices for the protection of their rights and for their involvement in democ-
ratic state-building. In their view, meaningful democracies could only be based on con-
sensual states incorporating all ethnic groups, whether majorities or minorities, on an
equal footing. This inclusive legitimacy of the newly emerging states was thought to be a
major guarantor of stability, a condition sine qua non of effective transition to market
economies and the rule of law. Due to the legacy of nationalist-communist countries that
discouraged and sanctioned public participation in policy-making in general and increas-
ingly regarded the state as the ethnic property of the majority population, the aspirations
of minorities for the preservation of their identity and effective participation have been
resisted to various degrees throughout much of the region. Nevertheless, as a result of
heated domestic debates under international pressure for peace and stability, it has been
broadly recognised that the aspirations of minorities and indigenous peoples will not dis-
appear and that there must be a systemic response to their needs. 
The protection of minority rights and the political, economic and social inclusion of
minorities have also been urged by various intergovernmental organisations. These organ-
isations include the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU), which
have developed a number of politically and legally binding instruments regulating and
guiding the domestic treatment of minorities. The international community has declared
that the welfare of minorities is no longer an exclusively internal affair of the state but a
legitimate concern of the entire community.
As a consequence of domestic and international events, post-communist countries have
established various forms of legal and institutional frameworks for the protection of minori-
ties. But it has become increasingly clear that an exclusively rights-based approach in the
spirit of effective protection defined by international minimum standards may not neces-
sarily provide for a broader inclusion of minorities at all levels of government. Thus, the
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development of participatory systems of governance responsive to the special needs of
diverse minorities has become key to stable and functioning democracies of this multi-eth-
nic region. The establishment of inclusive systems of local governance in general and from
an ethnic perspective in particular, is an important first step towards building participa-
tory systems overall. 
The bulk of the minority rights and multi-ethnic policies are implemented by local
authorities. In addition, special measures and services are truly effective only if designed
and carried out at the closest level to those affected. In many countries, as a result of pub-
lic administration reforms and decentralisation, local authorities gained competencies to
design policies responsive to ethnic diversity through the representation or direct involve-
ment of minorities. In some countries, autonomous arrangements in the field of culture
were set. Yet the effective implementation of these policies is often hindered by central gov-
ernment control, skewed administration of law, insufficient technical expertise and inad-
equate resources. There is, therefore, an urgent need to develop methods to overcome these
barriers and to enhance local government capacity to meet the specific needs of diverse
communities.
Experience shows that, on one hand, effective decentralisation can often be delayed
by central government fears of secession by territorially compact ethnic groups. On the
other hand, even if the centre is co-operative on ethnic issues, nationalist local authori-
ties may block the implementation of decentralised minority policies. Whilst decentrali-
sation and the principle of subsidiarity can be very effective, domestic supervision and
international monitoring are also needed to improve minority protection in the region.
In addition, the building of a political culture acceptant of a multi-ethnic public admin-
istration should supplement the legal and institutional reforms. A multi-disciplinary
approach to public administration reform coupled with the application of multiple tools
of reform, including training, is key to the establishment of pluralist democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe.   
The Project 
In the fall of 1996, the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) of
the Open Society Institute launched a project to identify and disseminate useful infor-
mation on the effective management of multi-ethnic communities and development of
multi-ethnic politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Managing Multi-ethnic Communities
Project (MMCP) http://lgi.osi.hu/ethnic). As of January 2001, more than 160 relevant
cases of local policy innovation had been identified, and a network comprised of more
than 300 local experts and civil servants was established. (As of spring of 2000, LGI
Managing Multiethnic Communities Project and the Center for European Migration and
Ethnic Studies (CEMES) have engaged in a partnership to update and maintain the data-
base of case studies on innovative practices.) 
As a result of this project, LGI understood the urgent need for support of local gov-
ernment capacity-building and multi-disciplinary training of public officials to address
problems related to the governance of multi-ethnic communities. In November 1998 LGI
began the production of this textbook for schools of public administration in the region in
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order to provide public officials with a solid knowledge of the relevant legal, political and
administrative issues related to the effective governance of multi-ethnic communities of
the region. As most country chapters were submitted before the summer 2000, important
political events which have since occured in the region are not addressed in the book.
Consonant with the Managing Multi-ethnic Communities Project, LGI has already
published a book with similar focus covering the countries of former Yugoslavia. (Nenad
Dimitrijevic (ed.), Managing Multiethnic Local Communities in Countries of Former Yugoslavia,
LGI: Budapest, 2000.) Another book on the Newly Independent States is forthcoming.
(LGI Managing Multi-ethnic Communities Project and the Network of Ethnological
Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflict in Moscow are expected to publish Democratic
Governance of Multi-ethnic Communities in the Newly Independent States, edited by Valery
Tishkov, in 2001.) 
Substance and Methodology 
Due to the lack of relevant literature and research in this field, this textbook intends to
fill the gap by providing information and ‘food for thought’ for public officials and rele-
vant professionals and practitioners. It is not intended to be an exhaustive comparative
study of local management of multi-ethnic communities in the region; it does not estab-
lish theories and models that identify commonalties and differences in inter-community
management at the local level across all relevant countries in a systematic way. Such a
task would exceed the introductory intentions of the book. The major objective of this
book is to set the ground for basic multi-disciplinary knowledge in this field, to provide
a regional overview of the major issues that were identified across the countries in ques-
tion and to collect and share strategies for addressing these issues through the case stud-
ies of good practice. It is hoped that this book will invite creative criticism and further
research and debate that can inform the everyday work of those concerned.
The textbook covers the following countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine. These countries
share commonalties that make them suitable for comparative research. All of them are
post-communist and in a period of political, economic and social transition; they have all
experienced peaceful transition processes; each of them opted for accession to the European
Union and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures; and all of them are historically multi-
ethnic and have undertaken significant institutional reforms, including public adminis-
tration reform.
This volume analyses the management of multi-ethnic communities from a multi-dis-
ciplinary perspective, attempting to briefly map out the broader context of the issue togeth-
er with a focus on particular in-country situations and practices. It also combines a more
detached view of comprehensive expert analyses with the perspective of local authors
focusing on local particularities. The book is divided into two major parts. 
Part One introduces the political, legal and administrative environment of the man-
agement of multi-ethnic communities. 
The political science chapter is structured around the basic concepts of state, ethnic-
ity and civil society, and the conditions for their effective functioning under modernity
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and globalisation. Related issues such as legitimacy, state integrity and state collapse, cit-
izenship, ethnicity and cultural reproduction, multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism are
re-assessed critically in a comparative framework of examples from Western and Eastern
Europe. The question of post-communism and the special role of ethnicity in these states
are also addressed. 
The chapter on public administration gives an overview of institutional reforms car-
ried out in the last ten years at both central and local levels in the relevant countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. In the section discussing the initial constitutional and insti-
tutional reforms in post-communist states, the two major competing constitutional set-
tlements, parliamentarism and presidentialism, are presented and analysed. The follow-
ing part provides a critical survey of the central government reforms, including the civil
service and administrative structures and the issue of the training of public officials. A
number of problems related to the development of the new administrations are analysed
from historic, economic, political and legal perspectives. The overview of local govern-
ment reform incorporates key elements including size, competencies and property as well
as central/local relations. 
The overview of the existing legislative framework on the protection of minorities pre-
sents the international law background and context and the leading global and European
texts. Its analysis focuses on four key texts: Article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Minority Rights Declaration, the Charter for
Regional and Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of
Minorities of the Council of Europe. The interpretative complexities of each text are
addressed, and an explanation of what these instruments mean and how they can be used
is provided. The focus on legal analysis is combined with a broader focus on political
issues, ‘diplomatic’ approaches to conflict prevention and redress, and the benefits of
inter-cultural and multi-cultural education.   
Part Two identifies the relevant historic legacy, legislation and institutional structures,
major political debates in minority protection and public administration reform, with par-
ticular reference to local government on a country by country basis. Innovative local prac-
tices in this subject area are included. Policy analysis is combined with demographic and
sociological surveys, and rights-based assessments are combined with inquiries from a
public policy perspective. To lay the foundation for a more or less systematic compara-
tive review, the editors suggested some guidelines to the authors containing a set of issues
for analytic consideration. These issues include: various characteristics/qualifiers of multi-
ethnicity, the legal and political position of minorities, public administration and local
government reform with reference to the representation and participation of minorities,
and policy recommendations. Some authors chose to structure their analyses according
to the guidelines. Others shaped them according to what was considered as most impor-
tant from their perspective in the field. For instance, some authors focused on the analy-
sis of one or two minority situations instead of a more comprehensive overview of inter-
ethnic issues in their states. 
Authors identified various types of minorities and minority policies. It seems that the
number/size, geographical location, pre-communist history and institutional memory,
elites (skilled, organised), available local resources (spiritual and material), and external
resources proved to be decisive factors in designing minority policies. Part Two empha-
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sises that various ethnic groups in a given country may have very different aspirations,
claims and needs. Different groups also enjoy very different levels of social and political
integration. This kind of information, it is hoped, may help public officials and civil ser-
vants to better understand the nature of the region’s ethnic diversity and to design poli-
cies according to the needs of various ethnic groups. 
Each country chapter includes an in-depth analysis of the legislative and institution-
al frameworks for the protection of minorities. Chapters discuss differences between de
jure and de facto provisions of legal and institutional guarantees. Conflicts between inter-
national law and domestic legislation are discussed in all chapters. While Central and
Eastern European countries have become parties to various international and European
legal instruments, these guarantees sometimes contradict domestic legislation. Sometimes
international standards are stronger than domestic laws, while in other cases domestic
law can exceed international norms. Harmonisation of international and domestic legis-
lation, however, should not be used as a means of lowering or disrupting existing domes-
tic standards.  
There are various forms of constitutional recognition of minorities throughout the
region. The outcomes of political debates on these forms of recognition can be assessed
along a broad constitutional spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, minorities are recog-
nised in constitutions, and may be granted state-constituent status. At the other end, their
constitutional recognition may be denied altogether. This lack of recognition can prevent
effective minority protection. However, nonrecognition of minorities at a constitutional
level may be the price for some de facto provisions for identity protection at the local level.
In the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, new institutions in civil
society have emerged to design and implement various types of public policy. Nonprofit
or civic organisations have been established to respond to new challenges or to provide
adequate services for particular groups. Due to their autonomy, these organisations are
often more creative in developing new models and means to provide specialised services.
On the basis of the experience of these NGOs, successful innovations might be translat-
ed and adapted in other localities. The civil sector can fill in gaps in government policy
and practice, and can work in partnership with local government to meet minority needs.
Some other major issues identified across the chapters are the following: represen-
tation and/or direct involvement of minorities in local governments, use of minority
languages in public administration, financial guarantees for cultural autonomy, finan-
cial and political support for minority education, and minority access to local public
services. Almost all of these topics have emerged in each of the seven countries. However,
institutional arrangements and policy responses have varied to a great degree. Further,
political debates that marked the introduction of new policies both at the central and
the local level crystallised around different issues: language, education, territorial auton-
omy or property restitution, citizenship, and distributive justice. The textbook presents
a set of innovative approaches and policy programmes that have attempted to address
these issues. 
The country analyses are supplemented by case studies of innovative practices com-
ing from various multi-ethnic localities in the region. Case studies are intended to raise
awareness among public officials and practitioners of the many old and new strategies for
the promotion of local multi-ethnic harmony across the region. These case studies were
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included to illustrate local experiences in concrete detail so that they can be adapted and
used under different circumstances.
Special attention was paid to ensure that multiple ethnic perspectives were reflected
in each country chapter. Expert readers from diverse ethnic groups were invited to pro-
vide comments and advice to the authors that were subsequently integrated into the text.
Because of the pilot nature and multi-ethnic character of the book, the editors did not opt
for a rigid structure and uniform style and terminology across chapters. On the contrary,
they tried to respect the individual perspective, methodology, style and language present
in each chapter to celebrate what is the major topic of this book: diversity.
Key Features of the Book 
Each of the chapters is designed to be easy to read with a number of learning aids includ-
ing:
· Abstracts. A brief summary of the main points is provided at the beginning of each
country chapter.
· Boxed Case Studies. Important cases of good practice and innovative thinking are
contained in boxes.
· Appendices and Annexes. These provide useful information to supplement the text.
· Further reading. Each chapter provides a brief list of further reading on the subject
covered. 
· Consolidated bibliography. At the end of the book a detailed list of sources is pro-
vided chapter by chapter.
· Glossary. A selection of key concepts is briefly explained at the end of the book. 
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MINORITIES AND DEMOCRACY
George Schöpflin
The central issue is this—how can the modern democratic state come to terms with its
own diversity, with the very diversity that democracy produces, and not fall apart while
simultaneously providing for the expression of that diversity? 
Democracy 
There are various answers. In the first place, democracy is made democratic by basing its
rule on the consent of those governed. The means for articulating that consent and feed-
ing into the system of governance is the concept of popular sovereignty. There must also
be a system of institutions for transmitting the will of the people to the rulers, together
with a readiness on the part of the rulers to translate popular aspirations into policy. These
might be termed inclusive means. Equally, there are instruments for excluding certain
ideas, options, actions and pressures. Some of these instruments are explicit, like legal
regulation, and others are implicit and informal, encoded in cultural givens. And some
are physical, material, technological, economic, etc.
Language is one of the most self-evident ways of including and excluding. People who
speak the same language and share the same culture will automatically be closer to one
another and have the sense that they can rely on fellow members of the language com-
munity to understand them without further explanation. But language is seldom enough
on its own. There have to be factors like shared history, memory and ways of life for com-
munities of solidarity to come together. Note that speakers of the same language in the
philological sense do not automatically constitute a community of solidarity. Thus speak-
ers of English understand each other more readily, but their communities of solidarity
are quite different—English, American, Irish, etc.
Under conditions of modernity, which in politics means continuous change, expand-
ing choice and increasing complexity, the central institution for sustaining order and
coherence is the state. The state comprises the entire set of institutions controlled by the
elected authorities, the machinery of administration, central, regional and local levels of
government, plus various state and semi-state agencies, as well as the judiciary, procura-
cy and other bodies involved in the administration of justice. Parliaments and elected
local councils are notionally semi-autonomous of the state; in practice, they are in con-
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tinuous interaction with it. Government agencies may be also semi-autonomous of it, in
that they depend for their legality and legitimacy, as well as their budgets, on the state,
but can act with extensive discretion. Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are notion-
ally fully independent of the state, but will normally be in continuous interaction with it
and will be structured by that interaction; NGOs which receive some or all of their fund-
ing from the state may also have a status that is more autonomous than that of govern-
ment agencies.
Then, there is an important distinction to be made between democracy and consent
to be ruled. A system may be consensual in the sense that its rulers are elected democra-
tically, meaning that the electorate has consented to their being in power. But if the rulers’
power is not exercised according to the principles of democracy—self-limitation, com-
mitment, moderation, compromise, responsibility—it will not be democratic. This split
between democratic sanction for power, which is often exercised undemocratically or
semi-democratically, is characteristic of many of the post-communist states.
The State 
It is vital to recognise a number of real, as distinct from formal, features of the state. In
the first place, the state, like any other political actor, operates by adhering to a set of rules
and does so supposedly in strict terms, thereby ensuring transparency, consistency and
accountability. Hence following procedures and accounting for budgets are essential in
maintaining a responsive relationship between the citizens and the state. The profession-
alism of the administrators, their training and socialisation, is another safeguard against
the exercise of arbitrary power. Respect for the rule of law is vital.
However, given the complexity and extent of the tasks that the state has to resolve, it
is impossible to make advance provision for all the contingencies that the state adminis-
tration must deal with. Hence the agents of the state are entrusted with a considerable
degree of discretion and they are supposed to exercise this within their formal and infor-
mal terms of reference. This requires them to act according to the doctrine of self-limita-
tion, to accept feedback and to recognise a wider public good in acting in conformity to
the dictates of consistency. In real political terms, the result is that the agencies of the
state can arrogate power to themselves, leaving the citizen with only few resources to
resist, particularly when judicial remedies are restricted.
The agencies of the state and their personnel are, therefore, political actors, even when
their power is relatively restricted, and should act in a democratic way, guided by demo-
cratic values. When they do not, that power is to some extent discredited. Citizens will
be reluctant to rely on it and will prefer to make their own private arrangements with it.
This can take the form of various types of informality like corruption or the personalisa-
tion of power, when individuals prefer to deal with agents of the state known to them,
rather than rely on the impersonal norms by which the state is supposed to abide.
True democracy, then, requires that there be a widely acknowledged sense of public
good and an impersonal public sphere, impersonal in the sense that all citizens are treat-
ed evenhandedly by it and there are clear and effective remedies against abuses of power.
But this desirable state of affairs is hard to establish and demands constant vigilance by
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all political actors, inside the state machinery and outside it (i.e. civil society), to moni-
tor such abuses. And all actors have to accept that they may themselves stray into arbi-
trariness.
There is a particularly complex problem of the interlocking nature of the relationship
between the state, language and modernity. Under conditions of modernity, the state is
the pivotal agency of establishing and maintaining coherence and stability. All societies
aim to create coherence; coherence provides a stable moral order and the set of shared
meanings that lets individuals feel that they are members of a collectivity rather than mere
individuals disconnected from the world they live in.
At the same time, modernity also demands very high levels of successful communica-
tion in order to secure state-driven coherence. This creates an expectation for the state to
be monolingual. This means, further, that there is a qualitative difference between ‘lan-
guage’ in general and the ‘language of the state’. The language of a state has the prestige
and power that the state has created. All languages have the potential to be developed
into state languages and thus acquire the political power that is encoded in such a lan-
guage, but comparatively few actually succeed in this. Crucially, it is vital to distinguish
between the philological quality of language and the political. This distinction is frequently
overlooked and ignoring it can contribute materially to the disempowerment of linguis-
tic minorities.
Arbitrariness 
The arbitrary power of the state is a worldwide phenomenon, and the institutions, instru-
ments and culture of democracy are notionally the most effective means of making the
state responsive to the aspirations of the citizens. In this connection, however, it should
be clearly understood under modernity that the state itself has an interest in being respon-
sive to society. If the state pursues a largely arbitrary course and ignores public opinion,
it will generate both active and passive opposition or, in extreme cases, violent resistance.
Furthermore, all the evidence points in the direction of the proposition that the central
raison d’etre of the state, the maintenance of a monopoly of coercion and taxation, are
achieved most efficiently when the citizens consent to this monopoly. Without such con-
sent, therefore, the state is captured by its own bureaucratic norms and becomes inca-
pable of discharging its tasks of sustaining order and coherence, because it cannot cope
with simultaneous change and complexity. This, in effect, was the fate of the ultra-bureau-
cratic and hyper-etatistic communist systems. They collapsed under the weight of their
own disorder and incoherence.
Order and Diversity 
Thus the modern democratic state has, in effect, two irreconcilable tasks—to sustain order
and to permit the articulation of ever more fragmented, disparate, differentiated aspira-
tions; the integration of these two tasks is the criterion of success. In this context, there
will never be a perfect solution to the key political issues of democracy at this time, only
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more or less acceptable ones. Hence it becomes vital to provide space for remedies, and
that, in turn, requires that the state and those exercising power should have the neces-
sary self-awareness and flexibility to respond to pressure. Equally, while the power of the
state must be circumscribed, it should neither be excessively constrained nor fragment-
ed. Crucial in this connection is that the state should be perceived as legitimate, a process
that is sustained both by the actions of the state and that of society.
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is not automatic. All political actors, the state included, have to earn legiti-
macy by being responsive to the needs of the citizens; citizens as actors have to abide by
the law and apply self-limitation to their activities. This is a counsel of perfection, of course,
because it is impossible for all actors, especially the state, to meet the individual demands
of each and every citizen. 
The solution is to create predictability by following routines and procedures and to
exercise discretion with care. Accountability must also be made clear, balanced and pre-
dictable. There must be proper procedures for calling political actors to account for their
decisions and equally actors must be protected from trivial or frivolous attacks on their
work. Note that both ‘trivial’ and ‘frivolous’ are culturally determined and will differ in
time and place.
If a system is generally disliked by the bulk of the population and if that dislike is
expressed in the open, then over time the self-confidence of political actors is eroded. The
severe criticism of the public sector in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, coupled with
far-reaching privatisation, clearly lowered the morale of those working there. In the longer
term, a ruler who no longer feels that he has the support of the population will find it
difficult to discharge his tasks or to do it very effectively, with the result that the self-legit-
imation of the entire system may be called into a question and a process of erosion will
be under way. The institution in question, and it may be a state, will be seen as irrelevant
or as a distraction; what it says will be ignored. Russia was in this situation for much of
the 1990s.
State Collapse 
There is, furthermore, a particular and generally undiagnosed problem with respect to
the post-communist state. When communism collapsed in 1989-1991, it was not mere-
ly communism as an ideology that disintegrated, but so too did the communist state.
Whatever the legitimacy of that state, it was a real entity in as much as it did provide a
degree of order and coherence that was seen as ‘normal and natural’ by the bulk of the
population. Its institutions may have been regarded as facades, and the levels of arbi-
trariness and informality that they sustained were certainly incompatible with anything
remotely resembling democracy. 
Nevertheless, they had established themselves, had become routinised and were to
that extent accepted. The collapse of communism eliminated the key principle on which
8 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART I
these states rested and on which their integrative power depended. Hence the end of com-
munism brought into being political formations that had to re-establish their authority
and to find new raw materials for their raison d’etre. Classically in Europe, as we have
seen, this is derived from the state, from civil society and from ethnicity. Given the absence
of civil society (destroyed under communism) and the weakness of the state (disintegrated
after the collapse), the purposiveness of politics and social-cultural coherence came to
depend heavily on ethnicity.
Ethnicity 
Ethnicity is a widely used (and abused) term. In essence, it refers to a group that defines
itself as a community of solidarity and identity, with a sense of its past and future, a shared
set of meanings and a web of symbolic and mythic markers. Ethnic communities mark
themselves off from other groups by various boundary mechanisms, of which language,
territory and religion are the most significant, though not sufficient conditions. Ethnicity
functions both at the explicit, overt level of meanings, and equally at the tacit, implicit
level through the encoding of assumptions that members of a community accept without
further questioning. While the codes of solidarity that ethnic groups generate vary enor-
mously, the actual fact of ethnicity is universal. All human beings share in these codes at
some level—the language they speak ensures this—and to that extent they all have eth-
nicity. 
Although many in the West deny that their actions are in any way affected by ethnic-
ity, this denial does not have to be taken at face value. Rather, the denial is a part of the
assumption that European values are universal, something that has been one of the cen-
tral tenets of European thought since the Enlightenment. In this perspective, what are
defined as universal human values are regarded as ethically superior to those seen as par-
ticularistic. In reality, all universalisms are coloured to a greater or lesser extent by codes
of ethnic solidarity. In this sense, French civic values are not only civic but also French
and so on. The problem of ethnic exclusion or violence, therefore, is not ethnicity as such,
but the presence or absence of other, countervailing ideas, values and institutions, like
civil society and civic values, that delimit the exclusivist functioning of ethnicity
Modernity 
With the coming of modernity in the 18TH century, and the steady growth of the reorder-
ing and integrative power of the modern state, ethnicity has become politicised. Ethnic
groups have concluded that in order to ensure their uninterrupted cultural reproduc-
tion—the ultimate purposiveness of all groups—they must gain access to political power.
Most commonly, this is the state, which thereby becomes the nation-state. However, var-
ious types of arrangements short of state independence also exist, which can—at any rate
for a period of time—satisfy the needs and aspirations of ethnic communities. The
autonomous arrangements for Catalonia, Scotland and the different regions of Belgium
illustrate this.
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One particular quality of ethnicity that has to be addressed is that when it functions
without strong institutions and impersonal norms that are accepted by both rulers and
ruled, negotiations between one ethnic group and another become extremely problem-
atic. When a group concludes that its survival is challenged, it will be most reluctant to
make the compromises that are a necessary element of democratic politics. 
Different Meanings of Ethnicity 
A further complication is that the term ‘ethnicity’ is currently used with a variety of dif-
ferent, and not necessarily complementary, meanings. Thus the word can refer to the
identity of Third World immigrants to Western Europe, in which case its resonance is
positive; to the salient ways of expressing identity under post-communism, in which case
it is viewed as negative; and to the ethnic identities to the well-established democratic
states of the West, in which case the existence of ethnicity is denied. This results in the
kinds of absurdity that gives high value to the ethnicity of, say, Turkish immigrants in
Germany but denies that German ethnicity has any value at all. This confusion is relevant
to any discussion of issues of multi-ethnicity and multi-culturalism. In broad terms, the
ethnicities of long-settled, established European communities tend to be regarded as neg-
ative, because they are regarded as sources of majority power and thus, in the eyes of
those promoting this kind of discourse, inherently undesirable. This approach is based
on the misconception that such disapproval will diminish attachment to majority eth-
nicity; a more effective way forward is to accept it and make political provision for it.
Multi-culturalism and Multi-ethnicity 
There is a considerable amount of confusion about these terms and they tend to be used
interchangeably, which adds to the confusion. In reality, they refer to different sociolog-
ical and political situations. In multi-culturalism, one is dealing with the identities of
recently settled populations in another country and the problems of integrating them into
the dominant majority. In other words, multi-culturalism applies to immigrants, possi-
bly immigrants of different racial origins, who by immigrating are signalling that in the
long term, they or their descendants are ready to adopt the cultural norms of the major-
ity. Crucially, under multi-culturalism there is not expected to be any long-term persis-
tence of the languages that the immigrants bring with them. 
Certain cultural traits, like religion, may well be conserved, but the intensity of accultur-
ation and, correspondingly, the degree of separateness between majority and minority is like-
ly to be small. Indeed, the concept of multi-culturalism contains a serious challenge for white
majorities—will they be prepared to accept the demand that will certainly arrive on the cul-
tural agenda, that non-whites can be fully accepted as members of the dominant communi-
ty? For the time being, the answers differ. In some states, like France, the answer is notion-
ally yes, but the terms of full acceptance are harsh—complete acculturation, including the
abandonment of all previous cultural traits. Elsewhere, the answers are more ambiguous, as
in Britain, roughly implying that the white majority has yet to face up to the question.
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Multi-lingualism and multi-ethnicity are qualitatively different, in as much as they
explicitly reject the idea of full acculturation and assume that the different language groups
will live in the same state and sustain their different languages and cultures. This is a far
more difficult state of affairs and requires quite different solutions from multi-cultural-
ism. Above all, it will demand a level of sensitivity and accommodation by both (all)
groups to the demands of the others and a readiness to compromise one’s own moral and
cultural agendas that some will not find palatable. In political terms, this means forms of
power sharing, along the lines defined by consociationalism, which accepts and relies on
the collective identities of groups as a key political building block (see below).
In practice, it is inconceivable that well-established ethnic minorities, like the
Hungarians of Romania or the Russians of Latvia will abandon their languages and moral
norms in order to merge into the majority. Nor is it certain that the majority would wel-
come this. Hence these ethno-linguistic groups constitute separate societies that live in
the same political space. The consequence is that the traffic between majority and minor-
ity has to be regulated by clear and transparent rules, ones that both accept and, where
necessary, challenge. Communication between them is likely to operate at the elite level,
and in this context effective elite communication is vital for political stability, while at the
street level mutual respect and acceptance of the other are generally sufficient.
Civil Society 
The concept of civil society also demands further examination. Currently, ‘society’ when
it is invested with the term ‘civil’ is widely seen as a possessing the moral high ground,
even while it is perfectly clear that certain forms of social activity are evidently immoral
(e.g. the oppression of minorities). Hence any analysis of civil society has to be refined to
resolve the contradiction. The key here is the role of the state in establishing order and
maintaining the rule of law. Where these processes are weak or absent or the state is not
trusted, as in many of the post-communist states, society will not be very civil; it will not
have any sense of operating under an even-handed set of rules and will, therefore, prefer
personal to institutional forms of operation. This makes access to power uneven and bears
particularly hard on minorities, social as well as ethnic. 
Political actors will not necessarily act by the yardstick of democratic values, but—
where the state is not strong enough to enforce the law—will rely instead on clientilistic
networks, personal (rather than institutional) trust, favours and hierarchies of power. All
these usually overlapping, informal institutions do, indeed, provide an alternative to the
civic state and create a restricted security and order that people need in their encounters
with power. But such a system is not very efficient or reliable: it perpetuates arbitrariness.
Power is opaque and people will see abuses of power whether they are there or not; nor
will they see remedies, resulting in frustration and a sense of injustice. Under moderni-
ty, there is no adequate alternative to the impersonal state.
Ethnic (and other) minorities will tend to have poorer access to these informal net-
works because they are in a minority and thus inherently weaker; their negative reaction
to the exercise of power will be correspondingly stronger. They will be inclined to see
power as being directed against them and will not recognise that the rulers (from the
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majority) may also be dealing with the majority ethnic group poorly. A case in point was
the Slovak language law of the mid-1990s passed by the Meciar government, which the
Hungarian minority saw as aimed at itself and would not accept that the law bore hard
on some of the Slovak majority as well.
Post-communism 
It should be noted that the present weakness of the state in the post-communist world is
exacerbated by an unexpected phenomenon. The current discourse of civil society has
evolved out of a Western context, from a need to challenge the strong, well-grounded
Western welfare state of the post-1945 era. This discourse tends to see the relationship
between civil society and the state as, at best, a zero-sum game and, vitally, it has no the-
ory of the state.
The discourse does not, therefore, try to understand what the state is for, what its pos-
itive features and functions are and why sizeable sections of society continue to depend
on it materially and culturally. Nor does this attitude like to recognise that civil society
and the state are in a mutual relationship—each needs the other to operate effectively.
Instead, this discourse dismisses the state as an obstacle to emancipation and does what
it can to delegitimate it. This state of affairs tends to perpetuate the weakness and inef-
fectiveness of the state, even while the state has extensive tasks to discharge, which it con-
sequently does much less well than it should.
The importing of this discourse into the post-communist world, aided as it was by
the pre-1989 democratic opposition’s anti-etatist perspectives, has resulted in the para-
dox noted above: that the post-communist state is not strong enough to provide the sta-
bilising framework for civil society; hence society operates along a pattern of informal-
ism, thereby weakening itself. Thus the pattern so common in post-communist societies:
they have no pronounced civic sense and are not well able to exercise democratic con-
trol over the state and the government. The system is partly consensual, established and
self-reproducing; there is no reason to expect any change in this area in the foreseeable
future.
Ethnicity and Post-communist Systems 
The foregoing should begin to provide an explanation for why ethnicity has come to play
such a significant role in the running of post-communist states. It is the preeminent
resource for the maintenance of order and coherence and will remain so until the state
has acquired the requisite authority to provide the framework for the functioning of civil
society. In the interim, where multi-ethnic relations are involved, these can raise ques-
tions that go beyond the capacity of the existing conflict resolution mechanisms. When
the state and its institutions are not regarded as neutral by all the actors, for example, the
police is seen as ethnically biased, minority ethnic groups will find themselves forced to
create their own, potentially divergent forms of self-protection, which can come to be
seen by the majority as threatening to the integrity of the state.
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This has several outcomes. The weakness of the agreed mechanisms for conflict reso-
lution tends to lead to rapid escalation in majority-minority relations; each is inclined to
see the activities of the other in the worst light; each sees the other as a single, solid—
and, therefore, threatening—block, which then leads them to listen only to the extrem-
ists and disregard the diversity of the other. Thereby, it is easy to understand the nega-
tive cycles from which it is difficult to escape. However, escape is not impossible, merely
difficult. No community actually wants to live in a state of tension and if the elites can
find an effective minimum basis for communication, de-escalation is feasible. Northern
Ireland is a case where accommodation has proved all but impossible; Estonia offers a
more positive picture.
Moral Worth 
Central to any community’s sense of itself in the modern world is that it is accepted by
others, especially by its direct competitors, as a community of moral worth. While oth-
ers may not share its particular combination of values and ideals, let alone its symbolic
system, it is vital for collective self-esteem that a community be accepted by others on
equal terms. What is very significant in this connection in the modern world is that all
cultures seek acceptance as high cultures; indeed, there is a close nexus between politi-
cal power and possessing a high culture, with all the necessary paraphernalia of language,
vocabulary and density of meanings that allows a cultural community to compete on equal
terms. Crucially, political demands—whether within a state or internationally—have to
be articulated in a universally acceptable form. This means possessing the right kind of
high cultural vocabulary that modernity demands.
However, when two cultures are competing for power within the same state, the major-
ity will find such political contests very difficult to tolerate, given the close association
between cultural power, state power and political power. It is this collision that makes
the rights of ethnic minorities so difficult to regulate in a democratic way. Probably the
most successful form of such regulation is consociationalism, which provides the neces-
sary political power for all the cultural communities in the same etatic space and the means
for resolving political contests. 
Consociational systems explicitly recognise that the power of the state depends on all
the ethnic groups that live there. Power has to be shared and exercised proportionately
between them. In practical terms, consociational systems (Belgium, Switzerland, Finland,
South Tyrol) depend on the idea of a coalition in which all groups are represented, on
elite cooperation, on proportional access to the material and symbolic goods of the state
by all groups, on the right of veto by all groups on matters that affect their most vital inter-
ests and, it should be added, that all the ethnic communities are committed to the terri-
torial integrity of the state.
It is crucial in such systems that contests for political power, which are a normal part
of every political system, can be expressed in such a way as to avoid ethnic polarisation,
which spills very readily into ethnicisation, a situation where everything—all initiatives,
moves and decisions—are read in ethnic terms and only in ethnic terms. In such situa-
tions, the ‘public good’ or civic sphere, that ought to attach to the state and transcend eth-
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nicities, does not do so. Switzerland is an illustration of a successful case, as is Finland;
Northern Ireland is an example of the opposite.
State Integrity 
The problem of the integrity of the state is not as straightforward as it appears at first sight.
On the face of it, this concept refers to the integrity of state territory and seeks to impose
a general interdict on the fragmentation or disintegration of states. It implies that once a
state has come into being, it is there forever—that there is a moral purposiveness in state
integrity—and, hence, anything that threatens it is to be condemned and may, therefore,
be combated. However, in the real world of politics, the configuration of states under-
goes constant change and it is only from the unusual perspective of 1945-1989, when
state boundaries remained extraordinarily stable, that this appearance of changelessness
arose. Most European states have been involved in some kind of major or minor bound-
ary change in the 20TH century. At the same time, such change is deeply disliked by states
and thus by the international order, which has adopted this position. 
There are several factors which help to explain this conservatism. In the first place, the
state has a tacit function as the final repository of rationality, so that the questioning of
the state is a challenge to rationality itself. Second, when a state is rearranged, this caus-
es far-reaching upheaval, as the new state—the state within its new frontiers—has to
impose its particular order on the newly acquired territory. Germany after reunification
is a good example. Third, new states give rise to greater complexity in the international
order, which is disliked by the existing beneficiaries of the system, as it means accepting
new entrants. Foreign ministries, which have established their own routines, networks of
information, contacts and other forms of cultural capital, are reluctant to accept that their
hard-won knowledge has become useless in the new circumstances. This conservatism
was acutely visible during the crisis that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, when
Western states were most uneasy with the idea that Yugoslavia as a state and as an aspi-
ration had lost the consent of the majority of the people who lived there. Indeed, the hes-
itations of the West contributed to the ensuing chaos. Fourth, given the foregoing,
reconfiguring the state order (new states, new frontiers) is generally difficult and is often
the outcome of upheaval. While it is usually the outcome of upheaval and not necessar-
ily the cause of it, in popular perceptions the two are often confounded. Fifth, as the mod-
ern state has been entrusted with the maintenance of order and coherence, any challenge
to it is deeply disturbing—when states are faced with collapse or fragmentation, it as if a
part of the natural world had suddenly changed, it seems inexplicable and is profound-
ly threatening. If an alternative source of order is not available, those affected will be vul-
nerable to extremist mobilisation, as happened to the Serbs of Bosnia in 1992.
Ethnic Minorities 
All this inevitably impacts on ethnic minorities, because majorities can seek to present
their claims for political power as a threat to the international order and the territorial
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integrity of the state and find a ready audience. On the other hand, the evolution of the
European order in the 1990s has to some extent confronted this problem by giving minori-
ties an international audience, a space within which they can articulate their demands,
without the automatic assumption that they are seeking secession. Through the Council
of Europe, the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as a host of international NGOs, ethnic minori-
ties have acquired the space to address international public opinion directly, while simul-
taneously there is a consensus that the classical, strict definition of state has been con-
siderably diluted. The international community has in effect declared that the welfare of
ethnic minorities is the concern of the entire community.
Territory 
Particular attention should be paid in this connection to the role of territory. Historically,
there was a direct equation between territory and power; the more territory a state con-
trolled, the more powerful it was thought to be. Elements of this kind of thinking sur-
vive, although in power terms, territory is far less important than it was. Power nowadays
resides in information, in ideas, in ability to manipulate concepts and to persuade others
to act, rather than force them to do so. The consensual exercise of power, which this shift
betokens, is far more effective—far better at condensing and accumulating power—than
the power that grows out of the barrel of a gun.
Nevertheless, this does not signify that territory has lost all significance in the exercise
of power and especially in the context of power in inter-ethnic relations. Despite global-
isation and despite the loss of power by the state (as traditionally measured), territory
continues to play a key role at the concrete level, as well as at the symbolic one.
Communities structure their identities around myths of territory and project this onto a
concrete piece of land. In this sense, territory has a dual function in the politics of iden-
tity—it establishes and expresses a particular community and it gives it wider recogni-
tion, as well as endowing it with the space in real terms that it can regard as its own. 
In an indirect way, communities weigh one another’s worth by their being communi-
ties of territory. This makes it especially difficult for nonterritorial groups, like the Roma,
to gain the recognition they are seeking. Equally, when two or more groups share the
same territory and invest it with special symbolic significance, the arrangement of inter-
ethnic relations will be highly intractable, though not completely so. 
This points to another facet of the role of territory in inter-ethnic relations. Each com-
munity tends to regard its territory—its mythic territory—as its monopoly possession.
When the mythic territory coincides with the boundaries of the state, there is no serious
difficulty; but when there is no such coincidence, the conflict of concrete and mythic can
become very complex indeed to negotiate. Inter-ethnic relations in Romania, where both
Romanians and Hungarians invest Transylvania with a mythic function of this nature, is
an example of this kind of contest.
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Myths and Symbols 
All this raises the thorny issue of the role of myths and symbols in politics in general and
in the politics of inter-ethnic relations in particular. In a good deal of the literature on this
area, there is no serious analysis of the role of symbols; reference may be made to that
role, but it is not examined in any depth. This can result in the underestimation of the
impact and importance of symbolic-mythic processes. The most persuasive way of look-
ing at these processes, then, is to see the concrete and the symbolic as being in a contin-
uous, interactive relationship, that when the institutional and procedural forms of power
are well grounded, the role of symbols stays in the background, though it would be a mis-
take to imagine that they disappear entirely. 
All communities—ethnic, civic, other—depend on myth and symbol to screen in cer-
tain ideas, propositions, meanings and to exclude others. By doing so, communities cre-
ate an order, a way of seeing the world that is particular and proper to them and them
alone. These meanings are then made ‘normal and natural’ by that particular community.
Communities construct narratives about themselves as a way of responding to the
bewildering variety of experience that the world is and to make sense of what would oth-
erwise be chaos. The meanings so created are then transformed into the particular world
of the community concerned and are seen as the norm, as central to its sense of self and
its aspiration to live on, engaging in cultural reproduction. The myths and symbols on
which communities rely also act as a boundary towards the external world and control
the boundary traffic—certain ideas are screened in, while others are screened out. These
processes are not necessarily conscious; nor are they manipulative, but constitute the nor-
mal means of community maintenance.
Cultural Reproduction 
The continuity of communities, their reproduction, the capacity of their members to recog-
nise one another and to establish boundaries towards nonmembers all depend in part on
the web of symbolic meanings that are generated and used to sustain solidarity.
Furthermore, once a community is established at the symbolic level, it will necessarily
sacralise the bases of its founding assumptions, meaning that they will be placed in the
realm of doxa, where the ‘normal and natural’ is encoded and where implicit meanings
reside; this means that for the members of that community, the assumptions so encoded
will be beyond ordinary scrutiny. Nonmembers of the community can quite often see
these assumptions—certainly, the symbolic and ritual forms that they take will be quite
visible—but they will not identify with them. Thus at the most everyday level, people will
identify themselves with their flag, but for others, the particular colours of someone else’s
flag will generate no resonance.
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Globalisation 
In the last 10-15 years, however, a new phenomenon has appeared with far-reaching con-
sequences for identity formation. This is globalisation. Globalisation should be seen as a
series of overlapping and interconnected processes, not just economic and fiscal, but also
informational, technological and a whole range of other activities. There is a causal nexus
operating here, so that globalisation in one area can reinforce it in another. The crucial
result of globalisation is that established tradition is rapidly fragmented, the denseness of
meanings is diluted and coherence feels threatened. Communities feel that they have lost
control over their destinies. The loss is too rapid to be easily replaced—something that
could be done in the past—and the outcome is a bewilderment, a fear, a sense that both
individual and collective security, faith in the future, transparency and predictability are
being destroyed.
Consequently, we feel that we can no longer devise viable life strategies, that our cul-
tural meanings are differently interpreted by different members of the community, so that
solidarity is waning. We find it difficult to respond to these challenges, we do not neces-
sarily even have the language for doing so, and the most that we can do is to retreat into
the thickets of our cultural norms, underpinned by a stronger insistence on our symbols
and myths. The problem is that much as we would like to do this, the sheltered quality
of our cultural norms is in danger, there is or there seems to be no safe area because of
the impact of globalisation. Our endeavours to recreate tradition, through the packaging
of history and memory in theme parks, for example, do not work too well when our self-
awareness is constantly reinforced by the flood of information about ourselves. This is the
phenomenon known as reflexivity and reflexivity does not make for an easy world.
In Europe, we tend to see globalisation as having its roots in the United States. When
we resent its effects on us, it is the intrusion of US values that we dislike and above all,
we dislike it that what we regard as US norms are presented to us as universal norms,
whereas we know that they are not so. How do we know? Because we have our culture,
our distinctive cultural norms, that are not respected by what we perceive as those of the
United States. We do not seem to have consented to them, there has been no negotiation,
they just arrive and we take them or else. In this sense, globalisation directly erodes our
sense of moral worth and produces defensive reactions—identities are changing and our
control of that change seems weak.
Conclusion 
Broadly, there are both positive and negative trends in inter-ethnic relations in Europe
and it is far too easy to concentrate on the pathology, as many do, and to ignore the suc-
cess stories. The war in Kosovo in 1999 and the ensuing ethnicisation of the territory
were, indeed, a major catastrophe, but success stories are generally less conspicuous and
much less sensational. The central proposition is that there are indeed successful ways of
managing inter-ethnic conflict, but these demand long, slow and often tedious negotia-
tions that are much less visible—the extremely lengthy negotiations that resulted in the
relatively relaxed state of affairs in the South Tyrol is a case in point.
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Second, although the process of European integration via the European Union is like-
wise slow, cumbersome and bureaucratic, it has resulted in the rise of a European iden-
tity that for certain purposes transcends the nation, the state and ethnicity. European inte-
gration is a very long-term project and its outcome remains unclear. But what is indubitable
is that for the generations born after the 1960s, it has become the norm and they accept
that their European identities bring them closer to one another than before.
Third, the rise of the discourse of human rights has a direct bearing on the fate of
minorities—they are very much included in human rights normativity as a matter of prin-
ciple. The radical nature of this turn is frequently underestimated. Before 1989, the treat-
ment of ethnic minorities was overwhelmingly seen as an issue for the sovereign state. As
argued, this is no longer the case and the process is far from over. Both politically and
legally, minorities have acquired a protection that is denser and more effective than at any
time in the past.
Fourth, the adoption of democracy throughout Europe, even where its functioning is
imperfect, establishes far greater space for innovation than before. New forms of knowl-
edge and power can create institutions for minorities—give them voice—at both the local
and the state-wide levels that can in itself be helpful. Besides, democracy helps to ensure
that neither the majority nor the minority defines itself as homogeneous and the conse-
quent heterogeneity creates spaces where inter-ethnic cooperation can take root. The
emphasis here is on ‘can’; there is no automatic guarantee of success, but the potential is
significantly greater than before 1989.
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM: A MIXED PICTURE
Tony Verheijen
Introduction
An analysis of progress in institutional development and public administration reform in
Central and Eastern Europe, more than 10 years after the start of the transition, yields a
mixed picture of success and failure. 
Assessments of central government systems by the European Union (EU) and in aca-
demic publications continue to paint a dire picture of public administration. This may
come as a surprise if one considers the overall achievements in Central and East European
(CEE) states in building new political institutions. With the exception of some of the suc-
cessor states of ex-Yugoslavia and a few states in the European part of the former Soviet
Union (fSU), the states in the region have created generally accepted constitutions, built
the political institutions provided for in these constitutions and undergone one or more
peaceful changes of government and leadership. Progress in the development of democ-
ratic systems of local self-government is generally acknowledged, even though in most
Central and East European states several questions regarding the status, functions and
financial management of local self-governing authorities remain to be addressed. 
In this chapter a brief review is made of progress on both central and local govern-
ment reform in Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter starts with a brief comparative
overview of the institutional frameworks put in place. Then it focuses on a comparative
analysis of success and failures of public administration reform at central and local gov-
ernment level in order to contextualise a discussion on governance in multi-ethnic states
later on in this volume. 
Institutional Reform and Constitutionalism
The overall governance framework can be considered settled in most states in the Central
and East European region.1 The states in the region went through a period of institutional
flux, the duration of which varied strongly. Scenarios ranged from a short transitional
period in Hungary (2-3 years), which ended with a fundamental revision of the previous
constitution and institutional framework, to a prolonged political battle over the consti-
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1 With the exception of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Belarus, where further institutional transfor-
mation seems to be inevitable if democratic systems of governance are to emerge; and possibly Bosnia-
Herzegovina—once an indigenous fully operational system of governance will start to function.
tutional framework, in Poland, where it took until 1997 before a final constitutional set-
tlement was reached.2
In the early years of the transition to democracy there was a strong academic and polit-
ical debate on the suitability of institutional models for the new democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe, a debate on the relative merits of presidentialism versus parliamen-
tarism (see above).3 In the end, most Central and East European states have opted for
some form of a semi-presidential system (for an in-depth discussion, see Elgie 1999). Slovakia
joined the long list of states with semi-presidential systems with the direct election of
President Schuster in Spring 1999; it represented a compromise between the two extremes
outlined above. Interestingly, this form of government previously was quite rare in
European states, with Finland, France and Iceland the only examples until the transition
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Semi-presidential systems with strong presidential offices have been created, for
instance, in Russia and the Ukraine. The semi-presidential systems of Poland and Romania
have strong presidents in legal terms, but their real strength depends on the extent to
which they can count on a clear and supportive majority in parliament. Bulgaria and
Slovakia have created semi-presidential systems in which presidents have very limited
powers, even though at times presidents have played a crucial role in forging political sta-
bility.4
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The Debate on Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism
The debate on presidentialism vs. parliamentarism focused on the relative merits of different
types of institutional models. In pure presidential models, such as in the US, the government
depends fully on the president for its appointment and dismissal, while in pure parliamentary
models the government depends fully on the confidence of the parliament.
The arguments of those advocating systems based on strong, directly elected presidents, with
wide-ranging powers was that this model:
1. Would provide a combination of direct democracy and strong leadership.
2. Safeguard the new democracies against the woes of coalition politics.
Those advocating the creation of parliamentary system of government argued that:
1. Giving too much power in the hands of one politician, whether directly elected or not, would
stifle the development of truly democratic systems of government.
2. There are tried and tested methods to limit potential instability arising from parliamentarist
systems, such as constructive no-confidence votes, in which a government cannot be dis-
missed unless parliament also agrees on the appointment of a new prime minister.
2 Even more radical examples include the attempted coup in Russia, which also resulted from a
conflict between institutions.
3 See for a summary of the debate: Verheijen (1995) chapter 1.
4 Verheijen (1995).
The experience of the states that have opted for semi-presidential systems has been
one of gradually finding a balance of power between president, prime minister and par-
liament. This balance has generally been achieved, even if there have been in many states
turbulent periods in political development and even lengthy political stalemates between
president and legislature, in particular on the issue of the appointment of a prime minis-
ter. The cases of Russia, Poland and, in more recent times, Lithuania highlight such con-
flicts.
Fewer states in the region have opted for creating parliamentary constitutional sys-
tems, often including a weak presidential office, the incumbent of which is generally elect-
ed by the parliament, for instance, in Hungary and the Czech Republic. The latter sys-
tems give much more formal power to parliament, as the government depends fully on
the confidence of the parliament, with the president having very limited influence over
the appointment and dismissal of the government.
Pure presidential systems do not exist in any European state at the current time, even
though the Russian system has de facto leaned towards this model.5
The institutional compromises which have led to the prevalence of semi-presidential
systems of government in Central and Eastern Europe have not created the much feared
instability associated by some with such systems. Regardless of the initial political tur-
moil surrounding the creation of semi-presidential systems in several states (see Elgie
1999), a balance of power between the main state institutions has gradually emerged,
allowing for a stabilisation of the political system in the overwhelming majority of Central
and East European states.
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The Role of Presidents in Stabilizing Political Systems 
President Zhelev in Bulgaria 1990-1996
The case of Bulgaria provides an interesting illustration of how a directly-elected president man-
aged to play an important role in stabilizing a polarized political system in the early years of the
transition to democracy. Zhelev used his limited powers, such as the ability to submit legislation
to the constitutional court, in a way as to try to prevent a ‘dictatorship of small majorities’ (a term
coined by the American political scientist Jon Elster). Zhelev did not make himself popular with
any of the political forces in the country by playing this role, especially not with the Union of
Democratic Forces, the party that had nominated him. However, by being a president above party
politics he did play a crucial role in preventing an escalation of the political conflicts that marred
the early years of the transition in Bulgaria (see also Verheijen 1995, chapter 5).
5 Some states not discussed in this volume, but nevertheless often considered ‘European’, such as
Azerbaijan and Georgia can be considered presidential in real terms, even if from a formal con-
stitutional point of view they are not.
Central Government Reform—Continued Limited Achievements
In contrast to the development of the overall constitutional and institutional system, where
important achievements have been made, the level of progress in the reform of public
administration at the central government level remains incomplete. The following section
will provide a comparative analysis of progress in several key areas, as well as an expla-
nation why this particular area of reform has proven to be so problematic. 
Key indicators of the limited progress in central government administrative reform include: 
1.  Academic publications on public administration in Central and Eastern Europe
continue to focus on the need to address some of the classical issues in public
administration.
A comparison of academic work on central government reform written early on in
the transformation process (for instance, Hesse 1993) with more recent publications6
would lead one to conclude that little progress has been made in addressing the key
issues in public administration development, such as structuring politico-administrative
relations, creating a system of employment conditions which allows the civil service to attract
and retain highly qualified staff, defining a new accountability system and developing man-
agement and policy-making capacities. A review of the last five issues of the proceedings
of the Annual Conferences of the Network of Institutes and Schools of Public
Administration in Central and Eastern Europe (NISPAcee) leads to a similar conclusion7
2.  Negative assessments in European Commission Opinions and Progress Reports.
A second indicator of the limited progress in administrative reform in Central
and Eastern Europe are the Commission Opinions and Progress Reports.8 The 1997
Commission Opinions highlighted serious deficiencies in the administrative sys-
tems of the candidate states (European Commission 1997 and Fournier 1998).
Whereas the Opinions are moderately positive on the development of the overall
institutional system, the central public administration is singled out as a weak link
in this system. What is reflected in the opinions are fragmented, politicised administra-
tions, rife with allegations of corruption, underpaid staff and a resulting high degree of
staff turnover. Policy-making capacities are evaluated as weak and the lack of personnel
development strategies is frequently pointed out.
The 1998 and 1999 Commission Progress Reports again evaluated public admin-
istration capacities as weak in most of the candidate states, with progress in admin-
istrative capacity development assessed as mixed at best. 
3.  High disapproval ratings in public opinion polls.
A further indication of the weak administrative capacities at central government
level is the continuing high level of citizens’ distrust in central administrations
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for further reference). Jabes and Vintar (1996); Jabes (1997, 1998, 1999); and Jabes and Caddy
(2000).
8 http://www.europa.int/comm/enlargement/index.html.
4. The widely acknowledged link between inadequate administrative capacities and
failure in economic reforms.
Finally, the low quality of administrations is considered an important explana-
tory factor for the economic downturns and crises that several Central and Eastern
European states have experienced in recent years. In Bulgaria, failure and corrup-
tion in the administration were considered a major factor in the severe economic
crisis of 1996-1997 (Dimitrova and Verheijen 1998). In the same period these con-
ditions also held for Romania (International IDEA 1997). In the Czech Republic,
the economic downturn of 1997-1998 gave rise to a debate on the need for admin-
istrative reform which had been a neglected issue until that time (see Vidlakova in
Jabes 1999). In 1999 in Lithuania, serious criticism of the government planning
capacity and budgetary patterns resulted in the creation of a ‘Sunset Commission’
which examined ways to downsize the administration and improve its effective-
ness and efficiency. 
The following comparative section on reform in three key areas—civil service reform,
the development of training systems and structural reform—provides an illustration.
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Levels of Trust in Central Public Administration
A. Confidence levels
In a comparative study on Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Verheijen 1999),
the general picture of levels of trust in public administration was dismal. In the nine states dealt
with in the study, the number of citizens expressing trust in the public administration never
exceeded 40%, with a low of 10% in Russia (based on material from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia and Yugoslavia).
B. Perception of behaviour: comparison with the previous regime
A study by Miller, Grodelund and Koshechkina on corruption in Central and Eastern Europe
includes the following discussion on relative appreciation of behaviour of officials:9
Two out of three citizens in the Czech Republic said most of their politicians now behaved
worse than they did under communism, so did 82 percent in Slovakia and 87 percent in
Ukraine, though much less in Bulgaria. People in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were even-
ly divided on whether officials who deal with ordinary people and their problems now behaved
better or worse than they did under communism; but 66 percent in Slovakia and 89 percent
in Ukraine claimed such officials behaved worse.
9 Miller, Grodelund and Koshechkina (1999) Are the People Victims or Accomplices? The Uses of
Presents and Bribes to Public Officials, Discussion Papers No. 6, Budapest: LGI. See also:
http://www.osi.hu/lgi/publications/dp/index.html.
Civil service reform
Civil service reform has in most states been limited to the development and adoption of
civil service legislation—considered the main reform tool for addressing problems like politi-
cisation, fragmentation and instability. Regardless of the adoption of civil service laws in an
increasing number of states in the region, the problems of instability and politicisation
have not been resolved in most states, and in no case has the adoption of laws led to the
development of a well-working system of long-term career development. 
In Hungary, where a civil service law was adopted as early as 1992, the development
of a well-balanced recruitment and promotion system has still not evolved. Furthermore,
politicians have made extensive use of loopholes in the law, such as the fact that the civil
service law does not make it mandatory to advertise vacancies. Hungary, however, at the
same time constitutes the most positive example of administrative stabilisation. Staff
turnover has been reduced significantly since the adoption of the civil service law. The
question that remains, and on which there is an ongoing debate in Hungary, is how the
impact of the civil service law can be taken beyond stabilisation.
In Poland, the incoming government in Autumn 1997 halted the implementation of
the 1996 civil service law and adopted a new law in 1998. The incoming government was
reluctant to work with civil servants in office and with management structures created
and staffed by the previous government, thus the scuttling of the law. Under the previ-
ous communist regime, Poland was the only state in Central and Eastern Europe to have
a civil service law; it continues to use the old 1982 law in conjuction with implemented
elements of the new civil service law, which mostly apply to higher level civil servants. 
Civil service laws were adopted in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania within a relatively short
time span. Even though in all three cases the laws were based on continental European tra-
dition, the impact of civil service legislation has been very different from case to case. In
Latvia and Lithuania, the adopted civil service laws were never fully implemented. In Latvia,
the revision of the law is still not complete, while, in Lithuania, a new civil service law was
adopted in 1999. In Estonia, the civil service law, adopted in 1995, entered into force in
January 1996. Unlike in the other two Baltic States, the Estonian civil service law has been
implemented. However, since the implementation of the civil service law was not enshrined
in a clear public administration reform concept (the development of which was complet-
ed only in 1998), the overall impact of the law has remained limited.
In Bulgaria, a new civil service law was adopted in August 1999 and its implementa-
tion has just started. The Romanian government adopted new civil service regulations by
decree in late 1999.
In three of the EU candidate states, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, civil
service laws are still pending. In these three states there has been neither the political will
nor the political consensus necessary to pass a civil service law.
In conclusion, from the perspective of adopting relevant legislation, the positive pic-
ture is really a false impression. Civil service laws seldom have had the impact they were expect-
ed to have: to be a catalyst for the stabilisation, de-politicisation and professionalisation of the
central administration. They have in many cases been reconsidered even before the imple-
mentation process was completed or have not been fully implemented at all.
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Reform of administrative structures:
An underestimated element of administrative development?
The redesign of administrative structures is a core element of administrative reform. Even
if a professional civil service is constituted, this will have a limited impact as long as they
are not embedded in well-designed administrative structures. Well-designed administra-
tive structures should be based on: (1) functioning horizontal and vertical co-ordination sys-
tems, (2) a clear definition of responsibility and accountability and (3) provide civil servants with
the necessary freedom of action.
The development of new administrative structures has legal as well as cultural aspects.
The redefinition of the role and position of ministries, their subordinated organisations
and the core executive unit10 in the administration is a crucial aspect of the administra-
tive development process. This element is of particular importance in Central and East
European states, since the core executive units of the administration used to ‘shadow’ line
ministries under the previous regime and played a dominant role in the process of poli-
cy co-ordination. Policy processes were therefore ‘top heavy’, based on co-ordination at
the top. Core executive units also tended to manage large numbers of subordinated insti-
tutions. Accountability lines were directed towards the leading political party.
The reform of policy-making and implementation structures and systems could have
been expected to be one of the most difficult elements of the administrative development
process in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, little or no attention was given to
this element of reform until recently. Policy-making and implementation processes still
show many features of the previous systems, as discussed above. Even in new states, such
as the Baltic States, the division of labour between ministries and the core executive unit
in the policy process still shows some of the features of the former system. The SIGMA
Centre of Government Profiles11 provide a clear illustration of this point.
In some states attempts have been made to redefine the role of the different compo-
nents of the central administration in the policy process. Poland has carried out a sub-
stantial reform of the administration of the Council of Ministers, with the objective to cre-
ate a small core Prime Minister’s Office, among others, by ‘pushing down’ co-ordination
tasks into the administration. In Hungary, attempts have also been made previously to
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Main Issues Hindering the Developments of Effective Policy-making Processes
1. Lack of delegation in the administration;
2. Lack of ‘filtering mechanisms’ in the policy process, needed to separate routine issues from
the core political issues for debate at government level;
3. Lack of strategic planning capacities in the centre of government offices.
‘slim down’ the Prime Minister’s Office, though the current government has again expand-
ed the number of substantive shadow units in the office (Meyer-Sahling 2000). 
A thorough and sustained reform effort will be required for policy-making systems to
start working more effectively, in particular a comprehensive redefinition of the role of the
different units in the administration and the relations between these units. This is an issue
that has not featured on the administrative development agenda until quite recently. 
During the last few years initiatives have been taken in several states to adopt laws to
regulate the role and function of the different institutions in the administration and to
rationalise the way in which the administration works. In Bulgaria, the Law on Public
Administration was adopted in 1998, which defines the type of institutions that can exist
in the state administration, how these relate to one another and what the role and func-
tion of different types of institutions can be. Other states have also taken initiatives of this
kind in recent years, such as Latvia, Lithuania and the Republic of Macedonia. The adop-
tion of such laws is a tentative step in the direction of a rationalisation of the policy process
in these states; however, one should pose the question to what extent these laws can and
will be enforced. In the drafting process there has been a great resistance among line min-
istries to what is considered to be the limitation of their ministerial autonomy. It there-
fore remains to be seen to what extent such laws are enforceable.
The development of a new administrative culture will be even more difficult to achieve.
Under the previous regimes the operation of administrative systems was based on secre-
cy and suspicion, both in relations with citizens and in relations between the different
elements of the administration. Adopting laws cannot change these types of attitudes. The
potential to bring about change in the administrative culture depends heavily on the will-
ingness of politicians to allow and stimulate co-operation between civil servants working
at different administrative units and to encourage officials to adopt a client-friendly
approach towards citizens. So far there is little evidence of a decentralisation of respon-
sibility inside the administration or of co-ordination being ‘pushed down’ to lower levels
in the administration. Even if formally more co-ordination structures are set up at the
lower levels of the administration, this has often not led to real changes in policy-making
practises.12 The development of a different administrative culture depends on the adop-
tion of enabling legislation and procedural rules in the administration and on a clarifica-
tion of accountability relations. 
In view of the discussion above on civil service legislation, it seems doubtful that much
progress can be made on this second core element of administrative development. The
definition of the framework structure of the central administration should have been an
issue at the start of the administrative development process, not at the end. Obviously it
takes time to bring about changes in administrative culture, but it seems that lack of trust
between politicians and civil servants remains a feature of many Central and East European
administrations. The development of a new legislative framework for the administration
and the development of a less centralised administrative culture are therefore elements in
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the administrative development process in Central and Eastern Europe on which most of
the work remains to be done. 
Training: the problems in developing new training systems
Training can play an important role in the development of new administrative systems.
Whereas civil service legislation can set the framework for the development of a stable
and professional civil service, training can be used as an instrument to fill in the substance
of the framework. Training can also make a contribution to the development of a coher-
ent administration. Joint pre- or post-entry training of new recruits can help in creating
a sense of community among new civil servants. This sense of community could play a
role in reducing the still universally high degree of fragmentation in Central and East
European administrations. Joint training of top level officials can have a similar effect. 
In order for training to have a positive impact on the way administrations work, train-
ing efforts should be underpinned by a well-defined human resource policy and training
strategy. Furthermore, pre- or post-entry training for new recruits should be carried out
in parallel to in-service training to bring about changes in attitudes and work practises
among existing staff. In Central and East European administrations the method of train-
ing high quality young graduates and inserting them into the administrations as ‘change
managers’ was unlikely to work on its own, in view of the very fundamental changes to
be introduced in work practises, in attitudes and in relations with citizens and politicians. 
Training—if implemented in the right way, combining a sustained effort at in-service
training with the development of high-quality initial training programmes for new
recruits—could have had a significant impact on Central and East European administra-
tions. Instead, the lack of developed human resource development policies, in tandem
with a lack of progress in creating suitable new training structures in Central and Eastern
Europe, can be considered key elements of the failure to develop new administrations. 
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The Fate of Training Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe
In the early years of the transition, there were numerous attempts to develop new government
initial training institutions in a number of Central and East European states. The National School
of Public Administration in Poland provides the most interesting example of this ‘first genera-
tion’ of initiatives. The Polish school was created as an integrated element of the administration,
based on the French model of the École National d’Administration/National School of
Administration (ENA) . The concept of the Polish school was based on the assumption that by
inserting highly qualified graduates in top positions in the administration, it would be possible
to create a ‘multiplier effect’ and bring about rapid change. This high level training of young
promising staff would have to be accompanied by in-service training for those already in the
administration to achieve the desired effect. However, the parallel in-service training system was
never made fully operational, which limited the impact of the institution. However, unlike other
similar institutions created in the early 1990s, the Polish school is still working; its graduates
are still guaranteed a position in the administration and have the obligation to work for the
administration for a defined number of years. 
The problem of using training as a reform tool has two aspects in the Central and East
European context. 
First, governments have generally been reluctant to use training as an element of
reform programmes. The emphasis has generally been put on the adoption of legislation
rather than on the application of more complex reform tools like training. As a result of
this most governments have no training policy or programme. The general scepticism
among politicians about the usefulness of training as a reform has thus become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 
Second, training capacities in Central and East European states are generally not well
developed. A lot of training is ‘imported’. ‘Imported’ training might have been useful in
the early stages of the reform process, as an information and awareness raising tool, but
is now of much less value, unless it is tailor-made and aimed at the transfer of specific,
job-related skills. The training capacities of national institutions are still too limited and
for budgetary reasons most governments have not been willing to invest in their devel-
opment. Thus there is a stalemate situation, which makes it difficult to use training as a
reform tool at the current time. Only sustained support of the development of local capac-
ities might provide a solution to this problem.
Explaining Problems in Administrative Development
The following section addresses five important factors explaining the limited progess of
administrative development in Central and Eastern Europe. They are: the legacy of his-
tory, economic pressures, political polarisation, the lack of a balanced ‘package’ of reform
instruments and the changing and often contradictory signals of external organisations.
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Two other training schools created in the early 1990s—the Slovak School of Public
Administration at Academia Istropolitana and the Romanian National School of Public
Administration—were either closed down (Slovakia) or progressively marginalised for political
reasons (Romania).
The experience in developing government-run or -funded in-service training institutions has
been slightly more positive. The Latvian School of Public Administration was given a central
role in the training of civil service candidates. However, when the implementation of the civil
service law was halted by the government in 1997, the role of training in the civil service devel-
opment process was reduced significantly. In some other states in-service training institutions
have also been established. In Slovenia, Estonia and Lithuania, government and semi-govern-
ment in-service training institutions are among the most important providers of in-service train-
ing. In other states the creation of such institutions is planned. The problem with these train-
ing institutions is that very often they are little more than managers of training programmes and
do not actually have a core body of permanent trainers in the staff, which in practise has often
made them overly reliant on training supplied by foreign institutions.
The legacy of history
The legacy of history remains one of the most important potential explanations for the
problems in administrative development in Central and Eastern Europe. Whereas before
WW II the development of administrative systems in Central and Eastern Europe was
more or less in line with continental European tradition.13 The divergence which have
occurred between the adminstrative systems of the Soviet block and the West of Europe
in the period 1945-1990, explains much of the difficulties of the process of adminstra-
tive reform in Central and Eastern Europe.  From the perspective of Western bureacra-
cies, there are three major factors which make the two systems differ significantly.  These
are:  full politicisation, the abolition of the distinction between civil servants and other
workers in terms of labour relations and fragmentation brought about by communism.
Under the former communist system public administration tasks were more or less
divided between the Party and the state administration. The state administration only ful-
filled a part of the traditional functions of the public administration. The previous regimes
in Central and Eastern Europe created an administrative apparatus which worked accord-
ing to the principle of subordination of the administration to political power and priori-
ties. A parallel Party bureaucracy was created, consisting of Party members, which devel-
oped policies, gave orders and controlled the state bureaucracy at each hierarchical level.
The part of the systems which was considered most similar to a traditional state admin-
istration was in reality a subordinated mechanical organisation. The state administration
carried out its tasks without giving professional input or feedback to the policies devel-
oped by the party bureaucracy. Giving feedback or professional inputs was punished
rather than rewarded. The administrative side of the political administrative process was
fully politicised, creating a so-called ‘Politbürokratie’ (Josza 1988 and 1989). Politicisation
of the public administration was common practise under the previous regime and sup-
ported by ideological considerations.
The public administration was an important instrument of suppression for the state in
the politico-administrative systems of Central and East European countries before 1989.
Therefore there was a need to rapidly depoliticise the administration after the change of
regime. However, the impact of forty years of institutionalised and ideologically supported
politicisation of the general perception of public administration has made the depolitici-
sation of the administration a difficult issue.
The system of employment conditions in place under the previous regime made it easier for
politicians to continue the tradition of politicisation. Where specific legislation governing the
employment conditions had been in place before the establishment of the communist regimes,
this legislation was abolished; under communism employment conditions were regulated under
the Labour Code. The idea of a civil service, distinct from other sectors of the economy in func-
tion, tasks and position, vanished with the ‘privatisation’ of the administration.
The third part of this legacy is the fragmentation of the administration. Public admin-
istration previously consisted of ministries subordinated to the government. The central
office of government, the Council of Ministers, was often substantially larger than cabinet
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offices or departments of general affairs in Western Europe. Constitutionally, the Council
of Ministers was controlled by the parliament.14 In reality, however, it was politically sub-
ordinated to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, while the top layers of the
administrative structure were controlled by the Party bureaucracy. This rather straightfor-
ward governmental system often complicated the creation of a State Council. The State
Council was a kind of collective head of state to which the parliament delegated certain
powers (often foreign and defence policy). The relation between State Council and Council
of Ministers was often not defined clearly.15 Initially the State Councils lacked the admin-
istrative apparatus needed to prepare and implement decisions in an efficient way. The
State Councils developed their own bureaucracy soon after they had been created. Four
different types of bureaucracies co-existed in Central and Eastern Europe before 1989, all
highly politicised and in competition with one another: Communist Party Bureaucracy,
Council of Ministers administration, State Council administration and the ministries. Public
administrations were characterised by an iota of co-operation and co-ordination. 
In conclusion, the previous regimes left a cursed legacy in terms of public administration. The
previously existing civil service tradition was supplanted by the direct subordination of officials to
political parties in a system characterised by horizontal and vertical institutional fragmentation.
Economic pressures: working against administrative development
Economic pressure could have been a potential catalyst for the initiation of administrative
reform processes. Efficient and effective administrations are needed to attract foreign invest-
ment, to ensure state income from taxation and to perform a number of other tasks crucial to the
often still-fragile economic recovery process. The weakness of administrations has been con-
sidered an important factor in the economic crises, which have plagued several Central
and East European states in recent years. Therefore there appear to be several strong eco-
nomic arguments for the prioritisation of administrative development. However, even
though economic conditions, at first glance, constitute a potential incentive to politicians
to move administrative development forward, the specific nature of the administrative
problems in Central and Eastern Europe has so far created the reverse effect. 
The nature of administrative ‘reform’ in Central and Eastern Europe is often misunderstood.
The use of the word ‘reform’ in itself would mean that the objective of the process would be to
change an existing administration. However, Central and East European states did not have a
‘public administration’ as it is generally understood in ‘Western Europe’. This has important
implications for the nature of the processes under way in Central and Eastern Europe—process-
es of developing new administrative systems, not of reforming established systems.
It is important to note that building a professional, stable and impartial administra-
tion is costly and requires a considerable investment, even if one opts for the creation of
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15 Ibid.
a ‘career’ civil service with a limited scope.16 The cost of recruitment, training and the
employment conditions associated with a career civil service are considerable, both in the
immediate term and for the future.17 The notion of administrative reform as used in
Western Europe and other OECD states—the main objective of which is usually saving
money—therefore does not apply to Central and East European states. The economic con-
ditions in these states make the implementation of reform strategies more difficult.
Political polarisation and a lack of continuity
Central and East European voters have virtually thrown out the government in office on
every occasion.. This affects administrative development policies in particular, since these
are not ‘vote-winning policies’. Governments mainly concerned with framing popular poli-
cies to keep the allegiance of a volatile electorate are unlikely to ‘invest’ in administrative
capacity development, which is generally an issue that does not ‘speak’ to the voters.
As an aggravating factor, political party systems remain highly polarised, which fur-
ther reduces the potential for continuity in policies. Interestingly, this appears to affect
economic policies, where there is a certain degree of continuity even when governments
change, much less than administrative development. However, the reversal of adminis-
trative development measures, strategies and even laws remains common practise through-
out the region, including in states which were considered to have overcome the high level
of adversity deemed characteristic for states in transition or in the early stages of consol-
idation. The absence of long-term policies to stimulate administrative development there-
fore does not need to come as a surprise.
The ‘legal bias’
Politicians in Central and Eastern European states often appear to have mistaken the term ‘Rule
of Law’ as ‘Rule by Law’, especially where public administration development is concerned. The
adoption of laws has so far been the main and sometimes the only administrative development
tool. Where administrative development strategies have been adopted, they are often little more
than a framework for a package of laws. The problems with this type of approach to adminis-
trative development is that the value of law as a reform instrument depends heavily on the qual-
ity of their implementation and that laws do not change mentalities. These implementation
problems have certainly reduced the value of law as a reform instrument. 
The overreliance on laws as reform instruments would not come as a surprise to those
who have studied the Central and East European administrative tradition. Most states in
the region have a strong legalistic tradition stemming from the pre-World War II period,
based either on the German, Austrian or, to a lesser degree, on the French model. The
approach of the previous regime (creating legitimacy through law) has strengthened, rather
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM: A MIXED PICTURE 33
16 Under consideration, for instance, in Latvia, where the number ‘civil service’ posts is unlikely to
be higher than 200.
17 Considering, for instance, the cost of pensions.
than weakened the legalistic bias. The EU, which also focuses very much on legal require-
ments for membership, has, perhaps involuntarily, strengthened this bias towards using
legal instruments in administrative development. It is important that advisers to Central
and Eastern European governments put more emphasis on the development of a multi-
instrument approach to administrative development, stressing the importance of law as
one but not the only reform instrument. The formation of multi-disciplinary reform teams
would be an important step in this direction.18 The expert team which carried out the
review of the Slovak state administration, is one rare example of such a multi-disciplinary
team, including economists, lawyers as well as public administration specialists. The rec-
ommendations of the expert team, which were endorsed by the government in August
2000, have created the basis for a comprehensive reform of the structure and manage-
ment of the state administration.
Contradictory signals from international actors
At first glance, external pressure to carry out administrative reform seems to be consid-
erable. The EU is the main organisation to have important political leverage in the region.
EU membership conditions include the creation of stable, professional and accountable
administrations,19 which should provide incentives to Central and Eastern European gov-
ernments. However, the EU has been far from consistent in the signals it has sent to the
candidate states. The re-orientation of PHARE assistance towards the development of sec-
toral administrative capacities—through twinning arrangements between candidate states
and member states—could be interpreted by governments of the candidate states as an
indication that general administrative capacities are of less importance than the creation
of technical capacities to implement and enforce the acquis communautaire. The
Commission recognises the potential dangers inherent in this approach and has contin-
ued to put pressure on candidate states to create a stable and professional civil service.
However, if some financial support for general administrative development is not con-
tinued, there is a strong likelihood that the concerns about the development of sectoral
capacities will move the development of a professional and coherent administration fur-
ther down the political agenda. 
Other institutions, in particular the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), have also increasingly put pressure on Central and Eastern European governments
to give more priority to administrative development. The interest of the World Bank, and
to a lesser degree the IMF, in promoting public administration development is still quite
recent and it is too early to predict to what degree these institutions will be able to have a
significant impact in this area. However, the work of the World Bank has generally focused
on improving management in public administration, rationalising central government struc-
tures20 and the development of fair and sustainable reward systems in the region. These are
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some of the core issues identified earlier on as crucial to the success of public administra-
tion development. In this respect the work of the World Bank has the potential to become
a catalyst for administrative development in years to come.
Viable Alternatives?
The complex reasons why administrative reform has failed to produce good results are
difficult to address. It is clear that politicians need to be convinced, one could even say
‘converted’, to the idea of a professional administration. This remains one of the keys to
a process of successful development of professional and impartial central administrations.
However, even if one could address the issue for the politicians currently in government
and parliament by means of training and information provision, the considerable turnover
among parliamentarians would still make it difficult to find a long-term solution to this
problem. Building a ‘political culture’ which accepts the idea of an impartial public admin-
istration has taken decades in most European states. Re-introducing the concept to soci-
eties which have had impartial administrations in the past (at least to some degree) might
take less time, but still more than ten years. This problem is aggravated by the fact that
there are few indications of a possible decrease in political polarisation.21
A change in reform instruments, a second measure to be considered, might be easier to
bring about, at least at first glance. However, for a variety of reasons it is unlikely that
there will be a considerable change in the use of reform instruments. First, the European
Union (EU) membership requirements, which potentially have a high degree of influence
at least in the candidate states, have focused primarily on the adoption of laws and regu-
lations. Second, whereas the adoption of laws is relatively ‘cheap’, the investment required
to develop sustainable training capacities would be considerable. This also explains, in
part, why the adoption of laws, as such, has not led to significant changes: implementing
laws does require budgetary means, which very often are not made available.
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Alternative Approaches to Central Government Reform
Three possible methods can be proposed to improve levels of achievement in public adminis-
tration, taking into account the complexities of the Central and East European situation:
1. Investing in the development of a political culture that accepts the idea of an impartial
and professional public administration by convincing politicians and mobilising public
opinion.
2. Using a different approach to reform, applying multiple reform instruments rather than
focusing almost solely on legislative reform.
3. Using the potential leverage of the academic community.
Whereas there might be viable alternatives in terms of strategy and the use of reform
instruments, a combination of reluctant politicians, political polarisation and the ‘confir-
mation’ of the current approach by potentially influential external actors like the EU, make
it very difficult to bring about a real change in approach. The academic community, anoth-
er potential ‘change agent’ with ‘privileged access’ to politicians is still often dominated
by lawyers, which currently limits the potential role of the academic community in this
respect. Unless one of the above potential sources of influence could and would bring
about a change in approach, it may take a generation before professional and impartial
administrations will be in place in Central and East European states.
Local government: a successful start
Public administration reform at the central government level emerges as a problematic,
complex and contentious issue. But analyses of local government reform yield a rather
different and more mixed result. Whereas there are many issues that remain to be
addressed, at the same time significant progress has been made, especially when consid-
ering the legacy of dual subordination and democratic centralism that characterised the pre-
vious communist system of local governance.
The creation of local self-governing authorities, often with rather broad competencies,
has been completed in virtually all Central and East European states at least on one level
of government (see Bennet 1994, Coulson 1995, Verheijen and Coombes 1998). Even
though these authorities have encountered serious difficulties, due to problems of size22
and budget, they remain popular with citizens (see Baka on Hungary and Bercik and
Kuklis on Slovakia in Verheijen and Coombes 1998). Popular affinity with the newly cre-
ated democratic structures at the grass-roots level has stifled moves towards a recentral-
isation of self-government, at least in Hungary and Slovakia. 
The above development is highly important for the creation of sustainable democratic
systems of governance. The development of participatory approaches to local governance
is extremely important in this region in particular. The previous regime discouraged and
even penalised public participation in policy-making. The development of a culture of local
governance that stimulates and facilitates participation could play an important role in revers-
ing the trend of alienation and disaffection. The development of inclusive systems of local
governance is an important first step towards building participatory systems of government
overall. Obviously, this first step is easiest to make at the local level, where a number of
instruments can be applied to promote broad participation such as:
· local elections,
· local referenda,
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22 The creation of local self-governing authorities was in most Central and East European states
guided by the principle that each community should have the right to create its own self-gov-
erning authority, which has led to the establishment of large numbers of very small authorities
in many states (e.g. Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia). The lack of a second level of self-
government which could co-ordinate the first level has created serious problems.
· public hearings,
· citizens’ initiatives, such as petitions.
Laws on local elections can be designed in such a way to make it easy for citizens to
vote as well as to stand for elections, for instance, by requiring only small numbers of
nominations for the registration of candidates. In Poland, only 20 signatures are required
in smaller municipalities. Provisions on local referenda can facilitate citizens’ initiatives
by allowing for groups of voters to initiate referenda as well as by making results binding
for the local council. In Hungary, a variety of systems are in place in municipalities that
allow groups of voters to initiate referenda, requiring 10 per cent of eligible voters’ sig-
natures in some cases, up to 25 per cent in others. The right of citizens to call public meet-
ings, participate in public hearings and submit petitions to local politicians are further
instruments that can be applied much more easily at local government level than at cen-
tral government level. Provisions to facilitate participation have been included in various
ways in the legal frameworks that regulate local government. Local government laws in
most states, including Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, include provisions on
local referenda. The overall level of popularity of local governments, which is higher than
that of central governments in virtually all states, indicates that local government indeed
has the potential to help building the foundations for the further development of plural-
ist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
In terms of democracy, this element of public administration reform has been a success,
at least in a majority of the Central and East European states. 
In terms of effectiveness and efficiency, further measures need to be taken to ensure effec-
tive service delivery to citizens, for example, through co-ordination and co-operation in
delivery between small self-governing authorities. In terms of sustainability, local self-
governing authorities need to be put on a sounder financial basis. However, in general,
local government reform in Central and Eastern Europe has so far delivered good results.
Democratic self-governing structures at the grass-roots level have been set up and a basis
for the further development of a sustainable system of local self-government has been
established. 
The following is a comparative discussion of some key elements of local government
reform and an illustration of how these are being addressed in Bulgaria, Hungary and
Slovakia, drawn from research work carried out between 1995-1998. 
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Reform of Local-Central Government: Some Key Issues
1. The definition of the ideal size of basic units of self-government.
2. Division of labour between central government and self-governments.
3. The separation of county/municipal property from state property.
4. Local government finances: How to strike a balance between financial independence and con-
trol of public deficits.
5. Definition of the relations between local state government and local self-government.
6. Finding a new equilibrium in relations between central government and local self-govern-
ment 
Source: based on Verheijen and Coombes (1998) chapter 10.
Definition of the size of basic self-government units 
Decisions on the size of basic self-government units generally are a trade-off between effi-
ciency and democracy. Giving self-government status to each identifiable settlement is obvi-
ously the most democratic form of self-government, but this can create substantial prob-
lems of sustainability and quality of service delivery, unless a higher tier unit of self-government
is created to which some functions can be transferred. In Hungary and Slovakia, the prin-
ciple of self-government was applied in a way that granted the right of self-government to
even the smallest settlements. A large number of self-governments were thus created, some
with numbers of inhabitants lower than 500. In Hungary, a higher tier of local self-gov-
ernment was created to fulfil some of the functions small local self-government units were
unlikely to be able to cope with. In both countries the smallest self-government units are
experiencing considerable problems. They lack the financial means to provide adequate
services and have as a consequence become financially dependent on central government.
In addition, it is more difficult for such units to attract qualified staff. Furthermore the
duplication of administrations makes the system expensive to run. However, at the same
time, there is widespread popular support for the small municipalities, which makes it dif-
ficult for central governments to abolish the local government system. 
In Bulgaria, the principle of sustainability was given preference over giving rights of
self-government to each unit; the territory of self-governing units was determined in a
way as to ensure that the smallest basic self-government units would still have at least
5,000 inhabitants. However, smaller settlements inside municipalities were given repre-
sentation in the form of executive mayors, who manage lower tier administrative units. In
this way a solution was found for the problems of sparsely populated municipalities dot-
ted throughout mountain areas. However, the system of executive mayors has generally
not worked well. This has given the population of more remote settlements the feeling of
being too far removed from local decision-making, a situation that does not help local
self-governments in their attempts to increase their level of legitimacy.
Possible alternatives, such as using single or multi-purpose joint councils to deliver cer-
tain types of public services, as is practised in France and Italy, have so far not been used
extensively in the region.
The above cases show the difficulties involved in deciding on the size of the basic self-
governing units, which constitutes a difficult trade-off between democracy and efficien-
cy. It is therefore likely that it will take more time before a more permanent self-govern-
ment system will emerge in most Central and East European states. 
Functions, finances and property
The unambiguous definition of functions, financial means and self-government proper-
ty is a basic condition to be fulfilled to allow self-governments to function independent-
ly. This issue has been resolved to a varying degree in the three cases discussed here.
In Hungary, a clear separation of municipal and state property was carried out early
on in the reform process. The tasks of municipalities and counties are considered finalised.
Financial independence of local self-governments is guaranteed in principle, though local
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governments depend to a large degree on fluctuating levels of central government fund-
ing.23 However, this is counterbalanced by their practically unlimited right to take out loans,
even from foreign banks, which provides them with an important bargaining tool with a
central government bent on reducing the public deficit in the context of EU accession.24
Furthermore the predominant proportion of central government transfers are not ear-
marked, which further increases the freedom of local self-governments to determine their
own expenditures.
In Bulgaria, local government tasks are also clearly defined. The system of financial
relations between local and central government has also been defined quite clearly, even
though the system as it works is rather disadvantageous for local self-governments.
Bulgarian local governments do not have similar revenue raising and borrowing rights
like their Hungarian counterparts, but, like in Hungary, the main portion of central gov-
ernment transfers are not earmarked (even though more or less binding ‘directions’ are
sometimes issued), which gives local self-governments some degree of freedom in expen-
diture management. The provisions of the law providing the basis for separating state and
municipal property in Bulgaria were implemented only in the last few years. For a long
time local self-governing authorities were thus deprived of important potential income
and had no incentive to try to use property on their territory in the most profitable way. 
In Slovakia, the discussion on the division of tasks between the state and local self-gov-
ernment has not yet reached its conclusion. A number of ‘expensive’ policy areas, such as
health and education, were transferred from local government to state control in 1990.
The central government intends to transfer many of these competencies to local govern-
ment control over the next years. However, the previous experience of other institutions,
such as health insurance companies, which received inadequate compensation for func-
tions they had taken over from the state in the mid-1990s, have made local governments
reluctant to accept any transfer of functions—unless a transparent financing system will
be created. The definition of municipal property was finalised early on in the reform process.
Relations between local state administration and local self-government 
The relationships between local self-government and local state government in Bulgaria,
Hungary and Slovakia are characterised by a high degree of separation. They therefore
more closely resemble the dual system of local-central government relations that exists in
the United Kingdom and in Ireland, rather than the fused system in place in most conti-
nental European states. In fused systems, central government appointees work together
with elected representatives in managing self-governing structures, whereas dual systems
rely on regulations and instructions as the main instrument for steering policy delivery
by local authorities. The rather strict separation between local state government and local
self-government in the former cases can be explained as a reaction to the high level of
integration under the previous regime. Similarly, the preference for small basic units of
self-government can be explained as a reaction to the high level of centralisation.
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23 The proportion of transferred income tax has varied between 100% in the first year after the
adoption and 5% at the current time.
24 The risk involved with municipalities taking out loans has been limited by the provisions of the
law on municipal bankruptcy. 
Source: Tamás M. Horváth (ed.) (2000) Decentralisation: Experiments and Reforms, LGI: Budapest, p. 49
It is still difficult to predict how the relationship between local state government and local
self-government will evolve. The two main elements of the relationship that need clarifica-
tion are the nature of the supervisory role of local state government and the form that method-
ological assistance from local state government to local self-government will take.
In relation to the supervisory role, institutions of local state government should, in
theory, only have the right to contest the legality of local self-government decisions in
the courts, except when local self-governments are performing certain functions on
behalf of the central government. Due to the existence of a rather extensive system of
local state government in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, the number of tasks self-gov-
ernments actually perform on behalf of the central government is rather limited, so
direct supervision should appear rather rarely. In reality, however, local authorities
often appear to be under significant informal pressure from local state government
authorities,25 which indicates that there is a difference between the relations as regu-
lated by law and the real character of the relations between local state government and
local self-government. Such informal pressures can significantly limit the real inde-
pendence of local self-government.
The second aspect of the relationship between local state-government and local self-
government that needs further clarification is the provision of ‘methodological assistance’ by
local state government institutions. This methodological assistance usually consists of advice
on the organisation and management of local self-governments. In the early stages of the
development of self-governments, small self-government units, in particular, do need assis-
tance from local state government officials. However, some ten years after the start of the
development of local self-government institutions in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia, there
is now a less apparent need for methodological assistance. There is a risk that local state
government institutions will use their right to provide methodological assistance to extend
their influence over the management of self-government institutions. It may, therefore, be
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25 Research in other CEE states indicates a similar pattern.
Figure 1. Middle-Level Local Government Tiers in Central European Countries 1999
Countries with Dominantly Direction of Change Countries with Dominantly Self-
Governing Mid-level Tiers Administrative Mid-level Tiers
Latvia (®)?
Lithuania
Estonia
Poland ¬ (1 Jan 1999)
¬ Czech Republic
(¬)? Slovakia
Hungary
¬ Slovenia
worth considering whether the provision of methodological assistance should remain an
explicit part of the tasks of local state government institutions.
Finding a new equilibrium between central government and local self-government
The position of self-governments vis à vis central government in the three Central and
East European countries discussed here varies significantly. Two main factors can be sin-
gled out which largely determine whether self-governments are able to act independent-
ly and stand up to central governments in defence of their interests. The first factor is the
extent to which self-governments really use the powers which legislation assigns to them.
The second factor is the extent to which local self-governments are able to develop a coher-
ent interest group structure to counterbalance the power of central governments.
The results of the research work referred to above show that there is a marked differ-
ence between Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia as regards the attitude of local self-gov-
ernment towards central government. Whereas in Bulgaria local government officials still
suffer from a mentality of subordination, self-governments in Hungary, and to a lesser
extent in Slovakia, show a high level of self-confidence. As a result Bulgarian local gov-
ernments have not managed to make the best use of their relatively extensive competen-
cies. Local governments take few initiatives and often look for approval by central gov-
ernment bodies before doing so. As a result, local self-governments have failed to gain
high levels of legitimacy with local citizens. Local governments in Hungary and Slovakia
have managed to gain much more support from local residents. The reluctance of central
government in Hungary to reduce some of the extensive powers of local government and
the lack of a decision on amalgamation of local self-government units in Slovakia can, in
part, be explained by the fear of an electoral backlash.
The development of a coherent interest group structure can help local self-governments
to improve their position vis à vis central governments. Notably, among the three states
discussed here, the only country in which local self-governments managed to develop a
common interest group is Slovakia.26 In Hungary and Bulgaria, local government inter-
est groups are divided along political lines, leaving local governments open to ‘divide and
rule’ tactics from above. The Slovak local government association ZMOS has cross-party
membership and therefore is able to put pressure on the central government to take local
government interests into consideration as it makes relevant policy decisions. Even though
ZMOS still finds it difficult to influence central government policy, it still has much bet-
ter chance of helping local government reach its objectives than the divided interest groups
in Hungary and Bulgaria.
A preliminary balance
Progress in the development of local self-government and the redefinition of relations between
central and local government in the early stages of the transition to democracy was impres-
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26 ALAL in Lithuania is a further example of a unified and rather influential local government asso-
ciation.
sive, particularly when compared with progress in central government reform. However,
the results of field research carried out in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia indicate much
work remains to be done in this area, as in many other states in the region. By the year 2000,
Hungary was the only country among these three, and generally one of the few states in the
region, to have fully established a system of both local self-government and local state gov-
ernment, closely modelled on the German system. A more permanent system of relations
between state and self-governments remains to be put in place in the near future in all three
countries. Progress in the still less politically controversial area of local government reform
therefore remains considerably more impressive than in the area of central government
reform. Political polarisation also seems to play a much less significant role.
Conclusion
A comparative review of institutional reform in Central and Eastern Europe reveals a high-
ly contrasting picture of achievements and failures. While the basic institutional frame-
work for policy-making has been created in virtually all states, with few well-known excep-
tions, progress in public administration reform at central government level remains
unsatisfactory. At the same time, the roots for any democratic system of governance—
local self-governing institutions—have been created in most states of the region, provid-
ing a good foundation for further development.
The reasons for the uneven development of governance structures in the region are
complex. Though the creation of core governance institutions and an agreement on accept-
ed basic ‘rules of the game’ in the form of constitutions or constitutional laws is a condi-
tion sine-qua-non for states to function at all, the impact of deficient systems of public
administration is felt only after a longer period of time. Only in recent years has the link
between weak systems of public administration and weak economic performance has
become an issue of concern to policy-makers, spurred by the growing importance of
administrative capacity requirements as a condition for EU membership. A complex set
of factors—the legacy of the previous regime, weak design of the reform process, politi-
cal polarisation, factors, as well as a lack of consistent external pressure—explains the
disappointing results in public administration development. There are no easy remedies
for this problem, making it likely that in many Central and East European states policy-
making and, in particular, policy implementation will remain serious bottlenecks in the
operation of the institutional system.
The prevailing picture of the development of new administrative structures, especial-
ly the creation of local self-governing institutions, is more positive. Even if the process of
developing new administrative structures cannot be considered finalised in virtually any
of the states of the region, the problems to be addressed seem more easily resolvable. A
discussion of three representative case studies has highlighted some five to six key areas
where work remains to be done to complete the development of local government sys-
tems, and in particular local-central government relations. In general, the development
of structures for grass-root’s democracy appears to be much more advanced than the cre-
ation of modern central administrations. This reflects the clear wish to break with the past
system early on in the transition process, the less politicised nature of local government
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reform, and, perhaps most importantly, a much higher degree of citizens’ interest. 
More than ten years after the start of the post-communist transition, the process of
institutional transformation in Central and Eastern Europe is by no means complete, even
though significant progress has been made on the creation of core political institutions
and, to a lesser degree, on local government reform. For a diverse set of reasons, the devel-
opment of new systems of public administration at the central government level has proven
to be the most complex element of the reform of governance systems. This imbalance in
the institutional reform process in Central and Eastern Europe must be addressed, so that
systems of governance in the region can help foster rather than hinder economic devel-
opment, social progress and EU integration.
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AN UNFINISHED STORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS
Patrick Thornberry
Introduction
Contemporary interest in identity and ethnicity throughout a range of scholarly disci-
plines parallels the concern of international law. The ‘philosophical’ interest has been con-
ditioned by political and legal ‘events’ and in turn has the capacity to shape them. Threads
in the great tapestry of ‘events’ involve the dismantling of communism in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, accelerated processes of globalisation, the development of
an international civil society particularly in the fields of environment and human rights,
and the emergence of indigenous peoples’ and other subaltern movements. Liberals, com-
munitarians and republicans,1 cultural relativists and agnostics,2 idealists, hegemonists,
merchants of astonishment,3 sentimentalists,4 postmodernists and religious fundamen-
talists have all devoted attention in recent years to ethnic and nationality questions. 
Some of the ferment has infused the staid institutions of law and government; most of
those who deal therein with minority issues are involved or should be in ‘a hermeneuti-
cal process mediated by international documents’.5 It is tolerably clear that international
law has been subjected to a considerable process of ethnicity-sensitisation, particularly in
the course of the last decade.6 As philosophers have turned their attention to identity and
self-determination in a battle of the books, organisations have moved, some with all the
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1 For a spectrum of ‘philosophy’, see: W. Kymlicka (ed.) (1995) The Rights of Minority Cultures,
Oxford University Press. The term ‘Republicans’ is employed in: P. Pettit (1997) Republicanism:
A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford University Press.
2 A distinction made by Makau wa Mutua (2000) ‘Politics and Human Rights: An Essential
Symbiosis’, in: M. Byers (ed.) The Role of Law in International Politics, Oxford University Press, pp.
149-75.
3 C. Geertz (2000) Available Light, Princeton University Press—he means anthropologists.
4 The implied reference is to that ‘sentimental education’ which Richard Rorty urges as a non-foun-
dationalist basis of human rights: ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, in: S. Shute
and S. Hurley (eds.) On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993.
5 W. Barbieri (1999) ‘Group Rights and the Muslim Diaspora’, 21 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 907-
26, 913.
6 P. Thornberry (1999) ‘In the Strongroom of Vocabulary’, in: P. Cumper and S. Wheatley (eds.)
Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 1-14.
inertia at their command, to shake out texts on the table. The world of human rights texts
is opulent, while categories of resistance to their implementation are legion and the texts
are often only paper tigers.7
The present chapter is a short guide through the babble of international instruments.
Within this compass it is possible to catalogue only the main legal ‘events’, a little ‘phi-
losophy’ and a few reflections. We pick out the leading global and European texts only,8
suggesting what they mean and what they import, bearing in mind that this is a person-
al reading with which others will differ. Within the canon of human rights, minority rights
raise difficult issues. It is relatively easy—give or take a few anthropologists—to agree that
torture is wrong and interpretation of anti-torture laws is directed to the question of how
to stop the torturers plying their trade.9 Minority rights are not like that, but raise issues
about the kind of society we have and want, the principles which do or should animate
it, and the means by which we should achieve it, keeping in mind that means cannot
always be detached from ends. 
It is not accurate to suggest that the ‘underpinnings’ of human rights are the main or
only controversy;10 that the texts are lucid. Such philosophical disorder as there is infus-
es the texts, adding to interpretive complexities. We discuss the international law back-
ground and context; the spectrum of instruments and processes; four key texts: two ‘glob-
al’ and two emanating from the Council of Europe, with the longest analysis reserved to
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The leading ques-
tions raised by the texts are then set out, with intimations of possible answers. The point
of doing it this way is that while general principles can be extracted from the panoply of
texts, the application of a human rights instrument starts with that text and may or may
not subsume principles from elsewhere. 
International Law: Comings and Goings
Minority rights have a long if ambivalent history in European international law. In the
twentieth century, the League of Nations protected particular groups through specific
instruments, covering the States of Eastern and Central Europe11 and even Iraq12 with a
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7 Broad assessments of human rights ‘performance’ are made in: P. Alston and J. Crawford (eds.)
(2000)The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
8 I use the term ‘global’ to indicate geographical scope: I am aware of the distinction between the ‘mere-
ly global’ and ‘the universal’. Readers will decide whether the texts underlined contain ‘universal’
principles, timeless truths or simply the latest historical consequences. For an elaboration of the dis-
tinction see T. Asad (1997)  ‘On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment’, in: R. A.
Wilson (ed.) Human Rights, Culture and Context, London and Chicago: Pluto Press, pp. 111-33, 128.
9 Asad, supra: I do not attribute this view to the author.
10 Barbieri, supra.
11 The States and territories covered were Austria, Poland (including Upper Silesia), the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Greece, the Free City of Danzig,
the Aaland Islands, Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Turkey and the Memel.
12 Iraq made a Declaration to the Council of the League of Nations on becoming independent in
1932.
carpet of treaties or declarations to the League Council for the benefit of ‘racial, religious
or linguistic’ minorities. The system described but did not define minorities. A limit on
the authority of States to define at will is implied in the Permanent Court of International
Justice’s observation on the Greco-Bulgarian Convention of 1919 that: ‘The existence of
communities is a question of fact; it is not a question of law …’13 What this means is that
‘minority’ carries an autonomous meaning in international law, and claims by States that
they have no minorities will be judged on the facts in the light of international standards.
The minority regime collapsed with the League itself. In 1945, the ‘new world order’
embodied in the UN Charter and later in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), omitted reference to minority rights, focusing instead on individual rights cou-
pled with a principle of nondiscrimination. Critical reaction to the League experience was
tinted with the wisdom of hindsight and dyed with a new philosophical individualism
which superficially opposed individuals to groups.
The political version of Occam’s Razor which excised minorities from the corpus of
international law never completed its cut. The setting up of the UN Sub-Commission on
the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities in the 1940s,14 and the
drafting of Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) were point-
ers to an eventual re-emergence of minority rights on the international agenda. In Europe,
bilateral and domestic law arrangements provided codes of minority rights; the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) included ‘association with a national minority’
among prohibited grounds of discrimination. In the UN era, international law gradually
moved in the direction of greater complexity, supplementing the simple notion of ‘rights
for all without discrimination’. The founding concepts of the ‘age of rights’15 have been
‘stretched’ to recognise the specific claims of refugees, migrant workers, children, women,
indigenous peoples, adherents of religions, the stateless and myriad other groups through
dedicated international instruments.16
Principles of nondiscrimination are still axiomatic, but function in the context of a
widening range of rights specifically addressed to multiple human groups. In line with
the American heritage, early UN era human rights were potentially conducive to a melt-
ing-pot of cultures. The total effect of the newer prescriptions is an increased validation
of diversity as opposed to sameness; integration as opposed to assimilation of groups;
lightness, quickness and multiplicity of communities as the heaviness of state-building
lifts off and nations redefine themselves in pluralist terms.
A Range of Instruments and Mechanisms 
International organisations have now delivered up basic principles on minority rights
which enshrine respect for the complexities of human community and resistance to the
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16 For a snapshot, see: I. Brownlie (1992) Basic Documents on Human Rights, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 3RD edition.
notion that States are single communities in all important senses. Apart from the ICCPR,
most other texts were drafted in late 1980s and in the 1990s, responding at various speeds
to the recrudescence of ethnic consciousness in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. At the
level of the United Nations, Article 27 of the ICCPR continues to function as the mini-
mum global treaty standard, and the most important non-treaty text specifically devoted
to minority rights is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.17 The application of this instrument is now
in the hands of a Working Group of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights. 
At the specifically European level, the ‘politically binding’ instruments of the CSCE
(now OSCE) contained the earliest set of specific principles in European space. The broad-
est spectrum of minority rights in the OSCE canon is provided by the Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Human Dimension 1990; the OSCE created the office of the
High Commissioner on National Minorities in 1992.18 The Council of the Baltic Sea States
followed this by establishing the post of CBSS Commissioner on Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights including the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in
1994. The Council of Europe has produced two treaties which incorporate the term ‘minor-
ity’: the Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, 1992, and the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995. The former is pro-minority languages
ad cultural diversity, not explicitly pro-minority rights; the latter is claimed by the Council
of Europe to be the first multilateral treaty of its kind. Non-treaty standards from the
Council of Europe may also be brought into consideration—notably Recommendation
1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly,19 a document which gained an additional
‘force’ in being part of ‘admission requirements’ to the Council of Europe in the case of
some States.20
In addition to these, the Central European Initiative produced an instrument in 1994,21
as did the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).22 The CEI text is strong on the
international character of minority rights—’issues concerning … minorities are matters
of legitimate international concern and … do not constitute exclusively an internal affair
of the respective State’.23 It is however restrictive on citizenship, the preamble asserting
that ‘the protection of national minorities concerns only citizens of the respective State’;
this is coupled with a definition in Article 1 referring to members of minorities as ‘nation-
als of the State’. CEI States also recognise the treatment of the Roma as a human rights
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17 General Assembly resolution 47/135, 18 December 1992.
18 The setting up of the office of High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) at the Helsinki
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his speeches and recommendations may be obtained from the OSCE site on the internet.
19 See generally, P. Thornberry and M. Amor Martin Estebanez (1994) The Council of Europe and
Minorities, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
20 F. Benoit-Rohmer (1996) The Minority Question in Europe: Texts and Commentary, Strasbourg:
Council of Europe Publishing.
21 Text on CEI website: http://www.ceinet.org/minority.htm.
22 21 October 1994.
23 Preamble.
issue, promising measures to preserve and develop Roma identity and facilitate their social
integration.24 The CIS text describes minorities as both citizens and permanent residents;
the document is flawed in purporting to restrict some rights in the name of ‘national leg-
islation’,25 and by insisting that minorities fulfil unspecified ‘obligations’ to the State. States
of Eastern and Central Europe have also concluded a range of bilateral treaties and dec-
larations among themselves, wholly or partially devoted to minority rights.26 Some of
these have the effect of transforming ‘soft law’ into legally binding standards to be applied
within States. The Dayton Agreement27 and the Stability Pact for South-East Europe also
incorporate minority rights standards.28
The European Union has not developed an instrument on minority rights, but treaty ref-
erences to culture and education, to European cultural and linguistic diversity, and princi-
ples further reflected in Article 22 of the European Charter on Fundamental Freedoms  agreed
at the EU Summit at Nice are significant.29 Europe Agreements’, and ‘Association Agreements’
with potential members effectively enshrine minority rights. The European Bureau for Lesser
Used Languages, largely financed by the European Commission, watches over the autochtho-
nous linguistic heritage of EU members. Despite the limited attention given to minority ques-
tions within the EU, one writer summarises the EU approach as insisting: 
... that East European minority nations must be recognised as legitimate groups
within their respective societies, and must be accorded group rights … (whereas)
in Western Europe, within the EU, minority nations have self-evidently not been
protected through the granting of group rights.30
There is now a wealth of texts relevant to the concerns of minorities in contemporary
international law. For pedagogical purposes they can be classified into instruments of
‘undifferentiated’ human rights (for all persons), and ‘differentiated’ texts (or parts there-
of) for minorities in particular. The United Nations has acted on the concerns expressed
at the time of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948—when the General
Assembly declared that the UN could not remain indifferent to the fate of minorities;31
other international organisations have also taken up the cry.
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26 See: A. Bloed and P. van Dijk (eds.) (1999) Protection of Minority Rights through Bilateral Treaties:
The Case of Central and Eastern Europe, The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
27 J. Mertus (1999) ‘The Dayton Peace Accords: Lessons from the Past and for the Future’, in:
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29 M. Amor Martin Estebanez (1996) International Organisations and Minority Protection in Europe,
Turku/Abo: Abo Akademi University, Part III, and various references in: P. Alston, M. Bustelo
and J. Heenan (eds.) (1999) The EU and Human Rights, Oxford University Press.
30 A. Biscoe (1999) ‘The European Union and Minority Nations’, in: Wheatley and Cumper, supra,,
89-103, 98.
31 Resolution 217C (III).
Key International Texts
The brunt of the analysis below relates to the differentiated minority rights instruments.
For comparison, a short account of the European Convention on Human Rights is includ-
ed: the attraction of that Convention for minority rights activists lies mostly in its imple-
mentation mechanism, based on individual applications to the (former Commission and)
Court of Human Rights alleging violation of the provisions. In passing, it may be observed
that while ‘individualisation’ of implementation mechanisms plays an important role in
securing human rights, mechanisms with a systemic and preventive focus also have their
place. While an adverse finding by the European Court of Human Rights is intended to
deter, the judgment is still only a reaction to a violation which may have given rise to
uncompensable harm to individuals. UN treaties tend to combine overview reporting pro-
cedures with procedures for individual claims; European instruments usually detach these
functions in practice if not in theory. The focus on legal interventions should not lead us
to underestimate ‘diplomatic’ approaches to conflict prevention and redress, the poten-
tial of intercultural and multicultural education, and the benefits of a complementarity of
approaches in attempts to resolve particular cases.
Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
The ICCPR’s implementing body, the Human Rights Committee, has been exercised by
this brief, weight-bearing article on many occasions:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language.32
The right to identity represents in many ways the essence of the case for minorities
within the corpus of human rights. The elements of that identity can be ethnic, religious
or linguistic, or more than one in combination. Article 27 appears tentative in its affirma-
tions. The opening phrase ‘In those States in which … minorities exist’ almost invites
States to declare that they have no minorities., but only France has recorded an ‘official’
statement to that effect, declaring that ‘Article 27 is not applicable so far as the French
Republic is concerned’.33 Following this example, reservations and declarations on Article
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30 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child have been made upon signature
confirmed on ratification by France, Venezuela, and upon signature by Turkey.34
However, according to General Comment No. 23 of the Human Rights Committee:35
‘The existence of an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority in a given State party … requires
to be established by objective criteria’.36 In the language of the General Comment and fol-
lowing the line in Greco-Bulgarian case of the PCIJ (supra) ‘existence’ ‘does not depend
upon a decision by (a) State party …’.37 Article 27 does not contain a definition of ‘minor-
ity’ and the General Comment does not offer one. In Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v.
Canada,38 a majority of the Committee decided that members of the majority Angloph-
one community in Canada could not be considered as a minority even when they were a
minority in a Province (Quebec): Article 27 ‘refers to minorities in States; this refers …
to ratifying States … the minorities … are minorities within such a State, and not minori-
ties within any Province’.39 Other Members of the Committee dissented.40 Confining the
meaning of ‘minority’ to exclude members of a majority in a minority situation in provinces
or autonomous areas distances the approach of the Committee from that found in some
of the ‘European’ texts.41
Minority rights have been ‘admitted’ into the contemporary canon of human rights as
rights of individuals, not as ‘collective’ or ‘group’ rights. The terms are ambiguous and
conceal two truisms: that ‘the individual’ is an abstraction as much as ‘the group’, and that
all rights are ‘collective’ in that they apply to a class of persons.42 Of the contested con-
ceptions, we should distinguish between collective rights of individuals in virtue of belong-
ing to or being perceived as member of a particular group (collective as adjective); and
rights of a ‘collective’—a corporate conception implying rights for the group as such,
against the world and even against its ‘members’. 
Article 27 clearly eschews the corporate conception: rights are for: ‘persons belonging
to … minorities’. There is no indication as to how membership (‘belonging’) is to be
defined. In Lovelace v. Canada,43 the Human Rights Committee stated, in relation to a
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34 UN Doc. CRC/C/2 (22 August 1991) 10, 16, 17.
35 26 April 1994.
36 General Comment, para. 5.2.
37 Paragraph 5.2.
38 UN Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/Rev.1 (31 March 1993).
39 Paragraph 11.2.
40 Individual opinion by Mrs. Elizabeth Evatt, co-signed by Messrs. Ando, Bruni Celli and
Dimitrijevic, 23.
41 For example, Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (Article 1) defines ‘national minority’ to include groups ‘smaller in number than the rest
of the population of that State or of a region of that State’.
42 Barbieri, pp. 916-18.
43 Human Rights Committee (1985) Selected Decisions Under the Optional Protocol (2nd to 16th ses-
sions), UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, 10 (admissibility); 37 (interlocutory decision); 83 (views of the
Human Rights Committee).
woman denied membership in the Tobique Band of Indians through marriage to a non-
Indian, that: ‘Persons who are born and brought up on a reserve, who have kept ties with
their community and wish to maintain these ties must normally be considered as belong-
ing to that minority …’. The general ‘membership’ criteria to be extracted from this lacon-
ic statement are those of fact, intention or desire: the use of ‘normally’ indicates that these
may not always be decisive. So while a certain threshold weight may be accorded to ‘self-
definition as a member of a minority’, that criterion is not absolute. Article 27 exhibits a
further collective dimension in that members of minorities ‘enjoy the rights in commu-
nity with the other members of their group’. The Human Rights Committee has also indi-
cated that in the enjoyment of rights under Article 27, the right of individuals to partici-
pate in aspects of community life may be restricted, but only if the restricting legislation
reflects the legitimate aim of minority group survival and well-being, and the restriction
on the right of an individual is not disproportionate to that aim.44
Following Lovelace, the Human Rights Committee stated in Kitok v. Sweden,45 that ‘a
restriction upon the right of an individual member of a minority must be shown to have
a reasonable and objective justification and to be necessary for the continued viability and
welfare of the minority as a whole’. The significance of this is that, despite the ‘individu-
alist’ phrasing of Article 27, continued group existence and character is assumed to have
value in itself, a factor which may be ‘weighed’ against the desires of individuals.
If the principle of survival of minority cultures and religions in the face of assimila-
tionist pressures is to have meaning, States should take measures to the extent necessary
to ensure that the disadvantages of minority status do not result in the denial of the right.
Protective State action will be required for as long as minority status persists. Article 27
does not specify the modalities of action to be taken. The General Comment on Article
27 insists on the positive nature of the Article despite its negative language, and on its
‘horizontal’ effect46: 
Positive measures of protection are … required not only against the acts of the State
party itself, whether through its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities,
but also against the acts of other persons within the State party.47
Finally, we may note that within the confines of the ICCPR, minority rights are served
by the ensemble of other articles, some of which impact intimately on questions of iden-
tity. In cases where for one reason or another Article 27 may not be applied, the Human
Rights Committee has been creative in its utilisation of other articles to secure ends anal-
ogous to those of Article 27.48 The message is that human rights strategies need not be
narrowly focused: the full text is there to be quarried for relevant principles, article by
article, and interpreted as a whole.
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47 Paragraph 6.1.
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The UN Minority Rights Declaration49
This non-treaty instrument (the UNDM) was adopted by the consensus of the UN General
Assembly in 1992. Despite the paragraph in its preamble claiming ‘inspiration’ from Article
27, the Declaration represents a fresh start and is not simply an ‘expansion’ of the ICCPR.
The text took some fourteen years to emerge from the bowels of the UN, in which time ide-
ological and political configurations had changed enormously. The Declaration was the UN’s
response to changes which by 1992 had already begun to reveal their dark side in the for-
mer Yugoslavia and the former USSR. The drafters were obviously aware of distinctions
between individual and collective rights. Rights are consistently for ‘persons belonging to’
minorities. On the other hand, Article 1.1. of he Declaration transcends the tentative phras-
ing of Article 27 and explicitly describes identity and existence as fundamental attributes of
groups. The obligation to protect existence and identity is set out as mandatory. 
A meagre diet of rights is set out in article 2, which begins brightly by replacing the
‘shall not be denied the right’ of Article 27 with the positive ‘have the right’. While the
textual limitations of Article 27 have not prevented the Human Rights Committee from
declaring that ‘positive measures of protection are … required’.50 The explicitly positive
approach of the Declaration removes some intellectual doubts about the international
community’s reception of minority rights: the Article 27 formulae suggests a kind of
‘aggrieved hospitality’ was at work,51 but not a welcome. The Declaration makes an impor-
tant departure from Article 27 in its wide-ranging specification of participation rights—
minority rights ‘to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and pub-
lic life’, and the right to participate effectively in decisions affecting them. Modalities of
participation remain unspecified but the development of mediating organisations to facil-
itate participation is legitimate since the article sets out a right to establish and maintain
minority associations. The own associations right is supplemented by rights to establish
and maintain free and peaceful contacts including ‘contacts across frontiers with citizens
of other States to whom they (the members of minorities) are related by national or eth-
nic, religious or linguistic ties’. Article 3 provides for the exercise of rights individually
‘as well as ‘collectively—in case States should be tempted to ‘decide’ that culture, religion,
etc., are to be carried on only in private.
The measures set out  in the qualified language of Article 4 confront important aspects
of group life and should, by analogy with measures in the International Covenants, be
‘deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations
recognised …’.52 Mandatory language extends to members of minorities the promise that
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they may ‘fully and effectively’ exercise all their human rights without discrimination and
on a basis of equality. Measures are not defined, but the term is appropriate to cover both
legislative and non-legislative measures.53 Article 4.2. indicates that States must facilitate
the expression and development of minority culture, traditions and customs, etc., ‘except
where specific practices are in violation of national law and international standards.’ The
qualification is necessary and meets an objection sometimes placed against minorities and
indigenous peoples: that group traditions may incorporate practices inconsistent with
human rights. 
The provisions on learning and instruction in mother tongue are qualified and ambigu-
ous. The intended contrast in the references to ‘learning’ and ‘instruction’ is between learn-
ing through the medium of one’s own language, and being taught the rudiments of that
language. The words in the text convey this contrast only in dim fashion. The ‘philo-
sophical’ point of Article 4—expressed in its fourth paragraph—is to promote self-knowl-
edge on the part of minorities, and their awareness of the wider world, while informing
society at large of the cultural and other contributions of minorities to the nation as a
whole. Accordingly, the culture, history, traditions, etc., of minority groups should be
the subject of positive valuations and not of the kind of distorted representations which
produce low self-esteem in the groups and negative stereotypes in the wider communi-
ty. Reciprocally, minority doctrines of ethnic exclusiveness are discouraged. 
Article 8 sets minority rights in their universal context and ‘balances’ their exercise
with the rights of others, implying that measures for minorities are generally compatible
with equality, though this also suggests that they should not be pushed too far to the detri-
ment of others. Article 8.4. connects with the fear of some States that minority rights may
lead to self-determination. To the extent that a secessionist ‘threat’ exists, it must be in
virtue of other principles of international law, and this applies equally to the converse
argument that the Declaration ‘protects’ territorial integrity from valid claims to self-deter-
mination. The Declaration has nothing to say about self-determination. The General
Comment on Article 27 goes to great pains to eliminate any ‘confusion’ between the two
rights, and notes in analogous fashion to the Declaration that: ‘enjoyment of the rights to
which Article 27 relates does not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a
State party’.54 Article 9 points to contributions from the United Nations to the realisation
of the purposes of the text. The language is such as to implicate all the relevant organs of
the UN system. The follow-up to the Declaration proceeded slowly. The Commission on
Human Rights adopted, on 3 March 1995, resolution 1995/24 authorising the Sub-
Commission to establish a Working Group on Minorities. The Working Group met for
the sixth time in 2000, and now enjoys an ‘indefinite’ mandate.55
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European Instruments
Virtually all European States (however we define ‘Europe’) are parties to the main UN
human rights treaties, or have joined in the consensus which validates the UN Declaration.
As noted, the standards of the OSCE were ‘first in line’ to meet the challenge of the melt-
down of communism in Europe, on democracy and rule of law questions as well as human
rights, minorities, environment—the manifold forms of human security. The OSCE
Copenhagen Document is important primarily as a commitment made by States re-vali-
dating minority rights in the new ordo rerum. It represents an early contemporary
‘codification’ of minority rights in Europe, setting out the essential standards of group
recognition, promotion of culture, participation, etc., recognising also the positive con-
tribution of autonomy to the resolution of ethnic conflicts. The Copenhagen document
influenced the drafting of the UN Declaration and subsequent exercises in setting stan-
dards at the Council of Europe and elsewhere. The OSCE continues to develop minority
rights through the instrumentalisation of Copenhagen principles and the work of the
HCNM. Attempts have also been made under the aegis of the HCNM to consolidate minor-
ity rights principles in the fields of education, language and participation.56
The major treaty-promoting human rights organisation in Europe is the Council of
Europe, dedicated to the holy trinity of human rights, democracy and the Rule of Law.
The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 remains the organisation’s ‘flagship’.
The text deals only with human rights for all persons and not minority rights; it is in our
terminology ‘undifferentiated’, although Article 14 forbids discrimination on the grounds
of ‘association with a national minority’. The ECHR underpins many rights which, while
they concern ‘all persons’, have particular relevance to minorities. Accordingly, the
Convention’s focus on pluralist democracy,57 nondiscrimination, respect for private life,
family life and ways of life,58 the attention paid to issues of human dignity,59 and the pro-
tection offered to freedom of expression,60 freedom of association,61 and profession of
religion,62 all offer vital safeguards to minority groups while not formally visualising
minorities through its ‘optic’. 
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62 Serif v. Greece, Application No. 38178/97, Judgment of 14 December 1999.
There is evidence that, like undifferentiated instruments at the global level, the ECHR
is undergoing gradual ‘sensitisation’ to minority questions in a number of fields, although
doubts remain as to whether the bodies of the ECHR always treat ‘ethnic’ issues with
sufficient gravitas.63 The prospects for an ‘opening out’ of the Convention to minority
issues are enhanced by the adoption of Protocol 12 on nondiscrimination in general.64
The Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe
The Charter for Regional or Minority Languages is the first treaty essay by the Council of
Europe in the field of minorities.65 Although it has ‘minority’ in the title and operative
articles, it is not per se an instrument on minority rights. The Charter works for the benefit
of speakers of minority languages. As the Explanatory Report makes clear: 
The Charter sets out to protect and promote regional or minority languages, not
linguistic minorities. For this reason emphasis is placed on the cultural dimension
and the use of a regional or minority language in all the aspects of the life of its
speakers. The Charter does not establish any individual or collective rights for the
speakers … Nevertheless, the obligations of the parties with regard to the status of
these languages and the domestic legislation which will have to be introduced in
compliance with the Charter will have an obvious effect on the situation of the com-
munities concerned ….66
Its validation of these languages contributes to the Council of Europe’s overall con-
ception of a diversified and culturally pluralist Europe where lesser used languages have
enhanced capacity for survival and flourishing. The Charter adopts a ‘menu’ approach to
State undertakings in the area of minority languages. Positively, this allows for flexible
accommodation to particular circumstances and is less potentially confrontational than a
platform of strongly asserted group rights. The limitation is the perceptible dilution (infra,
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66 Ibid., paragraph 11.
concluding lecture) of State obligations through the range of options offered to States.
The Charter should not therefore be understood as proposing a complete alternative to
standard minority rights but as a project to foster the creation of detailed national regimes
for the support of minority languages with points of guidance to States which concen-
trate and highlight essential areas of action. 
The supervision mechanism is essentially a reporting procedure through a Committee
of Experts. The major normative limitation is its focus on the ‘traditional’ languages of
Europe and not on the newer arrivals. Migrants are, however, a part of European society,
and the Charter’s focus on languages traditionally used may alienate. In conceptual terms
there are possibilities of ‘slippage’ between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘new’. Conceptions of
languages of European ‘tradition’ to be safeguarded are subject to change: further explo-
ration of this point by the Committee of Experts over the life of the instrument will be
welcome. However, de minimis, the Romany language is covered by key provisions. 
The stance of the Charter is broadly comparable with that of minority rights texts, in
that it seeks an improving relationship between the ‘public’ and ‘official’ languages, and
the living languages of European minorities. While some States remain resolutely opposed
to minority rights, ratification of the Charter may represent an avenue to realise some
minority rights objectives. From its own perspective, the Charter goes beyond other instru-
ments in interlacing the ‘public’ space with a complex of language requirements. Its flexi-
bility is capable of meeting the resource constraints on human rights programmes, though
it is important that the application of the Charter should not be unduly ‘minimalist’.
Perhaps the principal concern for civil society is that the Charter should be worked through
in as transparent a manner as possible and not be perceived as only ‘intergovernmental—
the relative lack of NGO input into the drafting may be accounted as a loss.67
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities68
In the drafting of the ECHR, unavailing suggestions were made for the adoption of a
specific provision on minority rights; more recently the Council of Europe laboured in
vain to produce and additional minority rights (and even cultural rights) protocol to the
ECHR.69 The lack of a binding ‘differentiated’ instrument in the Council of Europe was
remedied in 1995, when the Framework Convention was opened for signature by the
Committee of Ministers. The Convention distils, elaborates, applies—and possibly
dilutes—propositions in OSCE and UN texts. The present chapter concentrates on some
of the principles therein which give the Convention its particular colour. The strength of
the Framework Convention lies in its character as a binding treaty backed up by a stand-
ing implementation mechanism.
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68 The text was opened for signature by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
1 February 1998, entering into force in 1 February 1998. At the time of writing thirty-one States
have ratified the Convention. More than half of these States have submitted their initial reports.
69 Benoit-Rohmer, op.cit.
i) A Framework
The incorporation of the notion of a ‘framework’ into the title of a legally binding
Convention has attracted critical comment, to the general effect that the terminology rep-
resents the softening of an otherwise ‘hard law’ treaty.70 The nature of State obligation
takes colour from two paragraphs in the preamble, the first of which expresses the reso-
lution of the signatories ‘to define the principles to be respected and the obligations which
flow from them, in order to ensure … the effective protection of national minorities …’;71
and the second, describing the signatories as ‘Being determined to implement the princi-
ples set out in this Framework Convention through national legislation and appropriate
government policies’.72 One author considers that the ‘framework’ idea ‘seems to impose
upon States only an obligation to endeavour to put … vague and imprecise descriptions
of rights into effect’,73 which, along with other ‘defects’, renders the Convention ‘almost
worthless’.74
This last remark assumes too much. All human rights instruments are in essence open
and developmental, only imprecisely dispositive of disagreements, so that the task of dis-
covering meanings in the human rights canon is a constant in the work of the imple-
menting ‘treaty-bodies’. Irrespective of the precise form, it should not be forgotten that
the Convention creates obligations in international law; it cannot be treated as somehow
less binding on account of its structure.75 The Explanatory Report on the Convention
observes that it ‘contains mostly programme-type provisions setting out objectives which
the parties undertake to pursue’, and that the provisions ‘will not be directly applicable’.76
However, certain provisions of the Framework Convention look appropriate for ‘direct
application’, including articles which ‘track’ or ‘parallel’ obligations under the ECHR;
Article 3 would also be a strong candidate. Some States appear to have committed them-
selves to a programme of ‘direct application’.77
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70 Strong language emanated from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in their
overall assessment that the Convention ‘is weakly worded’ and ‘formulates a number of vague-
ly defined objectives and principles, the observation of which will be an obligation of the con-
tracting States but not a right which individuals may invoke. Its implementation machinery is
feeble and there is a danger that, in fact, the monitoring procedure will be left entirely to gov-
ernments’—Recommendation 1255 (1995), text adopted by the Assembly on 31 January 1995.
71 12TH preambular paragraph.
72 13TH preambular paragraph.
73 G. Gilbert (1999) ‘Minority Rights under the Council of Europe’, in: P. Cumper and S. Wheatley
(eds.) Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe’, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 53-70,
at 63.
74 Ibid. For more nuanced views, see the same author’s ‘The Council of Europe and Minority Rights’
(1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly, pp. 160-89.
75 See A. Spiliopoulou-Akermark (1997) Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law,
Uppsala: Iustus Forlag, pp. 229, n. 114. Note also her remark that ‘the contracting parties can-
not avoid the legal implementation of a treaty by calling it “framework Convention” or “con-
vention specifying principle”’.—Ibid., pp. 227.
76 Explanatory Report, paragraph 11.
77 Consider Article 15 (4) (a) of the Hungarian-Slovak treaty on Good-Neighbourliness, etc., where-
in the parties declare ‘that as regards the rights and obligations of persons belonging to minori-
ii) National Minorities
Section I makes important points on the integration of minority rights with human rights
more explicitly than in UN texts, restating the UN and OSCE principles of freedom of
choice of every person belonging to a national minority to be treated as such without dis-
advantage,78 and the individual as well as communal exercise of the rights.79 The
Explanatory Report offers the opinion that ‘no collective rights of minorities are envis-
aged’,80 and that ‘choice of belonging’ ‘does not imply a right for an individual to choose
arbitrarily to belong to any national minority. The individual’s subjective choice is insep-
arably linked to objective criteria relevant to the person’s identity’.81 There is no explicit
reference in the Convention to State denial of the existence of minorities.
Despite the relative openness of the text, a number of States have provided restrictive
definitions of minorities,82 while others are more generous, addressing the existence of
minorities as a factual situation.83 In cases of exemption of noncitizens from the ‘nation-
al minority’, the objection of the Russian Federation, which considers that no State ‘is
entitled to include unilaterally in reservations or declarations … a definition of the term
‘national minority’,84 is noteworthy. Further, 
... attempts to exclude from the scope of the … Convention … persons who per-
manently reside in the territory of State parties … and previously had a citizenship
but have been arbitrarily deprived of it, contradict the purpose of the … Convention
….85
The Russian declaration raises an issue of the validity of the various readings of the
term ‘national minority’, particularly the narrower versions. The statement is close to
claiming that the restrictions ratione personae contradict, in the language of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties—the ‘object and purpose ‘ of the Convention.86 Such
objections raise delicate legal issues on the application of the treaty between objector and
reserving States.87 The Human Rights Committee offers the helpful advice in such situa-
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ties living within their respective territories they shall apply the Framework Convention … unless
their domestic legal systems provide for broader protection of rights of persons belonging to nation-
al minorities …’—treaty in force 6 May 1996, text in: A. Bloed and P. van Dijk (eds.) (1999) Protection
of Minority Rights through Bilateral Treaties, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp.  370-75.
78 Article 3.1.
79 Article 3.2.
80 Paragraph 31.
81 Paragraph 35.
82 See, for example, the statements on signature/ratification and initial reports of Estonia, Denmark,
Germany and Slovenia.
83 Finland, Initial Report, 5.
84 Declaration made on ratification, 21 August 1998—Council of Europe Information, 21 January 2000.
85 Ibid.
86 Article 19 (c).
87 See, in general: F. G. Jacobs, and R. C. A. White (1996) The European Convention on Human
Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2ND edition, chapter 22. 
tions that ‘an objection to a reservation made by States may provide some guidance … in
… interpretation as to … compatibility with the object and purpose …’ of the treaty in
question.88
iii) Culture and its Limitations
The preamble to the Convention refers to respecting the ethnic, cultural, etc., identity of
each person and to creating conditions for the expression of this identity. The text implies
that identity may have multiple aspects, so that the nuances of expressing identity will
vary with the person. According to Article 5.1., the parties undertake to promote the con-
ditions necessary for persons belonging to minorities ‘to maintain and develop their cul-
ture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, lan-
guage, traditions and cultural heritage’. The reference to ‘essential elements of their identity’
appears to be a narrower formulation than that in the UNDM, which speaks simply of
‘identity’.89 The Explanatory Report comments that ‘reference to ‘traditions’ is not an
endorsement or acceptance of practices which are contrary to national law or interna-
tional standards. Traditional practices remain subject to limitations arising from the require-
ments of public order’.90
Thus interpreted, the limits of cultural expression in the Convention are narrower than
elsewhere. The UNDM implies—in careful language—that cultural practices must not
violate international human rights standards and national law. The Report would allow
wider scope for restrictive national legislation.91 In this instance, the provisions of Article
19 of the Convention become relevant—allowing only for limitations, etc., ‘which are
provided for in international legal instruments’, in particular the ECHR.92 The Convention
also recognises that culture and identities are mutable through employing terms such as
‘express, preserve and develop’. There is no question within its terms of ‘locking in’ minori-
ties to an unchangeable corpus of traditional lifestyles and practices before allowing access
to the norms of international law—this coheres with the case law of the ICCPR.93
iv) Language and Education
For many minority groups, the provisions on language and education represent core issues.
Language and education are at the centre of ancient and modern exercises in minority
rights. The Convention’s provisions are replete with ‘qualifiers’. Their chief innovation is
to introduce the concept of a minority ‘area’, within the (indeterminate but protected)94
boundaries of which some minority rights are enhanced.95 Article 10 recognises the right
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88 General Comment No. 24 (52), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 11 November 1994, paragraph 17.
89 Article 1.1.
90 Paragraph 44.
91 See remarks in the report of Slovakia on ‘value modification’ in relation to Roma through edu-
cation: Initial Report, p. 27.
92 See: Jacobs and White, ch. 19—‘Limitations’.
93 Ilmari Lansman v. Finland, Views of the Committee in UN Doc. A/50/40, pp. 66-76.
94 Article 16 imparts a measure of integrity to minority areas.
95 Finland refers to Aland and the Sami Homeland as relevant ‘areas’—Initial Report, pp. 19-20.
to use a minority language freely and without interference, in public or in private, ‘per-
fecting’ the freedom of expression set out in Articles 7 and 9.96
Paragraph 2 of Article 10 is directed towards the possibility of using minority lan-
guages in dealings with administrative authorities. Not all relations with public authori-
ties are dealt with: the reference is to ‘administrative authorities’, though ‘the latter must
be broadly interpreted’ (the Explanatory Report specifically mentions Ombudsmen).97 The
‘area’ where the right applies is one inhabited by minority members ‘traditionally or in
substantial numbers’. For the right to be activated, there must be a request and the minor-
ity request should correspond ‘to a real need’. If this is the case, the parties are only com-
mitted to the thin obligation ‘to endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions
which would make it possible’ to use the minority language in relations with adminis-
trative authorities. 
The provision imports a lexicon of qualifiers: traditional or substantial inhabitation,
real need, and the various vocabularies of possibility, before the right is activated. The
right struggles to escape, gripped even more tightly by the Explanatory Report which sug-
gests that the existence of a real need ‘is to be assessed by the State on the basis of objec-
tive criteria’,98 and that the financial resources of the State must also be taken into con-
sideration in applying the article. The issue of need can hardly be in the exclusive domain
of the State—simply to be ‘assessed’ by State agencies. If need is subject to ‘objective cri-
teria’, as the Report suggests, the question of a minority input to the assessment cannot
be discounted.99 The ‘good-faith’ provisions of Article 2 are also relevant. In as far as
resources are concerned, all human rights consume resources—even the elimination of
official torture requires education (re-education) and training for aberrant officials, as well
as continuous vigilance against recurrence. 
The first paragraph of Article 11 sets out a right to use names in the minority language
‘and the right to official recognition of them, according to modalities provide for in their
legal system’. This is followed by the right to display minority language ‘signs, inscrip-
tions and other information of a private nature visible to the public’;100 and the second
‘minority area’ provision,101 whereby the State ‘shall endeavour’ ‘to display traditional
local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public also
in the minority language …’.102 According to the Explanatory Report, the first paragraph
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96 Paragraph 3 of Article 10—which provides a right to be informed of reasons for arrest, etc.,—
adds little or nothing to the body of minority rights. The paragraph is satisfied by proceedings
in the language understood by a person arrested, etc., not necessarily a minority language.
Compare Articles 5 and 6 ECHR, and Article 9 of the Charter on Regional or Minority Languages.
97 Report, paragraph 64.
98 Paragraph 65.
99 Article 15 supports this view.
100 Paragraph 2.
101 In this case dependent on being ‘traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers’ of persons
belonging to minorities—unlike Article 10.2., inhabitation and numbers are cumulative require-
ments.
102 Paragraph 3.
of Article 11, providing for official recognition of minority names, allows these to be tran-
scribed into the alphabet of the official language in their phonetic forms.103 Relying large-
ly on Article 11, the OSCE Oslo Recommendations interpret this requirement to mean
additionally that the phonetic rendering ‘must be done in accordance with the language
system and tradition of the national minority’.104 This will be the case even if the minor-
ity linguistic system sits uneasily with the forms of the official language.105 Paragraph 68
of the Explanatory Report also states that Article 11 means that persons who have been
forced to change their names—perhaps under policies of forced assimilation—should
have the right to revert to them. It must be supposed that in such cases any costs incurred
in securing a reversion will fall on the authorities and not on the victims. 
The question of minority language signs visible to the public draws the comment from
the Explanatory Report that the right does not prevent the individual being required to use
the official language in addition to the minority language.106 As a blanket proposition,
this cannot be right. While particular issues may be raised under health and safety, or
signs using offensive language, these can be addressed by specific State legislation. On
the other hand, many private signs (the name of a house, a poster in the window) are ‘vis-
ible to the public’, and there are clearly cases where there is no conceivable State interest
in adding the official or other language. Some States reporting on this article indicate that
the freedom to display is not subject to restriction.107 Different issues are raised by para-
graph 3, where the question is the public allocation of street names, etc., if there is sufficient
demand. In this case, it is appropriate that the official or State language enters the equa-
tion. What is ‘sufficient’ will vary with the case;108 questions of visibility of the respective
language components of any signage will also be raised.109 Erasing minority ‘footprints’
through changing names of towns, villages and historical sites can be part of a process of
assimilation against the will of a minority.
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103 Paragraph 68. See also R. Hoffman (1999) ‘A Presentation of the Framework Convention … and
its Contribution to the Protection of Minority Languages’, in: Implementation of the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 21-24, 23.
104 Oslo Recommendation 1 and Explanatory Report.
105 This applies for example to non-Slovak female suffixes. Thus, the ‘female surname of a person
other than Slovak nationality is written without the grammatical ending of Slovak declination’—
in the event of various requests to that effect; Initial Report of Slovakia, 23. This is a question
relating to ‘linguistic systems’.
106 Paragraph 69.
107 See, Report of Finland, 22; Report of Hungary, 99.
108 Estonia requires place names in Estonian, unless an exception is ‘justified historically’—Report,
50; Finland adopts the lowest percentage rule for a minority population in a municipality to
trigger bilingual signage rules—8% minority inhabitation—as well as all municipalities where
over 3,000 inhabitants speak the other official language—Report, 22-23; Romania opts for 20%
habitation—Report, 38; Slovakia also operates a 20% minority settlement rule for road signs—
Report, 24; Ukraine appears to require a majority in a locality of members of a national minor-
ity—Report, 26; UK rules are generally permissive and devolve to local bodies (in Northern
Ireland, adding a language implicates the agreement of ‘the occupiers of a street’)—Report, 37.
109 Among reporting States, Denmark uniquely raises the issue of road safety for bilingual signs;
Report, 37.
Article 12 provides that parties ‘shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields
of education and research to foster knowledge of the culture, history, language and reli-
gion of their national minorities and of the majority’. This is the Framework Convention’s
account of ‘intercultural education’. Analogous provisions are found in the human rights
canon.110 The aim, in the words of the Explanatory Report is to ‘create a climate of toler-
ance and dialogue’.111 Provisions on intercultural education require balancing with pro-
visions to strengthen the minority’s sense of itself. Accordingly, the Convention makes
provision in Article 13 for the setting up private educational establishments, and learn-
ing minority languages—Article 14. Apart from the general right ‘to learn his or her minor-
ity language’,112 the parties shall endeavour to ensure, in minority ‘areas’ and within the
framework of their education systems, that minorities ‘have adequate opportunities for
being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language’, without
prejudice to learning or teaching in the official language.113
The education provisions look tentative and ambiguous. The draconian statement in
Article 13.2. that the right to set up private institutions ‘shall not entail any financial oblig-
ation’ for the parties may be incorrect for many practical situations. As the Explanatory
Report notes in respect of para. 1, the principle of nondiscrimination enters the equation
when considering minority education.114 It can be argued that, in conformity with this
principle, when States subsidise the education of some groups, they would be obliged to
consider subsidising others.115 The wording of the language learning provisions appears
to visualise (a) being taught the minority language as any language; or (b) being taught
through the medium of the minority language’. In which case, like its equivalent in the
UNDM, it is inexpertly drafted, since the provision for learning through the minority lan-
guage comes across as a vague injunction concerning ‘instruction’. Assuming that alter-
natives (a) and (b) are indicated, there appears to be no obligation to support education
through the medium of a minority language. The Explanatory Report observes in para-
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110 See, for example: Article 4 of the UNDM, paragraph 34 of the OSCE Copenhagen Document,
and Articles 27 and 31 of ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples.
111 Paragraph 71.
112 Article 14.1.
113 Article 14.2. and 14.3. The Explanatory Report (paragraph 78) observes that ‘knowledge of the
official language is a factor of social cohesion and integration’. 
114 Paragraph 72. For recent experience of the UN Human Rights Committee, see Waldman v.Canada,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/694/1996, Views of the Committee on 3 November 1999; and Tadman
et al. v. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/816/1998, Views of the Committee on 29 October 1999.
115 Here, the Hague Recommendations make two pertinent points: (i) the setting up of private
schools should not be inhibited by unduly burdensome regulations (Recommendation 9); (ii)
minority education institutions (or promoters) are entitled to seek funding from the State or
elsewhere (Recommendation 10). A number of States report that they subsidise private minor-
ity education—Czech Republic, Report, 35-36; Denmark, Report, 40; Hungary, Report, 120-22;
Slovakia, Report, 29; UK, Report, 32. For a broad review, see: Report on the Linguistic Rights of
Persons belonging to National Minorities in the OSCE Area (1999) The Hague: OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities.
graph 77 that there is nothing to prevent a State from implementing (a) and (b), perhaps
through the medium of bilingual instruction.116
The assumption of the Convention seems to be that minority and official languages
stand opposed; that capabilities in one diminish the standards of the other. The Hague
Recommendations attempt to countermand this perception by suggesting a scheme where-
by being comfortable in the minority language leads to confidence in mastering the State
language. The Hague approach is partly grounded in an interpretation of the Framework
Convention, but reaches out to ‘relevant international norms’ interpreted in the light of
educational research.117 The Framework Convention makes no comment on levels of edu-
cation. Nor does it comment on the drafting of curricula which particularly concern
minorities—including the general curriculum to the extent that minority cultures are ‘rep-
resented ‘ therein. However, the participation provisions of Article 15 suggest, de minimis,
that minorities should have input into curricula, making education more responsive to
their interests and concerns.
In minority affairs, education issues are often delicately balanced between integration
and separation.118 If integration is pushed too far, the result is assimilation and the dis-
appearance of the minority as a distinct culture; a policy of separation, on the other hand,
can lead to a ghetto culture of withdrawal from society.119 Education is a powerful instru-
ment for the achievement of social engineering. The Convention suggests ways and means
through which a balance is to be achieved between the ‘separate domain’ reserved to the
flourishing of minority culture, and the ‘common domain’ of shared rights and responsi-
bilities.120 The Convention’s premises are that identity is shaped through interaction with
others and that identity is multiple or hybrid:121 that each person may be touched by a
66 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART I
116 The fact that there is a general provision on language learning in paragraph 1 of Article 14 sug-
gests that the provisions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that article, which are restricted to minority
‘areas’, must add something significant to the ‘basic right’ in paragraph 1. This should mean the
right to have education (instruction) through the medium of the minority language, subject to
the conditions in paragraphs 2 and 3. We may call this the strong conclusion. The distinction
between paragraphs cannot imply, as the Report appears to suggest (paragraph 74), that the State
under paragraph 1 is in effect obliged to nothing. The Report does not draw the strong conclu-
sion in respect of paragraphs 2 and 3.
117 Hague Recommendations 11-18 and Explanatory Report.
118 N. Dimitrov (1999) The Framework Convention, Skopje and Melbourne: Matica Makedonska,
pp. 173.
119 The anxieties of governments—and the need for balance—are reflected in the Romanian Law on
Education (1995, as amended in 1995), Article 12 (2) of which provides that the ‘organisation and
content of education shall not be structured according to exclusivist and discriminatory criteria of
an ideological, political, religious or ethnic nature …’. Such provisions can result in the disable-
ment of institutions of minority education. Accordingly, the provision (necessarily) adds that
‘Educational units and institutions established for religious or linguistic reasons in which educa-
tion is provided in accordance with the choice of pupils’ parents or legal guardians shall not be
regarded as structured according to exclusivist or discriminatory criteria’—Initial Report, 42. 
120 A. Eide (1993) Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of
Problems involving Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, section II.
121 C. Taylor (1991) The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University
Press.
complex of influences, from family to neighbourhood, through ethnic group, religion and
the wider society of the State—as well as the cosmopolitan ideals of human rights.122 The
education (and other) provisions should be seen as opening up possibilities of individual
self-authorship in conjunction with community survival and the aspirations of States to
a coherent and functioning democratic polity.
v) Obligations of Minorities
While it does not elaborate a special principle to promote the ‘loyalty’ of minority members
to their ‘host-State’, the Convention approaches the question of ‘duties’ in Article 20:
In the exercise of the rights and freedoms … in the present Framework Convention,
any person belonging to a national minority shall respect the national legislation
and the rights of others, in particular those of persons belonging to the majority or
to other national minorities.
The loyalty of minorities has not been an explicit demand of international human rights
law.123 Duties are expressed in general phrases in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights—Article 29 of which states that ‘everyone has duties to the community’, and in
general citizenship legislation. Loyalty-type provisions tend to ‘appear’ in instruments on
minority rights because of sensitivities about self-determination, secession, etc., despite
the often separation of the issues in international discourse.124 While no objection may
be taken to members of minorities respecting the rights of others, respect for ‘national
legislation’ as a treaty demand raises questions. What if the national legislation does not
respect the rights of members of minorities? Are minorities placed under an obligation to
‘respect’ when others are not? The rights in the Convention are in no sense ‘conditional’
on respecting the ‘national legislation’. 
The Explanatory Report offers limited guidance to the application of the provision, not-
ing that ‘this reference to national legislation clearly does not entitle Parties to ignore the
provisions of the … Convention’.125 Thus far, few States have reported explicitly on Article
20, which perhaps indicates that they do not perceive any pressing problems. For exam-
ple, Ukraine reports that its ‘citizens of all nationalities … are obliged to observe the
Constitution and laws of Ukraine, to defend its State sovereignty and territorial integrity,
to respect languages, cultures, traditions, customs, religious originality of the Ukrainian
people and all national minorities’126 a provision not directed specifically at minorities. 
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122 Cf. Article 26 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Education shall be directed to
the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote tolerance and friendship among all nations,
racial or religious groups ….’
123 For an appreciation of the issues, see various references in J. Jackson Preece (1998) National
Minorities and the European Nation-States System, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
124 See, for example, the opening paragraphs of General Comment 23 of the Human Rights
Committee, supra,.
125 Paragraph 89.
126 Initial Report, 35.
vi) Implementation127
The Convention sketches an outline of an implementation mechanism.128 Article 25.1.
provides that, within one year from the Convention coming into force for the Contracting
Party, State reports are to be transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe,
who will transmit them to the Committee of Ministers (COM). Further information of rel-
evance to the implementation of the Convention will be transmitted ‘on a periodical basis’
and ‘whenever the Committee of Ministers so requests’.129 The COM is assisted by an
Advisory Committee (AC), ‘the members of which shall have recognised expertise in the
field of protection of national minorities’.130 Ex facie, the supervision of the Convention
is entrusted to the political wisdom of the COM, with the AC playing a subordinate role.
These heavily criticised arrangements were developed in less ostensibly political direc-
tions through a set of rules adopted by the COM in 1997 on the basis of preparatory work
by an ad hoc committee (CAHMEC) with a significant input from the Parliamentary
Assembly and expert opinion. While the rules augment the transparency and impartiali-
ty of the mechanism, its ‘success’ will be assessed on the basis of its eventual ‘track record’. 
Essential points in the rules concern publicity and NGO input. The provisions on pub-
licity for reports state that they can be made public on receipt by the Secretary-General
of the Council of Europe and that opinions of the AC can be made public at the same
time as recommendations of the Committee of Ministers. According to the provisions for
consultation with NGOs—the AC may receive information from other sources than state
reports, and can invite information from other sources unless ‘otherwise directed’ by the
COM; however, the AC must obtain a specific mandate if it wishes to hold meetings with
other sources for purposes of ascertaining information.131 Additionally, the AC can call
on the COM to mandate an ad hoc report, and be involved in monitoring ‘follow-up’ to
the conclusions and recommendations as instructed by the COM. The rules also gave the
Advisory Committee the responsibility of drawing up its own rules of procedure132 these
were adopted by the Committee in October 1998.133 The AC may seek the assistance of
outside experts and consultants, and co-operate, etc., with other Council of Europe bod-
ies. The AC is to be kept aware of cases of non-submission of reports, and can propose
measures. Outlines for reports have been adopted by the Committee of Ministers;134 the
Advisory Committee emphasises that these are for initial reports only.135
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127 For a review of the initial working of the Convention mechanism, consult the First Activity Report
of the Advisory Committee, 1 June 1998-31 May 1999, ACFC/INF (99) 1def., 15 September 1999.
128 The Convention and associated documents are brought together in Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities: Collected Texts (1999) Strasbourg: Council of Europe
Publishing.
129 Article 25.2.
130 Article 26.1.
131 Rule 32. Such meetings shall be held in closed session.
132 Rule 37.
133 Collected Texts, 64-71.
134 642ND meeting of Ministers’ Deputies, 30 September 1998.
135 First Activity Report, paragraph 11.
The first year of operation of the Advisory Committee saw the setting up of various
procedures and processes. In general, the Committee observes that in almost all cases,
additional information has been sought from the country concerned—data which main-
ly relates to the application of norms in practice.136 In-country meetings have been held.137
The Committee argues the usefulness of involving NGOs and minority groups in process-
es leading to State reports, and decided that contacts with independent sources should
be a regular feature of its work. Information is sought from nongovernmental sources as
well as official reports, and meetings have been held with concerned groups.138 The
Committee of Ministers is not informed on every occasion about NGO contacts; instead
a ‘blanket’ notification to the Committee of Ministers covers the monitoring cycle. ‘Parallel’
reports from various NGOs have been submitted to the Advisory Committee.139 Initially
at least, and in the interests of consistency, the Committee decided to group together a
set of opinions on the country reports, rather than submit separate single opinions.140
The President of the Advisory Committee has argued that the Committee is under-
resourced: a Secretariat of three administrators ‘is clearly inadequate and needs to be aug-
mented as a matter of urgency’.141 He issued the following warning: 
‘The recent events in Kosovo and elsewhere demonstrate all too clearly the high costs
that result from ignoring minority protection. If we do not provide consistent, vigorous
monitoring, a human rights problem may develop into a full-blown crisis, and by then it
is already too late for the monitoring mechanism … to intervene effectively’.
Minority Rights: An Unfinished Story
The above sketch of minority rights is limited in scope. It has not been possible to say
enough about the abiding importance of nondiscrimination as an essential first step in
protecting minorities. Many practical problems of minority rights can be ‘solved’ (in a
technical sense) by the application of non-discrimination without more. But there are
cases where groups ask for explicit ‘recognition’ in law and practice, for sensitivity to their
voices, and opportunities to promote their character and culture—not merely to be tol-
erated by others. These demands and desiderata are the stuff of minority rights instru-
ments, symbols of that recognition and care. In a longer work, the relationship between
minorities and genocide would be a subject of concern, and the relevance of basic free-
doms for all, and of democracy. The reader may also wish to know more about the rela-
tionship between minorities and indigenous peoples, and the adaptation of principle that
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137 Ibid., paragraphs 19-20—in Finland, Hungary and Slovakia.
138 Ibid., paragraph 20.
139 Speech by the President of the Advisory Committee, Prof. R. Hoffman, to the Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 6 April
2000.
140 Activity Report, paragraph 21.
141 Hoffman speech.
being indigenous requires, in Europe as elsewhere.142 The boundaries of any outline of
minority rights are contestable. Whether we take it from the angle of lightening oppres-
sion or domination of groups, or their right to self-gathering and self-development, the
range of human rights which potentially affect minorities is indeterminate.
Despite the range of possibilities, contemporary minority rights texts are broadly sim-
ilar (a ‘family of resemblances’), and work with a limited palette. The texts are very gen-
eral, addressing the complex taxonomies of minorities with norms of general guidance.
They focus on definition, existence and membership in only slightly different ways, while
the absence of common definitions is noticeable. There are indeed definitions: ‘scientific’
and ‘official’,143 but the major instruments avoid them. A possible reason is that govern-
ments may be tempted to define narrowly, as if they are not convinced about pluralism,
and can more easily manage (or think they can) a ‘homogeneous’ nation, even if it is only
homogeneous in their ideology. Definitions abound at the domestic and community lev-
els. Their absence at the level of international law is partly accounted for by the nature of
the system, which remains essentially dynamic and fluid, allowing for development, change
and adaptation. Another reason is something to do with people having the capacity to
define themselves, to say who they are as persons and collectives. The legal point is that
all definitions are open to international scrutiny, and that the ‘resolution’ of a definition
puzzle is conceived as a dialogic exercise. It is also the case that, while self-identification
as a private exercise is unassailable, when it engages the responsibilities and resources of
the State, the latter is also entitled to a view.
The instruments suggest reflection on individual and collective rights. The question
exercises the Liberals, Communitarians, and the rest of the motley crew. ‘Differentiated’
texts of minority rights employ the formula of individual rights collectively exercised,
making it clear that the rights belong to persons. Ex facie, they do not deal with group
rights in the corporate sense. There are three basic reasons. The first is that the corporate
conception challenges State monopoly on power and loyalty, purporting to create an ‘enti-
ty’ with a legal and moral existence, capable of reaching international law directly over
the heads of governments. The second is self-determination: it is sensed that reifying the
group will contribute to the intensification of its potential for separatism. This also affects
perceptions of the legitimacy of autonomy—applauded but not mandated by interna-
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142 The present author is in the course of writing a book on ‘International Law and Indigenous Rights’
to be published by Manchester University Press in 2001. European indigenous peoples include
the Sami of Fennoscandia and Russia. There are many more such groups, particularly in the
area of the former USSR.
143 The most famous is by Capotorti, who defined a minority for the purposes of Article 27 of the
ICCPR as: ‘A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dom-
inant position, whose members—being nationals of the State—possess ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implic-
itly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or
language’—Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to … Minorities (1991) (New York: United
Nations, paragraph 568. The UN Human Rights Committee has not accepted the need for mem-
bers of a minority to be nationals of the State in order to claim Article 27 rights—General
Comment 23, supra.
tional law.144 The third is cultural—the literature is full on ‘cultural relativism’, often and
unfairly carrying the assumption that minorities are peculiarly oppressive of women, dis-
sidents, etc. All this washes over minority rights with insinuations of inadmissible prac-
tices. There is even a literature on ‘the minority within the minority’—a much theorised
oppression, as if no government ever oppressed its people.145
The formal absence of group rights does not mean that the group goes unregarded. In
cases on Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has attempted to balance
questions of group survival against individual choice. The shade of group rights haunts
the text; efforts to exorcise it look doomed to fail. Dealing with minority rights through
relentless insistence that they are rights not of minorities but of persons belonging to
minorities has its limitations. Other instruments are bolder: UNESCO declares that cul-
tures have a value; treaties and declarations on indigenous peoples address indigenous
peoples as holders of rights.
A further point is that minority rights—with difficulty—have penetrated the public
realm. The texts are at their most grudging when minority language meets the govern-
ment office, when minorities challenge for resources, when they claim participation in
decision-making, when they claim to mark the landscape with their names and their his-
tory. On the other hand, to ‘privatise’ minority rights would be the end. The texts have
made small moves in the direction of pluralising the public domain so that it comes to
represent the social and cultural pluralism of the people. Minority rights are anti-totali-
tarian, and against mega-projects of social or other engineering unless the ethnic dimen-
sion is seriously addressed, or just against mega-projects. The stress on participation skirts
the notion of deliberative democracy, listening to subaltern voices tell the story of the
nation.
While in the nature of things, minorities may have more need of the world’s attention
than the comfortable, the world’s oppression is not unique to minorities. Derrida paints
a dramatic picture: 
Never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and … economic oppression
affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity … let us
never neglect this macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suf-
fering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute
figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved or exter-
minated.146
In this theatre of cruelty, the provisions of minority rights instruments can appear
‘light’, frothy, superficial, dealing with superstructural questions of culture and language.
Derrida’s macroscopic drama can be set alongside Eagleton who writes that: 
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144 Cf. M. Suksi (ed.) (1998) Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague: Kluwer.
145 Among many contributions, see: L. Green (1994)  ‘Internal Minorities and their Rights’, in: J.
Baker (ed.), Group Rights, Toronto, Buffalo, London: Toronto University Press, pp. 100-17.
146 J. Derrida (P. Kamuf, trans.) (1994)  Specters of Marx, p. 85, cited in: S. Marks (1997) ‘The End
of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses’, 3 E.J.I.L., 449-77, at 457.
Culture is not only what we live by. It is also, in great measure, what we live for.
Affection, relationship, memory, kinship, place, community, emotional fulfilment,
intellectual enjoyment, a sense of ultimate meaning.147
There is also the point that ethnicity may not be ‘light’ to others. Ethnicity and the per-
ception of ‘otherness’ are distinctive bases of oppression and underprivilege. Poverty results
from cultural disintegration. Subordinate groups need cultural confidence. The Roma are
only one such case. Cultural self-determination, in negotiation with the norms of the
broader community, is a mode of resistance to the narratives and stereotyping of others
and of engaging their respect. We should nevertheless be cautious about overvaluing those
like ‘ourselves’—Eagleton again: 
Yet culture can also be too close for comfort. This very intimacy is likely to grow
morbid and obsessional unless it is set in an enlightened political context, one which
can temper these intimacies with more abstract, but also in a way more generous,
affiliations.148
It may be that in time the intensity of contemporary focus on minority rights will lessen.
If the forces of nation-building and other totalising ideologies are weaker, then hitherto
oppressed cultures will flourish again. Forms of domination vary, and the role of States
is ambivalent. If threats to minorities emanate from the State, minority groups and a sup-
portive civil society will appeal and resist. If threats emanate from transnational corpora-
tions, the continuing support of the State is vital. In the working through of internation-
al standards on minority rights, governments have modified their behaviour, if somewhat
unevenly: the glass is half-empty and half-full. Identity politics is not the only politics, is
more than merely reactive, and looks set to endure. Identities are strategic, but also pri-
mordial: the paradigm of the self-inventing cosmopolitan does not address the sheer quid-
dity of things, the burden of materiality that presses the lives of many people. 
Rights talk is not the only avenue for cultural groups. Rights are necessary now, but
can be confrontational, egotistic, a kind of Kulturkampf. Other languages—duty, agape,
virtue—may eventually come to illuminate the politics. The ‘communitarians’ already
speak of the need for a Copernican turn to duties; the religious concur. Education is a
key, including ‘education of the sentiments’.149 But it seems that the language of human
rights will not easily be discounted. It is effectively the only transnational language for
the negotiation of values that we possess. Even in a distorted, imperfect way, a spectrum
of nations or ‘civilisations’ has already contributed to its development. If ‘rights’ are to
continue to hold emotional sway, it is salutary to remember from where they came: from
the sense of right not as weapons but as rightness, right ordering, just states of being. If
it is to this justice that we aspire, minority rights are a means to that end, not the end in
itself.
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APPENDIX A
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF NATIONAL MINORITIES
Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 10 November 1994. It was opened
for signature on 1 February 1995. 
See: http://www.dhdirhr.coe.fr/Minorities/index.htm
The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States, signatories to the present frame-
work Convention,
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity between its mem-
bers for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their com-
mon heritage,
Considering that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and
further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
Wishing to follow-up the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the member
States of the Council of Europe adopted in Vienna on 9 October 1993;
Being resolved to protect within their respective territories the existence of national minorities;
Considering that the upheavals of European history have shown that the protection of nation-
al minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and peace in this continent;
Considering that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the eth-
nic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national minority, but
also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve and develop this identity; 
Considering that the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is necessary to enable cul-
tural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment for each society;
Considering that the realisation of a tolerant and prosperous Europe does not depend solely on
co-operation between States but also requires transfrontier co-operation between local and region-
al authorities without prejudice to the constitution and territorial integrity of each State;
Having regard to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and the Protocols thereto; 
Having regard to the commitments concerning the protection of national minorities in United
Nations conventions and declarations and in the documents of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, particularly the Copenhagen Document of 29 June 1990;
Being resolved to define the principles to be respected and the obligations which flow from
them, in order to ensure, in the member States and such other States as may become Parties to the
present instrument, the effective protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms
of persons belonging to those minorities, within the rule of law, respecting the territorial integrity
and national sovereignty of states; 
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Being determined to implement the principles set out in this framework Convention through
national legislation and appropriate governmental policies;
Have agreed as follows:
Section I
Article 1
The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those
minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of human rights, and as such falls
within the scope of international co-operation. 
Article 2
The provisions of this framework Convention shall be applied in good faith, in a spirit of under-
standing and tolerance and in conformity with the principles of good neighbourliness, friendly rela-
tions and co-operation between States.
Article 3
1. Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treat-
ed or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the
exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice. 
2. Persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing
from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in
community with others. 
Section II 
Article 4
1. The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of equal-
ity before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any discrimination based
on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited. 
2. The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all
areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between persons
belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. In this respect, they shall
take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities. 
3. The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered to be an act of
discrimination. 
Article 5
1. The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national
minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their
identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage. 
2. Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy, the Parties
shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national
minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assim-
ilation. 
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Article 6
1. The Parties shall encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and take effective
measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and co-operation among all persons
living on their territory, irrespective of those persons’ ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious
identity, in particular in the fields of education, culture and the media. 
2. The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who may be subject to
threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, lin-
guistic or religious identity. 
Article 7
The Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging to a national minority to
freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.
Article 8
The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has the right
to manifest his or her religion or belief and to establish religious institutions, organisations and asso-
ciations.
Article 9
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that the right to freedom of expression of every person belong-
ing to a national minority includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas in the minority language, without interference by public authorities and regard-
less of frontiers. The Parties shall ensure, within the framework of their legal systems, that persons
belonging to a national minority are not discriminated against in their access to the media.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Parties from requiring the licensing, without discrimination and
based on objective criteria, of sound radio and television broadcasting, or cinema enterprises. 
3. The Parties shall not hinder the creation and the use of printed media by persons belonging to
national minorities. In the legal framework of sound radio and television broadcasting, they
shall ensure, as far as possible, and taking into account the provisions of paragraph 1, that per-
sons belonging to national minorities are granted the possibility of creating and using their own
media. 
4. In the framework of their legal systems, the Parties shall adopt adequate measures in order to
facilitate access to the media for persons belonging to national minorities and in order to pro-
mote tolerance and permit cultural pluralism. 
Article 10
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has the
right to use freely and without interference his or her minority language, in private and in pub-
lic, orally and in writing. 
2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial
numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request corresponds to a real need, the
Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which would make it pos-
sible to use the minority language in relations between those persons and the administrative
authorities. 
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3. The Parties undertake to guarantee the right of every person belonging to a national minority
to be informed promptly, in a language which he or she understands, of the reasons for his or
her arrest, and of the nature and cause of any accusation against him or her, and to defend him-
self or herself in this language, if necessary with the free assistance of an interpreter. 
Article 11
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has the
right to use his or her surname (patronym) and first names in the minority language and the
right to official recognition of them, according to modalities provided for in their legal system. 
2. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has the
right to display in his or her minority language signs, inscriptions and other information of a
private nature visible to the public. 
3. In areas traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers of persons belonging to a national minor-
ity, the Parties shall endeavour, in the framework of their legal system, including, where appro-
priate, agreements with other States, and taking into account their specific conditions, to dis-
play traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the
public also in the minority language when there is a sufficient demand for such indications. 
Article 12
1. The Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and research to
foster knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their national minorities and
of the majority. 
2. In this context the Parties shall inter alia provide adequate opportunities for teacher training and
access to textbooks, and facilitate contacts among students and teachers of different communities. 
3. The Parties undertake to promote equal opportunities for access to education at all levels for
persons belonging to national minorities. 
Article 13
1. Within the framework of their education systems, the Parties shall recognise that persons belong-
ing to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their own private education-
al and training establishments. 
2. The exercise of this right shall not entail any financial obligation for the Parties. 
Article 14
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has the
right to learn his or her minority language. 
2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial
numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible
and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging to those minori-
ties have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruc-
tion in this language. 
3. Paragraph 2 of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the learning of the official
language or the teaching in this language. 
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Article 15
The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belong-
ing to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular
those affecting them.
Article 16
The Parties shall refrain from measures which alter the proportions of the population in areas inhab-
ited by persons belonging to national minorities and are aimed at restricting the rights and free-
doms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention.
Article 17
1. The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to national minori-
ties to establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers with persons lawfully
staying in other States, in particular those with whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic
or religious identity, or a common cultural heritage. 
2. The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to national minori-
ties to participate in the activities of non-governmental organisations, both at the national and
international levels. 
Article 18
1. The Parties shall endeavour to conclude, where necessary, bilateral and multilateral agreements
with other States, in particular neighbouring States, in order to ensure the protection of persons
belonging to the national minorities concerned. 
2. Where relevant, the Parties shall take measures to encourage transfrontier co-operation. 
Article 19
The Parties undertake to respect and implement the principles enshrined in the present framework
Convention making, where necessary, only those limitations, restrictions or derogations which are
provided for in international legal instruments, in particular the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in so far as they are relevant to the rights and freedoms
flowing from the said principles.
Section III
Article 20
In the exercise of the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present
framework Convention, any person belonging to a national minority shall respect the national leg-
islation and the rights of others, in particular those of persons belonging to the majority or to other
national minorities.
Article 21
Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage
in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and
in particular of the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.
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Article 22
Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from
any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any
Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.
Article 23
The rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention,
in so far as they are the subject of a corresponding provision in the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or in the Protocols thereto, shall be understood so
as to conform to the latter provisions.
Section IV
Article 24
1. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe shall monitor the implementation of this
framework Convention by the Contracting Parties. 
2. The Parties which are not members of the Council of Europe shall participate in the imple-
mentation mechanism, according to modalities to be determined. 
Article 25
1. Within a period of one year following the entry into force of this framework Convention in
respect of a Contracting Party, the latter shall transmit to the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe full information on the legislative and other measures taken to give effect to the prin-
ciples set out in this framework Convention. 
2. Thereafter, each Party shall transmit to the Secretary General on a periodical basis and when-
ever the Committee of Ministers so requests any further information of relevance to the imple-
mentation of this framework Convention. 
3. The Secretary General shall forward to the Committee of Ministers the information transmitted
under the terms of this article. 
Article 26
1. In evaluating the adequacy of the measures taken by the Parties to give effect to the principles
set out in this framework Convention the Committee of Ministers shall be assisted by an advi-
sory committee, the members of which shall have recognised expertise in the field of the pro-
tection of national minorities. 
2. The composition of this advisory committee and its procedure shall be determined by the
Committee of Ministers within a period of one year following the entry into force of this frame-
work Convention. 
Section V 
Article 27
This framework Convention shall be open for signature by the member States of the Council of
Europe. Up until the date when the Convention enters into force, it shall also be open for signa-
ture by any other State so invited by the Committee of Ministers. It is subject to ratification, accep-
tance or approval. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe.
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Article 28
1. This framework Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the
expiration of a period of three months after the date on which twelve member States of the
Council of Europe have expressed their consent to be bound by the Convention in accordance
with the provisions of Article 27. 
2. In respect of any member State which subsequently expresses its consent to be bound by it, the
framework Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expi-
ration of a period of three months after the date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification,
acceptance or approval. 
Article 29
1. After the entry into force of this framework Convention and after consulting the Contracting
States, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe may invite to accede to the
Convention, by a decision taken by the majority provided for in Article 20.d of the Statute of
the Council of Europe, any non-member State of the Council of Europe which, invited to sign
in accordance with the provisions of Article 27, has not yet done so, and any other non-mem-
ber State. 
2. In respect of any acceding State, the framework Convention shall enter into force on the first
day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date of the deposit
of the instrument of accession with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
Article 30
1. Any State may at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, accep-
tance, approval or accession, specify the territory or territories for whose international relations
it is responsible to which this framework Convention shall apply.
2. Any State may at any later date, by a declaration addressed to the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, extend the application of this framework Convention to any other territory specified
in the declaration. In respect of such territory the framework Convention shall enter into force
on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of three months after the date
of receipt of such declaration by the Secretary General. 
3. Any declaration made under the two preceding paragraphs may, in respect of any territory
specified in such declaration, be withdrawn by a notification addressed to the Secretary General.
The withdrawal shall become effective on the first day of the month following the expiration of
a period of three months after the date of receipt of such notification by the Secretary General. 
Article 31
1. Any Party may at any time denounce this framework Convention by means of a notification
addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
2. Such denunciation shall become effective on the first day of the month following the expiration
of a period of six months after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary General. 
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Article 32
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify the member States of the Council, other
signatory States and any State which has acceded to this framework Convention, of:
a. any signature; 
b. the deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession;
c. any date of entry into force of this framework Convention in accordance with Articles 28,
29 and 30; 
d. any other act, notification or communication relating to this framework Convention. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed this framework
Convention. Done at Strasbourg, this 1st day of February 1995, in English and French, both texts
being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Council of
Europe. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall transmit certified copies to each mem-
ber State of the Council of Europe and to any State invited to sign or accede to this framework
Convention.
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APPENDIX B
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO
NATIONAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS OR LINGUISTIC MINORITIES
Adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992.
See: http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_minori.htm
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming that one of the basic aims of the United Nations, as proclaimed in the Charter, is to
promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, 
Reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, 
Desiring to promote the realization of the principles contained in the Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well
as other relevant international instruments that have been adopted at the universal or regional level
and those concluded between individual States Members of the United Nations, 
Inspired by the provisions of article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
concerning the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, 
Considering that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national
or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to the political and social stability of States
in which they live, 
Emphasizing that the constant promotion and realization of the rights of persons belonging to
national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, as an integral part of the development of soci-
ety as a whole and within a democratic framework based on the rule of law, would contribute to
the strengthening of friendship and cooperation among peoples and States, 
Considering that the United Nations has an important role to play regarding the protection of
minorities, 
Bearing in mind the work done so far within the United Nations system, in particular by the
Commission on Human Rights, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities and the bodies established pursuant to the International Covenants on Human Rights
and other relevant international human rights instruments in promoting and protecting the rights
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of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
Taking into account the important work which is done by intergovernmental and non-govern-
mental organizations in protecting minorities and in promoting and protecting the rights of per-
sons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
Recognizing the need to ensure even more effective implementation of international human
rights instruments with regard to the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious
and linguistic minorities, 
Proclaims this Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities:
Article 1 
1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic iden-
tity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the pro-
motion of that identity. 
2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.
Article 2 
1. Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (hereinafter referred
to as persons belonging to minorities) have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and
without interference or any form of discrimination. 
2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in cultural, religious,
social, economic and public life. 
3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the nation-
al and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the
regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation. 
4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own associations. 
5. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain, without any discrimi-
nation, free and peaceful contacts with other members of their group and with persons belong-
ing to other minorities, as well as contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom
they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties.
Article 3 
1. Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights, including those set forth in the pre-
sent Declaration, individually as well as in community with other members of their group, with-
out any discrimination. 
2. No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minority as the consequence of the
exercise or non-exercise of the rights set forth in the present Declaration.
Article 4 
1. States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging to minorities may
exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any dis-
crimination and in full equality before the law. 
2. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minori-
ties to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and
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customs, except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to inter-
national standards. 
3. States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minori-
ties may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their
mother tongue. 
4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage
knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their
territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge
of the society as a whole. 
5. States should consider appropriate measures so that persons belonging to minorities may par-
ticipate fully in the economic progress and development in their country.
Article 5 
1. National policies and programmes shall be planned and implemented with due regard for the
legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities. 
2. Programmes of cooperation and assistance among States should be planned and implemented
with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities.
Article 6 
States should cooperate on questions relating to persons belonging to minorities, inter alia, exchang-
ing information and experiences, in order to promote mutual understanding and confidence.
Article 7 
States should cooperate in order to promote respect for the rights set forth in the present Declaration.
Article 8 
1. Nothing in the present Declaration shall prevent the fulfilment of international obligations of
States in relation to persons belonging to minorities. In particular, States shall fulfil in good faith
the obligations and commitments they have assumed under international treaties and agreements
to which they are parties. 
2. The exercise of the rights set forth in the present Declaration shall not prejudice the enjoyment
by all persons of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
3. Measures taken by States to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights set forth in the present
Declaration shall not prima facie be considered contrary to the principle of equality contained
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
4. Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integri-
ty and political independence of States.
Article 9 
The specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system shall contribute to
the full realization of the rights and principles set forth in the present Declaration, within their
respective fields of competence.
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APPENDIX C
LUND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION
OF NATIONAL MINORITIES IN PUBLIC LIFE
Published by the Foundation on Inter-ethnic Relations, a nongovernmental organisation established in
1993 to carry out specialised activities in support of the OSCE High Commissioner on National
Minorities in September 1999.
See: http://www.osce.org/hcnm/recommendations
Introduction
In its Helsinki Decisions of July 1992, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) established the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities to be ‘an instrument
of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage’. This mandate was created largely in reaction to
the situation in the former Yugoslavia which some feared would be repeated elsewhere in Europe,
especially among the countries in transition to democracy, and could undermine the promise of
peace and prosperity as envisaged in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe adopted by the Heads
of State and Government in November 1990.
On 1 January 1993 Mr. Max van der Stoel took up his duties as the first OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Drawing on his considerable personal experience
as a former Member of Parliament, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands, Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, and long-time human rights advocate, Mr. van der Stoel turned his atten-
tion to the many disputes between minorities and central authorities in Europe which had the poten-
tial, in his view, to escalate. Acting quietly through diplomatic means, the HCNM has become
involved in over a dozen States, including Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.
His involvement has focused primarily on those situations involving persons belonging to nation-
al/ethnic groups who constitute the numerical majority in one State but the numerical minority in
another State, thus engaging the interest of governmental authorities in each State and constituting
a potential source of inter-State tension if not conflict. Indeed, such tensions have defined much of
European history.
In addressing the substance of tensions involving national minorities, the HCNM approaches
the issues as an independent, impartial and cooperative actor. While the HCNM is not a supervi-
sory mechanism, he employs the international standards to which each State has agreed as his prin-
cipal framework of analysis and the foundation of his specific recommendations. In this relation, it
is important to recall the commitments undertaken by all OSCE participating States, in particular
those of the 1990 Copenhagen Document of the Conference on the Human Dimension which, in
Part IV, articulates detailed standards relating to national minorities. All OSCE States are also bound
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by United Nations obligations relating to human rights, including minority rights, and the great
majority of OSCE States are further bound by the standards of the Council of Europe.
Through the course of more than six years of intense activity, the HCNM has identified certain
recurrent issues and themes which have become the subject of his attention in a number of States
in which he is involved. Among these are issues of minority education and use of minority lan-
guages, in particular as matters of great importance for the maintenance and development of the
identity of persons belonging to national minorities. With a view to achieving an appropriate and
coherent application of relevant minority rights in the OSCE area, the HCNM requested the
Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations—a nongovernmental organisation established in 1993 to
carry out specialised activities in support of the HCNM—to bring together two groups of interna-
tionally recognised independent experts to elaborate two sets of recommendations: The Hague
Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities (1996) and the Oslo
Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities (1998). Both sets of rec-
ommendations have subsequently served as references for policy- and law-makers in a number of
States. The recommendations are available (in several languages) from the Foundation on Inter-
Ethnic Relations free of charge.
A third recurrent theme which has arisen in a number of situations in which the HCNM has
been involved is that of forms of effective participation of national minorities in the governance of
States. In order to gain a sense of the views and experiences of OSCE participating States on this
issue and to allow States to share their experiences with each other, the HCNM and the OSCE’s
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights convened a conference of all OSCE States and
relevant international organisations entitled ‘Governance and Participation: Integrating Diversity’,
which was hosted by the Swiss Confederation in Locarno from 18 to 20 October 1998. The
Chairman’s Statement issued at the end of the conference summarised the themes of the meeting
and noted the desirability of ‘concrete follow-up activities, including the further elaboration of the
various concepts and mechanisms of good governance with the effective participation of minori-
ties, leading to integration of diversity within the State’. To this end, the HCNM called upon the
Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, in co-operation with the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law, to bring together a group of internationally recognised independent
experts to elaborate recommendations and outline alternatives, in line with the relevant interna-
tional standards.
The result of the above initiative is The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation
of National Minorities in Public Life—named after the Swedish city in which the experts last met
and completed the recommendations. Among the experts were jurists specialising in relevant inter-
national law, political scientists specialising in constitutional orders and election systems, and soci-
ologists specialising in minority issues. Specifically, under the Chairmanship of the Director of the
Raoul Wallenberg Institute, Professor Gudmundur Alfredsson, the experts were:
· Professor Gudmundur Alfredsson (Icelandic), Director of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund University; 
· Professor Vernon Bogdanor (British), Professor of Government, Oxford University;
· Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic (Yugoslavian), Director of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights; 
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· Dr. Asbjørn Eide (Norwegian), Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights; 
· Professor Yash Ghai (Kenyan), Sir YK Pao Professor of Public Law, University of Hong Kong; 
· Professor Hurst Hannum (American), Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University; 
· Mr. Peter Harris (South African), Senior Executive to the International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance; 
· Dr. Hans-Joachim Heintze  (German), Director of the Institut für Friedenssicherungsrecht
und Humanitäres Völkerrecht, Ruhr-Universität Bochum; 
· Professor Ruth Lapidoth (Israeli), Professor of International Law and Chairman of the
Academic Committee of the Institute for European Studies, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem; 
· Professor Rein Müllerson (Estonian), Chair of International Law, King’s College, University
of London; 
· Dr. Sarlotta Pufflerova (Slovak), Director, Foundation Citizen and Minority/Minority Rights Group; 
· Professor Steven Ratner (American), Professor of International Law, University of Texas; 
· Dr. Andrew Reynolds (British), Assistant Professor of Government, University of Notre Dame; 
· Mr. Miquel Strubell (Spanish and British), Director of the Institute of Catalan Socio-Linguistics,
Generalitat de Catalunya; 
· Professor Markku Suksi (Finnish), Professor of Public Law, Åbo Akademi University; 
· Professor Danilo Türk (Slovene), Professor of International Law, Ljubljana University; 
· Dr. Fernand de Varennes (Canadian), Senior Lecturer in Law and Director of the Asia-Pacific
Centre for Human Rights and the Prevention of Ethnic Conflict, Murdoch University; 
· Professor Roman Wieruszewski (Polish), Director of the Poznan Human Rights Centre, Polish
Academy of Sciences. 
Insofar as existing standards of minority rights are part of human rights, the starting point of
the consultations among the experts was to presume compliance by States with all other human
rights obligations including, in particular, freedom from discrimination. It was also presumed that
the ultimate object of all human rights is the full and free development of the individual human
personality in conditions of equality. Consequently, it was presumed that civil society should be
open and fluid and, therefore, integrate all persons, including those belonging to national minori-
ties. Moreover, insofar as the objective of good and democratic governance is to serve the needs
and interests of the whole population, it was presumed that all governments seek to ensure the
maximum opportunities for contributions from those affected by public decision-making.
The purpose of the Lund Recommendations, like The Hague and Oslo Recommendations before
them, is to encourage and facilitate the adoption by States of specific measures to alleviate tensions
related to national minorities and thus to serve the ultimate conflict prevention goal of the HCNM.
The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life
attempt to clarify in relatively straightforward language and build upon the content of minority
rights and other standards generally applicable in the situations in which the HCNM is involved.
The standards have been interpreted specifically to ensure the coherence of their application in
open and democratic States. The Recommendations are divided into four subheadings which group
the twenty-four recommendations into general principles, participation in decision-making, self-
governance, and ways of guaranteeing such effective participation in public life. The basic concep-
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tual division within the Lund Recommendations follows two prongs: participation in governance
of the State as a whole, and self-governance over certain local or internal affairs. A wide variety of
arrangements are possible and known. In several recommendations, alternatives are suggested. All
recommendations are to be interpreted in accordance with the General Principles in Part I. A more
detailed explanation of each recommendation is provided in an accompanying Explanatory Note
wherein express reference to the relevant international standards is found.
I. General Principles
1. Effective participation of national minorities in public life is an essential component of a peace-
ful and democratic society. Experience in Europe and elsewhere has shown that, in order to
promote such participation, governments often need to establish specific arrangements for nation-
al minorities. These Recommendations aim to facilitate the inclusion of minorities within the
State and enable minorities to maintain their own identity and characteristics, thereby promot-
ing the good governance and integrity of the State. 
2. These Recommendations build upon fundamental principles and rules of international law, such
as respect for human dignity, equal rights, and nondiscrimination, as they affect the rights of
national minorities to participate in public life and to enjoy other political rights. States have a
duty to respect internationally recognised human rights and the rule of law, which allow for the
full development of civil society in conditions of tolerance, peace and prosperity. 
3. When specific institutions are established to ensure the effective participation of minorities in
public life, which can include the exercise of authority or responsibility by such institutions,
they must respect the human rights of all those affected. 
4. Individuals identify themselves in numerous ways in addition to their identity as members of a
national minority. The decision as to whether an individual is a member of a minority, the major-
ity or neither rests with that individual and shall not be imposed upon her or him. Moreover,
no person shall suffer any disadvantage as a result of such a choice or refusal to choose. 
5. When creating institutions and procedures in accordance with these Recommendations, both
substance and process are important. Governmental authorities and minorities should pursue
an inclusive, transparent and accountable process of consultation in order to maintain a climate
of confidence. The State should encourage the public media to foster intercultural understand-
ing and address the concerns of minorities. 
II. Participation in Decision-Making
A. Arrangements at the Level of the Central Government
6. States should ensure that opportunities exist for minorities to have an effective voice at the level
of the central government, including through special arrangements as necessary. These may
include, depending upon the circumstances: 
· special representation of national minorities, for example, through a reserved number of
seats in one or both chambers of parliament or in parliamentary committees; and other forms
of guaranteed participation in the legislative process; 
· formal or informal understandings for allocating to members of national minorities cabinet
positions, seats on the supreme or constitutional court or lower courts, and positions on
nominated advisory bodies or other high-level organs; 
90 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART I
· mechanisms to ensure that minority interests are considered within relevant ministries,
through, e.g., personnel addressing minority concerns or issuance of standing directives;
and 
· special measures for minority participation in the civil service as well as the provision of
public services in the language of the national minority. 
B. Elections
7. Experience in Europe and elsewhere demonstrates the importance of the electoral process for
facilitating the participation of minorities in the political sphere. States shall guarantee the right
of persons belonging to national minorities to take part in the conduct of public affairs, includ-
ing through the rights to vote and stand for office without discrimination. 
8. The regulation of the formation and activity of political parties shall comply with the interna-
tional law principle of freedom of association. This principle includes the freedom to establish
political parties based on communal identities as well as those not identified exclusively with
the interests of a specific community. 
9. The electoral system should facilitate minority representation and influence. 
· Where minorities are concentrated territorially, single-member districts may provide sufficient
minority representation. 
· Proportional representation systems, where a political party’s share in the national vote is
reflected in its share of the legislative seats, may assist in the representation of minorities. 
· Some forms of preference voting, where voters rank candidates in order of choice, may facil-
itate minority representation and promote inter-communal cooperation. 
· Lower numerical thresholds for representation in the legislature may enhance the inclusion
of national minorities in governance. 
10. The geographic boundaries of electoral districts should facilitate the equitable representation
of national minorities. 
C. Arrangements at the Regional and Local Levels
11. States should adopt measures to promote participation of national minorities at the regional
and local levels such as those mentioned above regarding the level of the central government
(paragraphs 6-10) The structures and decision-making processes of regional and local author-
ities should be made transparent and accessible in order to encourage the participation of
minorities. 
D. Advisory and Consultative Bodies
12. States should establish advisory or consultative bodies within appropriate institutional frameworks
to serve as channels for dialogue between governmental authorities and national minorities. Such
bodies might also include special purpose committees for addressing such issues as housing, land,
education, language and culture. The composition of such bodies should reflect their purpose and
contribute to more effective communication and advancement of minority interests. 
13. These bodies should be able to raise issues with decisionmakers, prepare recommendations,
formulate legislative and other proposals, monitor developments and provide views on pro-
posed governmental decisions that may directly or indirectly affect minorities. Governmental
authorities should consult these bodies regularly regarding minority-related legislation and
administrative measures in order to contribute to the satisfaction of minority concerns and to
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the building of confidence. The effective functioning of these bodies will require that they have
adequate resources. 
III. Self-Governance
14. Effective participation of minorities in public life may call for non-territorial or territorial arrange-
ments of self-governance or a combination thereof. States should devote adequate resources to
such arrangements. 
15. It is essential to the success of such arrangements that governmental authorities and minori-
ties recognize the need for central and uniform decisions in some areas of governance togeth-
er with the advantages of diversity in others. 
· Functions that are generally exercised by the central authorities include defense, foreign
affairs, immigration and customs, macroeconomic policy and monetary affairs. 
· Other functions, such as those identified below, may be managed by minorities or territor-
ial administrations or shared with the central authorities. 
· Functions may be allocated asymmetrically to respond to different minority situations with-
in the same State. 
16. Institutions of self-governance, whether non-territorial or territorial, must be based on demo-
cratic principles to ensure that they genuinely reflect the views of the affected population.
A. Non-Territorial Arrangements
17. This section addresses non-territorial autonomy—often referred to as ‘personal’ or ‘cultural
autonomy’—which is most likely to be useful when a group is geographically dispersed. Such
divisions of authority, including control over specific subject-matter, may take place at the level
of the State or within territorial arrangements. In all cases, respect for the human rights of oth-
ers must be assured. Moreover, such arrangements should be assured adequate financial
resources to enable performance of their public functions and should result from inclusive
processes (see Recommendation 5). 
18. This is not an exhaustive list of possible functions. Much will depend upon the situation, includ-
ing especially the needs and expressed desires of the minority. In different situations, different
subjects will be of greater or lesser interest to minorities and decisions in these fields will affect
them to varying degrees. Some fields may be shared. One area of special concern for minorities
is control over their own names, both for representative institutions and individual members, as
provided in Article 11.1 of the Framework Convention. With regard to religion, the
Recommendation does not advocate governmental interference in religious matters other than in
relation to those powers (e.g. concerning personal civil status) delegated to religious authorities. 
This Recommendation also does not intend that minority institutions should control the media—
although persons belonging to minorities should have the possibility to create and use their own
media, as guaranteed by Article 9.3 of the Framework Convention. Of course, culture has many
aspects extending to fields such as welfare, housing and child care; the State should take into account
minority interests in governance in these fields. 
B. Territorial Arrangements
19. There is a general trend in European States towards devolution of authority and implementa-
tion of the principle of subsidiarity, such that decisions are taken as close as possible to, and
by, those most directly concerned and affected. Article 4.3 of the European Charter of Local
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Self-Government expresses this objective as follows:
‘Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities which
are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the
extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy’. 
Territorial self-government can help preserve the unity of States while increasing the level
of participation and involvement of minorities by giving them a greater role in a level of gov-
ernment that reflects their population concentration. Federations may also accomplish this
objective, as may particular autonomy arrangements within unitary States or federations. It is
also possible to have mixed administrations. As noted in recommendation 15, arrangements
need not be uniform across the State, but may vary according to needs and expressed desires. 
20. Autonomous authorities must possess real power to make decisions at the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial levels. Authority within the State may be divided among central, regional and
local authorities and also among functions. Paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document notes
the alternatives of ‘appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific
historical and territorial circumstances’.
This makes clear that there need not be uniformity within the State. Experience shows that
powers can be divided even with respect to fields of public authority traditionally exercised by
central government, including devolved powers of justice (both substantive and procedural)
and powers over traditional economies. At a minimum, affected populations should be sys-
tematically involved in the exercise of such authority. At the same time, the central government
must retain powers to ensure justice and equality of opportunities across the State. 
21. Where powers may be devolved on a territorial basis to improve the effective participation of
minorities, these powers must be exercised with due account for the minorities within these
jurisdictions. Administrative and executive authorities must be accountable to the whole pop-
ulation of the territory. This follows from paragraph 5.2 of the Copenhagen Document which
commits OSCE participating States to assure at all levels and for all persons ‘a form of govern-
ment that is representative in character, in which the executive is accountable to the elected
legislature or the electorate’. 
IV. Guarantees
A. Constitutional and Legal Safeguards
22. This section addresses the issue of ‘entrenchment’, that is, solidifying arrangements in law. Very
detailed legal arrangements may be useful in some cases, while frameworks may be sufficient
in other cases. In all cases, as noted in recommendation 5, arrangements should result from
open processes. However, once concluded, stability is required in order to assure some secu-
rity for those affected, especially persons belonging to national minorities. Articles 2 and 4 of
the European Charter of Local Self-Government express a preference for constitutional arrange-
ments. To achieve the desired balance between stability and flexibility, it may be useful to spec-
ify some reconsideration at fixed intervals, thereby depoliticizing the process of change in
advance and making the review process less adversarial. 
23. This Recommendation differs from Recommendation 22 insofar as it encourages the testing of
new and innovative regimes, rather than specifying terms for alteration of existing arrange-
ments. Responsible authorities may wish to follow different approaches in different situations
among central authorities and minority representatives. Without compromising final positions,
such an approach may yield good experiences, not least through the processes of innovation
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and implementation. 
B. Remedies
24. In paragraph 30 of the Copenhagen Document, OSCE participating States ‘recognize that the
questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic polit-
ical framework based on the rule of law, with a functioning independent judiciary’. The idea
of effective remedies is also provided in Article 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, while ‘a judicial remedy’ is specified in Article 11 of the European Charter of
Local Self-Government. 
Judicial review can be performed by constitutional courts and, in effect, by relevant inter-
national human rights bodies. Non-judicial mechanisms and institutions, such as national com-
missions, ombudspersons, inter-ethnic or ‘race’ relations boards, etc., may also play critical
roles, as envisaged by paragraph 27 of the Copenhagen Document, Article 14.2 of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and para-
graph 36 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference
on Human Rights in 1993.
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PART TWO
THE PRACTICE:
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EMERGING MULTI-ETHNIC POLICIES IN BULGARIA: 
A CENTRAL – LOCAL PERSPECTIVE
Elena Gyurova
Abstract
This paper presents the diversity of minority ethnic communities in Bulgaria in the con-
text of their cultural identity, problems, political participation and civil mobilisation. The
text is concerned with their treatment by the state, in terms of relevant legislation and
policy, and with social attitudes toward them in the post-communist period. This analy-
sis also includes a review of the territorial and administrative division of Bulgaria as the
backbone of the central-regional-local relationship in policy implementation. Regional
development is being explored as the possible political vehicle for solving the socio-eco-
nomic problems of minorities by reducing the disproportion between and within the var-
ious regions, and improving the quality of life and the expansion of human capabilities.
Local services are analysed with reference to the democratic and decentralised manage-
ment strategies applicable for the integration of minorities in the various areas of local
social life: preservation of cultural identity and introducing intercultural dialogue in edu-
cation, learning the mother tongue, media, employment, social assistance and urban ame-
lioration. Minority representation in municipal councils is also analysed. This paper
attempts to find an appropriate balance between the positive developments in the build-
ing, preservation and development of minority rights in Bulgaria, and the negative aspects
of this process, by looking at what has been left out of the public discourse.
1. Introduction
Most public authorities at the national, regional and local levels face a challenge of man-
aging heterogeneous ethnic communities.1 Such regional and local communities are typ-
ical for the entire territory of Bulgaria.
Events of ten years ago signalled a change in the official Bulgarian policy towards eth-
nic minorities. Even as its economy contracted, Bulgaria made considerable progress.
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1 ‘…there is no mono-ethnic society’, as George Schöpflin states, viewing ‘ethnicity as the basic
(although not the only one) constructive matrix into which people and societies exist’. George
Shöpflin (1998) ‘Citizenship, Ethnicity and Cultural Reproduction’, Sofia: Etnoreporter, No. 1, p.
37.
Local legislation and practices were brought in compliance with international standards
and with European regulations enforcing respect for human rights. New opportunities
during democratisation and the transition to a market economy encouraged minorities to
promote their culture and reinforce their identity; this simultaneously created various
problems for these groups. In parallel with the lower socio-economic status of some vul-
nerable minority communities, differences in language, religion and culture act as a divide
among ethnic groups in the civil sphere, preconditioning discriminatory stereotypes and
cases of intolerance. A climate of neighbourly relations between the various ethnic com-
munities has not yet crystallised into tolerant civil co-existence, regardless of the positive
developments in this respect.
In a multi-ethnic democracy, bringing the various issues to the current agenda and solv-
ing them is a process conducted in the daily work of the regional and local authorities; decen-
tralisation logically demands that they administer the policies for minority rights. The imple-
mentation of an effective regional and local management of multi-ethnic communities is
both a challenge and responsibility for public authorities. Ethnic tolerance must be pre-
served as a component of the democratic processes occurring in Bulgaria, where ‘democra-
cy has to have respect for ethnicity and ethnicity has to comply with democracy’.2
2. Ethnic Diversity in Bulgaria
Bulgaria is a European, post-communist country situated on the Balkan Peninsula. Its his-
torical past, geo-strategic situation and cultural legacy shape it as ‘the border line’ between
Christian and Muslim civilisations. There is a diverse multitude of ethno-cultural and reli-
gious minorities in the country.3 Each group has its specific demographic features and a
type of territorial localisation and habitation. The process of economic restructuring dur-
ing the last ten years has had an aggravating impact on the gradual drop in the socio-eco-
nomic status of the largest minority/religious groups: Turks, Roma and Bulgarian Muslims
(Pomaks). This economic feature of the post-communist society in Bulgaria is often
expressed as ethnic intolerance impeding a coherent ethno-cultural society. This tension
is exacerbated by the lack of sufficient public information on the situation of the various
minority groups living within Bulgarian territory. 
The latest census in the country, dated December 1992, presents statistical data on the
ethnic composition of the population: 85.7% of a total of almost 8.5 million identify them-
selves as ethnic Bulgarians. Of the remaining 14.3%, the largest groups are Pomaks and
Roma.4 The representatives of the smaller ethnic groups represent a total of 1.3% (94,000
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2 Ibid., p. 39.
3 See the comprehensive Table 1 in the Annex. For more details, see: Anna Krasteva (ed.) (1998)
CDMR. 
4 According to unofficial data of the Ministry of Interior and local authorities, the share of the Roma
can amount to 6.5%, while other expert assessments point to a figure of 10% of the entire Bulgarian
population. See: Ilona Tomova (1995) The Gypsies in the Transition Period, Sofia: ICMSIR, p. 27;
Martin Emerson (1999) ‘Roma Education in Eastern and Central Europe: Some Personal
Reflections’, European Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 202.
people). These are mainly Russians, Armenians, Jews, Macedonians, Wallachians, Greeks,
Karakachans, Gagaus, Tatars, Cherkes and other Slavs.
The demographic and socio-economic features of the ethnic communities in Bulgaria
vary.5 They are mutually dependent on cultural factors, territorial distribution (com-
pact/dispersed), housing (urban/rural) and local socio-economic effects of structural
reform, etc.
The majority Christian community (86%) and the minority Muslim group (13%) are
ethnically heterogeneous.6 Notably, the Pomaks are a substantial religious community
who adhere to the Muslim religion and speak Bulgarian. According to experts’ estimates,
they amount to about 200,000. They live mainly in the rural regions of the Rhodope and
Pirin mountains in southern Bulgaria, though a small number live in northeastern Bulgaria.
During the last several years this religious community has faced multidirectional and com-
plex processes in establishing its identity.7
Economic depression, underdevelopment and establishment of competitive condi-
tions has so far doomed the representatives of the largest minority groups to unem-
ployment. This is exacerbated by the poor education and qualifications, especially for
the Roma, among which unemployment rates can reach about 80-90%.8 Bearing that
the unemployment problem in Bulgaria is mainly attributed to the so-called ‘skills gap’,
young and poorly educated individuals, especially the ones belonging to ethnic minori-
ties, are exposed to the highest risk of unemployment.9
The deterioration of the socio-economic parameters of vulnerable minority groups (the
Roma being the most prominent among these) condemns minorities to poverty and sends
them to the bottom of the social stratification scheme.10 All this influences the character
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5 See Table 2 in the Appendix.
6 For a more comprehensive analysis of the relations between the major religious communities in
Bulgaria, see: Interrelations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between the Christians and Muslims
in Bulgaria (1994) and (1997) Sofia: ICMSIR.
7 B. Panajotova, K. Bozeva (1994) ‘The Religious Community of the Bulgarian Muslims’, in: Minority
Groups in Bulgaria in a Human Rights Context, Sofia: CDMR, pp. 27-32; Tsvetana Georgieva (1998)
‘The Pomaks: the Bulgarian Muslims’, in: Anna Krasteva (ed.) Societies and Identities in Bulgaria,
Sofia: Petekston, pp. 286-308; Ilona Tomova (2000) ‘Social Change and Ethnoreligious Relations’,
in: Georgi Fotev (ed.) Neighbour Relations of Religious Communities in Bulgaria, Sofia: Institute of
Sociology at BAS, pp. 184-185. 
8 ECRI (2000) State Reports, The Second Report from Bulgaria, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, p. 18.
The reasons for the low educational level of the Roma community are complex and comprise cul-
tural, economic, social, discriminatory and other aspects. Poverty, which is the preventive factor
for school attendance by Roma children is reinforced by the low value education for parents. The
poor proficiency of Roma children in Bulgarian and discrimination in the classrooms demotivate
potential students. Early marriages are another reason for dropping out. The lack of any educa-
tional policy adequate to the peculiarities of Roma culture also discourages school attendance by
the Roma. 
9 The World Bank (1999) Bulgaria: Poverty during the Transition, Report No. 18411, Sofia: World
Bank Mission in Bulgaria, pp. 4-5; UNDP (1999) National Report on Human Development in Bulgaria.
Part I. Regional Differences: A Burden or a Chance, Sofia: UNDP, p. 43.
10 ‘There is a distinct “bottom” in Bulgarian society. It is formed mainly by the older social groups,
the ethnic minorities, the unemployed and the inhabitants of the villages and small towns, where 
and the quality of life of minorities, their opportunities, and their individual and group
strategies for dealing with these problems.
Urbanised minority populations include Jewish, Armenian, Russian and Greek com-
munities. Broader opportunities for development and self-fulfillment in Bulgaria’s eco-
nomic, public, cultural and scientific life are available within urban centres. A high level
of education and qualification facilitates their equal and full participation in Bulgarian
society. As a whole, they can be said to be well integrated.
Bulgarian Turks and Muslims live mainly in villages and this limits their equal access
to social benefits and services. Their young representatives often migrate to urban areas,
where they have better chances of finding employment. The emigration of Bulgarian Turks
to the Republic of Turkey has advanced at varying rates. At present, however, emigrants
are primarily motivated by economic concerns (greater employment opportunities else-
where), unlike the ‘Great Trip’ of the 1980s, which was forced upon minorities by the
government and threatened the ethno-cultural identity of such minority groups. 
Generally, the Turkish and Pomak ethnic communities enjoy functional integration in
Bulgarian society. They participate in the political, economic, public, cultural and intel-
lectual life of the country. They also maintain good relations with the majority.
The Roma are often beneficiaries of social support, thus engendering a culture of pas-
sive assistance. The long-term high unemployment rate among the Roma is a crime-gen-
erating factor that contributes to their further marginalisation. Relative to other groups,
the Roma are more frequently physically, economically, socially and psychologically ghet-
toised, and are the object of effective desocialisation and discrimination practices.
The hardships of the structural economic reform process have resulted in the rein-
forcement of prejudices against ethno-cultural ‘others’ and the intensification of ethno-
centrism. Regardless of this economic tension, regulatory, institutional and civil initia-
tives have been undertaken in order to facilitate the harmonisation of ethnic relations.
In conclusion, it can be said that:
· About one-seventh (15%) of the Bulgarian population belongs to minority com-
munities. The largest minority groups are Bulgarian Turks, Roma and the Pomaks
(there is debate as to whether this is a religious or ethnic minority). Smaller ethnic
groups constitute about 1.3% of the population of the country.
· The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the minority communities
vary. Housing, territory and employment are traditionally predetermined and heav-
ily influence their way and quality of life, their survival strategies and individual
opportunities.
· The typical feature of the post-communist situation in Bulgaria is that the transi-
tion to a market economy has resulted in a drop in the socio-economic status of
vulnerable minority groups, which applies mainly to the Roma.
· In general, all minority groups are well integrated into Bulgarian society, except for
the Roma.
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unemployment is highest. In terms of education, this group encompasses the more poorly edu-
cated people, but qualified workers are steadily making their way into it.’ A. Raichev, K. Kolev,
A. Bundjolov, L. Dimova (2000) Social Stratification in Bulgaria, Sofia: Fridrich Ebert Foundation,
Social-Democratic Institute, LIK, p. 29.
3. The Legal, Political and Civic Status of Minorities
The democratic ‘revolution’ of 1989 marked the beginning of processes, which made nec-
essary the search for legislative, political and civil solutions to new and urgent ethnic
minority issues. Promoting the issues and implementing measures to improve inter-eth-
nic relations in the country has been one of the most dynamic areas of democratic devel-
opment in Bulgaria for the last ten years.
3.1. The political agenda and minority rights discourse
Bulgaria could not afford to seclude itself from human rights discourse as most post-
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe began their transition to democra-
tic rule. Meanwhile, the inflammation of nationalist conflict in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which resulted in armed conflict along Bulgaria’s border, forced Bulgaria’s
politicians and public to explore flexible political solutions and civil strategies in inter-
ethnic relations. 
The policy of integrating the country into European institutional structures calls for a deci-
sive improvement of Bulgaria’s human rights instruments, mechanisms and practices.
Negotiations for equal membership are expected to increase the range and effective enforce-
ment of minority integration measures and improvement of the status quo of vulnerable
minority groups, especially the Roma.
Ethno-cultural awareness and civil mobilisation among minority representatives is also a
catalyst for the political effort for the re-establishment of ethnic and religious rights. The
gradual legislative, political and civil empowerment of minorities has pushed minority
rights issues higher on the agenda of social discourse. A further positive development in
recent years has been the tendency of public authorities to address nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs) on minority issues.
3.2. International legal instruments
In the past ten years, distinct processes have been put into place that provide for legisla-
tively enforced respect for human rights, regardless of the ethnic identity of citizens. These
processes are in line with Bulgaria’s commitments in the field of international human
rights protection.
By signing and ratifying a number of international human rights documents, Bulgaria
has become a party to nearly all important UN instruments and to 29 legislative docu-
ments of the Council of Europe on human rights.11 This considerable effort made by the
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11 Here are some of the instruments ratified by Bulgaria: The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the First Optional Protocol to it; the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the First Additional Protocol and 
state since 1990 has provided a larger scale of international, regional, legislative standards
for civil, political, economic, social and cultural minority rights. The opportunity now
exists for individuals to appeal to international human rights institutions.12
An important step in the settling of multi-ethnic relations was Bulgaria’s ratification of
the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. The Convention
was signed by the Bulgarian head of state on 9 October 1997. It was not ratified by
Parliament until 18 February 1999. In the interim, various political positions on ethnic-
ity converged. The major issue in the political debate was the question of whether to rat-
ify the Convention ‘with’ or ‘without’ an accompanying declaration, and (in the former
case) what its content should be. The Consultative Council on National Security at the
President’s Office decided to ratify the Convention with an accompanying Declaration.
Policy in the Balkans demands intensive harmonisation of minority rights with the prin-
ciples of security, territorial integrity, the sovereignty of the state and the prevention of
separatist aspirations. Therefore, political forces agreed to draft an accompanying
Declaration to Article 21 of the Framework Convention, which was perceived as a pro-
tective mechanism.13
Bulgaria’s ratification of the Convention is an expression of a more civilised attitude
toward minorities and their rights and freedoms, and demonstrates efforts to harmonise
Bulgarian laws with European ones. The provisions of this document constitute a serious
resource for the actual implementation of minority rights in the country by setting forth
mechanisms for the harmonisation of the relations between the majority, minorities and
the state. Unfortunately, neither the minorities nor the regional and local authorities have
made sufficient use of the opportunities presented by the Convention. The reason for this
is insufficient information in public sphere: limited dissemination of the texts of the
Convention and the accompanying Declaration, inadequate clarification of the actual sub-
ject and meaning of the Convention, and the long and veering political debate, which was
poorly covered by the media. Public administrators should read this document and should
attempt to translate its legal clauses into practical actions in accordance with the specific
ethnic, economic and social conditions of the country, region, city, municipality or vil-
lage in question. 
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Protocol No. 6 to it, Declarations to Articles 25 and 46 of the Convention; the European Social
Charter—Revised, etc.
12 There are cases of sanctions by the Court of Europe for violations of the human rights of minor-
ity representatives. See: Annual Report for 1998 (1998) Sofia: Human Rights Project (NGO); or
‘Human Rights—Enforceable or Only Guaranteed’ (2000) Pari, No. 4, February.
13 The text of the accompanying declaration says: ‘The ratification and the implementation of the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities shall in no way justify any activ-
ities aimed against the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the integral Bulgarian state, its
domestic and international security’. The Convention was ratified by the votes of two-thirds of
the MPs. The final congratulation words of the prime minister before the Parliament sound
emblematic: ‘This Parliament said “yes” to patriotism and “no” to nationalism. In this Parliament
there is a European majority of two-thirds’. See: ‘The Framework Convention: The Way to
Consensus’ (1999) Ethonoreporter, No. 1, pp. 19-27.
3.3. National legal framework
In the past ten years, a number of legislative acts or amendments and revisions to exist-
ing laws have been passed, which influence (directly or indirectly) the problems of eth-
nic communities and inter-ethnic relations, and reinforce the rights guaranteed by the
Bulgarian Constitution.
3.3.1. Constitutional provisions
The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, which was voted on 12 July 1991, guar-
antees individual human rights, equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, ori-
gin, religion, education, convictions, political affiliation, personal or social status or
property standing (Article 6). Specific rights are democratically provided to citizens,
regardless of their ethnic, religious and linguistic belonging: prohibition of organisa-
tions inspiring racial hatred; the right to study one’s mother tongue and to develop
one’s ethnic culture; freedom of religion; etc. The Bulgarian Constitution does not make
any explicit reference to the term ‘national minority’. Statutory provisions (Article 11,
paragraph 4) prohibits political parties established on the basis of ethnic, racial or reli-
gious affiliation. This regulation is found to be discriminatory because it restricts the
right to association; it is criticised by both Bulgarian and international human rights
monitors.14
3.3.2. Other legal texts
Nonpenal regulations and the provisions of civil and administrative law15 guarantee nation-
al and racial equality, nondiscrimination and anti-xenophobia. The tendency of includ-
ing anti-discriminatory provisions in revising the existing legislation and passing new laws
seems to be a lasting one. Also, progress is being made with respect to the registration
and profession of minority religions. The question remains, however, as to whether the
rights provided for by the legislation are actually being implemented. In this respect, there
is still some inconsistency between the formulated and the implemented rights for minori-
ties, especially for the groups which are in a more disadvantageous position. Negative
stereotypes and discriminatory attitudes are indeed difficult to overcome (especially for
the Roma community).
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14 K. Kanev (1998) ‘Legislation and Policy to the Ethnic and religious Communities in Bulgaria’,
in: Anna Krasteva (ed.) Societies and Identities in Bulgaria, Sofia: Petekston, p. 102. 
15 Penal Code, Art. 162, 163, 164, 416, 417, 418; the Acts on: the Ministry of Interior; Public
Assemblies and Demonstrations; Bulgarian Radio and Television; Education; Higher Education;
Vocational Education; Social Benefits; Public Officials, etc.
3.4. Institutions
The elimination of discrimination and the integration of minorities is a process that can-
not be conducted only by virtue of decrees, legislative acts and orders. The governmen-
tal policy on solving minority problems must be implemented through the establishment
of special institutions.
3.4.1. Specialised bodies
In Bulgaria, there are neither anti-discriminatory laws nor specialised state bodies for the
prevention of discrimination and the encouragement of equal opportunities for all social
groups. Their establishment, however, is essential due to the special character of inter-
ethnic relations and the social and economic problems stemming from them. By the adop-
tion of the Framework Programme for the Equal Integration of the Roma in Bulgarian
Society in 1999, the government expressed their intention to set up a remedial institu-
tion and settle its legislative framework. Roma and non-Roma civil organisations are in
the process of drafting an anti-discriminatory legislative act.
During the last two years, the Centre for Social Practices (an NGO), through financing
from European programmes, has established a social facilitator, i.e. local ombudsman, in
four municipalities. The Centre for the Development of Democracy (another NGO) is draft-
ing a legislative act on the establishment of national and local parliamentary ombudsmen.
The issues concerning specialised institutions and laws to protect human rights are
already on the agenda and their political solution is pending. 
3.4.2. Consultative bodies
Public institutions at the national level are establishing specialised units and/or hiring
minority representatives who correspond between the policy of the state and the inter-
ests of the various ethno-religious groups. Such agencies exist in the Parliament, the Office
of the President and various ministries. For example, minority experts in the ministries
function in the practical implementation of specific sector measures outlined in the
Programme for the Integration of the Roma in Bulgarian Society.
During the years of the democratic transition, several consultative bodies have been
set up within the Council of Ministers,16 but their progress in dealing with issues related
to issues of minority religious groups has been inadequate.17 At the end of 1997, a National
Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues (NCEDI) was established at the Council of
Ministers. It performs an interdepartmental, consultative and co-ordinating function. Its
membership includes representatives of ministries, other governmental institutions and
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16 See: Bibliography, Position I.3, Council of Ministers Documents.
17 These consultative bodies are the result of the efforts of several governments to institutionalise
inter-ethnic relations in accordance with their traditional political approaches to the issue. The
consultative body, which was established in 1994 did not meet even once. By its philosophy and
work, the consultative body which was established in 1995 by the socialist government express-
es its perception of minority issues in terms of their social and not their ethnic aspect. None of
them has been a force for change.
minority NGOs. The major functions of the NCEDI include: (1) the encouragement of
tolerance and understanding among Bulgarian citizens belonging to various ethnic and
religious groups; (2) the adoption of specific measures for the implementation of Bulgaria’s
obligations under relevant international treaties and conventions; (3) the improvement
of communication between these groups and similar communities in other countries. This
body is responsible for dialogue between the government and the civil sector, and assists
the development and implementation of the national policy on ethnic and demographic
issues and migration. The NCEDI does not investigate individual claims: it has no pow-
ers to appeal before the court and its recommendations are not legally binding.
Within Bulgaria’s 28 regional administrations, a number of experts on ethnic issues who
belong to minority groups themselves have been appointed, many of them from the Roma
community. Regional Councils on Ethnic and Demographic Issues are being established—
comprised of the deconcentrated authorities of centralised power, regional administration,
municipal institutions and the civil sector. Each of the regional councils drafts and adopts
its own Working Rules and its own programme for the integration of ethnic minorities in
the respective region. It will be necessary to draft a legislative act that regulates the com-
petence of these experts on ethnic issues. At present, their precise role is often not clear.
At the local level, in some municipalities with a mixed population, experts on ethnic issues
are being appointed in the municipal administration. In a number of cities where there are
compact Roma communities, Roma deputy mayors are being appointed by mayors for the
respective quarters. The major function of these officers is to consult with and inform the
authorities on the problems of the community in order to co-ordinate the policy of the
municipality with the interests of minorities. Most often, however, they have no actual
power and cannot make decisions independent of the municipal councils and mayors.
3.5. Programmes
To date, no general government programme has been announced for the integrated devel-
opment of all minority communities in Bulgaria. The political commitment of the gov-
ernment to the improvement of the situation and the elimination of discrimination against
the Roma, who are the most vulnerable and disadvantaged community, was rendered
operational by the adoption of the Framework Programme for the Equal Integration of
the Roma in Bulgarian Society.
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Case Study 1. The Framework Programme for the Equal Integration 
of the Roma in Bulgarian Society18
The issue: Inequality and discriminatory attitudes towards the Roma can be observed, which is
a precondition for the problems of the Roma community in terms of the socio-economic and 
18 Sources: NGO Human Rights Project Bulletin (1998) No. 10, Special Issue; ‘An interview with R.
Rusinov’ (1999) Why not? Sofia: CEGA, No. 10, pp. 8-14; ‘Fifteen months and a half…’ (1999)
Sofia: Etnoreporter, No. 2, pp. 36-38. 
3.6. Political position
‘The basic meaning of the political approach is quite simple: integration will take place
on the basis of active participation in political life’.20 through the implementation of the
individual right of suffrage and the group right of association into political parties.
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19 Regular Report of the European Commission (1999).
20 Deian Kyuranov (1998) ‘Integration Today: An Attempt at Sysytematic Theses’, Sofia: Etnoreporter,
No. 4, p. 13.
cultural-educational plane. The successful integration of the Roma into society calls for the
application of an overall strategy of state mechanisms and measures for the attainment of the
emancipation of the group.
The actors involved: 1) National, regional and local Roma and non-Roma NGOs; 2) National
Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues at the Council of Ministers (NCEDI); 3) Regional
authorities.
The issue proceedings: At the beginning of 1998, the Human Rights Project (a Roma NGO), togeth-
er with other national Roma organisations in Bulgaria, started to draft the matrix of a pro-
gramme. The text was vastly debated by both Roma and non-Roma organisations. The gov-
ernment offered their own project. The major issue in the debate between the government and
the NGOs was discrimination. Specific measures have been listed to combat this phenome-
non. The programme became a compromise between the government project and the docu-
ment suggested by the Roma.
The strategy addressed: Strategies of advocacy and lobbying have been applied. The initiative of
the Roma NGOs was supported by the Roma community, non-Roma civil organisations and
representatives of the international community. Two round tables have been organised which
have been widely covered and publicised by the media. Deliberately cautious tactics were
applied in the advance of the talks on the convergence of positions and the finalising of texts.
The programme was composed on the principles of observing the fundamental rights and free-
doms of citizens. It was rendered in compliance with the recommendations of the European
intergovernmental institutions related to the protection of national minorities.
Result: On 22 April 1999 the Council of Ministers adopted the Framework Programme and
placed the solving of the Roma issue on the state agenda. The government document con-
tains the major principles of a general state strategy for the enactment of the actual equal
enjoyment of the rights by the Roma in the following ten years. The development of a sys-
tem of measures (which should be appropriate for their specific ethnic and cultural charac-
teristics) is envisaged for the solving of the problems of the Roma and their sustainable inte-
gration. Guarantees are being established for the equal representation of the Roma at all levels
of public administration. 
Unfortunately, this document is still void of specific content. The concrete commitments
of the ministries have not yet been voiced, nor have the envisaged expert councils been formed.
‘It is also necessary to allocate the required budget funding for the implementation of this pro-
gramme’.19 The society as a whole is not familiar with the Framework Programme. Through
this programme, however, the Roma community has made an important step towards its social
and political participation in public life.
Regardless of the prohibitive constitutional provision, a political minority organisation
was established in January 1990: the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)—con-
sisting mainly of Bulgarian Turks. The party was registered for the very first democratic
elections for the Great National Assembly in June 1990. In April 1992 the Constitutional
Court did not vote with a majority on the petition for proclaiming the organisation uncon-
stitutional. The MRF managed to survive the obstructions of nationalistic circles and to
overcome serious after effects of the ‘revival process’.21 It has been represented in Parliament
since 1990. In spite of the decreasing number of Turkish MPs in a succession of Bulgarian
parliaments,22 the MRF has preserved its role as an important parliamentary participant
and performs a balancing function in times of political crisis.
The process of political legitimisation has been completely different in the case of the
Roma. The emergent Roma civil organisations have been unable to transcend the estab-
lished two-pole political model and have gravitated toward one pole or the other—the
Socialist Party or the Union of Democratic Forces. In the first years of the post-1989 tran-
sition, the registration application of the Democratic Roma Union was rejected on the
basis of prohibitive provisions of the Constitution. At the end of 1998, about 100 Roma
representatives founded a Roma political party named Svobodna Bulgaria (Free Bulgaria).23
In 1999 it took part in local elections.
In February 1999 the Macedonian ethnic minority also registered their political party,
OMO Ilinden–PIRIN,24 which also took part in local elections. A year after its registra-
tion the Constitutional Court proclaimed it as unconstitutional, providing arguments
related to the threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The members of the
party have voiced their intention to file a petition to the European Court for Human Rights
in Strasbourg.
The remaining minority communities in the country have no representative political
organisations. They adhere to the large national political forces and participate in Parliament
through the lists of the political parties represented there.
The ethnic minority communities share a motivation and will to form political parties
and participate in power. The majority is reluctant to support the rights of minority com-
munities to political representation and to occupy key government positions at various
levels: national, regional and local.25 This tendency has remained constant throughout
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21 The ‘revival process’, which took place during 1984-1985, was the culmination of the central
government’s assimilationist policy toward the Turkish minority. The process included the force-
ful renaming of Turks. Further, Turks were forbidden to speak Turkish in public places and
were prevented from performing religious rituals. Turks were branded as ‘separatists’, and the
previously existing trust between the Turkish and Bulgarian communities was replaced by mutu-
al suspicion and alienation. 
22 See Table 5 in the Annex.
23 P. Kostov (1999) Drom Dromendar, No. 6, November.
24 The complete name of the party is the Ilinden United Macedonian Organisation: A Party for
Economic Development and Integration of the Population (PIRIN).
25 See Table 3 in the Annex. ‘Even the rights which have been accepted as a principle and imple-
mented for years are regarded with strong reservation and resistance: such as the right to learn
one’s mother tongue at school, the right to representation in local authorities and the National
Assembly, the right to radio programmes, the right to publish and distribute books and other edi-
Bulgaria’s post-communist transition, reflecting the historic negative attitudes of mistrust
and fear that have been generated in a series of social traumas in inter-ethnic relations.26
In recent years, civil organisations have worked to assist in breaking through this ethnic
‘encapsulation’.
3.7. Civil mobilisation
The right to freedom of association of citizens in NGOs is constitutionally and legally
guaranteed. The social attitudes of the majority do not impede the civil association of
minorities aimed at the preservation and the development of their culture. There is a broad
inter-ethnic consensus on these issues.27
The beginning of the democratic transition has marked the registration of numerous
cultural organisations of the Turks, Armenians, Karakachans, Wallachians and
Macedonians that are all aimed at the development and the preservation of their specific
cultures. These organisations are in the process of promoting cultural activities such as:
folklore groups, newspaper publications and mother-tongue education. The Roma com-
munity is currently forming a number of national, regional and local organisations for the
protection of their rights and the development of Roma culture.
In addition to those civil organisations founded and staffed by minority representa-
tives, a number of human rights organisations which work toward the attainment of eth-
nic harmony in Bulgarian society have minority representatives among their staff. 
The most recent legislative changes have encouraged the dialogue between public author-
ities and the civil sector by regulating the right to consultative participation of NGOs in the
work of various public bodies at the three levels of governance—national, regional and local.
NGOs have played an important role in the monitoring and advocacy of human and
minority rights. They have made particular efforts in raising awareness, sensitising and
informing both the wider public and the specialised public administration about the rights
of persons belonging to various minorities. Their activities contribute to the mobilisation
of the civil resources of ethnic communities and their more active representation on the
public scene.
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tions and other mother-tongue materials, etc. Less than half of the respondents (which were inter-
viewed in 1997 during the second part of the research on the Relations of Compatibility and
Incompatibility between the Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria) state their support for all these
rights, which are already established in post-totalitarian practices’. See: Ilona Tomova (2000)
‘Social Change and Ethnoreligious Relations’, in: Georgi Fotev (ed.) Neighbour Relations of Religious
Communities in Bulgaria. Sofia: Institute of Sociology at BAS, p. 207. See also: Interrelations of
Compatibility and Incompatibility between the Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria (1994) and (1997).
Sofia: ICMSIR; Peter-Emil Mitev (1999) ‘From Neighbourhood to Fellow Citizenship’, Etnoreporter
No. 1, Sofia: IEIHR, pp. 15-17; M. Jecheva (1998) ‘Will Integration Be Able to Fight the
Accumulated Effect of the Disadvantaged Position’, Sofia: Etnoreporter, No. 4, pp. 4-6.
26 See the above mentioned positions and also: Anna Krasteva (ed.) (1998) Societies and Identities
in Bulgaria, Sofia: Petekston; J. Georgiev, I. Tomova, K. Kanev, M. Grekova (1993) The
Ethnocultural Situation in Bulgaria, Sofia: ICMSIR.
27 See Table 3 in the Annex. 
In summary, it can be said that:
· The placement and the undertaking of legislative, political, institutional and civil
measures towards solving inter-ethnic issues in Bulgaria has been one of the most
dynamic aspects of democratic development during the last ten years, which has
been stimulated by the democratic changes in Bulgaria of 1989, international events
and the process of the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union.
· The question of adopting anti-discriminatory legislation and setting up a specialised
administrative body for the prevention of discrimination as well as the establish-
ment of national and local ombudsman is on the agenda.
· The National Council on the Ethnic and Demographic Issues (NCEDI) at the Council
of Ministers currently functions as a consultative body. Regional councils on eth-
nic and demographic issues are being established, and minority-member experts
are being appointed. The municipal administration of diversely populated regions
also employ such experts to mediate the convergence of local policy and the inter-
ests of local communities.
· No comprehensive government programme exists for the integrated development
of all minority communities in Bulgaria. Efforts have been made, however, for the
integration of the Roma population. The Framework Programme for the Equal
Integration of the Roma in Bulgarian Society is a programme unique to Bulgaria,
and includes a document indicating the commitment of the cabinet.
4. Regional and Local Dimensions 
Democratic Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with local self-governance. The decen-
tralisation of state power to the local level is constitutionally established. The state acknowl-
edges the right to self-governance of the administrative-territorial units. However, state
power preserves its authority and supervising position with respect to the protection of
the law and common national interests. A reasonable balance in the proportion between
the authorities of the central state and the self-governing territorial administration is a
prerequisite for a successful and effective management policy towards the development
of multi-cultural communities.28
BULGARIA 111
28 On the territorial and administrative structure and local government, see: ‘Public Administration
and the Democratic Process’ (1998) Sofia: Parliamentary Democracy, Special Issue; M. Stefanova
(1998) ‘The Model of Local Government in Bulgaria’, Sofia: Parliamentary Democracy, No. 8, pp.
22-37; E. Kandeva (1998) ‘Reforms in the Public Administration and the Modern State’, Sofia:
Parliamentary Democracy, No. 8, pp. 4-21; E. Kandeva (1997) ‘Bureaucracy and the Rights of
the Person: the Defence of the Rights of Citizens—a Necessary Element of the Administrative
Reform’, in: Emil Konstantinov (ed.) (1997) ‘The Civil Society and the Rights of the Person’, Sofia:
Fridrich Ebert Foundation, The Institute for Political and Legal Research, pp. 109-120.
4.1. The territorial-administrative framework
The Constitution sets forth a two-tier administrative and territorial division of the 111,000
square-kilometre territory and the 8.5 million inhabitants of Bulgaria. The major territo-
rial structures and the key levels of local government are 28 districts and 262 munici-
palities.
The administrative district or region (oblast) is a governmental level of locally decon-
centrated state power. The governance of the district is carried out by the district gover-
nor, deputy governors and district administration. The district governor is appointed by
the prime minister for an unspecified term. The major functions of the district are relat-
ed to the conduct of effective regional policy, the local implementation of state gover-
nance and the maintenance of accord between national and local interests. The district
governor exercises control over the legitimacy of the acts and the actions of local author-
ities and the locally deconcentrated units of state power within the district. The admin-
istrative districts (oblasts) are subdivided into municipalities. An average of 32 munici-
palities are included in the territory of each district (except for the capital).
The municipality (obshtina) is a major unit which enacts local governance. It exists and
functions both as an administrative and territorial unit and as a legal entity. The munic-
ipality consists of one or more neighbouring settlements whose lands constitute its terri-
tory. On average, municipalities are comprised of 21 settlements. As a legal entity, the
municipality is entitled to property ownership (both public and private), which it uses in
the interest of its territorial community. It has an independent municipal budget, which
is funded by permanent sources provided for by law.
The municipality has competencies and exerts public power according to the regula-
tions of the relevant legislation. As a public, legal and juridical entity, the municipality is
authorised—by the Constitution (Chapter 7, ‘Local Government and Local Administration’)
and legislation—to perform public services within the established local boundaries, act-
ing, at the same time, as a constituent in the specific relations with the central state power
and as a special dependent on the central state power (control over the legitimacy of acts
and actions).
The local authorities in Bulgaria are the municipal council and the mayor. They are
elected directly by residents of a municipality for a four-year term of office. 
The municipal council (Obshtinski savet) is the legislative authority of local self-gov-
ernment. It consists of municipal councilors proportionally elected from the election lists
of political parties or independent candidates. The membership of the municipal coun-
cils varies in number in proportion with the population of the municipality (from 11 to
61 members). The municipal council is a body of general competencies. It determines the
development policy for the municipality and the implementation of the public services
and activities provided for by the law. 
The mayor (kmet) is the executive authority of local self-government, which is elect-
ed on the majority principle. The mayor functions in a double capacity. As a representa-
tive of local executive power he/she manages the administrative activities of the munici-
pality, organises the performance of all the decisions of the municipal council and has
representative authorities. As a representative of the authority of the state within the munic-
ipality and as a state administrative body, the mayor organises the fulfillment of tasks gen-
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erated by legislation, acts of the president of the Republic and the Council of Ministers.
The mayor may also perform functions assigned to him/her by the central bodies of the
state. 
The mayoralty (kmetstvo) is the smallest unit of local self-government in the Republic
of Bulgaria. It is the constituent administrative-territorial unit of the municipality. Any
town, village or rural territory belonging to a municipality may be definied as a mayoral-
ty. Under the present legislation a mayoralty of above 500 inhabitants is a valid con-
stituency for the election of a mayor. Mayoralties have no financial independence.
In 1998 the government adopted a Strategy for the Establishment of a Modern
Administrative System of the Republic of Bulgaria. The document takes into account the
important role of public administration at the national and local level as an instrument
for the implementation of state policy, the enhancement of government, the regulation of
social processes, the provision of administrative servicing, permanent communication
with citizens and their organisations in a civil society environment, and the compliance
of Bulgarian legislation with that of the EU.29
4.2. Regional policy opportunities
Analysis since 1990 points to a number of problems in regional development.
Environmental conditions, inherited socio-economic and territorial structures, past poli-
cies and the dynamics of development during the transition period have resulted in
significant disparities among Bulgaria’s regions in economic development, employment,
income and quality of life.30 Those regions with concentrated minority populations have
lagged behind in their development. These regions are characterised by higher unem-
ployment rates, less developed infrastructure, lower investments and incomes, and greater
dependence on government subsidies than the national average. For example, unem-
ployment is extremely high in regions with the following compact minority populations:
Kurdjali (66%), Razgrad (53%), Turgovishte (40%), Silistra (38%) and Shumen (37%).31
According to the values of the Human Development Index,32 the districts most densely
populated by Roma communities—Montana, Sliven and Dobritch—are ranked 19TH, 28TH
and 22ND respectively.33
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Establishment of a Modern Administrative System of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Declaration
of the Government on the Strategy.
30 National Regional Development Plan for 2000-2006 (1999) State Gazette, No. 106, p. 2.
31 See Table 4 in the Annex.
32 The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the achievement of three basic dimensions of
human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. Since
1990, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has monitored, compared and ranked HDI val-
ues nearly all countries in the world. Bulgaria’s HDI ranked 60 out of 147 countries evaluated
in 2000. 
33 See Table 4 in the Annex. See also: UNDP (1999) National Report on Human Development in
Bulgaria. It must be mentioned that the correlation between the values of the Human Development
Index at the district level is not straightforward due to the more complex nature of the 
In response to these disparities, the central government developed and began to imple-
ment a regional development policy34 with the objective of achieving sustainable and bal-
anced development by directing resources and developing infrastructure and economic
activities in certain regions. Four types of regions have been targeted for impact: (1) regions
for growth, (2) regions for development, (3) regions for transfrontier co-operation and
development, and (4) regions with particular problems and priorities (including declin-
ing industrial regions, underdeveloped rural regions and mountainous regions). The cri-
teria used in defining these categories were established by a team made up of both Bulgarian
and EU development experts. This policy programme is important with respect to minor-
ity integration issues, because the last two types of regions are highly populated by minor-
ity groups. 
In terms of regional development, the major policy objective of the current govern-
ment is to reduce the number of the municipalities and regions which have reached crit-
ical levels of poverty, unemployment, population decline, environmental problems, and
social and ethnic tensions.35 Favourable conditions for such developments are: the reform
of the territorial and administrative division of the country, the formation of 28 districts,
the adoption of the Regional Development Act36 and the reform of public administra-
tion.37 Transparency has been introduced into the process of regional and municipality
planning and forecasting, and greater opportunities are being created for civil participa-
tion.38 Additionally, citizens now have wider access to public services.
It is important to stress that the implementation of regional policy in Bulgaria has
been a two-way process: bottom-up as well as top-down mechanisms exist for the draft-
ing of regional development plans. For instance, every year, each of the 262 municipal-
ities develops its own municipal development strategy. On the basis of these strategies,
each of the 28 districts (regions) designs a District Plan for Development. Using these
district plans, the National Plan for Regional Development is put together. Local-level
planning initiatives are thus taken into consideration at higher levels of government. In
light of this process, it is especially important that minority communities be active with-
in their municipalities in order that issues of concern to them are included in these devel-
opment plans.
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relation and the averaging of the values of the individual components of the Index.
34 This policy is laid out in the Regional Development Act—a legislative document that regulates
the planning, management and provision of resources for regional development. 
35 National Regional Development Plan for 2000-2006 (1999) State Gazette, No. 106, p. 2.
36 Regional Development Act (1999) State Gazette, No. 26. 
37 During the last two years new legislation and subsidiary acts were adopted, as well as revisions
were made in the existing legislative basis, which shall provide for a modern public adminis-
tration in Bulgaria: the Public Administration Act, the Public Official Act; the Public Procurement
Act; the Local Finance Act. Revisions: the Act on the Territorial and Administrative Division of
the Country; the Act on the Local Self-Government and Local Administration, etc.
38 ‘It is the administrative reform which, through specific measures, could bring the state and the civil
society closer or make the relations between them less controversial’. E. Kandeva (1997) ‘Bureaucracy
and the Rights of the Person: the Defence of the Rights of Citizens—a Necessary Element of the
Administrative Reform’, in: Emil Konstantinov (ed.) The Civil Society and the Rights of the Person,
Sofia: Fridrich Ebert Foundation, Institute for Political and Legal Research, p. 113.
4.3. Regional differences and municipal budgets
The regional administrative-territorial tier in Bulgaria acts as a kind of intermediary between
the central and local government. The sphere of the relations between central and local
authority is backed by guarantees for the respect of citizens’ right to self-government and
for the provision of opportunities for local authorities to exercise their rights and perform
their duties. In practice, however, regardless of the process of reforms geared toward
increased autonomy and distinct decentralisation in terms of organisation and finance,
local government structures in Bulgaria do not yet have the financial independence nec-
essary to perform their functions without the financial support of the state.
Within the structure of the municipal budgets, more than one-third of the incomes
column is composed of state transfers in the form of general or specifically allocated sub-
sidies, whereas about half of the funds are procured from taxes shared with the state. Own
and raised funds in the municipal budgets have little relative weight. Municipal councils
have no powers to levy additional taxes on local citizens except for those provided for by
the law. Two-thirds of the municipalities in Bulgaria depend on state budget subsidies
above 50%, and 17% of them have a dependency higher than 80%. The 44 municipali-
ties in question are mainly small mountainous ones, economically underdeveloped, with
a high rate of migration and with a population of ethnic and religious minorities. The gen-
eralised data at the district level confirm the highest dependency of municipal budgets
on centralised subsidies for the districts with compact minority populations like Kurdjali,
Silistra, Montana, Targovishte, Razgrad, Shumen and Sliven.39 The reason for this is the
limited own revenues generated within the municipal budgets.
People residing in these regions are of unequal standing in terms of their access to
opportunities for equal development. Local authorities are restricted in their attempts to
launch their own decentralised initiatives due to their drastic dependence on the finan-
cial abilities of the state.
About 90% of the municipalities’ funds are spent on current expenses: teachers and
physicians’ salaries, medicines and medicinal products, heating, social services, repairs,
etc. Municipalities allocate most of their funds for education, health care and social sup-
port. The means for building new facilities are meagre.
Budgets are inadequate for the range of multiple services which municipal authorities
are expected to provide to the population. The most frequent practices search for oppor-
tunities to raise some of the necessary funding from external sources: international pro-
grammes, co-financing of activities by civil organisations and formation of specialised
funds.
4.4. Minority representation
Minority representatives have an increasing opportunity to participate in the local gov-
ernment authorities of Bulgaria.
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Bulgaria, p. 72..
From the very first democratic elections held in 1991 until the most recent elections
in 1999, the Bulgarian Turks, represented by the MRF, have enjoyed significant repre-
sentation in local government authorities in those municipalities traditionally populated
by compact Bulgarian Turk communities. Roma representation at the local level is spo-
radic. The Roma, like all the other ethnic groups, participate in local authorities as rep-
resentatives of the dominant political forces in the country.
The results of the latest local elections show the political and the ethnic patchwork of
the public vote. In some places voters have supported mayoral candidates and municipal
councilors appointed as independent nominees by local and regional coalitions. These
1999 elections were the first in which the Roma and the Macedonian communities had
their first participation as politically legitimate forces through their parties, Free Bulgaria
and OMO Ilinden–PIRIN, and won mandates as municipal councilors and mayors.40 The
result of the elections was significantly wider multi-ethnic representation in local author-
ities: municipal councils and mayors.
The latest legislative revisions of local self-government increase the dependency of
mayors on municipal council decisions. These decisions, however, will be less and less
entrusted to one-party and mono-ethnic majorities, and the groups promoted by civil
society will have a greater influence on local policy.
4.5. Local management practices
This wider ethnic representation in local self-government bodies has already begun to
yield practical results in the management of multi-ethnic communities.
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on 16 October 1999 and on 23 October 1999, Vol. I, General Results, Sofia: CCLE.
41 Sources: I. Bedrov (2000) ‘Discrimination in Establishments Is a Disturbance of Social Order’,
Sofia: Etnoreporter, No. 1, p. 14.
Case Study 2. Local Government Measures against Discrimination
Case study: Local government measures against minority discrimination and solving minority
issues in the municipality of Pazardjik.41
The issue: There are overt discriminatory practices against minority groups (which consist of
about 20,000 Roma and Turks) in the town of Pazardjik (the municipal centre). Some public
posted signs reading, ‘We don’t serve food to minorities’. In addition to this humiliation, the
Roma population has grievous socio-economic problems. 
The actors involved: 1) The Municipal Council; 2) The Mayor; 3) Municipal administration; 4)
Representatives of the ethnic quarter in the town: municipal councilors from Svobodna (Free)
Bulgaria Roma party and other political forces.
The issue proceedings: Between two mayoral polls in October 1999, an agreement was signed for
joint government, whereas the Roma party undertook to support the mayoral candidate from
the United Democratic Forces (UDF) Coalition, and UDF committed to attending to the prob-
lems of minorities. At the third session of the newly elected municipal council where five 
Municipal authorities in Bulgaria have applied various approaches for the expansion
of civil participation in domestic legislation and government.
In some municipalities, the drafting of the internal rules of the municipal council is
debated together with civil organisations. The exercise of civil control over the work of
municipal administration, the mayor and the municipal council is being regulated.
Often, before sessions of the municipal council, public discussions are held on vari-
ous issues and are covered by local radio and TV stations, thus providing the opportuni-
ty for direct participation. Thus public consensus is attained even before any decisions
are taken by commissions on the municipal council.
Another approach widely used by the municipalities is the involvement of civil organ-
isations’ representatives in the work of municipal commissions. 
In many places, public councils for the various areas of municipal administration (main-
ly unemployment, social care, health care and education) have been established and func-
tion successfully. They have consultative functions and their members are volunteers with-
in the council. They consist of representatives of the municipal services, NGOs, other
organisations and institutions affected by the relevant issues and representatives of informal
communities. Those public councils which have minorities among their members function
as intermediaries between the minority population and specialised municipal services.
NGOs participate in the formulation of local development strategies. Thus munici-
palities with diverse ethnic populations apply a model whereby professionals, regardless
of their ethnic belonging or creed, may work together for the sustainable development of
the municipality and the region.
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minority representatives were sitting, the Ordinance on Observing the Order in Public Food
Establishments was revised unanimously. Revisions set forth fines to be imposed on those own-
ers of public food establishments who selected their customers on ethnic grounds. Any attempts
to violate the provision for a second time would the invalidation of their license for commer-
cial activity. For the first time ever in the history of the municipality a Human Rights Unit was
established which is managed by the head of the Mayor’s Office in municipal administration.
The strategy addressed: The political agreement signed for the purpose of winning the local mayor
elections has turned into a working strategy for the multi-ethnic government of the munici-
pality. Legislative measures are being taken at the local level to prevent discrimination against
minorities, which constitute 80% of the citizens coming to the Mayor’s Office to complain
about various issues. The recruitment of Roma and Turks as police officers is pending, togeth-
er with the elimination of segregation in municipal schools and kindergartens. In co-opera-
tion with the National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues at the Council of Ministers
and the Shelter for Everyone Foundation, municipal authorities are developing a programme
on building housing facilities for poor minority people. The project is currently raising funds.
The construction design plans have been drawn. It is necessary to draw the urban plan for the
quarter. The building of the houses will be carried out by the programme, whereas the munic-
ipality is committed to building the infrastructure.
The results: Open discriminatory practices against minorities at public places have been restrict-
ed. The representation of minorities in the public services is about to grow. Overall work is
being done for solving the socio-economic matters, housing and ameliorating the quarter pop-
ulated mainly by minority groups.
The latest local elections have illustrated that a government model is needed that pro-
vides for the broader participation of the civil sector in decision-making processes for the
development of the country. The development of such a model is already underway.
4.6. Local public services 
The Local Government and Local Administration Act42 (which stipulates the competen-
cies of local authorities) complies with the European Local Government Charter to which
Bulgaria is a party. It empowers the local authorities elected by the citizens to solve, with-
in their competencies, issues in all areas of life for the territory of the municipality. Local
authorities are obliged to provide services related to: education, health care, culture, ame-
lioration, communal activities, social support, social and housing facilities, environmen-
tal protection, rational utilisation of natural resources, and development of sports, recre-
ation and tourism.
4.6.1. Education and intercultural dialogue at school
In Bulgaria, rights to the development of ethnic cultures, education, the study of one’s
mother tongue and access to the media are all guaranteed by the Constitution. In prac-
tice, however, the attitude often persists that the protection of minority rights represents
a threat to national interests and national security.
Education is a very sensitive aspect of inter-ethnic relations. Schools are a socialising
and cultural institution that do not merely transfer knowledge but also play a crucial role
in shaping attitudes about one’s ‘own’ and ‘other’ ethnic groups. The Bulgarian govern-
ment does not make use of a clear-cut, well-defined guiding philosophy in developing
policies related to multi-cultural and intercultural education.
The education system in Bulgaria is deconcentrated rather than decentralised. The state
determines the school curriculum. Between 2% and 10% of the local public school cur-
riculum may be devoted to programmes of their choice, but these programmes must be
offered as electives. In 1999 an Act regulating school curricula, minimum-level educa-
tion and levels of education was adopted. In May 2000 the Ministry of Education and
Science issued an Instruction on State Educational Requirements. Together, these two
documents determine the content of the public school curriculum and the obligatory skills
and knowledge that students must acquire by the end of each level of education. According
to these new laws, which will come into force beginning in the 2001-2002 school year,
the school curriculum is less tightly controlled by the central government. From that point
on, between 12% and 40% of the school curriculum (depending on the level of educa-
tion) can be determined by the school itself. 
This nascent decentralisation process allows for the development of special programmes
for intercultural dialogue and leaves open the possibility of greater co-operation between
the four major players in the education system: teachers, parents, public authorities (state
and local) and students. 
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Three types of schools exist in Bulgaria: state, municipal and private schools. State
school teachers are paid through the state budget, and municipal school teachers are paid
through the municipal budgets. In practice, however, a substantial part of the municipal
budget is in reality a state subsidy. As such, a significant part (and often the entirety) of
municipal school teachers’ salaries come from the state budget. The local government is
at present responsible only for building maintenance and not for pedagogical issues. The
responsibilities of the local government are merely to ensure that the necessary require-
ments for the functioning of the school are met, and to ensure that children below the
minimum legal drop-out age are enrolled in school.
Appropriate policy decision-making for the schools and the supervision of the results
will require the more active participation of parents and civil organisations. The intro-
duction of multi- and inter-ethnic education sensitive to the specific needs of various eth-
nic groups, the use of adequate pedagogical strategies, flexible teaching programmes and
diverse educational forms are all necessary conditions for the improvement of minority
education, and represent a challenge which local public authorities must face.
4.6.2. Mother-tongue education
Mother-tongue education, which was introduced in 1992, was supported neither by a
sufficient number of books and classes nor with qualified teachers for bilingual children.
These deficiencies serve as major impediments to the effective implementation of per-
missive provisions on education.
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Religions’, Sofia: Etnoreporter. No. 6, p. 26.
Case Study 3. A Pilot Programme for Tolerance
Case study: A trial for intercultural dialogue in a school in the city of Shumen.43
The issue: Children from various ethno-cultural/religious groups experience difficulties in com-
munication due to their mutual unfamiliarity.
The actors involved: 1) Local authorities; 2) The Department of Philosophy at the University of
Sofia; 3) The University of Shumen; 4) The Minerva Foundation.
The issue proceedings: Through the financial support of PHARE, a project has been implemented
entitled, ‘The Enhancement of the Communication Methods between Minority Ethnocultural
Communities and Civil Society in Bulgaria’. The project activities are focused in the municipal
school of Shumen, which is the centre of a municipality with a large population of Muslim Turks
and Roma. Under the supervision of specially trained teachers, students were expected to com-
pare the major moral edicts of the Bible and the Koran and the proverbs of the various ethnic
groups: Bulgarians, Turks, Roma and Armenians. 
The strategy addressed: Through the use of research, comparative and analytical techniques, prox-
imity is sought between the value systems of the various ethnic and religious groups, as they
are reflected by the proverbs and sayings and the major scriptures of Christianity and Islam.
The results: By increasing knowledge of various ethnic cultures and religions and, also, by dis-
covering the similarities and the differences between them, trainees are expected to gain a bet-
ter mutual acquaintance and understanding.
The intensified public debate on human rights, closely related to the process of Bulgaria’s
integration into European institutions, and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, have
given new status to issues related to mother-tongue education, particularly following the
adoption of the Act on the Degree of Education, General Education Minimum
Requirements and the Educational Plan in 1999. On the volition of students, mother
tongue will be studied at primary and secondary schools within the regular curricular
classes allocated electives. The status of the teachers has been changed and there will be
no need for their annual re-appointment. This implies that municipal authorities will need
to allot the necessary organisational, financial and facility resources in order to provision
mother-tongue education at school.
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Case Study 4. Hebrew in Sofia
Case study: A successful model of mother-tongue education (Hebrew) implemented in a school
in Sofia (Hebrew and English Language Elementary School) which is also attended by Bulgarian
children.44
The issue: Mother-tongue education in a school with broad Jewish attendance aimed at the preser-
vation of the cultural identity of the ethnic group.
The actors involved: 1) The Ministry of Education and Science, 2) Local authorities; 3) The School
Supervisory Board, the School Board and the teaching staff; 4) The Jewish Shalom Organisation
in Bulgaria; 5) The Ronald S. Lauder Foundation, New York, USA.
The issue proceedings: The state school is of mixed attendance, with both Jewish and Bulgarian
pupils. From the 1998 school year, two curricula are being implemented in the school. In the
first one, Hebrew is taught as a mother tongue twice per week as an optional choice. More
than one-third of the attendees study Hebrew as their mother tongue. Some Bulgarians also
attend this programme. The groups are formed after determining the language proficiency of
the children. In the second curriculum, Hebrew is taught as the first foreign language within
the regular classes of the school (from the first year onwards). From the third year on the study
of the second foreign language (English) is introduced. Books in Hebrew have been approved
by the Ministry of Education and Science. The curriculum in Hebrew is uniform for a total of
fifteen schools from CEE, that participate in an educational network under the auspices of the
Ronald S. Lauder Foundation. The curriculum, the know-how, the preparation of teachers and
the various teaching tools such as audio and video recordings, newspapers, magazines, etc.,
were provided by the Ronald S. Lauder Foundation, New York, USA. Mother-tongue classes
are aided by computers where pupils have access to the Internet.
The strategy addressed: The collaboration between the various international, national, local and
civil institutions and organisations provide for all necessary means for mother-tongue educa-
tion. This hones the interest of Bulgarian children who wish to share in the classes of Hebrew
groups and thus gain an acquaintance with the language and the culture of the other ethnic
group.
The results: The children from the Jewish community in Sofia are able to preserve and develop
their ethnic culture through the study of their mother tongue, the Jewish cycle of life and
Jewish Festivals. In parallel, the participation of Bulgarian pupils in the Hebrew classes helps
to break down social barriers between the different ethnic groups at the school. Steps are being
taken for the transformation of the elementary school into a secondary school.
Regardless of the permissive provision, the system still lacks a coherent philosophy of
education about and in the mother tongue. But the impediments enumerated above are
not fully resolved. Adequate solutions will be sought by the innovative approach of local
authority representatives and the teachers in each municipality and each individual school.
The partnership of NGOs working in this area is already yielding positive results for the
solving of these issues at a local level.
4.6.3. Preventing drop-outs 
In combination with various government strategies, the partnership referred to above is
useful for solving another serious educational problem: minority children dropping out
of school. According to the 1999 National Human Development Report, during the 1998-
1999 school year, the official number of school drop-outs was 36,000. Other organisa-
tions and NGOs have estimated that the number of school-age children not attending
school is closer to 120,000. These are mainly Roma children. Some of them never attend
school, while others are unable to pass to a higher grade.
This problem has thus far been addressed by public authorities through various man-
agement strategies. Administrative sanctions (such as fines) for the parents refusing to
send their children to school are ineffective, especially with poor Roma families.
The attempt to attract Roma children to school by providing humanitarian aid is unsus-
tainable. Once food supplies cease, non-attendance returns to its previous rates. A more
successful approach would be to motivate the parents and the children by persuading them
that education will give them better opportunities in their lives. This is a slow process, but,
in addition to parent-teacher-child work, it is important for the campaign to be reinforced
by interesting activities relevant to the everyday life, culture and character of the child.
Municipal decisions in the area of education acknowledge the fact that Bulgarian is
not the mother tongue for the majority of Turkish and Roma students. In some schools
children attend the ‘preparatory classes’ provided for by law. In the course of one year
during nursery school or their first year of primary school, children are trained in the
official Bulgarian language. The attendance rates in such classes for Roma children are
still low. In some of the municipalities, ethnic NGO collaborators assist local school author-
ities by visiting families’ homes and trying to convince parents of the benefits of this pre-
liminary education for their children.
Another method is the appointment of assistant Roma teachers as mediators between
minority children, their parents and majority teachers. Where this approach has been
used the results have been very promising.
The provision of adequate education corresponding to labour market demands, moth-
er-tongue education and the introduction of intercultural dialogue into the curricula of
Bulgarian schools are landmarks in the preservation of various cultural identities and the
development of the intercultural experience.
4.6.4. Access to the media and intercultural dialogue
In theory, the media should play a crucial role in the development and the encourage-
ment of different ethnic cultures, and of mutual understanding between the majority and
minority communities. In practice, however, there is no intercultural dialogue in the media
and minority access to the media is limited.
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Events are presented and interpreted exclusively from the viewpoint of the ethnic
majority. Therefore, the state and local authorities need to implement policies that will
ensure the participation of minorities in the media and promote inter-ethnic dialogue
rather than the monolithic representation of individual ethnic communities. This partic-
ipation has to account both for programmes addressing minorities and for the involve-
ment of journalists of diverse ethnic backgrounds.
Examples of programmes by and on minorities exist at a local level. They are sup-
ported by local radio stations, cable televisions and NGOs.
Some of the local radio stations have been broadcasting in Turkish since 1990. The
National Radio has transmitted such programmes since 1993. There is a programme for
minorities on national television. Private TV channels have also allocated time to minor-
ity issues. A Turkish-language programme has recently been launched in regions with
compact minority populations.
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45 E. Tododrov, M. Velikova (1999) ‘A TV Programme Standing on its Own (for Now)’, Sofia:
Etnoreporter, No. 5, pp. 51-52.
Case Study 5. Neighbourhood TV 
Case study: Neighbourhood TV programme produced by Trakia Public Television, Plovdiv.45
The issue: Plovdiv is the second largest city of Bulgaria and it is typical for its multi-ethnic pop-
ulation. There is a large Roma ghetto in the city. Ethnic groups live in mutual ignorance and
mistrust of one another. No media programmes have been launched for or by minorities. 
The actors involved: 1) Local authorities, 2) Trakia Public Television, Plovdiv; 3) The Media with
A Human Face Association, 4) Local NGOs working for the inter-ethnic relations in the region.
The issue proceedings: Neighbourhood is the first programme in Bulgaria that has made an attempt
to address both multi-ethnic needs and the Bulgarian model of inter-ethnic tolerance. The TV
programme is financed by the Open Society Foundation (Sofia) and the King Baudoin
Foundation (Belgium). The Media with a Human Face Association managed to assemble a
good multi-ethnic team of moderators, cameramen and consultants representing Balkan minori-
ties. Very soon, the 20-minute regional programme became so popular that other cable tele-
visions decided to broadcast it as well. It presents the customs and the traditions of the vari-
ous ethnic communities, their problems and their standpoint on public issues since 1997. 
The strategy addressed: Representatives from the different ethnic groups on the team exchange
their ideas and views for the TV programme. Thus, through their co-operative work, they pre-
sent a crystallised formula for mutual acquaintance via electronic media. The programme acted
as an impetus for outsiders to speak and show their ways of life, their customs, beliefs and his-
tory, thus bridging the differences between minorities and attaining better understanding
between the communities. 
The results: Minority representatives are provided with an opportunity to access the media.
Intercultural dialogue was started on a local TV programme in order to foster the acquain-
tance and understanding between citizens. The Neighbourhood programme in Plovdiv was
chosen to represent Bulgaria in a publication of the European Commission Against Racism
and Intolerance entitled Examples of Good Practice Against Racism in the Media, which was
released in April 2000. 
Nine newspapers have been published in Turkish during the transition period. Some
of them have closed down due to funding problems. The Armenian and the Jewish com-
munities each have an independent press. In the case of the Roma, eleven periodicals
were designed for publication after 1989. Some of them barely managed to release one
or two issues. Nonetheless, for the past six years, the local media space has included
the Roma publication, Drom Dromendar, released in Sliven (a city with a high Roma
population).
Aided by sponsors, NGOs active in some neighbourhoods with compact minority pop-
ulations have been able to publish information bulletins or newspapers. They publicise
the activities of NGOs among the local community and provide information on the ini-
tiatives of municipal authorities which address minority problems.
4.6.5. Employment and unemployment
The problems related to the education and qualification of vulnerable minority groups
are directly related to the high rates of unemployment among them. There is a definite
discriminatory attitude against the Roma in the labour market.
Local unemployment offices are the major vehicles for a number of national pro-
grammes aimed at the enhancement of employment opportunities for minority repre-
sentatives. Among these programmes are: Beautiful Bulgaria; From Social Benefits to
Employment; Attaining Literacy, Qualification and Employment; etc. Effective partner-
ship routines are established between local unemployment offices and minority NGOs
for the participation of minority representatives in the programmes.46 Such programmes,
however, are not very productive because minority members gain only temporary employ-
ment at low salaries that are inadequate to support their families.
A number of municipalities have created and dispatched Public Councils on
Unemployment which function on the basis of the ‘tripartite’ principle (they include rep-
resentatives of the deconcentrated state and municipal offices, employers’ organisations
and employees’ organisations) and involve minority representatives as their members.
According to the varying potential of local economies, the councils have been exploring
possibilities for the creation of new jobs. One of the measures that could prove effective
is the elaboration of programmes for qualification training and employment that take into
account local labour market demand and the specific labour patterns of some Roma groups
(especially in regions dominated by seasonal employment).
4.6.6. Social assistance
Vulnerable minority groups (especially the Roma) are the major beneficiaries of social
support services. In a large number of municipalities, the meagre budgets and the allo-
cation of funds to other priorities is the main reason for the irregular payment of month-
ly benefits. As they are the primary source for the survival of the Roma, overdue payments
sometimes generate social tension.
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46 An example in this respect is the unemployment office servicing the minority neighbourhood
of Stolipinovo in Plovdiv. A minority representative from the neighbourhood is employed in the
office. Active minority NGOs contributed to the work of the commission responsible to elect
this candidate. 
Municipal Social Care Offices often rely on the effective assistance of local minority
NGOs. In many cases, they participate in Community Councils (which are legislatively
provided for by the Rules for Social Assistance). They exercise civil control over the appor-
tioning of the various types of social benefits. Some NGOs have set up their own social
offices to mediate in the servicing of the Roma population by the municipality. Legal pro-
visions allow NGOs to be licensed and exercise a specific range of social activities. Holders
of such licenses may apply for finances before the National Social Assistance Fund (in
order to perform the services).
4.6.7. Housing and public amenities
Housing, public amenities and communal activities constitute a major part of the respon-
sibilities and services provided by local authorities. Multiple investments are necessary in
order to improve the technical and social infrastructure, which is in extremely poor con-
dition in the Roma neighbourhoods in a number of towns and villages.
In many towns and villages Roma quarters or parts of them are outside the planning
regulations. As such, their status is uncertain and the effective construction and regula-
tion plans for the respective settlement cannot be applied. Public services and public com-
munity spaces (parks etc.) are almost nonexistent. These areas are characterised by ille-
gally erected structures, an extreme density of habitation, and appalling sanitary,
environmental and technical conditions. Housing facilities are mainly generally ramshackle
or make-shift structures.
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Case Study 6. A Community Council Improves Social Services for Roma
Case study: Intermediary functions of a Roma community council in social activities in the munic-
ipality of Karlovo.
The issue: The municipality of Karlovo (with the town of Karlovo as its centre) is populated by
a large Roma community. Its major source of income is social benefits. Municipal social ser-
vices find it hard to function accordingly due to the poor proficiency of the Roma in Bulgarian.
The actors involved: 1) Local authorities and municipal services; 2) The V. Levski Human Rights
Centre, Karlovo (NGO); 3) The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.
The issue proceedings: In 1999 the V. Levski Human Rights Centre, Karlovo, obtained a license
from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy for carrying out three types of social activities
conducted respectively through: The Social Service Office, the Club of the Disabled and the
Public Charitable Kitchen. The financing of these activities was supported jointly by the munic-
ipal budget and the Social Assistance Fund. In January 2000, by the decision of the Municipal
Council, a Roma Community Council was established to exercise civil control over the allot-
ment of social aid and to mediate between the Municipal Social Care Service and the local
Roma community. The seven Roma on the council are responsible for a community of 5,000.
Such councils are about to be established in the villages near Karlovo where the Roma popu-
lation is numerous.
The strategy addressed: The national and local authorities and NGOs are joining their efforts to
enhance the social services for the population in the municipality.
The results: The Roma community made a step towards its social participation in the public life
of the municipality. The services for the minority population are improved.
Local authorities are exploiting an expanding co-operation scheme with NGOs for the
improvement of these quarters. Most often, NGOs provide the architectural designs for
housing facilities and try to raise funds for their construction. Local authorities have
assumed the commitment to improve technical facilities.
In summary:
· Policies implemented in the fields of regional and local development are aimed at
decreasing the existing disparities between regions and municipalities. The admin-
istrative-territorial units with compact minority populations most frequently expe-
rience hardships in their development.
· Regional and local authorities and the NGOs are collaborating to provide a range
of services to their communities. The limitations in the financial decentralisation
of municipalities are decreasing the opportunities for specific initiatives address-
ing minority issues.
· Minorities are represented in municipal councils. Municipal authorities apply more
flexible solutions and innovative practices for the involvement of citizens’ groups
in the management and solving of the specific problems of multi-ethnic commu-
nities.
5. Conclusion and Recommendations
In the past ten years, the democratic development of Bulgaria and the adoption of mea-
sures for the harmonisation of inter-ethnic relations has resulted in the preservation of
the Bulgarian pattern of ethnic co-habitation. The issue of inter-ethnic co-operation is
more widely voiced in the public sphere than it was ten years ago. Progress has been made
in the rendering of national legislation and practices in compliance with international
standards for the protection of human and minority rights. There is a growing under-
standing that targeted measures must be adopted to address the problems of the most
vulnerable minority group—the Roma. A government consultative body on ethnic issues
has been established which has divisions at the regional level. A persistent tendency is
the creation of partnerships between public authorities at all government levels and NGOs.
The transition to a market economy affected most unfavourably the socio-economic sta-
tus of Roma, Turks and Bulgarian Muslims. Uneven development during the transition
has resulted in increased ethnocentrism and the manifestation of open discriminatory atti-
tudes, particularly against the Roma community.
The obvious progress that has been made in the field of inter-ethnic relations must be
complemented by the adoption of further democratic measures for the preservation of
ethnicity and the future integration of minorities:
· The current information on the status quo of the various ethnic groups living in
Bulgaria must be made available to the public.
· Criminal accusations made on the basis of race or ethnicity must be explicitly includ-
ed in the provisions of the Penal Code as an aggravating circumstance.
· It is important to establish an extra-judiciary institution (an ombudsman) to which
victims may appeal to resolve problems of discrimination at national and local levels.
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· An approach of ‘positive action’ must be applied to equalise the opportunities of
minorities with those for the majority under the conditions of competition and
democracy. This is a different approach from ‘positive discrimination’, which can
intensify negative stereotypes and the humiliation of minorities.
· Minorities and their organisations must become active participants in the public
sphere by putting forth their problems and decision-making processes for address-
ing them. This will help in the establishment of programmes for integrated and sus-
tainable development to respond to the specific nature and needs of the local com-
munity. The active stand of minorities in the public administrative government at
all levels (national, regional, and local) is a prerequisite for the successful imple-
mentation of such programmes.
The growing responsibility of public authorities for the democratic and effective man-
agement of multi-cultural communities requires more than just a traditional proficiency
in the major principles of public administration:
· Political dedication and mutual co-operation between authorities is needed to solve
problems at all government levels and to ensure the provision of adequate services
to the population.
· It is necessary to know and understand the cultural peculiarities of the various eth-
nic communities that exist together. Administrative decisions should be made with-
in the broader context of respect for the cultures of all ethnic groups.
· Improvement is needed in the organisational systems, procedures and practices of
all levels of public administration in order to ensure that they are as flexible, open,
accessible, accountable and democratic as possible in their interactions with minor-
ity groups and individuals.
· It is important to establish a clear division of roles, prerogatives, and responsibili-
ties among the various actors involved in community development. This should
have a positive impact on efficiency, equity, and economic, political and civil par-
ticipation at the local level.
· It is of key importance that governors and other public administrators possess the
conflict-management and mediation skills necessary to act as ‘honest brokers’ in
the case of inter-ethnic conflicts of interest. These skills should be acquired by stu-
dents of public administration and by acting public administrators. This requires:
a) The inclusion of special courses on ethnic conflict management/resolution with-
in the curricula of public administration schools;
b) The inclusion of specific training courses for acting public administrators that
focus on issues of multi-ethnic community management;
c) The compilation of a database of ‘good practices’ in managing multi-ethnic com-
munities that should be easily accessible for public administrators;
d) The encouragement of networking among public administrators in order to facil-
itate the exchange of ideas and experiences on these issues. 
The major requirements of the modern world place a challenge before the public
authorities in the management of multi-ethnic communities:
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· The world is a multi-cultural place and this calls for the implementation of a man-
agerial policy which combines multi-ethnicity and inter-ethnicity. Therefore, rep-
resentatives of authority need to be ethnically sensitive in order to be aware of the
differences on the intercultural plane. This approach will lead to proactive prac-
tices of inter-ethnic collaboration, partnership and co-operation for the joint
improvement of each individual local community. The diversity of cultures and
languages must not split the community but enrich it.
· The processes of globalisation and localisation are deepening. They can be experi-
enced even at a local level where people act locally even when they think ‘global-
ly’. Public authorities must skillfully combine the strategies for global macrodevel-
opment of the community and individual strategies for human development, which
are enacted at a personal level and depend on local conditions for their successful
operation.
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ANNEX
Table A.1. The Largest Ethnic Minorities in Bulgaria and their Main Characteristics:
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Ethnic Group Number Character Type of Religion Region(s)
in thou- of distribution distribution 
sands (compact/ (city/village)
and % dispersed)
of total
Turks 800.0 Dispersed, but Predominantly Muslim Southeast: the 
9.43% regionally rural. 98.8% Rhodope mountain:
concentrated The ratio: Kirdzhali, Haskovo; 
rural to urban Northeast:
population is (Deliormana): 
68% to 32% Razgrad, Burgas, 
Silistra, Targovishte, 
Varna, Shumen
Roma 313.0 Dispersed on the Urban 52% Christians Cities: regional cen-
3.69% territory of the and rural 48% (60.4%) tres and towns (Sofia, 
country but resi- Muslims Plovdiv, Sliven, 
dence in compact (39.2%) Pazardzik, Lom, Stara 
homogeneous Zagora, Vidin, 
communities Montana, Burgas, 
‘Roma areas’ or Varna; Rural popula-
‘Roma neighbour- tion in the regions of 
hoods’ Lom, Sliven, Plovdiv, 
Stara Zagora, etc.)
Russians 17.0 Predominantly urban Russian Cities and towns 
0.20% dispersed Orthodox (Sofia, Shumen, 
Varna, Plovdiv, etc.)
Armenians 13.7 dispersed Urban 99% Christians Cities and towns 
0.16% (Plovdiv, Sofia, Varna, 
Russe, Shumen, etc.)
Macedonians 10.8 Predominantly Rural and Christians Southwest part (the 
0.13% compact, Urban region of Pirin 
regionally mountain)
concentrated
Karakachans 5.0 Predominantly Rural and Christians Villages and towns 
0.06% compact urban close to the mountain 
pastures (the region of 
the Balkan mountain 
range—Stara Planina—
Berkovitza, Montana, 
Sliven, Tvarditza, 
Nikolaevo, Peshtera, 
Samokov, etc.
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Ethnic Group Number Character Type of Religion Region(s)
in thou- of distribution distribution 
sands (compact/ (city/village)
and % dispersed)
of total
Wallachians 5.0 Predominantly Rural and Christians Northwest region 
0.06% compact urban near the northern 
border: the Danube 
river (the regions of 
Vidin, Kula, Oriahovo, 
Lom, Nikopol, 
Svishtov, etc.) and in 
the inner parts of the 
country—in the 
regions of Peshtera, 
Dupnitza
Greeks 4.9 Dispersed but urban Christians Black sea coast towns: 
0.05% regionally Varna, Burgas, 
concentrated Tzarevo, Pomorie, 
Ahtopol, Sozopol, 
Nesebar, etc.; in 
towns of central 
southern part: 
Assenovgrad, Topo-
lovgrad, Plovdiv, etc.
Tatars 4.4 compact Predominantly Muslim Rural population in 
0.05% rural Dobrudza region and 
Ludogorie region
Jews 3.5 Dispersed and Urban—95% Judaism Cities and towns: 
0.04% compact in the (approximately one-
capital half live in Sofia) 
Plovdiv. Russe, 
Shumen, Varna,  
Burgas, Kyustendil, 
etc.
Gagaus 1.5 Predominantly Predominantly Christians Northeast part:
0.02 % compact rural the regions of Balchik,
Varna, Shumen, etc.
Table A.2. Some Demographic and Socio-economic Characteristics 
of the Major Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria (in %)
Sources: National Statistical Institute, Sofia (1994) Results of the 1992 Population Census, Vol. I
Demographic Characteristics; The World Bank Report (1999) Bulgaria, Poverty During the
Transition.
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Characteristics Bulgarians Bulgarian Roma Other
Turks
Age group
0 – 29 years 36.3 51.4 66.0 38.7
30 – 59 years 40.5 37.0 28.9 44.1
60 years and over 22.2 11.6 5.1 17.2
Economically active age
Under economically active age 18.2 27.5 40.7 14.4
In economically active age 55.4 58.0 53.0 62.4
Above economically active age 26.4 14.5 6.3 23.2
Education
University/College 20.2 2.0 0.9
Secondary /11/12 grades/ 54.0 24.6 7.8
Elementary /8 grades/ 22.6 55.0 46.2
Primary /4 grades/ 3.0 16.0 36.7
Illiterate 0.2 2.3 8.5
Unemployment
Ethnic group average 14,43 25,04 39.13 20.66
Unemployment men 13,79 24.99 40.73 19.59
Unemployment women 15,08 25.09 37.52 21.72
Poverty level (1996)
Ethnic group average 10.4 24.5 65.1
Adults without children 14.7 41.6 76.5
Adults with children 18.9 30.1 63.3
Retired 15.0 34.8 71.4
Table A.3. Minorities’ Rights: Actual Recognition, Real Fulfillment and Public Opinion. 
Answers of Christian Bulgarians (in %)
Source: Peter-Emil Mitev (1999) ‘From Neighbourhood to Fellow Citizenship’, Etnoreporter, No.
1, Sofia: IEIHR, pp. 15-17. This data comes from the surveys presented in: Interrelations of
Compatibility and Incompatibility between the Christians and the Muslims in Bulgaria (1994) and
(1997) Sofia: IMIR.
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Rights Actual Real Positive Positive 
recognition fulfillment answers answers 
1994 1997
To establish organisations and associations Yes Yes 63 67
for preserving and developing their 
own culture
To publish books and other publications Yes Yes 42 52
in their native language
To study their mother tongue in state Yes Yes 21 29
schools
Education in mother tongue at school No No 7 9
Representation in Parliament Yes Yes 50 50
Representation in local authorities Yes Yes 49 47
Public mother-tongue signs Not Yes 7 12
(companies, advertisements, forbidden (private) 
road signs, etc.) 
To form their own political parties No No 23 25
Territorial autonomy No No 1.5 3
To have their own TV-channels Not No – 18
forbidden 
To have broadcasts in their own language Not No – 20
on national TV forbidden 
To have their own newspapers Yes  Yes – 45
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THE FICTION OF ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY: 
MINORITIES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Laura Laubeová
Abstract
This chapter combines descriptive and normative analysis relevant to inter-ethnic rela-
tions in the Czech Republic and focuses on their manifestation on local-level governance.
While briefly outlining the situation of other minority groups, this chapter will focus
largely on the most ‘problematic’ and marginalised ethnic group—the Roma—and the
hostile majority attitudes towards this group. The chapter aims to focus on ‘good prac-
tices’ that have helped foster multi-ethnic co-operation as well as challenges and policy
obstacles to Roma integration. The main factors analysed in this chapter are the lack of
decentralisation and the politically stymied process of public administration reform, in
combination with the so-called ‘citizenship principle’ (proclaiming equality of all citi-
zens, regardless of ethnicity). Most policies targeted at minorities have been initiated by
the central government, largely in response to international criticism (arising when large
numbers of the Roma community began to emigrate) and after the establishment of the
office of the Government Commissioner for Human Rights in September 1998. Since
then, the political discourse on the status of minorities has altered—the citizenship prin-
ciple has been complemented by specific measures reflecting the need for special recog-
nition and protection measures for national minorities as stipulated in the Constitution
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Important national documents
reviewed in this chapter include the Bratinka Report and the Government Concept on
Romany Integration to the Draft Bill on Minorities. The research provides a range of good
practices, illustrated by case studies initiated at the local level and by nongovernmental
organisations. Conflictual issues and policies are also highlighted.
1. Introduction
Analysis of the situation of ethnic minorities in the Czech Republic clearly identifies sev-
eral major challenges. The following areas demand critical attention by policy-makers at
both the central and the local level of government: 
1. Minority rights protection, 
2. Perception of ethnic homogeneity,
3. Inter-ethnic tension resulting from increased immigration,
4. The situation of the Roma minority.
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In order to deconstruct these pressing issues, however, this chapter operates on the
premise that all four of these areas must be understood within the context of the process
of decentralisation of authority and power from the central to the local level of govern-
ment in the Czech Republic. As such, this chapter will devote significant attention to
decentralisation, and will argue that one of the major political obstacles to improved
minority protection, representation, education and political participation—and improved
inter-ethnic relations in general—is the limited degree of authority that has been devolved
to local government. Indeed, public administration and policy decision-making remain
highly centralised in the Czech Republic. Local administrative bodies make few policy
decisions of their own, and instead act largely as deconcentrated state administrative bod-
ies. This chapter will argue that this situation results in irresponsible implementation of
state-directed (or ‘top-down’) policies by local officials, who have little invested in these
policies. 
Against this conceptual backdrop, this chapter will touch briefly on the first three
issues listed above; significant problems exist in each area. But because the integration of
the Roma minority constitutes the greatest policy obstacle for the Czech government at
all levels, this chapter will focus primarily on the status of this highly marginalised, dis-
enfranchised minority group from a variety of perspectives.
Attention will also be paid to the important role played by nongovernmental actors
(NGOs) in developing policy initiatives designed to facilitate minority integration. Because
top-down policy-making has produced largely unsatisfactory results in terms of minori-
ty issues, and because local administrative actors have such limited authority in policy
areas of concern to minorities, the civil sector has played an important role in bridging
the gap between policy and practice in the Czech Republic.
1.1. State policies
New policy initiatives relevant to minority rights issues are more apparent at the central
level of government than at the local level. Their implementation is often dependent on
the capacity and co-operation of numerous agents (public, private and civic) at various
levels (central, regional and local) and in all areas of policy-making (education, employ-
ment, housing, police, etc.). 
Certain programmes do focus on local governments and communities and provide
space for multi-ethnic co-operation. For example, the Crime Prevention Comprehensive
Programme was initiated by the central government and provides for a number of com-
munity centres and Romany advisers at district offices. Another central initiative is the
National Employment Plan, which provides space for active employment policies admin-
istered at regional and local levels. 
Many new policy measures have been introduced and important processes initiated
following the establishment of the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner. These are:
· Work on the new government Concept on the Romany Community, including the
proposal of the Commission for Ethnic Equality and a plan for ‘equalising action’.1
(In February 2000 the full Concept on Romany Integration was, however, returned
by the Czech government in order to be redrafted.)
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· Monitoring the implementation of international commitments of the government,
mainly the Framework Convention on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities, and the
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism. With the implementa-
tion of the Framework Convention, preparation began in 1999 on the Act on
National and Ethnic Minorities (the so-called ‘Minority Act’). This Act may consti-
tute conditions for minority representation on the local level, though it is still too
early to forecast its content and consequences.
· Publishing of the first Annual Report on Human Rights in the Czech Republic in
April 1999 addresses issues of ethnic and national minorities and foreign workers
and residents.
· Within the Government Council for Human Rights, eight Working Sections were
established in April 1999 that provide platforms for communication between cen-
tral agency representatives and NGOs and aim to assist in finding solutions in the
area of human rights protection.
· In April 1999 the government again proposed the Bill on (the establishment of the
Office of the) Ombudsman, which was later approved and came into effect in January
2000.
· In May 1999 the government approved the National Plan of Employment with poli-
cies targeting Roma.
· In June 1999 ‘Tolerance’—a campaign against racism—was announced and allo-
cated 10 million CZK. The campaign began in February 2000. 
· In July 1999 the government approved measures to clamp down on skinhead organ-
isations.
· In July 1999 the government approved the proposal to amend the Education Act,
facilitating Roma access to secondary education. The amendment was later passed
by the Parliament.
· In July 1999 the Senate passed a new Citizenship Law; it replaced the discrimina-
tory Citizenship Law of 1993 (that disallowed former emigrants to hold dual citi-
zenship). 
Another significant top-down issue not compiled above relates to (the now extreme-
ly small) German minority. The historically ambivalent relationship between Czechs and
Germans has improved since the signing of the Czech-German Friendship Declaration in
May 1997, which brought the two countries closer to resolving the controversial issue of
the removal of Germans from Czechoslovakia after the World War II. 
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1 Otherwise known as ‘positive action’ or ‘affirmative action’.
1.2. Local policies
Although many constructive policy measures have been initiated at the central level of
government, these initiatives are not enough to solve the myriad problems facing minor-
ity groups in the Czech Republic. Local-level initiatives—or ‘bottom up’ processes—are
crucial to resolving minority issues. A number of locally targeted programmes currently
are in progress. The introduction and support of Romany teaching assistants can be regard-
ed as one of the most significant bottom-up policy programmes. The same can be said
about other nongovernmental educational projects focusing on tolerance, nonviolence
and human rights. Projects facilitating communication and problem-solving at the local
level, such as round tables organised by the Czech Centre for Conflict Prevention, have
proved quite successful. Without question, policies and practice at the local level should
play a more and more significant role in the future.
One of the main problems ethnic minorities face in the Czech Republic is the high
level of prejudice and intolerance; this is not sufficiently addressed by the public educa-
tion system. Other negative factors include the political exploitation of ethnic problems
(mainly by local-level political representatives), low levels of professionalism and com-
petence among public administration officials, the lack of relevant training for teachers
and administrative staff at all levels, and insufficient communication between munici-
palities and ethnic minority representatives. For example, poor communication between
the local town hall and the Roma community was largely responsible for the widely pub-
licised events in the town of Usti nad Labem, where a wall was built to separate the homes
of the majority community from buildings housing Roma (details in Case Study 3). Thus,
although the Czech Republic has made important steps in the development of active poli-
cies addressing inter-ethnic conflicts, the result has been perceived not as integration but
as segregation. 
2. Ethnic Homogeneity—Fact or Fiction? 
2.1. Ethnic composition
With the division of the former Czechoslovak Republic at the start of 1993, the Czech
Republic became a relatively homogenous society in ethnic terms. Almost 94% of the pre-
sent population is Czech. Slovaks constitute 3% of the population. Other minorities are
Roma (2-3%), Poles (0.6%), Germans (0.5%), Hungarians (0.2%), Ukrainians, Bulgarians,
Ruthenians, Russians, Jews, Croats and Greeks. More details on ethnic composition, as
reflected in the 1991 census, are available in Annex 1.
The Czech Republic has had some traditions of multi-ethnicity as part of the Habsburg
monarchy, and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for three centuries. The Czechoslovak
Republic was established in October 1918. Its composition was multi-ethnic: 51% Czech,
23% German, 14% Slovak and 5.5% Hungarian, according to a census conducted in 1921.
Historical development brought about major shifts in the majority-minority ratio. Even
after World War II—despite the Nazi genocide directed at Jews and at Czech and Moravian
Roma and despite the postwar removal of Germans—Czechoslovakia remained an eth-
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nically heterogeneous state with two distinct nations: Czechs and Slovaks. In 1992, 7%
of the Czechoslovak population was composed of ethnic minorities—i.e. more than one
million out of a population of 15 million, not including Czechs living in Slovakia and
Slovaks in the Czech Republic.
Since the establishment of the Czech Republic in 1993, the percentage of ethnic minori-
ties still represents approximately 6% of the total population—the majority of which are
Slovaks who are socio-economically well integrated and generally assimilated in terms of
culture and language. The Roma have been largely assimilated in terms of language, as
have been the Germans, Poles, Hungarians and other small minorities.2 Apart from nation-
al minorities, whose members—in accordance with the definition of national minority—
have Czech citizenship, there are approximately 220,000 foreigners with long-term or
permanent residency in the Czech Republic, mainly of Slovak, Ukrainian, Vietnamese and
Chinese origin. The number of illegal immigrants has been steadily increasing over the
past few years. The issue of illegal Vietnamese traders from Germany residing in the Czech
Republic has become a particular source of inter-ethnic tension in Northern Bohemia
since 1997. The actual number of foreigners in the country may be much higher than
official estimates suggest. Most likely, an additional 200,000 illegal workers and another
100,000 transit migrants3 are living in the Czech Republic—making the total number of
foreigners more than half a million.
Apart from the new phenomenon of illegal foreigners, the most ‘problematic’ and mar-
ginalised ethnic group remains the Roma.4 This group can also be important as a model
case study, as positive experiences of inter-ethnic communication and the elimination of
prejudice against them can serve as a springboard for improved relations with other minori-
ties and ethnic groups in the country. For these two reasons, the remainder of this chap-
ter will focus primarily on the situation of the Roma minority. 
2.2. Roma in the Czech Republic
The end of communist rule in 1989 brought about the official recognition of the Roma
as an ethnic minority group; it also brought with it overt racism and the emergence of
extremist, right-wing political parties that have included anti-Roma measures in their
political programmes. The number of racially motivated attacks against the Roma has also
increased dramatically since 1989. Growing data accumulated by nongovernmental
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2 Only Poles who are concentrated in North Moravia have managed to keep their schools in their
mother tongue—a system extending from kindergartens and primary schools to several secondary
schools. Other minorities are geographically dispersed.
3 Office of the Human Rights Commissioner (1999) Zpráva o migraci za rok 1998 (Draft report on
migration in 1998), June.
4 Roma are the largest ‘visible’ minority. It is very difficult to estimate their number, as there are
currently no policies on ethnic monitoring of Roma and the 1991 census figures do not reflect
the reality accurately—the method was self-declaration (only 32,903 people declared to be Roma,
i.e. approximately one-tenth of the total number). Usual estimates of their number vary, official
number has been agreed to be approximately 200-300,000, i.e. 2-3% of the total population.
Roma themselves give higher estimates. Recently, however, some estimates say that the number
of Roma decreased due to high emigration abroad.
organisations and, more recently, government sources, indicates that Roma in the Czech
Republic face discrimination by the state and its public administration, providers of pub-
lic services, the education system and other institutions. The present despair of the Roma
community has been reflected in several recent waves of Roma emigration. Indeed, emi-
gration has become a widespread ‘exit strategy’ for this vulnerable and marginalised minor-
ity group.5
The growing tension between the Czech majority and the Roma has become a more
significant social problem then ever before. The high number of unemployed Roma, reach-
ing 70% to 90% of the total Roma population,6 the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness
of the education system with respect to the Roma, and limited access to vocational train-
ing have all contributed to the violence toward and criminalisation of the Roma commu-
nity. Roma crime rates cannot be objectively assessed as above-average in comparison
with other groups of the same social status, and crime rates also usually include petty
crime and minor offenses. The Roma continue to be perceived as the ‘most dangerous’
group in Czech society.7 Stereotypes of the Roma as ‘inherently criminal’ people make it
difficult for those Roma individuals who wish to be integrated into the workforce and
education system.
The ‘social costs’ of the current state of affairs have been considerable, and it is appar-
ent that if the situation is not addressed they will continue to grow. The social costs of
discrimination, segregation and marginalisation of certain groups in society include
increased social expenditures, increased punitive expenditures and greater expenditures
on social integration. Though it has become impossible to ignore the need for interven-
tion, it will prove very difficult to introduce structural changes with a long-term impact
that would extend to the community level. The difficulties lie mainly in the huge social
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5 Followed by Vlach Roma, Hungarian Roma, Moravian Roma, Sinti and other groups. 
Vlach Roma, the only group that had been nomadic until 1958, are the most closed and cul-
turally and linguistically specific group. Their representatives claim to have a status of a separate
ethnic minority.
Within Slovak Roma themselves, there are big differences between those who came to the
Czech lands after World War II and those who came in the 1970s and afterwards.
Although Roma originally came from India around 1000 AD and are known as an itinerant,
travelling population, they have long been settled in the Central and Eastern European lands.
Slovak Roma, for example, have been settled for 200-300 years. The majority of Czech and
Moravian Roma were killed during World War II: very few families survived. Slovak Roma now
inhabiting Czech lands were first brought there after 1948 to replace expelled Germans, as well
as to provide labour in the industrialised areas of northern Moravia and northern Bohemia. Many
others followed in a voluntary migration seeking a better life.
6 This increased emigration led directly to the reintroduction of visa requirements for Czech citi-
zens entering Canada. The influx to Canada in summer 1997 and to Britain in autumn 1997, as
well as later on, brought the issue to the attention of political representatives and the general pub-
lic, but also increased the expression of negative feelings and attitudes towards Roma in the media. 
7 While the national unemployment rate was 5%. In: Bratinka Report (1997) October, paragragh
7.2. In July 1999 the unemployment in the CR rose to 8.8%. In 2000 it has reached almost 10%.
In certain areas the unemployment of Roma exceeds 95% (Czech Helsinki Committee Report
1997, http://www.helcom.cz).
resistance to any changes in the area of social redistribution. In addition, past negative
experience with communist indoctrination and social engineering also play an important
role in contributing to this resistance.
The communist regime regarded the problems and needs of the Roma population
mainly as social and economic concerns. The Roma were viewed as victims of the capi-
talist class system and a simple solution was designed: by removing poverty and provid-
ing employment for the Roma—i.e. by addressing the economic causes of the so-called
‘Gypsy problem’, and by providing education, health care and social security—their sit-
uation would automatically improve. This would enable them to integrate successfully
into Czechoslovak society and participate in building a communist future. Thus, policies
of assimilation and ‘co-ordinated dispersal’8 were designed and put into practice. The
main error in the approach of the communist regime was its refusal to take into account
Romany ethnic and cultural distinctiveness, their traditions and their language. The Roma
were not recognised as a national minority. As a consequence, they were not entitled to
any special legal rights—for example, in education—in contrast to the Hungarian, Polish
and Ukrainian minority groups. The Czechoslovak government decided to fully assimi-
late the Roma into the dominant population.9 This authoritarian policy was extremely
damaging to the social and cultural bonds of the Roma population, particularly because
mainstream Czechoslovak society was not welcoming, and often hostile, to them.
Another fatal mistake was the communist government’s failure to take into consider-
ation the negative attitudes and deep aversion of the majority population toward the
Roma—completely ignoring signs and manifest expressions of racism and prejudice har-
boured by the majority population, including national and local government officials
themselves. Thus, despite officially declared ‘equality’, the Roma faced all forms of dis-
crimination and were not given equal opportunities in employment.
2.3. Gaps between policy and practice
In analysing the past, it must be noted that before 1989 all relevant political documents
declared the integration of Roma as a significant policy goal. In spite of this, no effective
legal, institutional or financial means were created to facilitate this integration. Since 1995,
a number of positive changes have occurred in this respect. Much progress remains to be
made, however, in order to reach the point at which state officials and policy-makers are
able to reflect upon the current state of affairs and their own attitudes and prejudice. ‘State
policy circumvents systems, i.e. it does not change them, but it rather substitutes them
with temporary measures (such as special educational programmes only for Roma); how-
ever, the basic problem of structural discrimination is not only not being solved, but it is
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8 Pamela Jenkins (1999) American Social Problems in a Global Environment, Charles University
Prague, a two-week course, summer 1999.
9 Eva Sotolova (1997) ‘Prichod Romu do Evropy’, in: Pekarek Pavel et al., Romove–reflexe proble-
mu. Soubor textu k romske problematice, Praha: Pastelka, pp. 71-77. 
10 Resolution of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, April 1958. See:
Eva Davidova (1995) Cesty Romu, Romano Drom 1945-1990, Olomouc: Palacky University.
not even discerned by state policy’.10 In this respect, positive examples from other coun-
tries may be used by Czech policy-makers to accelerate social change. 
3. The Legal and Political Position of Minorities 
The main legal problem with respect to minority rights thus far seems to be the weak
enforcement of relevant provisions of the Czech Constitution and the slow pace at which
international conventions signed by the Czech Republic have been integrated into domes-
tic law, norms and regulations. The problem lies not only in insufficient respect for human
rights and in insufficient monitoring of their implementation but also in the indolence
and ignorance of state and public administration in the area of law enforcement. There
are currently no mechanisms with which to monitor and/or limit the racial prejudice of
state employees and law enforcement personnel.
The major policy document that influences central policies toward minorities is Government
Resolution 63/1994. This document is not legally binding but establishes the basic principles
of Czech minority policy, the legal position of minorities and the protection of their rights. The
Council for National Minorities of the Government of the Czech Republic, established in 1993,
includes representatives of six minority groups. The Council itself has no executive power and
serves only as an advisory body to the government. In September 1998 the Council fell within
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Government Commissioner for Human Rights. 
The rights of national minorities are also protected through international commitments
of the Czech Republic that according to the Czech Constitution ‘take preference before
the law’.11 An important international instrument is the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities which assigns an obligation to the contracting parties
based on the equal social position of people belonging to minority groups in the areas of
education, culture, employment and politics. The Framework Convention was ratified in
December 1997 and came into effect in April 1998. A year later, the Office of the
Government Commissioner for Human Rights published a report on compliance with
this convention, stating that ‘the absence of more detailed legislation, as presupposed by
the Charter, has resulted in a legislative deficit since adoption of the Charter in 1991’.12
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11 In Socioklub (1999) p. 492.
12 As stipulated in Article 10 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic: ‘Ratified and promulgat-
ed international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are binding on the
Czech Republic, are directly binding and take precedence over the law’. They are the following:
– UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (No.
95/1974 Coll.)
– UN International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
– UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (No. 120/1976 Coll.)
– UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (No. 120/1976 Coll.) 
– UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect
of Employment and Occupation, ILO No.111
– European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
– Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
The report further states that ‘discrimination is commonplace in the Czech Republic, espe-
cially against the Roma… The law does not define sanctions for cases of racial (and eth-
nic) discrimination in the educational system, in the health care system, in prisons and
in other areas of society’.13 According to human rights NGOs, numerous reports of both
participants and observers indicate that Roma suffer widespread discrimination in the
Czech justice system.14
Legal protection of minorities in the Czech Republic is ensured by the Czech
Constitution and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Further, the
Criminal Code and Civic Code explicitly require equality before the law. There is
insufficient protection, however, against discrimination in the Criminal Code, under which
there is no formulation that makes discrimination a criminal offense. It can be said that
Czech law prohibits, but does not penalise, acts of racial discrimination. In other words,
in the absence of implementation procedures, the Constitution contains only formal and
overly general proclamations that have not been developed into particular laws. The only
‘discriminatory’ law, the Citizenship Law of 1993, was replaced by a new citizenship law
that was approved by the Senate in July 1999. The new Citizenship Law allows former
emigrants to hold dual citizenship and facilitates the process of obtaining citizenship for
Slovaks living in the Czech Republic since the 1993 secession of its two entities.15
3.1. Protection against racism
Many positive changes have occurred since 1995, when a Roma individual was brutally
murdered in his house by skinheads in a provincial town.16 1995 was a crucial year in
terms of the acknowledgement and monitoring of racially motivated crimes. In this respect
the Criminal Code was amended, police units focusing on extremism were created and
the Chief Prosecutor issued a general directive regulating the procedures in prosecuting
racially motivated criminal acts. After the mass emigration of the Roma in 1997, the
Ministry of Interior—largely due to significant international pressure—began publicising
instances of state action to combat hate crimes and other relevant statistics. 
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Currently, the Czech Republic is preparing ratification process of the European Charter on
Minority and Regional Languages.
13 Information about Compliance with Principles Set Forth in the Framework Convention…, 1 April 1999,
Part 1, Section 16.5.
14 Ibid., Part 2, Article 4, Section 3.
15 According to the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), ‘repeated allegations of differential treat-
ment of Roma victims (inadequate investigation of their complaints by law enforcement author-
ities) and Roma defendants (subjected to more frequent and longer periods of pre-trial deten-
tion, and disproportionately severe sentences) suggest that the second class status of Roma in
Czech society does not end at the courthouse door’. In ERRC (1998) Submission to the Committee
for Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Executive Summary. 
16 Such incidents have been frequent and numerous examples have triggered international outrage.
In July 1999 the Czech government approved a plan to fight extremism, drawn up by
Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky and Human Rights Commissioner Petr Uhl. The plan
clamps down on organisations and movements that act against human rights, and pro-
vides guidelines to be followed by the Ministries of Education, Interior, Justice, and Labor
and Social Affairs.17 It also lists organisations that can be dissolved by the Interior Minister.
The list includes the Patriotic Front and the National Front of Castists, which dissemi-
nates propaganda against foreigners, Jews, Roma and homosexuals.18
3.2. Central policies targeting the Roma
Pressed by the international implications of the exodus of Roma over the past few years,
the Czech government has repeatedly expressed its determination to solve problems faced
by the Roma community. In October 1997 the so-called ‘Bratinka Report’ was adopted
by the government and led to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Commission for
Romany Affairs and prepared a long-term plan of action.19 One of the major steps for-
ward was the establishment of Romany social advisers at the district level, as well as the
institution of changes in educational policies, such as the introduction of Romany teach-
ing assistants. (See Case Study 1 for details.) However, most changes have been met with
resistance from bureaucrats in charge of their implementation,20 local-level representa-
tives and teachers. In spite of these difficulties, these changes are gradually being intro-
duced with the support of nonstate organisations and initiatives. 
In September 1998 the government established the Office of the Government
Commissioner for Human Rights and appointed Petr Uhl—a well-known human rights
activist—as Commissioner. His role is to initiate and co-ordinate activities in the field
of human rights monitoring (with no executive powers or budgetary provisions, how-
ever).21 He also serves as the chairperson of the Interdepartmental Commission for
Romany Affairs and of the Council for National Minorities.
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17 Upon the pressure from abroad the law was partially amended in 1998 so that citizens of the
Slovak Republic who had the place of residence in the Czech Republic as of 31 December 1992
could be forgiven the condition of five-year indemnity. The amendment, however, did not remove
the discriminatory effect of the law.
18 One of the reasons behind this measure is the fact that the number of supporters of extremist
movements has risen. In 1997 this community was estimated at 5,500 persons and in 1998
around 10,000 persons. ‘Roma who ask for asylum abroad giving arguments that they have been
prosecuted by skinheads speak the truth’, said the Interior Minister when submitting the Report
on Prosecuting Racially Motivated Crimes, approved by the government on 14 July 1999.
19 ‘Stále více lidí sympatizuje s extremisty’ (More and more people symphatize with extremists)
(1999) MF Dnes, 15 July, p. 3.
20 Radio Free Europe (1999) 29 July.
21 Report on the Situation of the Romany Community in the Czech Republic and Government Measures
Assisting its Integration in Society (1997) Office of Minister without Portfolio, The Czech Republic
Government Office, 29 October . The so-called ‘Bratinka Report’, includes Government Resolution
No. 686/97.
In December 1998 the government established the Government Council for Human
Rights as an ‘advisory and co-ordination body in the field of protection of human rights
and basic freedoms’ and appointed the Government Commissioner as its chairperson.22
In April 1999 the government adopted the ‘Policy of the Czech Government towards the
Romany Community Supporting their Integration into Society’, which will hopefully serve
as a catalyst for long-term systemic change in terms of the rights of the Roma. The draft
concept also includes a proposal to establish a Commission for Ethnic Equality, and plans
to introduce a widespread policy of ‘equalising action’ are scheduled to take place between
2001 and 2020. An important component of the new policy is a statement on the value
of Romany identity, culture, language and history as positive assets for the majority. The
Concept of Romany Integration—elaborated at the end of 1999—was not adopted by the
Czech government. According to some Roma, this signalled that the government still pre-
ferred a policy of assimilation to one of integration.23
The majority of Czech policy-makers and opinion leaders have not yet seriously reflected
on the status quo and are usually unwilling to acknowledge past political mistakes.24 State
bodies focus only on open manifestations of racism and too often ignore structural and
institutional forms of racial discrimination and segregation (for example, local staff of the
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior, i.e. school administrators and
police). Given the level of prejudice in the Czech society on the part of many municipal
leaders, political representatives and other influential people, and the high level of resis-
tance to social change, the problems that the Roma face are very difficult to address.
4. The Role of Local Government 
4.1. Public administration reform and decentralisation
Democratisation and decentralisation began as dual processes after 1989. National
committees that previously had served as state administrative bodies were replaced
by district and municipal offices. When the Czech Republic emerged as an indepen-
dent state in 1993, the new Constitution25 modified its position on local government
by creating two territorial-administrative units—municipalities and regions. Current
plans call for the creation of fourteen separate regions beginning in 2001. District
offices continue to serve as the decentralised authority of state administration.
Municipalities perform self-administrated tasks—independent activity—and perform
some previously state-administrated functions—transferred activity. With roughly
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22 For example, until March 1998 the Ministry of Education was not willing to start implement-
ing Government Resolution No. 686 and officially recognise Romany teaching assistants.
23 Resolution of the Czech Government No. 579 on Appointing the Government Commissioner
for Human Rights (1998) 9 September.
24 Resolution of the Czech Government No. 809 on Improving the Protection of Human Rights in
the Czech Republic (1999) 9 December.
25 ‘Nemají-li se Romové integrovat, co tedy?’ (What else if Roma should not integrate?) (2000)
Romano hangos, 25 February.
ten million inhabitants and 6,244 municipalities, it seems that, on paper at least, there
is a considerable degree of decentralisation. 
An important step forward in the process of public administration reform occurred in
December 1997 when the Czech Parliament passed a law26 on the establishment of regions
and an amendment to the Constitution. These legal initiatives have laid the fundamental
foundations for the implementation of the principles of decentralisation and subsidiarity
in the future. The government also approved a timetable for legislative work to allow
regional local government to be established by the end of 2000.
In March 1999 the government reviewed the Concept of Public Administration Reform,
prepared by the Ministry of the Interior and, in May 1999, set further objectives for its
implementation (Resolution No. 511). By September 1999 a package of draft laws, con-
stituting the legislative framework for the reform process were submitted to the govern-
ment and entered into force in January 2000. The reform concept is characterised by:
· transfer of competence from state administration to self-government of regions and
municipalities (decentralisation), 
· transfer of competence of central state administration to regional state administra-
tion (vertical deconcentration), 
· exercise of state administration in the first instance on the level of ‘small districts’
to be established, numbering some 210, 
· exercise of self-government by all municipalities.
The side effect of these reforms is the abolishment of the existing 73 district offices
(state administration authorities of general competence, i.e. the district tier) and the estab-
lishment of some 210 administrative districts (‘small districts’).
The actual reform process began in January 2000 with enforcement of this law. In
practice, regional administrative and local self-governing bodies should be established by
November 2000. All other changes will be connected to the transfer of competencies from
the central state administration to deconcentrated regional and local administrations. At
the same time, the territorial offices of the ministries and other central state administra-
tion agencies will be abolished and their competencies transferred to district or regional
administration offices. Regional self-governments will be provided with a host of new
responsibilities, including activities related to regional socio-economic development. 
This somewhat complicated, and still controversial, system of public administration
reform presents certain tensions between the state administration and local governments,
mainly with respect to the transfer of competencies and the implementation of state poli-
cies at the local level. Political pressures has been exerted, mainly on part of the Civic
Democratic Party (CDS), with the aim of hindering the reform process. Compared with
other CEE countries in which decentralisation took place shortly after the collapse of com-
munism, the situation in the Czech Republic looks rather grim.
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26 As apparent from a discussion with Jiri Pilar and Marta Tepla from the Ministry of Eduaction,
28 June 1999, and an answer by Petr Uhl to a question raised at the conference ‘Legal Protection
of Roma in the Current Europe’, 29 June 1999.
4.2. Romany advisers in district offices
In accordance with the Bratinka Report, Roma social advisers are being placed in district
offices throughout the Czech Republic. Since September 1999 there has been a regular
training programme for these advisers and their assistants, organised by the Institute for
Local Development. In many areas, the advisers’ work represents a significant step for-
ward in facilitating communication between the municipalities and the Romany com-
munity. They help to initiate projects aimed at improving the situation of the Roma (and
majority-Roma relations more generally) and sometimes even perform tasks that fall with-
in the jurisdiction of local self-government personnel. 
Almost half of the 72 Romany Social Advisers are not of Roma origin (as of February
2000). According to the Secretary of the Interdepartmental Commission for Romany
Affairs, this has occurred as a result of a ‘bureaucratic error’—the goal had been to employ
Roma. When the formal statute of this position was elaborated by the Ministry of Labour
and Social Affairs, however, it included the statement that: ‘these positions should prefer-
ably be filled by Roma’—indirectly offering municipalities a legal basis to hire non-Roma
advisers. This corresponds with the current trend of giving preference to the Roma only
when no appropriate Roma candidates can be found and then offering positions to non-
Roma candidates.27
According to some experts, there is only limited space for Romany advisers to devel-
op platforms to unite and mobilise the Roma community in their respective communi-
ties. This is largely because these advisers are overwhelmed with the everyday problems
of their clients regarding housing, social benefits, citizenship, relations with local author-
ities and schools.28
4.3. Political representation
Regarding the representation of minorities in local governments, members of any minor-
ity group may be elected—but only as citizens, not as minority representatives. This is
due to the fact that the only principle regulating minority-majority issues has been the
‘citizenship principle’—i.e. equal treatment of all citizens irrespective of ethnicity. This
formal principle is not always appropriate in practice, due to widespread discrimination
and the resulting underrepresentation of minorities in the political sphere. Recently, there-
fore, the citizenship principle has been complemented by the introduction of specific
measures (see in Section 3.2). The shift from the citizenship principle is likely to be a slow
one, however, and political participation of minorities remains limited at both the local
and central level. The fragmentation of the Roma community, its very low level of self-
confidence and its exclusion from the media and other public spaces are among the main
problems with respect to Roma political participation. 
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27 Constitution of the Czech Republic, Law No. 1/1993 Coll., Head 7
28 Constitutional Act No. 347/1997 Coll.
By April 1999 there were 110 Romany citizens associations in the Czech Republic.29
The common problem with these associations is that they do not co-operate with each
other. The state administration does not support any such co-operation, most likely because
of fears that a united and politically mobilised Roma community might (rightly) make a
series of political claims. 
In spite of their many problems, certain positive changes have occurred recently
in terms of Roma political representation. In March 1999 a group of twelve Roma
representatives met at the New School Foundation (see Case Study 6) in order to dis-
cuss a proposal to create a united Roma political party. Only partial agreement has
been reached on this issue, but all parties to the discussion have agreed to continue
with further negotiations.
In 1997 the Association of Roma Regional Representatives was established. The
primary goal of the Association is to formulate regional solutions to current problems
faced by the Roma. One of its most visible political activities was an organised protest
against the building of the Maticni wall in October 1999. Association representatives
literally dismantled the wall on the same day that it was constructed in October 1999
(see Case Study 3).
State financial support for minority organisations is generally organised on a project-
by-project basis. Each year, nongovernmental organisations must submit project pro-
posals for evaluation. Only after these proposals are approved can the funds be appro-
priated for one year (occasionally for longer periods). The same principle is typically valid
for local public and private resource allocation. This process hinders long-term organi-
sational planning and presents problems for hiring new personnel.
4.4. Media, culture and the use of mother tongue
Minority access to media is still insufficient though some progress has been made recent-
ly. Only one multi-cultural programme is broadcast on the Czech television every two
weeks, though not during prime broadcasting hours. An important precedent was set
recently with the employment of one Roma newscaster and one Roma programme
announcer by Czech TV. Four Romany periodicals are financially supported by central
government. (Apart from the Romany press there are four Slovak, four Polish and three
German periodicals, as well as one Hungarian and one Ukrainian periodical financed by
the state.) There are also several local-level Roma publications.
Mother-tongue education for minorities is organised only for the Polish minority in
North Moravia. Because only a very small number of Roma declared their nationality in
the population census in 1991, the Czech government continues to treat the Roma not
as a national minority but rather as a ‘community’. This is not advantageous for the Roma:
it limits their rights. Little has been done in the way of Romany-language education. This
is in part because education in the Czech Republic remains highly centralised. As the
decentralisation process continues, the possibility remains open that minority education
will, in the future, be managed in accordance with local needs.
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29 Jaroslav Mitras, interview, Ministry of Interior, 3 May 1999.
4.5. Employment 
The ethnic group hardest hit by unemployment has been the Roma. As a result of the
declining demand for unskilled labour in the transformed economy and substantial influx
of unskilled migrant workers into the Czech Republic, the Roma now have fewer long-
term employment opportunities. Industrial areas—containing large Roma populations—
are bearing the brunt of the economic restructuring process and their regional unem-
ployment rates are higher than anywhere else in the country.
Apart from these structural causes, other factors have contributed to high Roma unem-
ployment, including low education, virtually no job training, a unmotivating system of social
benefits, poor health conditions and discrimination in the labour market. According to
numerous sources, there continue to be cases where Roma job applicants are rejected under
the pretext that positions have ‘already been filled’, though they remain open for non-Roma
applicants.30 For many employers, incentives such as the grants offered by regional employ-
ment offices for ‘effective job creation’ are not attractive enough to encourage the hiring of
Roma workers. Discrimination in the labour market is one of the primary reasons for the
high level of Roma migration to countries with more developed democracies.
4.5.1. Employment policy responses
In May 1999 the Czech government passed the National Plan of Employment,31 launched
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, which explicitly deals with Active Employment
Policies (AEP) targeted at the Roma and equal opportunity policies and practices. It aims
to:
· increase employment of long-term unemployed job seekers, with special empha-
sis on members of the Roma community,
· use public tenders preferentially to ensure the employment of job seekers with ‘job
placement difficulties’,
· reinforce legal and institutional tools and mechanisms in order to eliminate dis-
crimination in the labour market,
· create realistic opportunities to give preferential treatment to those groups whose
access to the labour market is markedly limited, 
· monitor the level of enforcement of the right to employment of for groups of citi-
zens ‘menaced by discrimination’.32
In June 1999 the Czech government—after more than two years of pilot verification—
implemented a policy document entitled, ‘Measures to Address the Employment of Persons
with Job Placement Difficulties with Special Regard to the Roma Community’. The doc-
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30 According to Mr Mitras, a Rom working at the Ministry of Interior as Administration Councilor
(spravni rada) who co-operates with Romany social advisers and with district offices and is in
charge of dealing with complaints. Mr Mitras also helps with  citizenship issues and he also advis-
es how to establish a citizens association, one of the most common type of nongovernmental
organisation. 
31 Jaroslav Mitras, interview, Ministry of Interior, 3 May 1999.
32 Hilda Pasova, interview; also in Documentation Center for Human Rights.
ument covers four projects: ‘Most,’ ‘Sance,’ ‘Romstart’ and ‘Trenink’ and lists instruments
of Active Employment Policies (AEP). Along with these measures, the government also
passed budgetary provisions for these projects’ implementation. The largest part of the
budget is for the implementation of AEP instruments targeted predominantly at the Roma,
including publicly beneficial jobs, youth and adult training, public works jobs and pro-
tected workshops. 
In order to prevent discrimination the government decided to amend the Law on
Employment33 by inserting an anti-discrimination clause. The amended Law was enforced
in January 2000. It made discrimination in the labour market illegal and specified sanc-
tions and fines for such discrimination.34 Labour offices at the district and local levels are
responsible for the implementation of the Law.
4.6. Public education 
4.6.1. Top-down policies
Education is one of the sectors that has thus far been least affected by decentralisation.
Within the public education system, one of the main problems for the Roma minority is
the placement of Roma children in special schools for mentally handicapped children.
(See Annex 1 for details.)
Among central-level education policies, there have been some positive changes. In
1993 the government created the framework for an experimental programme of ‘prepara-
tory classes’ (zero classes) to prepare disadvantaged children for their first year of school.
Many districts with large Roma populations participate in this programme, which is fund-
ed solely by local governments. In 1998 there were nearly 90 preparatory classes operat-
ing throughout the country. 
A positive example of democratisation and effective policy-making was the amend-
ment of the Education Act in the fall of 1999 which facilitates access to secondary edu-
cation for students from special schools. The amendment aims to remove the ‘lid’ on the
special school system which had been kept tightly closed by a provision that only stu-
dents from elementary schools can sit for secondary school entrance exams. The propos-
al was submitted by the only Roma MP in the Czech Parliament, Monika Horáková, and
was originally initiated through a petition of teachers and other citizens early in 1999.
4.6.2. Bottom-up policies—the role of NGOs
A major step forward was the introduction of Romany teaching assistants in public schools,
initiated by the New School Foundation (in co-operation with several schools)—a poli-
cy that was formally adopted by the Ministry of Education in March 1998.35 The posi-
tion of Romany assistants has not yet been addressed in a fully satisfactory manner, large-
ly due to the continuing lack of communication between the Ministry, NGOs and district
school boards. As such, there are still many assistants without official contracts being paid
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33 Resolution of the Czech Government No. 418 on the National Plan of Employment (1999) 5 May.
34 ‘Národní plán zamestnanosti’ (National Employment Plan) (1999) Sociální politika, No. 6.
35 No.1/1991 Coll. and No. 9/1991 Coll.
by NGOs. To date, there are about 150 Roma teaching assistants working in mainstream
and special schools that have received or plan to receive a two-week intensive training
course organised by NGOs and funded by the state.
Other positive examples aimed at increasing the education level of the Roma include
the establishment in September 1998 of the Romany Social and Legal High School in
Kolín, at the initiative of the Roma community itself. The majority of the school’s students
live in halls of residence located directly in the school building. After completion of four
years of school and passing an exit exam, the graduates will work as professional social
workers in the area of minority integration or at district and municipal offices. The school
is funded by Roma sponsors in the Czech Republic and abroad. The operational costs of
the school are partially covered by the Rajko Djuric Foundation. 
Special training programmes for Roma social workers are run by several other insti-
tutions, such as the Evangelic Academy in Prague 4 that prepares Romany assistants
(through a two-year course) and Romany social advisers (through a five-year course pro-
viding full secondary education).
In sum, it can be argued that given the disparity between officially proclaimed gov-
ernment objectives in education policy and the current state of the educational system—
in terms of the quality of teacher training, lack of young flexible teachers, system of school
management, district-level bureaucracy and inconsistencies between the new Education
Concept and the new Education Bill—it will be difficult bring about real change in the
short term. Again, one of the primary problems is that real authority over public educa-
tion has not yet been decentralised. Local authorities still have no say in any education
policies. Additionally, co-operation between the Ministry of Education and the non-
governmental sector remains very low.36
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Case Study 1. Teaching Assistants
The introduction of Roma teaching assistants into the public education system in April 1998
was preceded by similar positive experiences in private schools. The first full-time assistant start-
ed to work in 1993 at the Church Primary School of Premysl Pitter in Ostrava. Others followed
in Brno in 1995, inspired by Ostrava. At present, the Premysl Pitter school employs nine Roma
teaching assistants. Another nineteen assistants are supervised by a Romany NGO—‘Romano
Jekhetaniben Pre Morava’. This association of Roma in Moravia supervises five educational cen-
tres that either employ or assist Romany teaching assistants. The centres are located in: Brno,
Bruntál, Ostrava, Olomouc and Stenberk. In Brno, five asisstants are financed by the District
School Office (state budget funds) and four are paid by Romano Jekhetaniben Pre Morava (which
also sponsors eight assistants in Ostrava). Two assistants in Sternberk are financed by the Church.
Another two assistants work in the Khamoro Kindergarten in Olomouc, also funded by the
Church. In this kindergarten, Romany assistants were introduced in 1994, initially using Romany
mothers as volunteers for a short period of time.
Source: Interviews with Helena Balabanova and Helena Jirincova
4.7. Central policies targeting local communities
There are virtually no equal opportunity policies initiated at the local level. Anti-dis-
crimination is widely perceived only in terms of preventing racist attacks on ethnic minori-
ties. Institutional discrimination occurs and is largely ignored (with the exception men-
tioned above in the new employment measures and legislation). In terms of employment,
this means that unemployment is significantly higher among the Roma minority than the
rest of the population. In terms of education, the consequence is that Roma children obtain
a lower standard of education in special schools and cannot continue on to higher edu-
cation.
According to municipal representatives and the Roma themselves, there have been
some positive efforts made to mitigate inter-ethnic tension at the local level. A short
Comprehensive Programme, initiated and funded by the Czech Ministry of Interior, has
been well evualuated.
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37 The government resolution 686/97 based on the Bratinka Report stated that at least 20 Romany
teaching assistants will be financed out of the state budget for 1998; the Ministry of Education,
however, ignored this resolution.
Case Study 2. Comprehensive Programme of the Ministry of the Interior
The Programme aims to support socially deprived Roma communities, to prevent inter-ethnic
conflicts and to support ‘good neighbour’ relations in mixed communities. In 1999 it was imple-
mented in 57 towns in the Czech Republic.
Concrete projects focus on:
· Education: preparation of Romany children for school, including special classes at kinder-
gartens, zero classes, social work with families, support of special teaching methods and
curricula at schools that respond to Romany children’s needs;
· Employment: motivating Romany youth to acquire occupational skills and abilities which
will allow them to succeed in the labour market;
· Community work within the Roma community: improving the quality of nonformal social
control, involving larger communities in solving problems of a given community, organ-
ising cultural and social activities that directly respond to the community needs;
· Hobbies and leisure activities: cultural and art activities, technological clubs, sports clubs
and equipment for playgrounds, etc.
In order to receive financial support from the state, the projects must be partially funded by
municipalities and Roma have to participate in them. The highest number of projects in the
period 1996-1998 were implemented by nongovernmental organisations (35%), schools (34%)
and local governments (18%); then by charity organisations (5%), state administration (3%),
municipal police (2%), children centres and sports clubs (1%). A total of 110 projects in 32
municipalities were supported in the period 1996-98.37
The Comprehensive Programme supports full integration, not assimilation, of Roma into major-
ity society. It is expected that integration will be more feasible and acceptable, if the dis-
4.8. Local inter-ethnic tensions and the search for solutions
Despite the fact that local governments are often in a better position than central author-
ities to respond to the needs of ethnic minorities and manage ethnic conflict at the local
level, tension permeates the process of decentralisation of power and administrative respon-
sibilities. The protection of human rights and the implementation of human rights legis-
lation has largely depended on political will at both the national and local level. Most poli-
cies that have an impact on the everyday lives of minorities can only be implemented at
the local level.
There have been numerous cases of racism and ethnic hatred on the part of local-level
political representatives that have negatively influenced inter-ethnic relations in the Czech
Republic. Since 1997, ‘there has been an increase in cases of political abuse of ethnic ten-
sion and tolerance towards strong xenophobia. The problem of Czech policy may poten-
tially be not only its incompetence in formulation and enforcement of positive programmes
but also a danger of resorting to populism’.38
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38 ‘Unwillingness and incompetence of the Ministry of Education officers to co-operate with NGOs,
that often substitute government’s duties (e.g. Romany teaching assistants or multi-cultural edu-
cation) is inexcusable’. Ludek Novák, Head of the New School Foundation, Debate over the
Complaint, G+G Literary Cafe, 15 June 1999.
39 ‘Roma in the Czech Republic after 1989’, a presentation of Jiri Zlamal at the conference Legal
Protection of Roma in Europe, 29 June 1999, Prague.
40 Romove v. Ceske Republice (1999) Prague: Socioklub, p. 89.
41 ‘Czech Cities Wall off Gypsy Ghetto’ (1998) Independent, 27 May.
advantages of Roma will be reduced. The remedy of such disadvantages will also contribute to
a decrease in crime related to poverty as well as traditional crime.
Source: Ministry of Interior (1999) and data from the conference ‘Legal protection of Roma in
Europe’, 29 June 1999, Prague.
Case Study 3. The Wall in Ústi nad Labem
In May 1998 the municipal leaders in two Czech towns Ústí nad Labem and Plzen introduced
‘apartheid-style measures … reminiscent of the Nazi holocaust when Roma, along with Jews,
were separated from the rest of the population’.39
In Ústí nad Labem–Nestemice, the municipality considered plans to erect a four-meter high
wall, separating houses with Roma tenants from other inhabitants in order to protect the latter
from bothersome noise and garbage. In Plzen, the solution of the Roma problem seemed to be
even more radical: the municipality planned to construct a compound on the city’s outskirts
with portable cabins surrounded by a fence and with a police force having 24-hour access to all
of the cabins.40
Populism proved to be successful when the mayor of Ústí nad Labem was re-elected in the
November 1998 local elections.41
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In August 1998 the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)
demanded an explanation for the proposed plan, and in January 1999 the Czech government
adopted a resolution to prevent construction of the wall.
In April 1999 the local municipality of Ústí made an agreement with the local Roma com-
munity that a two-meter high ceramic partition would be built and some construction had
already started when the Government Commissioner for Human Rights vigorously protested
against the partition’s construction. In response, the mayor of Ústí demanded the Commissioner
resign from his office. 
In May 1999 the Czech government asked the head of the Ústí District Office to question
the resolution of the Ústí–Nestemice Neighbourhood Council. If the Nestemice council failed
to prevent the partition, the Czech Chamber of Deputies would then be asked to block the con-
struction. The local authorities in Ústí  nad Labem claimed that nobody can stop them from
their decision to build a ceramic partition. In October the wall was constructed; on the same
day it was dismantled by Roma residents, and then built again with the assistance of the police. 
A month later it was officially removed after the local municipality reached an agreement
with the central government that the latter will provide financial assistance (10 million CZK) in
order to mitigate the noise and garbage problem by buying out the family houses of non-Roma
residents.
On 5 April 2000 the Czech Constitutional Court ruled that the Parliament did not have the
right to interfere in local government decision-making, stating that the Act on Municipalities
clearly discern executive from legislative powers, only the latter being the domain of the
Parliament. This ruling is significant for furthering conflicting views between the central gov-
ernment and local self-governments.42
An in-depth analysis of the situation was conducted by a team of experts and financed by the
Foundation ‘Vize 97’. The conclusions suggest that the main cause of the dispute was an incorrect
decision made by the municipality in 1994 to move Roma who do not pay rent into several build-
ings in one area.43 Other detrimental factors have been insufficient communication between the
municipality and the Roma and a lack of social work in the area. The major findings were:
· Problems exist in terms of co-operation with municipal and town offices—particularly
with social departments and their employees. 
· There are still many Roma who do not have Czech citizenship.
· There are no Roma represented in the local government.
· Regarding the payments of social benefits, however, there seem to be no problems.
Source: various newspaper articles and documents.44
42 ‘Ghettos for Czech Gypsies?’ (1998) Economist, 30 May; ‘Czech Town Plans High Wall to Isolate
Gypsy “Ghetto”’ (1998) Guardian, 16 May; Linda Grant (1998) ‘In the Ghetto’, Guardian Weekend,
25 July, pp. 16-22; Stephane Kovacs (1998) ‘Republique tcheque: le mur de la honte’, Le Figaro,
10 August; ‘Indésirables chez les Tcheques. Les Roms se heurtent toujours a la xenophobie’
(1998) Liberation, 27 August; Martin Plichta (1998) ‘Des villes tcheques veulent isoler les Tsiganes’,
Le Monde, 05 June.
43 ‘Primatorem Usti nad Labem se stal opet Ladislav Hruska z ODS’ (Ladislav Hruska elected again
to be the Mayor of Usti) and ‘Zastancem ‘ustecke zdi’ je opet primatorem’ (The defender of the
Usti wall became again the Mayor) (1998) Lidove noviny, 1 December, p. 7.
44 ‘The judges found out that politicians have been violating the Czech constitution for years’. In:
‘Ustavni soud: poslanci nemeli branit stavbe v Maticni’ (The Constitutional Court: The MPs
should not have prevented construction in Maticni) (2000) Lidové Noviny, 6 April.
In other municipalities, local governments have to deal with inter-ethnic tensions. In
Krnov, for example, the municipality and the Roma representatives came together to set-
tle problems that were reflected in the ‘Anti-Roma petition signed by several hundred
Krnov inhabitants’ that criticises past local governments for confining the Roma to one
neighbourhood. The petition makes complaints about ‘garbage in the streets, noise and
the rude behaviour of young Roma’.45
Many Roma have reacted to insufficient policies aimed at improving their situation
and inter-ethnic relations by leaving the country. In Rokycany, for example, more than
400 Roma residents have left—more than half of the total number previously living in
the town—according to the head of ‘Info-Roma’, a local Roma association. The mayor of
Rokycany claims that this figure is exaggerated and that there are no reasons for Roma to
leave. According to the mayor, there is no racism in Rokycany and a number of Roma
have ‘made a business out of the problem’.46
Even in localities where there are no marked tensions and substantial efforts have been
made by local governments to improve the situation, Roma emigration rates are high. For
example, in Liberec, the municipality helped to establish the Romany Community Centre
and has supported several pro-Romany projects with one million CZK. The Roma com-
munity in Liberec admits that there are no open inter-ethnic conflicts with the Czech
majority but they complain about inadequate job opportunities. Approximately 20 Liberec
Roma families left the country already.47
But some positive examples of long-term co-operation between the municipality and
the Roma community can be found. 
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45 Analyza vzniku, aktuální situace a moznosti resení problému obyvatel Maticní ulice, Záverecná zprá-
va projektu vypracovaného pro Nadaci Dagmar a Václava Havlovych Vize 97 (1999) Prague–Ustí
nad Labem: R Mosty–Socioklub, 30 April, pp. 13-19 
46 ‘Ghettos for Czech Gypsies?’ (1998) Economist, 30 May; ‘Czech Town Plans High Wall to Isolate
Gypsy “Ghetto”’ (1998) Guardian, 16 May; Linda Grant (1998) ‘In the Ghetto’, Guardian Weekend,
25 July, pp. 16-22; Stephane Kovacs (1998) ‘Republique tcheque: le mur de la honte’, Le Figaro,
10 August; ‘Indésirables chez les Tcheques. Les Roms se heurtent toujours a la xenophobie’
(1998) Liberation, 27 August; Martin Plichta (1998) ‘Des villes tcheques veulent isoler les Tsiganes’,
Le Monde, 05 June; ‘Ústí: Plot je v souladu se zákonem’ (Usti: The fence is in accordance with
law) (1999) Metro, 28 May; ‘Vláda je proti tomu, aby v Maticní vyrostla zed ’ (The government
is against the wall in Maticni) (1999) MF Dnes, 27 May, pp. 1, 3; ‘Cabinet Says No to Usti Fence’,
(1999) Prague Post, 28 June; United States Information Service (1999) Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 1998—Czech Republic, p. 16.
Also in : Analyza vzniku, aktuální situace a moznosti resení problému obyvatel Maticní ulice, Záverecná
zpráva projektu vypracovaného pro Nadaci Dagmar a Václava Havlovych Vize 97 (Analysis of begin-
ning, present situation, and possibilities of solving the problems of inhabitants of Maticni street.
Final Report) (1999) Praha–Ustí nad Labem: R Mosty–Socioklub, 30 April. 
47 ‘Krnovstí celí petici’ (Krnov faces a petition) (1999) Metro, 4 August, also in the Czech TV News-
CT1 (1999) 30 July.
Sometimes external assistance in analysing existing problems may result in complex
strategies and solutions.
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Case Study 4. Co-operating Cities
In 1995, in a project initiated by the Council of Europe, the town of Pardubice became one of
the founding members of the ‘Network of Czech Republic Cities Co-operating to Solve Romany
Issues’. The network aims to achieve optimal communication with Roma communities. The net-
work’s founding organisations are the Institute for Romany Studies in Ústí nad Labem in co-
operation with ‘Movement R’, the Town of Brno, the Town of Pardubice and the World Federation
of Joint Cities and Municipalities, Paris. The Deputies of the Town of Ústí  declined member-
ship and therefore Ústí did not join the network. Other towns in the network are Ceská Kamenice,
Vysoké Myto and Trmice.48 In June 2000 a seminar on ‘Roma and Municipality’ was organised
in Pardubice by the NGO ‘Movement–R’ with support of the Ministry of Education.
Source: Interview with Mrs Koskova
Case Study 5. Strategie Planning in Brno
As the result of co-operation with the Council of Europe, the state administration, local self-
governments, NGOs and the efforts of many institutions and individuals, in 1997-98 the Town
of Brno prepared a strategic plan concerning relations between the Roma minority and the major-
ity community in Brno.
The implementation of the plan is co-ordinated by the Social and Cultural Department of the
Brno Municipality. The main actors are: the Brno Employment Office; Brno District School Office;
Cultural and Educational Centre for Romany Children and Youth, DROM; Association of Roma in
Moravia; Helsinki Citizens Assembly–Roma Section; Museum of Romany Culture; Brno Municipal
Directorate of the Police of CR; Municipal Police Brno; and the Secondary Police School in Brno.
The Project focuses on five areas: education, security, social affairs, employment and media.
In the area of education, the School Office aims to create equal conditions for the develop-
ment of all national minorities, especially the Roma. Emphasis is placed on preschool educa-
tion, zero classes, transfer of children from special to mainstream schools, Romany teaching
assistants at schools, co-operation with families and Romany organisations, and the introduc-
tion of multi-cultural curricula. The Brno Municipality Department of Education, Youth and
Sports funds projects that focus on leisure time with special attention towards Romany children
and youth.
A very important actor in the project is an NGO called DROM—the Cultural and Educational
Centre of Romany Children and Youth. It organises after-school activities (20 activity circles for
250 children as well as less organised activities for approximately 70 children) and also serves
as an information centre for parents. In January 1999 a Romany adviser started to work at DROM
with the goal of removing communication barriers between the majority and the Roma and sup-
portive Roma families.
48 ‘Aktivista nabízí informace o azylu’ (An activist offers information about asylum) (1999) Metro,
4 August.
Schools may be used as community centres/community schools—a policy that may
become a widespread good practice.
Sometimes a school board can initiate good relations and practices.
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In other areas the most interesting activities are: 
· Co-operation on the ‘Crime Prevention Interactive Comprehensive Programme’ initiated
and funded by the Czech Ministry of Interior;
· Co-operation between the DROM Centre and the police school in teaching the Romany
language;
· Efforts to identify and recruit Roma for police training;
· Introduction of ‘public benefit jobs’ for those unemployed Roma who cannot afford to pay
rent. By participating in the project, they can gradually pay their debts and thus solve their
housing problems.
In co-operation with the Council of Europe, a new housing project is being prepared where
Roma will be involved in the construction of their own houses. This can serve, if successful, as
a model for similar activities elsewhere in the Czech Republic.
Source: Community Centre DROM; Council of Europe.
Case Study 6. The Community Centre and School 
A Community Centre was established by the Premysl Pitter School in October 1997, in co-oper-
ation with and with the support of the Ostrava Municipality and local governments in Moravska,
Ostrava and Privoz. The Centre is now administered by ‘Together’—a civic association estab-
lished in February 1999. This association consists of employees of the school and parents of
children attending the school. The main aim is to support social programmes as well as educa-
tional programmes. Target groups are Roma children, youth and adults. Emphasis is placed on
after-school activities of children and youth from several schools in the area that have closed
down their after-school clubs because of insufficient attendance. The main problem is that these
clubs must be paid for and the Roma cannot afford to keep their children there.
Through preventive activities and by providing positive role models, the Centre has man-
aged to reduce negative social phenomena as well as youth crime. 
The Centre also organises regular meetings for mothers and for fathers to play football. On
Fridays and Saturdays there are discos for children and adults, and once a month a lecture is
organised on various topics, such as drug abuse, sex education, education towards tolerance.
Tutoring is available for Roma students any day of the week.
The Centre also organises many other activities, such as cultural and sports events and com-
munity work, and co-operates with other NGOs and individuals.
Experience gained at Premysl Pitter School is slowly being used in other communities. Within the
framework of the experimental programme ‘Romany Children in Czech Schools’, recognised by the
Ministry of Education, the curricula model is being used by several other schools in the Czech Republic.
Hopefully, the community centre or community school model will be used more frequently in the future.
Source: Movement-R Seminar in Brno, 6 May 1999.
A very positive role is being played by nongovernmental organisations that design pro-
jects to address inter-ethnic problems at the local level. In 1996 the Czech Centre for
Conflict Prevention and Resolution and the civic association Movement-R (‘R-Mosty’)
began to conduct an educational project, ‘Education towards Tolerance and against Racism
in Prague Schools’.49 The Centre also organised seminars for teachers focusing on inter-
active methods and practical communication skills.50 NGO volunteers as well as state and
local administration personnel also attended the seminars. The seminars took place in
Prague, Brno, Pisek, Most, Pardubice and Beroun.51
The Centre also runs programmes directly targeted at local communities. It has estab-
lished Conciliation Commissions at the local government level and trained staff volun-
teering in the Commissions. 
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49 ‘Dalsi rodiny hodlaji opustit svuj domov’ (More families are leaving their home) (1999) Metro,
11 August.
50 Alena Koskova, interview.
51 Until April 1999, a total of 210 discussion seminars in 66 schools were organised for 4,500 stu-
dents at primary and secondary schools (ages 12-18).
Case Study 7. Tolerance and Respect
In spite of the problems and the generally negative attitudes of local self-government, the situ-
ation in Pribram may be viewed as a positive one thanks to close co-operation among the District
School Board, Romany social advisers and assistants, primary and secondary schools, the Centre
for Human Rights Education and Bohemia Corps, a Czech volunteer organisation.
The major successful results of this co-operation are:
· The Romany co-ordinator at the district office is in co-operation with the Romany teach-
ing assistant who organises tutorials for Roma children. Students from both Pribram high
schools help Roma children with homework on a voluntary basis. Additionally older
Romany children systematically help younger Roma children through tutorials.
· The Romany Co-ordinator organises lectures on Roma for students at secondary schools.
· There are in-service training sessions for headmasters in the Pribram district focusing on
Roma organised in co-operation with the Government Interdepartmental Commission for
Romany Community.
· The Romany Co-ordinator organises in-service teacher training sessions in the Pribram district.
· Romany social workers help families from the local Roma Community in solving their
everyday problems.
· A survey was conducted among the students of secondary schools that aimed at raising
interest among students in learning more about Roma. 
· An after-school programme for Roma and non-Roma children was created. 
· A new Romany music group is operating with support from the Municipal Office.
· According to the Romany Co-ordinator, there is very good co-operation between the
District Office, District School Office and District Labour Office in Pribram. 
· The Romany Co-ordinator is preparing training projects for Roma in co-operation with
the Labour Office and the Prince Charles Foundation.
Source: Pribram District School Board, interview with Mrs Hejkrlikova
Another important initiative that could serve as role models for other activities at local
level is the project ‘Strengthening Romany-Czech Relations Through Co-operative Problem-
solving’. The project helps to solve problems caused by the existence of barriers between
different cultures and lifestyles based on different traditions and values, and problems
resulting from insufficient information about other ethnic groups. The project aims to
provide basic communication skills to the Roma, public administration, NGOs and other
parties at the local level, and to identify and resolve problems that affect both the Roma
and non-Roma populations in a given community.
The project was conducted in four municipalities where there are sizeable Roma popu-
lations and significant inter-ethnic tensions, but where there is sufficient will to improve the
status quo. On the condition that the local government will cover 20% of the project costs,
the rest of the costs are covered by grants provided by the EU and the Council of Europe. 
The project produced positive results in all four regions where it was conducted.
CZECH REPUBLIC 161
52 In the period October 1997-April 1999 a total of 17 three-day seminars were organised for about
400 teachers.
53 Tatjana Siskova (1999) Strucna zprava o projektu Vychova k toleranci a poroti rasismu na
prazskych skolach (A brief report on the project), April.
Case Study 8.  Round Tables
Most
As a result of the round-table discussion in Most, the Romany civic association ‘Dzivas’ was
founded in the Chanov neighbourhood, a notorious area which became completely Romany as
a result of poor local management under communism.52 Co-operation started among the town
hall, the representatives of Dzivas, the police, the unemployment agency and the Chanov com-
munity, with the following results: The unemployment agency started to use a Romany work-
force for cleaning jobs in the town in order to keep the Chanov area tidy (some 140 tons of
garbage has been moved out from the area). In co-operation with police the issue of security
started to be addressed as well as new job opportunities. Sixteen Roma from Chanov were
employed, eight for the clean-up work and eight to help the police. In co-operation with the
school it was suggested to create a community school in Chanov. For 1999 a second round of
the project is being prepared: ‘Kvet’ (Flower—Community Negotiation and On-the-Job Co-
operation) aiming to strengthen and disseminate co-operation in the Most region, especially in
Becov, Lom, Obrnice and the town of Litvinov.53
Pardubice
The outcome of the round-table discussion called ‘Tolerance, nonviolent co-existence and elim-
ination of prejudice’ were the following: 
· An information youth centre was established which gathers information concerning activ-
ities for children and youth, and various prevention programmes. 
· The ‘Society Club’ project gained more support as it provides opportunities for Roma
youth to spend their leisure time actively. 
· A group of people was trained for further work in the Conciliation Commission, and it
was recommended that, after the necessary approval of the town hall, the Commission
would start working as a new tool for resolving difficult ethnic problems and issues. 
The above project proved that effective communication and problem-solving are two
of the most effective methods of preventing or resolving ethnic conflicts at the local level.
Structural and institutional changes are also important, however, and only an effective
combination of a variety of policy instruments and approaches can lead to long-term solu-
tions.
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· An information group was established that should follow activities important for the co-
existence of the majority and the Roma (so far the plan includes movies about Roma, joint
summer camps, lectures on xenophobia, training of Roma youth for work in the region-
al TV and radio as moderators, festivals, etc.).
Písek 
A basic network map of Roma families living in the Pisek region was established. The round-
table discussion, entitled ‘The security of citizens in the region and the police’, had the follow-
ing outcomes: 
· All Romany applicants who meet the legal requirements (adulthood, clean criminal record,
additional training) may become members of the Offense Committee.
· Roma representatives may participate in all other committees of the town hall.
· The possibility of establishing a special committee to solve minority issues.
· Surveillance in the streets is used not only for conflict prevention but also as a tool to
improve the safety of inhabitants. There will be more cameras in the streets in the future.
· The Roma may try to get a job in the local police if they meet the legal requirements.
· The Romany community representatives who would work for the town hall committees,
the Romany assistants at the district office and the Romany teaching assistants at schools
will help in investigation of crimes and in crime prevention (with a special focus on drug
abuse prevention for youth).
· Co-operation among the mayors of Pisek, Milevsko and Protivin, and of police and the
Roma representatives of these towns will continue.
· Selected representatives of the area (unemployment office, school authority, etc.) will cre-
ate a joint project for further development of educational level of Romany population, and
their job opportunities.
Ústí  nad Labem
The project focused on support and co-operation with the Roma families living in small flats in Maticni
street, and help in establishing the Roma Rainbow Association, the members of which are active in
solving problems of Maticni street in co-operation with various institutions and NGOs.
Two round-table discussions took place with the outcome of establishing the ‘Programme
Group for Ethnic Minorities’. The participants will continue in co-operation in the Ústí region
in the field of ethnic minority issues. The programme group includes six small action groups
with specific features and tasks. These are: housing, jobs and unemployment, education and
leisure time of children, social work, support of Romany initiatives and drug abuse prevention.
Source: Czech Centre for Conflict Prevention and Resolution.
5. Conclusion
It is very difficult to understand why there is such strong resistance to changes in atti-
tudes, public practices, institutions and structures that are necessary for the peaceful co-
existence of multi-cultural communities. Further, it is perplexing why many policy-mak-
ers still regard issues of ethnic and cultural diversity, multi-cultural education and racism
as irrelevant to their field of work. This chapter has aimed to demonstrate the complex-
ity of the problem in the Czech Republic, focusing on the importance of local-level ini-
tiatives within the framework of broader social processes. It has aimed at exploring the
manifestations of discrimination and racism, political resistance to accepting minorities,
as well as popular attitudes and prejudices. It has examined various policy initiatives and
developments in progress in the Czech Republic.
Solutions to the current problems must be found and implemented at all levels of gov-
ernment—emanating upwards from practitioners and local policy-makers and network-
ing at the local level, as well as pushing officials at central level to ‘open the gates’ to sys-
temic changes. Central government initiatives are undoubtedly essential but can be effective
only if complemented by broader social changes and changes at the local level. If the
Czech Republic wants to become a truly democratic society and be integrated into
European institutions,54 it must not only improve the political discourse on minorities
but take practical steps to improve their opportunities to fully participate in society. It
should also implement its constitutional provisions on minorities and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms where special concern for recognition and protection
of national minorities is stipulated. Preparations of the Minority Act is a positive devel-
opment, and hopefully enough political will can be garnered to complete and pass this
piece of legislation.
6. Policy Recommendations
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, one of the major policy obstacles to
improved minority integration and participation at all levels of government and stronger
minority rights protection is the lack of decentralisation of political power and decision-
making authority from the central government to local governing bodies. Significant decen-
tralisation is thus the first and most important step toward increased minority involve-
ment in all areas of Czech society. Within this context, this section devotes attention to
three major issue-areas for which policy recommendations are both appropriate and essen-
tial:
· Anti-discrimination measures;
· Development and implementation of equal opportunity legislation and policies;
· Promotion and development of multi-cultural education;
· Improving educational provisions for minority students.
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54 More details on Chanov are available in ‘Chanov se rozpadá, presto je pevností’ (Chanov is falling
apart, despite that it is a fortress) (1999) MF Dnes, 10 June, pp. 1, 9; and ‘Bílí utekli, zustalo
gheto’ (The whites ran away, a ghetto remained) (1999) MF Dnes, 10 June, p. 8.
6.1. Anti-discrimination measures
The removal of discriminatory practices presumes a major change in public attitudes. This
will undoubtedly be a complicated long-term process. The role of education and media
are crucial in this respect, but both must be complemented by law enforcement mechanisms
and concrete anti-discrimination policies originating at the national as well as the local level
of government.
· Czech policy-makers at all levels and in all sectors should review the alleged conflict
between the ‘citizenship principle’ and collective rights for minorities and decide on
further steps leading to the elimination of current social and cultural disadvantages
which perpetuate discrimination and racism. 
· These steps should be based on anti-discrimination legislation and policy initia-
tives that will allow Roma to compete with non-Roma candidates in employment,
education, housing, service provision and other areas. 
· Local governments should introduce inclusive policies with respect to minorities
and cease to support assimilationist or segregative policies. Such inclusion will
depend to a large degree on changes in the attitudes of local majority communi-
ties. Nonetheless, the appropriate legal and policy instruments must be in place at
the local level to precipitate these changes. 
· The central government should continue to review current human rights legislation
and work in compliance with international commitments with a focus on improv-
ing law-enforcement mechanisms. The government should introduce anti-discrim-
ination legislation in all fields with straightforward enforcement mechanisms. 
6.2. Equal opportunity policies
The employment of minority representatives in local governments, police, schools, state
bodies and other institutions is a necessary first step on the path to guaranteeing equal oppor-
tunities for minority groups (especially the Roma) in the workforce. Only by removing dis-
crimination through equal opportunity legislation and other measures, such as intensive train-
ing to increase the job qualifications of minorities, can previous injustices can be redressed. 
· Employing the Roma in visible public positions (in central and local public admin-
istrative positions, for example) would represent an important first step in counter-
balancing the dramatic under-representation of the Roma in the public sector. Further,
these Roma public employees can serve as positive role models for Roma youth and
can contribute to eliminating prejudices and stereotypes in the public sphere.
An important step in this process was introduction of Romany teaching assistants in
the official school system and establishment of the position of Romany Adviser at the dis-
trict level.
There are also initiatives to increase number of Roma in police forces. Again, indirect
discriminatory measures are hindering these efforts. Physical height and an ability to swim
are discriminating qualifications for police applicants. It is a known fact that Roma are
twelve centimetres smaller on average than the Czech population and that they do not
swim because of their traditions and values.55
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55 Milan Sivak, Romany assistant in Most, interview, 24 April 1999.
Efforts to employ Roma often have to cope with mistrust, criticism and negative atti-
tudes on part of majority society. Experiences from other countries, e.g. Britain, show that
although there are already many qualified teachers from ethnic minority groups (mainly
of Asian background) the important task is to retain them—they often leave their pro-
fessions because of the strong racism they encounter at their workplace!
6.3. Multi-cultural education
Multi-cultural education can serve as one of the most powerful factors in enhancing social
stability and democratisation and as a means of long-term ethnic conflict prevention in the
Czech Republic and in the Central Europe as a whole. Aside from formal legal instru-
ments against racially motivated crimes, educational programmes that promote inter-eth-
nic tolerance and provide information about diverse ethnic groups can provide the most
effective tool with which to combat widespread racism in Czech society. 
· Both the central government and local governments must be involved in designing
school curricula at all education levels that deal with multi-ethnic issues and themes
related to the value of diversity.
· The improvement of teacher education and teacher training in terms of raising
awareness and changing attitudes toward minorities is the most urgent prerequi-
site to improving the discriminatory ‘educational culture’ in the Czech Republic.
· The top-down approaches of the Ministry of Education and pedagogical institu-
tions aimed at improving teacher education will succeed only if supported by bot-
tom-up initiatives. Such initiatives include teacher networking at the local level and
the work of organisations such as ‘Movement R’ (teachers and other professionals
interested in Romany Education), ‘PAU’ (Friends of Engaged Learning), ‘SVOD’
(Association for Citizenship and Democracy Education) and other NGOs commit-
ted to education. 
· Shifts in awareness and attitudes toward minority issues must also occur at the level
of individual school managers—i.e. headmasters, education officers, school boards
and local government officials.
6.4. Improving educational provisions for minority students
· Mainstream public schooling should focus on anti-discrimination and multi-cul-
tural educational processes and structures, such as more appropriate teaching meth-
ods, better adapted curricula and textbooks, preschool programmes and support
classes, availability of support teachers and teacher assistants, increased co-opera-
tion with parents and using schools as community centres.
· These changes in education policy cannot simply be ‘ordered’ from above—local
initiatives and programmes are vital players in the process of public education
reform. 
· A multi-agency approach should be adopted at the local level, co-ordinated by a
local office of Romany social advisers in close cooperation with Romany teaching
assistants, as well as social workers and other public administration personnel. 
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ANNEX 1 
SEGREGATION OF ROMA IN THE CZECH SCHOOL SYSTEM
The education level of Roma population is markedly lower than that of the majority. The
Czech Schools Law provides for a system of ‘special’ schools, parallel to the nine-year ele-
mentary school system, and catering to ‘pupils…who have intellectual deficiencies such
that they cannot successfully be educated in elementary schools’.1 In practice, the law is
administered so as to relegate disproportionate numbers of Romany children to second-
class educational facilities offering inferior curriculum and limited opportunity for skills
training or educational preparation. Graduates of such schools have very limited access
to higher education. A paradox—whereby children with real intellectual difficulties attend
mainstream schools because their parents to not want to place them together with Roma—
is not unusual.2
The Bratinka Report has acknowledged ‘hitherto prevailing practices which led to
excessive numbers of Romany children being placed in special schools without any con-
clusive evidence as to their intellectual and learning capacity’.3 At present, according to
some experts,4 the majority of Romany children (more than 80%) are placed in special
schools. Although this placement is done with the approval of the parents and is based
on psychological testing, it is generally deemed to be discriminatory and has been criti-
cised by many NGOs and international organisations as well as Czech practitioner experts.5
Criticism is targeted at the approval required from parents, often obtained under pres-
sure and without explaining the consequences of such placing. IQ testing is biased against
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1 In relation with the Regular Report from 4 November 1998, the European Commission said the
Czech Republic and Slovenia performed least well among the six ‘fast-track’ countries in meet-
ing the conditions that the EU set for each potential members in 1997. Radio Free Europe (1998)
5 November.
2 Viktor Sekyt (1998) ‘Specifics of Romany children Entering Primary School’, lecture given on 1
December.
3 Zákon o soustavê základních skol, stredních skol a vyssích odbornych skol (skolsky zákon) (Law
on the system of basic schools, middle schools and higher specialised schools—schooling law),
in: Sbírka zákonou Ceské Republiky 1996 (Collected laws of the Czech Republic 1996), C.77 (10
October 1996), Article 31(1).
4 Interview with Helena Holcova.
5 Bratinka Report (1997) 29 October, Recommendation 1(e). 
6 Socioklub, p. 350.
Romany children as it requires culturally specific knowledge and a good level of Czech-
language knowledge. Some parents also believe that special schools provide a more friend-
ly and less racist environment than regular school. The result of segregating Romany chil-
dren into special schools has been the denial of equal educational opportunity for most
Romany children. 
In June 1999 lawyers from the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) filed a complaint
at the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic,6 which was later rejected by the Court
as unsubstantiated. According to ERRC, the evidence documented in the legal complaints
shows that Romany children outnumber non-Roma in special schools by a proportion of
more than twenty-seven to one in the Ostrava region. This racial disparity constitutes
what a United Nations committee of experts has condemned as ‘de facto racial segrega-
tion’ in the field of education, which is inconsistent with the government’s obligations
under international law. The ERRC further states that as a result of their segregation in
schools for the ‘retarded’, Romany children ‘have suffered severe educational, psycho-
logical and emotional harm’.7 Although this criticism may been seen as too radical and
many may find it unsubstantiated,8 its acceptance could lead to a much-needed systemic
change. Moreover, still more specialists agree that the Czech school is not suitable for
Czech children themselves,9 not to speak of children who are different or handicapped.
As proved by many practitioners, good education is good for everybody (‘quality in equal-
ity’). 
On 18 April 2000 the ERRC, on behalf of 18 Roma children from Ostrava, filed a com-
plaint against the Czech Republic at the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg.
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7 Helena Balabánova refers to a ‘30-year-long tradition of segragating Romany children into spe-
cial schools’, ibid., p. 350.
8 European Roma Rights Center, Press Statement: Lawsuits Filed by Roma Challenge Racial
Segregation in Czech Schools, 15 June 1999.
Also in : ‘Navzdy do príkopu, Romská zaloba na stát muze prinést zmenu nespravedlivého systému’
(Forever to be a digger. Romany complaint may bring a change of unjust educational system) and ‘Mentálne
retardovany systém. Romové zalují stát, protoze je posílá do zvlástní skoly’ (Mentally retarded system.
Roma sue the state because it sends them to special schools), Respekt, 14-20 June 1999, pp. 25,27; ‘Romske
deti koncí nekdy ve zvlástních skolách zbytecne’ (Romany kids end up in special schools without rea-
son), Slovo, 27 May 1999; ‘Romove se obrátili na soud kvuli skolám’ (Roma approached the Court because
of schools), Lidové noviny, 16 June 1999; ‘Romové si stezují k soudu kvuli zvlástní skole’(Roma complain
at the Court because of special school) and ‘Stíznost mírí na psychologické testy, ty vsak záhy sceká zmena’
(The complaint focuses on psychological tests, but they are to be changed soon) and Ztráta sancí, ztráta
rovnosti’ (Loss of chances, loss of equality), MF Dnes, 16 June 1999, pp. 1,4,16; Romové- zvlástnost
ceského skolství’ (Roma- the specialty of the Czech schooling), MF Dnes 17 June 1999
9 The ERRC criticises that Romany children: ‘... have been subjected to a curriculum far inferior to that in
basic schools; have been effectively denied the opportunity of ever returning to basic school; ... they have
been prohibited by law and practice from entrance to non-vocational secondary educational institutions,
with attendant damage to their opportunities to secure adequate employment; ... they have been stigma-
tised as ‘stupid’ or ‘retarded’ with effects that will brand them for life, including diminished self-esteem and
feelings of humiliation, alienation and lack of self-worth; ... they have been forced to study in racially seg-
regated classrooms and hence denied the benefits of a multi-cultural educational environment’. In ERRC
Press Statement: Lawsuits Filed by Roma Challenge Racial Segregation in Czech Schools, 15 June 1999.
ANNEX 2
ETHNIC MAKE UP OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC (1991 PUBLIC CENSUS)
Table A.1. Population of the Czech Republic According to National Identity and Mother Tongue 
National identity Mother tongue 
(absolute number) % (absolute number) %
Czech 9,770,527 94.8 9,871,518 95.8
Slovak 314,877 3.1 239,355 2.3
Polish 59,383 0.6 52,362 0.5
German 48,556 0.5 40,907 0.4
Romany 32,903 0.3 24,294 0.2
Hungarian 19,932 0.2 20,260 0.2
Ukrainian 8,220 0.1 4,882 0.1
Russian 5,062 0.1 – –
Ruthenian 1,926 0.0 2,307 0.0
Bulgarian 3,487 0.0 – –
Greek 3,379 0.0 – –
Romanian 1,043 0.0 – –
Austrian 413 0.0 – –
Vietnamese 421 0.0 – –
Jewish 218 0.0 – –
Other (of which 9,860 0.1 0.0 16,664 0.2
Czechoslovakian) 3,464
Unknown 22,017 0.2 29,666 0.3
Total 10,302,215 100 10,302,215 100
Note:
1. The proportion of the population whose national identity is other than Czech varies in indi-
vidual districts and regions of the Czech Republic. The Slovak national minority is dispersed
throughout the entire Czech Republic; it was de facto the largest national minority in Czech
lands in Czechoslovakia and after the dissolving thereof has been recognised as a national
minority. The highest concentration of Slovaks is found in the districts of Sokolov (9.9% of
population), Cheb (9.3%), Cesky Krumlov (8.3%), Karvina (8.3%), Bruntal (8.1%) and in
other cities, including Prague (2.0%). Some citizens who have declared the Slovak (and also
Hungarian) national identity are Romany. 
2. There is a significant concentration of persons belonging to the Polish minority located in
the continuous settlement along the state border with Poland. In two districts, Frydek-Mistek
and Karvina, persons belonging to the Polish national minority amount to more than 8% of
the local population. The educational system in this region includes Polish minority schools
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from preschool establishments to the level of high schools and specialised secondary schools
(including the Polish Pedagogical Center seated in Cesky Tesin which was established by
the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, a special office of the Czech School Inspectorate,
and an educational-psychological counseling center) as well as Polish cultural and educa-
tional organisations. 
3. Persons claiming German national minority live in the eastern, northern and western bor-
der regions of the Czech Republic, in an environment of former German-language islands
(such as the districts Jihlava and Vyskov). The greatest number of citizens who claim German
national identity live in the districts of Sokolov (6.1%), Karlovy Vary (3.1%), Chomutov
(2.6%) and Teplice (2.4%). In Moravia, a greater concentration of citizens declaring German
national identity is found in the Opava district (0.9%). 
4. Despite territorial dispersion of the Romany population throughout the Czech Lands, this
national minority can be considered concentrated in industrial cities in Northern Bohemia
and Northern Moravia and in Prague. 
5. Less numerous minorities—the Bulgarian, Russian, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Greek, Bulgarian,
Romanian and Jewish minorities—are dispersed throughout the country. In the case of
Hungarians and Ukrainians there are greater concentrations especially in Prague, the cen-
tral Bohemian and northern Moravian regions, and in the case of Greeks in the cities of Krnov
and Brno. 
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FROM PAPER TO PRACTICE IN HUNGARY: THE PROTECTION AND
INVOLVEMENT OF MINORITIES IN GOVERNANCE
Jenô Kaltenbach
Abstract
This chapter will discuss public policy toward minorities in Hungary and the implemen-
tation of this policy. The chapter uses a legal approach to analyse the process and impacts
of various legal instruments and explain their practical relevance for accommodating multi-
ethnic local communities in Hungary. The main policy issues analysed in this chapter are:
(1) the revitalisation of minority groups by a system of minority self-governments (MSGs);
(2) protection of minority cultures and languages through a system of minority educa-
tion; (3) the lack of consistent policy for the socio-economic empowerment of the Roma
minority; and (4) the lack of effective protection of the Roma from sundry discrimina-
tion. The chapter first outlines the important legal documents that influence the position
of minorities in local communities, and then provides a detailed analysis of problems
related to the implementation of these legal norms. Finally, the paper provides recom-
mendations to address these problems.
1. Introduction
Minorities in Hungary are in a unique situation, brought about by the country’s geo-
graphic and historic shifts and its decentralised system of governance. This chapter will
discuss the role of government and legal structures in the protection of minorities in
Hungary.
The Republic of Hungary is ethnically heterogeneous, but while it includes a number
of distinct national and ethnic minorities, in most cases each of these groups is fairly small
in number. Collectively, minorities account for less than 8-10%1 of the total population.
Since Hungary’s transition to a market economy, decentralisation through self-gover-
nance and the issues of human and minority rights have figured prominently on the polit-
ical agenda. Decentralisation has resulted in a fragmented public administration system
that provides the possibility of autonomy for even the smallest communities. This same
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1 According to census data, minorities represent less than 2% of the population. The estimated
number of persons belonging to national and ethnic minorities is between 8-10%. (See Annexes
1 and 2.)
system also complicates the implementation and financing of minority policies, because
multiple layers and branches of government are often involved in the process.
Hungary has introduced various legal measures to promote individual and collective
rights and cultural autonomy for minorities. Minority citizens have rights, privileges and
civic responsibilities that are equal in all respects to those of citizens belonging to the
majority population. The country adheres to international law and international treaties
with regard to the treatment of minorities, and in many ways its standards are quite pro-
gressive and provide a useful model for other countries.
The Hungarian Parliament has created a special system of minority self-government
(MSG) that functions at both the national and local levels. The law grants minorities the
right to choose their own identities, to use their native language, to form organisations
(including a self-government), to have a connection with their mother country and to
have parliamentary representation. Minority rights in Hungary go beyond those of the
European system of individual protection and extend to collective rights.
However, the successful execution of Hungary’s minority policies is complicated by
the fact that most minorities are widely dispersed throughout the country. Furthermore,
gaps remain between policies and their effective implementation. Overlapping responsi-
bilities require co-ordination involving Parliament, government ministries, local govern-
ments, MSGs and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Local authorities and MSGs,
in particular, are undergoing a learning process.
Because MSGs still lack real financial autonomy, the rules of co-operation between
local and minority governments require further clarification, and public officials need
more extensive training in minority issues. More needs to be done in establishing and
maintaining appropriate native-language schooling for minorities. In addition, adequate
minority access to the media is also of great importance.
While most minorities are economically and socially well-integrated, the Roma
(Gypsies)2 are not. Roma remain the largest of any minorities in Hungary, and their social
and economic situation is consistently worse than that of other minorities or the main-
stream population. Widespread prejudice against the Roma further aggravates the issue,
and discrimination takes many forms, not all of which can be realistically solved through
legislation.
Still, Hungary is continuously working to reform its governmental structures and legal
system with regard to the protection of minorities. The country’s plans to join the European
Union (EU) have encouraged the government to emphasise the minority rights system—
and to work toward its improvement.
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2 Hungarian Roma use both the term Roma and Gypsy for self-identification, but the term Roma
will be used in the text.
2. Ethnic Diversity and Historic Influences 
Hungary is situated in a region in which various national, ethnic and religious minorities
have intermingled throughout its history. Hungary shares its borders with seven coun-
tries: Austria, Croatia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. The Medieval
Hungarian Kingdom included territories that today belong to neighbouring countries,
including: Transylvania (Romania), the Upper-State (Slovakia) and Vojvodina (Yugoslavia).
After the Turkish occupation in 1526, western parts of the country were incorporated
into the Habsburg Empire, while a small independent Hungarian Principality existed in
Transylvania. In 1686, after the recapture of Buda, the Hungarian capital, from the Turks,
Hungary became part of the Habsburg Empire, and remained so until the end of World
War I. As a consequence of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, two-thirds of Hungary was
appropriated to neighbouring states.3
The territory of Hungary has accommodated various national and ethnic groups
throughout its history. In the past, most of these groups lived in close contact with other
ethnic groups as well as Hungarians. However, in the 19TH century minority populations
began to disperse and assimilate. The process of minority assimilation accelerated during
the 20TH century, due to policies that discouraged diversity—enforced by the nationalist
regime between the two world wars and later by the communist regime.
During World War II, about 600,000 Hungarian Jews and Roma were deported and
killed. After World War II, German and Slovak minorities in the country were subjected
to population exchange programmes that involved forced resettling. During communism,
the state provided education for minorities in separate so-called ‘national minority schools’.
However, strong political pressure to eliminate national and minority identities under
communism meant that the assimilation of minorities continued.
It is difficult to calculate how many people belong to national and ethnic minorities
in Hungary at present. The value probably lies between the official census figures and the
unofficial estimates, i.e. between 133,936 and 1,085,000 (see Annexes 1 and 2). Because
the census does not allow a person to declare double identity, as in cases of mixed race
or ethnicity, the data cannot provide a complete picture of the ethnic make-up of the
country’s inhabitants.
Today, the level of identification with specific minorities varies. Assimilation is quite
advanced, and members of many nationalities no longer speak their mother tongues.
According to the census, the number of citizens claiming that they are members of a
minority is declining for all groups except Germans and Roma.4
Most minorities, with the clear exception of the Roma, appear socially and economi-
cally well-integrated into Hungarian society. One of the most important indicators of this
integration is that the level of education among minorities is equal to the national aver-
age. However, the situation varies greatly among individual minorities: Many Germans
and Serbs have university degrees, while fewer Slovenians—only half the national aver-
age—are as academically accomplished. The Roma population’s indicators of equality are
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3 World Directory of Minorities (1997) London: Minority Rights Group, p. 223.
4 Most families belonging to minorities stopped passing on their native language to the next gen-
eration. Some 40-60% of the adult minority inhabitants are in ethnically mixed marriages.
well below the national average, and below that of other minorities too.5 Improving the
Roma’s situation is one of the key challenges in Hungary’s current domestic policy, and
the challenge is made more difficult by widespread prejudice and discrimination against
Roma. Recently, the marginalisation of the Roma population has become an issue rele-
vant to foreign policy concerns as well.
The need to integrate the Roma has been included in Hungary’s EU accession agenda,
and as a result, the government has shown more willingness to initiate comprehensive
policies aimed at their socio-economic empowerment.
3. Minority Legal Policy
European countries have two basic ways of acknowledging minorities: by definition and through
taxation. When a legal definition of the term ‘minority’ is created, all groups fulfilling the crite-
ria can be treated as national minorities. The country can then consider these minority groups
as nationally recognised groups, which can receive any tax preferences deemed appropriate.
Hungary legally acknowledges national minorities through established criteria. The 1993
Act on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (Law No. LXXVII, hereafter referred to
as the Minority Act), Paragraph 1, Section 2, defines a national minority as follows:
… all such nationalities, settled at least one century ago in the territory of the Hungarian
Republic, which are in a minority as regards the number of inhabitants of the state, are
Hungarian citizens and are different from the rest of the population in their language, cul-
ture and traditions, and such a consciousness of banding together can be seen in them
which preserves this heritage, protects their historically created societies and represents
their interests.
This definition is equally valid for national and ethnic minorities, as the Hungarian legal
system does not differentiate between the two. The definition is designed to achieve two aims:
first, to ensure that all legitimate minority groups settled in Hungary are able to fulfill these
criteria; and second, to ensure that no newly arrived groups or non-minorities would be able
to claim national minority status—either for financial preference or any other reasons.
According to Paragraph 61, Section 1 of the Minority Act, the nationalities settled in Hungary
are: Armenians, Bulgarians, Croats, Germans, Greeks, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Ruthenians,
Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenians and Ukrainians. These minorities fulfilled the necessary criteria at
the time the law went into effect, but the list has an open nature, so further minorities can be
acknowledged with the according legal status. Paragraph 61, Section 2 of the Minority Act says:
… if more minorities than those listed in section (1) wish to prove that they are eligi-
ble to fulfill the conditions of the law, then at least 1,000 voters who claim to belong
to the minority can submit a nationality initiative in this matter to the Speaker of the
Parliament….
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5 Report No. J/3670 on the situation of the national and ethnic minorities in the Hungarian Republic,
January 1997, Dr Pál Vastagh, Minister of Justice
While earlier laws and regulations contained provisions for minority protection, the
legal system lacked sufficient statutory regulation. Now the minority rights system is coher-
ent—its basic principles are stated in the Constitution and the details for implementation
are contained in the Minority Act. Protections for minorities are also contained within
several basic laws, especially: the fourth Law on the Penal Code, passed in 1978; Law
LXXIX, passed in 1993, on Public Education; and the first Law on Radio and Television,
passed in 1996. Additional legal guarantees of minority rights are contained in interna-
tional treaties and other documents.
This section analyses the various legal instruments that form public policy for minori-
ties in Hungary.
3.1. Hungarian law and international norms for minority protection 
Since the early 1990s, Hungary has played an active role in codifying international minor-
ity laws. According to the Constitution, international treaties take precedence and inter-
nal law must be harmonised with international treaties.
3.1.1. European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages 
Although it deals only with specific rights involving languages, the European Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages is a significant international treaty that defines the
direction of minority rights development. Hungary was one of the eleven states that
signed the Charter on 5 September 1992. The country submitted its ratification docu-
ment in 1999.
The Charter leaves the state to decide which languages to protect. According to
Paragraph 42 of the Hungarian Minority Act, the following languages are used by minori-
ties in the country: Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, German, Greek, Polish, Roma lan-
guages (Romany and Beás), Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian and
Ukrainian. But Hungary did not include all of these languages in its documentation rati-
fying the Charter—the Roma language being the most significant omission.
The official argument for not giving all of Hungary’s official minority tongues the full
protection of the Charter on Regional or Minority Languages had to do with territorial
concentration. As most minority groups are widely dispersed throughout the country,
Hungary only chose to take responsibility for establishing institutional types of instruc-
tion for Croatian, German, Romanian, Serbian, Slovak and Slovenian. The lack of pro-
tection for any of the Roma dialects under the Charter may contribute to the further ero-
sion of the Romany and Beás languages and thus promote the linguistic assimilation of
the Roma minority.
3.1.2. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
The Council of Europe accepted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (FCNM) on 10 November 1994. Unlike the Hungarian law, the FCNM does
not contain the definition of a minority because it was difficult to obtain international
agreement on the best way to describe the term. Omitting the definition allows more states
outside of the Council of Europe to join the Convention.
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The other significant difference between Hungary’s laws and the Convention is the
nature of the rights that are ensured. Hungarian law acknowledges the existence of col-
lective minority rights, while the FCNM is based on individual rights. The Convention’s
first article states: 
‘The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belong-
ing to those minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of human
rights, and as such falls within the scope of international co-operation’.
The Framework Convention does not include the right for autonomy and positive dis-
crimination, or the right to participate in cultural, economic and social life as a collective
legal entity, which the Council of Europe’s Recommendation 1201 does. With these omis-
sions, the number of clauses that could be categorised as ‘shy minority protection’6 increased.
The Framework Convention’s control mechanism rests on the nations’ periodic oblig-
ation to make progress reports to the Council of Europe’s Ministry Committee. Government
decision number J/1397 of June 1999 is the first report on the implementation of the
FCNM in Hungary.7
3.1.3. Bilateral treaties
A bilateral system of agreements in Central Europe has proven to be an effective means
for securing the protection of specific minorities. The first document of this type was the
Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement in 1991.8 Since 1991, Hungary has signed bilat-
eral treaties with Slovenia, Croatia, Germany, Slovakia and Romania.
The process of signing and ratifying these treaties brought about the interpretation of
minority rights in the form of several freedoms, including: freedom to choose identity, free-
dom from discrimination, freedom from forced assimilation, freedom of assembly, freedom
to use minority languages, freedom to preserve culture, freedom in education and media
and freedom to use the native language on settlements, street signs and in public notices.
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6 Dr Péter Kovács  (1996) International Law and Minority Protection, Budapest: Osiris, p. 114.
7 The report has been published by the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities in the publica-
tion ‘Minorities in Hungary’ in 1999.
8 After intensive talks, the following minority bilateral agreements were signed: 
· 1991 Declaration of the Principles of Co-operation between the Hungarian Republic and the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Area of National Minority Rights.
· 1991 Agreement for Good Neighbour Policy and the Basis of Co-operation between the Hungarian
Republic and Ukraine.
· 1992 Agreement for Ensuring Special Rights for the Slovenian National Minority in the Territory
of the Hungarian Republic and for the Hungarian National Community in the Slovenian Republic.
· 1992 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the Hungarian Republic and the Slovenian
Republic.
· 1992 Treaty between the Hungarian Republic and the Croatian Republic on Friendly Ties and Co-
operation.
· 1992 Treaty between the Hungarian Republic and the German Federal Republic on Friendly Co-
operation and European Partnership.
· 1992 A Joint Declaration between the Hungarian Republic and the German Federal Republic on
the German Minority in Hungary and Support for German to be Taught as a Foreign Language.
3.2. Minorities’ status as constituents of the state
The Hungarian legal system acknowledges the rights of both minority individuals and
minority communities. These rights are enforced through general legal institutions and
through specialised institutions established expressly for this purpose. The Constitution’s
minority prescriptions can be categorised into two groups: those that define the consti-
tutional rights of minorities, and those that seek to ban prejudicial discrimination.
According to the Constitution, minorities are regarded as ‘constituent factors of the state’,9
and therefore have rights and duties equal to those of the Hungarian nation. Minorities share
in the benefits accruing to the rest of the country, but they also share in the responsibility
to handle statutory, social and economic tasks—and therefore must have adequate repre-
sentation. This constitutional description of minorities can be regarded as granting equal
rights for minorities, but minority consultants have different opinions on the matter.
A more accurate definition of minority status is contained in the Minority Act of 1993,
which says that national minorities have the same rights as other citizens. Parliament has
also created the MSG system of special institutions to protect minority rights and elected
a Parliamentary Commissioner for Minority Rights. The Minority Act acknowledges the
right to choose an identity, the right to use a native language, the right to form organisa-
tions, the right to have a connection with the mother country, the right to self-govern-
ment and the right to parliamentary representation.
3.3. Collective rights
The Preamble of the Minority Act establishes that the individual and collective rights of
national minorities are fundamental human rights, which the Republic of Hungary respects
and ensures. The passage of the Minority Act was a major milestone in the process of
establishing collective rights. At the Venice Session of the Human Rights Committee it
was noted that the Hungarian legal system had recognised and codified the need to pro-
tect minorities’ community rights at a time when international law had not even acknowl-
edged the existence of such rights.
In the Hungarian legal system, minority communities may exercise the following rights:
· the right to exist as a minority group;
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· 1995 Treaty between the Hungarian Republic and the Slovak Republic on Good Neighbour
Policy and Friendly Co-operation.
· 1996 Treaty between the Hungarian Republic and Romania on Understanding, Co-operation
and Good Neighbour Policy.
9 Paragraph 68, Section (1) of the Constitution: The national and ethnic minorities living in the
Hungarian Republic shall share in people’s power, being constituent factors of the State.
(2) The Hungarian Republic shall accord protection to national and ethnic minorities, ensuring
their collective participation in public life, the cultivation of their own culture, the use of  their moth-
er tongue, education in their mother tongue and the right to use names in their own language.
(3) The Hungarian Republic’s laws ensure the representation of the national and ethnic minori-
ties living in the country.
(4) National and ethnic minorities are allowed to create local and national self-governments.
· the right to protect and develop their own culture and language;
· the right to political representation;
· the right to form local self-governments;
· the right to exist without discrimination;
· the right of access to electronic media.
The Minority Act ensures rights which may, by their nature, be exercised by entities
other than individuals—such as minority communities. These rights include:
· the right to identity;
· protection against discrimination;
· the right to education, culture and traditions.
The provision of collective rights is an important development that will surely have
an impact on future public policy regarding minorities in Hungary.
3.4. Statutory guarantees
The guarantee of minority rights appears in the laws regarding self-government, but the
enforcement of those rights is the task of the state government. This enforcement is accom-
plished through the following special minority rights organisations and general govern-
ment institutions.
3.4.1. Parliament’s Human Rights, Minority and Religious Committee
The Human Rights, Minority and Religious Committee deals with minority issues at the
top level of state power. The role of the Committee is to prepare legislation for the pro-
tection of human rights, including the rights of national and ethnic minorities.
3.4.2. Parliamentary Commissioner for the Protection of National and Ethnic Minority Rights 
Article 32/B of the Constitution provides for the institution of a Commissioner for the
Protection of National and Ethnic Minority Rights. The Commissioner provides a consti-
tutional check on public administration and has the right to investigate any abuse of
minority rights that come to his attention. Moreover, the Commissioner can initiate mea-
sures to redress abuses, and he can initiate procedures to investigate the enforcement of
minority rights.
Since the creation of the office, the Commissioner has investigated a number of cases.
Most of these cases involved discrimination on the grounds of national and ethnic origin,
and the majority of the cases involved the Roma community. More than half of the cases
investigated by the Commissioner related to local governments.
3.4.3. Office for National and Ethnic Minorities
Since 1990, the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities has carried out state tasks relat-
ed to the accommodation of minorities in Hungary. This Office is part of the central pub-
lic administration and operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, which is
responsible for preparing and enforcing statutory decisions about minorities.
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3.4.4. Action Plan for the Roma
In 1997, the government introduced a medium-term action plan to improve the situation of
the Roma minority. This plan touched on a broad range of policy issues, including education,
socio-economic empowerment, prevention of discrimination, protection of culture and access
to the mass media. In spite of its ambitious goals, the action plan has achieved almost no tan-
gible results to date. Although the new government in 1998 continued planning a major pol-
icy initiative under the medium-term action plan, the package is still in the development phase.
Thus far, it has generated virtually no efforts to design or implement concrete policies.
3.4.5. Central public administration
The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are two general govern-
ment bodies that deal with cultural autonomy. The Ministry of Education is involved in
educational issues in connection with MSGs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is the cen-
tral supervisory authority for local governments, which means that it is ultimately respon-
sible for legal supervision of MSGs.
3.4.6. Local public administration
The local governments’ duties include minority protection and enforcement of minority
rights in their respective settlements and at the county level. As most public services are
delivered at the local level, local public administrations play a major role in distributing
resources and providing equal access to public services. Furthermore, local governments
are responsible for co-operating with MSGs. The rules for this co-operation are clearly
spelled out in the Law on Local Government and the Minority Act. However, due to the
unequal distribution of power and financial dependence of MSGs, the level of participa-
tion of minorities in local policy-making really depends on the good-will of the local gov-
ernments (see Section 4).
According to the Act on Local Governments, candidates can run as minority repre-
sentatives for seats in the local governments. A total of 1,055 minority deputies were elect-
ed in 1998. Most of them belong to the two largest minority groups, the Roma and the
German minority.
3.5. Territorial autonomy
The Hungarian system of minority protection is often praised in the international commu-
nity as one of the most generous systems. The Minority Act of 1993 guarantees national and
ethnic minorities a special community right to establish their own local governments.
The main reason behind this generous provision of cultural autonomy for minorities
in Hungary was to provide Hungary’s neighbours, who accommodate large Hungarian
minorities, with a powerful model of minority protection.
The Hungarian legal system ensures cultural autonomy through a two-tier local gov-
ernment system: Minorities are allowed to form their own self-governments (MSGs)—either
in connection with local government elections or in independently organised elections.
According to the Minority Act, MSGs regulate or administer jurisdiction over cultur-
al autonomy of their community. However, by their legal nature, MSGs can only affect a
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public law through another public legal entity, mainly the local and central governmen-
tal bodies. This means that MSGs can have an impact on laws through participation in
the decision-making process.
The Minority Act allows for another special form of territorial autonomy—it is possi-
ble to declare a MSG after local government elections if more than half of the elected board
belongs to the same minority group. This right is very rarely applied in practice, howev-
er, because of the dispersed geographical nature of most minority groups.
3.6. Cultural autonomy of minorities: 
The system of minority self-governments
Because Hungary’s minorities live scattered throughout the country, it was sensible to cre-
ate a system connected to the local government system. Hungary’s minorities established
their first self-governments in 1994-95.
According to the Minority Act, each individual can claim to belong to any national or
ethnic group, but they are not required to do so, and there is no minority registration in
Hungary. This free choice of identity is the basis of the MSG model. Minority citizens vote
locally for their MSG candidates according to the idea of free choice of identity.10 The
MSG representatives have created—through electors—the national MSG.
The local MSGs can make certain key decisions within their jurisdictions, including:
their own organisational regulations; signs and names; and the establishment of institu-
tions, especially in the area of local public education and local media.
The MSG system is set up to work closely with the local government system, and the
Minority Act outlines the local governments’ responsibilities to the MSG system. For exam-
ple, according to Paragraph 29, Section 1, in questions that have an impact on the minor-
ity population—such as local public education, local media, the patronising of local tra-
ditions and culture and collective language use—the local government’s board can only
decide in accordance with the local MSG. According to Section 2, the relevant MSG’s
agreement is required when appointing leaders of minority institutions or making local
government decisions that have an impact on minority education.
The situation is similar with the national MSGs. They must be allowed to declare an
opinion about proposed laws affecting their minorities, and they have the right of approval
in the creation of the basic material for minority education. They also have the right of
approval in the creation of rules pertaining to the preservation and maintenance of his-
toric settlements and architectural monuments.
The local government is also required to consider the interest of the minorities living
in the settlement, to create rules for communal living and to maintain the regulations of
the Minority Act. For their part, MSGs must learn the technique and rules for represent-
ing and enforcing their own interests. These are the new tasks for both types of govern-
ments, and fulfilling them sometimes causes difficulty.
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10 There are 3,200 settlements in Hungary. Some 679 minority self-governments were created in
the 1994 local government elections and 138 were created in 1995. On 18 October 1998, 1,375
minority self-governments were elected.
3.6.1 Practical problems
The law requires that municipalities and MSGs conclude co-operative agreements, which
prescribe the extent and utilisation of assets separated for use by the MSGs. Budgeting is often
a bone of contention, because there is frequent disagreement about the utilisation of funds.
Paragraph 102/C of the Act on Local Governments makes it possible for a local gov-
ernment to transfer—if it so wishes—a number of its functions to the local MSG. In prac-
tical terms, such a transfer runs into two major hurdles: First, there is sure to be debate
over how much funding is sufficient to handle the duties being transferred. The second
problem is that the law does not allow the local government to transfer powers connect-
ed to its scope of authority or to public utilities.
4. The Role of Local Government
During the past ten years, the local level of government has become a major actor in pub-
lic policy formulation and service delivery. Local governments also play a key role in
implementation of minority policy. This section discusses major issues of local manage-
ment of multi-ethnic communities.
4.1. Decentralisation and public services
The former system of local public administration followed the Soviet scheme of councils,
undemocratic due to their centralised character and the absolute domination of the
Communist Party. After the adoption of Act No. LXIV of 1990 on Local Elections, a new
system of local democracy was established, based upon the principles of Hungarian tra-
dition and the European Charter of Local Self-Governments of the Council of Europe.
The Constitution and the Act on Local Governments recognised the rights of local
communities, including the smallest of settlements, to manage their own local affairs. The
number of local units has increased to 3,149. All of these elect their own representatives
and executive bodies.
Local government in Hungary exists at two levels: the municipality and the county.
Municipalities are settlements, which in Hungary includes villages, cities and cities with
county rights. The middle-tier of local government, also referred to as ‘regional’ government,
consists of 19 counties. The capital city, Budapest, has special legal status. There are no hier-
archical relations between the two levels of local government. Municipalities provide local
public services to their settlements while counties provide public services that settlements
are not capable of performing, as well as services that have a regional character.
Municipal governments have broad responsibilities in providing local services. While
some local services are optional, the Parliament determines mandatory functions and pow-
ers of local governments. Parliament must simultaneously ensure the financial means nec-
essary for the fulfillment of these tasks. The Act on Local Governments further requires
that municipalities provide: healthy drinking water, kindergarten education, primary
school education, basic health and welfare services, public lighting, local public roads and
public cemeteries, and the protection of the rights of ethnic and national minorities.
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Despite the fact that the scope of duties to be performed by MSGs differs from that of
local governments, legislation has provided MSGs with a similar legal status. Local and
minority elections are based on the same principles of voting rights and the same regula-
tory framework.
As minority rights apply to a specific group of people within society, a constitutional
question worth considering is whether the MSG system is best served by an election sys-
tem based on equality and universal voting rights, like the one used for local governments.
It could be a cause of concern that non-minority members can participate in MSG elec-
tions. But, because the descriptive value of the term ‘minority community’ is not absolute,
and because every citizen is granted the right to vote in MSG elections, the foundations
of the current system cannot be questioned on formal, constitutional grounds.
Nonetheless, under the current system it is constitutionally crucial that all minority
members be ensured their rights to vote, as well as easy access to MSG elections, so that
voters identifying with a particular minority can vote for candidates of the MSG. For exam-
ple, MSG elections should perhaps be held separately from regular local elections, to make
sure that voters have a clear understanding of the issues in the minority election. And vot-
ers should be granted the chance of getting to know minority candidates and their pro-
grammes, thus making a real choice between individual candidates possible.
4.2. Local governments and minority self-governments
The MSG system—due to its nature—works in close connection with the local govern-
ment system, which is why the Minority Act gives local governments certain commit-
ments to the MSGs and attempts to establish co-operative decision-making.  The MSGs’
strongest power is their ‘right of veto’ in questions impacting on minorities, such as local
public education, local media, collective language use, etc. Another, weaker power grants
local and/or national MSGs the opportunity to express an opinion in cases where either
the law on minorities or another statute of law provides this right.
Unfortunately, in many cases, these rights only exist on paper. Practical experience
indicates that disregarding the rights of agreement and of expressing opinions entails no
real legal consequence. As we have indicated above, the Act on Local Governments allows
the body of representatives of a municipality to transfer some of its duties and tasks to
the local MSG. But there are some special regulations included in this act that prevent
minority governments from exercising the powers of an authority.
Although the Act on Local Governments excludes any means for an MSG to allocate
support for the needy under social welfare legislation, there have been efforts to transfer
some of this responsibility as a means of helping underprivileged Roma populations. In
recent years local governments have tried to give MSGs representing the interests of Roma
communities certain social functions—and appropriate funds—without formal transfer
of the responsibility or direct access to the budget.
The attitude of local governments is crucial to the successful implementation of minor-
ity rights and the operation of the MSG system for several reasons:
· The overwhelming majority of public affairs affecting citizens are local affairs, and
hence in the domain of and the responsibility of local governments. The average
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person’s perception of public affairs is mostly determined by his/her opinion of
local government.
· Local governments operate the most important public service systems, the largest
two being education and health care, both of which are entwined with the issue of
minority rights.
· Minority communities may be defined locally, and local tensions are typically the
main concern in minority affairs.
· Approximately one-third of the central budget is channelled through local gov-
ernments.
According to the statistics prepared by the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner
for Minorities, every prominent case of minority rights violation in 1999 concerned munic-
ipal governments. It would be a simplification to claim that officials in municipalities are
more inclined to commit legal offences. It is more likely that their frequent involvement
in minority issues, and heavy caseloads, make municipal governments more prone to
committing rights violations.
The current MSG system grants large discretion to local governments, which means
MSGs are often at the mercy of the local ‘big brother’ financially, professionally and in
terms of local policy. A great deal depends on the attitude of the mayor as well as the local
council. While a good relationship with the local government is always important to the
MSG, the reverse is not necessarily true. Local mayors or councils may prefer not to share
power, and there has been a definite trend towards the significant politicisation of minor-
ity problems.  This is also true of minority affairs in general. Irregularities in benefits,
housing and education are at once charged with political content if the clients are minori-
ties, especially Roma.
A genuinely dangerous occurrence that gives reason for real concern is that some may-
ors and municipal boards, aware of the backing of local public opinion, consciously ignore
laws protecting minorities, or construe and apply them in their own particular way.
4.3. MSG checks on local government
Despite initial difficulties, including local hostility and inconsistencies in legal regulation,
the system of MSG is on the way to consolidating its status and role in Hungary.  Nevertheless,
the Hungarian system, which gives wide responsibility and autonomy to local authorities,
lacks adequate controls on the local level. A small, or insufficiently organised, community
is vulnerable to rigid oligarchies, due to the lack of division and distribution of local power.
The risk of a local ‘one-party regime’ becomes more likely if the local government does not
receive sufficient financial and professional support from the national government.
MSGs do have some checks on local governments, including participatory rights in
minority matters at the local level. In addition, the chairman of the MSG, or other minor-
ity representatives, are allowed to take part in meetings of the municipal council. The MSGs
can also address any requests to local government organisations and the organisations are
obliged to reply to the request. And, as mentioned above, MSGs have co-operative deci-
sion-making rights and definite regulative and administration rights on the local level.
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4.4. Financial guarantees for cultural autonomy
Serious concerns have been raised, however, about the autonomy of MSGs when it comes
to financing. MSGs are often dependent on relations with local authorities and must com-
pete with them at the local level for allocation of scarce funds. This competition has been
known to create hostility between majority and minority members.
Roma MSGs frequently have the greatest difficulties due to their communities’ socio-
economic position. At the local level in particular, Roma representatives feel squeezed by
the reluctance of municipalities to help, compounded by increased responsibility to address
problems that their MSG is incapable of handling—such as distributing social aid, fight-
ing discrimination and racism and organising measures against unemployment.
Co-ordinating the financing of MSGs and minority organisations is difficult because
minorities are administered by many bodies, including Parliament, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office, as well as local governments. Parliament has juris-
diction over an amount defined in the annual central budget (HUF 87.8 million in 1999),
which is provided to the NGOs of national and ethnic minorities, based on the tenders
received.
MSGs receive subsidies, distributed through local governments, from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. The maintenance of minority and majority school facilities is covered by
the local governments, and they receive national government grants for this purpose, equal
to about 65-70% of the total costs. In addition, minority education institutes receive fur-
ther subsidies because the government has acknowledged that minority education involves
additional costs.
The present financing system is wasteful, for as long as MSGs receive money in equal
proportions, irrespective of the kind of activities they perform, MSG officials will have
less impetus to do more locally. It would be more efficient to subsidise MSGs based on
the services they provide that directly reduce the burden of the local and national gov-
ernment. An MSG that assumes more governmental tasks that are beneficial to minori-
ties should receive a correspondingly larger subsidy.
Hungary’s principle of free choice of minority identity makes it impossible to give
MSGs financing on the basis of the local minority population. But there are ways to mea-
sure the number of people an MSG serves. For instance, it is possible to count the num-
ber of students enrolled in a minority education programme, or the number of people
visiting a minority library. It is also possible to measure the exact cost of other services,
such as upkeep of a minority museum. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Finance seems to
find it simpler to distribute funding evenly, and simply claim that it is too hard to esti-
mate the exact costs of MSG work.
4.5. Parliamentary representation
Although the Constitution requires that minorities be represented in Parliament, the leg-
islation necessary to implement this requirement has not yet been passed. The
Constitutional Court has ruled that Parliament’s failure to create this law is in violation
of the Constitution, but still no progress has been made.
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The issue of minority representation was raised in 1990, when Article 68 of the
Constitution was supplemented with Paragraph (c): ‘Representation of national and lan-
guage minorities living in the Republic of Hungary shall be ensured. Irrespective of the
elections for Parliament as per Article 71(1) the Parliament shall elect members of
Parliament for the representation of minorities—of a number and in a way to be speci-
fied by a separate law’.
Parliament never passed the separate law necessary to define the system for minority
representation, however. In 1991 the Constitutional Court was petitioned to rule on the
legislature’s inaction on the matter. Because a law on the rights of minorities was expect-
ed soon, the court suspended the case until 1 January 1992. But the Parliament still did
not act by that date, so the Court ruled in the case.
In its resolution No. 35/1992 (VI.10.) AB, the Constitutional Court declared that: ‘The
statement by the Constitution that it recognises national and ethnic minorities as part of
the state of Hungary renders the statutory regulation of the rights of national and ethnic
minorities extremely important ... Representation is a necessary prerequisite for national
and ethnic minorities to fulfil their roles as constituents of the state’. The resolution also
stated that ‘the Parliament failed to carry out its task as per Article 68 of the Constitution
whereby it created an unconstitutional situation’. Consequently, the Constitutional Court
called on the Parliament to fulfill its legislative task, but the Court noted that it is up to
the legislators to decide whether they will carry out the task by adopting one or several
acts of law.
On 7 July 1993, the Parliament adopted the Minority Act, which says in Article 20 (1)
that: ‘minorities have a right to parliamentary representation—to be specified in a sepa-
rate act of law’. Thus, instead of resolving the question of representation, the Minority Act
transferred the issue to the scope of another law. It did not specify, however, whether it
was necessary to create a separate law specifically on elections by minorities or whether
the task can be performed by an appropriate modification of the act on general elections.
After the Minority Act’s passage, another petition to the Constitutional Court sought
to declare the Elections Act unconstitutional because it did not have an appropriate pro-
vision to treat minorities as a ‘constituent of the state’.
The Constitutional Court rejected this motion without substantive discussion, argu-
ing that it sought to terminate an unconstitutional status in the form of failure to carry
out an action and is therefore a judged fact. But in resolution No. 24/1994 (V.6.) AB, the
Court ruled that: ‘The No. 35/1992 (VI.10.) resolution by the Constitutional Court had
already established the fact of the violation of the Constitution in respect of the parlia-
mentary representation of national and ethnic minorities’.
The 1994 resolution by the Constitutional Court clarified the fact that the Parliament
remained in violation of the Constitution. Furthermore, by failing to create the necessary
provisions for minority representation outlined in Article 20 (1) of the Minority Act, the
Parliament failed to carry out its own promise.
Even though adequate representation is a necessary precondition for minorities to ful-
fill their role as constituents of the state, the law to provide this representation has yet to
be passed, and Parliament has been in breach of the Constitution by failing to act for
almost a decade. This failure deprives minority communities living in Hungary from exer-
cising their constitutional rights and weakens trust in the Parliament.
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4.6. Education
For individuals in minority groups, familiarity with the group’s language and culture can
be a great help in freely choosing and preserving minority identity. Generations of minori-
ties have lost their language due to assimilation, but kindergartens and schools can help
children—and their parents—preserve their identities and stop the assimilation process.
The education of ethnic nationalities is therefore a high-priority area of minority rights.
Hungary provides for native-tongue education for members of national and ethnic
minorities in Article 68, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution. Paragraph 43 of the Minority
Act leaves the decision of whether the child is to be educated in Hungarian or in the lan-
guage of a different nationality up to the child’s parent or ward.
There is no separate minority education system in Hungary. Minority education is con-
ducted as an integral part of the Hungarian public education system. The education of
national minorities has a well-established structure of schools, education programmes
and qualified teachers belonging to the specific national minorities. There are two major
types of minority education systems—larger minorities have their own educational net-
work within the framework of the public education system, while smaller groups have
no autonomous network but have separate classes to host their children.  The Roma are
poorly served and do not enjoy an adequate version of either of these two minority edu-
cation systems.
In striving to create cultural autonomy, the Minority Act gives great importance to
autonomy over minority education. The current form of ensuring educational autonomy
is the right to consent and opinion—exercised through the MSGs—in local decisions that
concern the education of minorities.
Small national minority schools often face serious financial constraints. Financial short-
falls have been temporarily averted thanks to co-ordinated government intervention, but
a permanent solution is still required.
The Minority Act makes minority education possible, even for classes of lower-than-
average size, by transferring the additional expense to the national and local governments.
Since these regulations ensure the upholding of constitutional rights, executing them inad-
equately can lead to legal and constitutional controversies.
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Case Study 1. Changes in Minority Education
In 1996 the amendment of Law No. 1993/LXXIX on Public Education brought significant changes
to legislative regulations concerning minority education. The rules of the previous public education
law did not take the regulations of the Minority Act into account. The old law was ambiguous about
which institutions might be considered minority institutions, and as a result the MSGs have not always
been able to practice their rights to consent and opinion on the subject. The financing system for
public education did not provide for small schools for nationalities, and the regulations ignored the
fact that the per capita costs of small nationality schools are higher than those of schools with more
students. In seeking a solution to the problem, the Parliamentary Commissioner on the Rights of
Ethnic and National Minorities has had meetings with the president of the Human Rights, Minorities
and Religious Affairs Committee and leaders of the National and Ethnic Minorities Office.
The Law on Public Education strives to reform the education system as a whole. A new
national basic curricula was passed, leaving room for locally maintained public schools
to make a range of choices in setting their curricula. This reform, which has increased the
independence of schools, also affects minority education. But it is too early to tell what
impact the law will have on minority institutions.
There are three types of settings for providing minority education:
· minority language taught as a foreign language;
· so-called ‘bilingual schools’, where some subjects are taught in the mother tongue;
· schools where all subjects are taught in the mother tongue.
Special programmes/schools for Roma children are also considered as part of the sys-
tem of minority education. However, due to the lack of trained teachers specialised in
Roma language and culture, these institutions often address the disadvantages of the Roma
children rather than building their identity.
The creation and operation of a minority class or student group is mandatory if request-
ed by eight parents belonging to the same minority, or by their legal representative.
Paragraphs 86 and 87 of the Law on Public Education regulate the tasks the local gov-
ernment has to perform in providing education. For example, the local government must
ensure compulsory attendance by all children, regardless of ethnicity, at kindergarten,
elementary school and junior high school.
The amendment to the Public Education Law has made it clear that the official lan-
guages of education are Hungarian as well as the language of the national minority in
question. Examinations may be in the language of the national minority, while the grade
certificate must be written in both Hungarian and the minority language.
Local and national MSGs may maintain educational institutes, and often also have the
right to consent and opinion on a range of educational matters. For example, local gov-
ernments must obtain the consent of the local and national MSG in order to establish pub-
lic education institutions, to extend the scope of an existing institution’s responsibilities
or to discontinue the operation of an institution or certain services.
This version of educational autonomy is probably well suited to most MSGs, because
most minority schools are so-called mother-tongue schools in settlements with a popu-
lation of less than 5,000. In these communities, MSGs do not have the professional and
financial capacity for maintaining schools by themselves.
The amended Public Education Law provides for a gradual transfer of minority insti-
tutions from local governments to MSGs. Paragraph 88, Section 7 regulates the condi-
tions under which the local government may transfer the ownership or operating rights
of educational institutions. Because transferring an institution to MSG control only involves
a change in maintenance, such a transfer does not have a dramatic impact on public edu-
cation.
4.6.1. Financing minority education
The Minority Act acknowledges that minority education involves higher costs than stan-
dard education. To offset these costs, the government has established the Earmarked State
Grant to Support Minority Education. The amendment to the Public Education Law states
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that the grant cannot be used for other purposes,11 but the legislation does not spell out
exactly what counts as a ‘minority education’ cost. It is not clear, for example, whether
the grant can be used to pay operating costs at a school building where both minority and
regular classes take place. The Parliamentary Commissioner has ordered a nationwide
investigation to examine this controversial situation.
It is understandable that it may cause a conflict in smaller settlements if the minority
institute receives more grants than a majority school or kindergarten, but nationality edu-
cation clearly involves higher costs, and the failure to cover these costs can constitute a
breach of national and ethnic minority rights. It falls to Parliament to find a solution for
financing minority education.
Financial constraints have lead to problems, such as the poor supply of textbooks for
nationality education. Nationality education can only become an integral part of the pub-
lic education system if appropriate teaching materials are published in accordance with
the basic national curricula.
More funding and facilities are also needed for nationality teacher training. Minority
education can only live up to the new challenges and growing demand if an appropriate
number of properly trained teachers are available to train each nationality. Since the
amendment to the public education law applies higher standards when employing facul-
ty for these nationalities, the government must elaborate appropriate measures to assist
in their professional development.
4.6.2. Provisions for Roma education
The education of the Roma is clearly insufficient in Hungary. Roma students perform statis-
tically poorer than the countrywide average, and they lack appropriate minority classes and
special educational programmes. In many cases, educational policy aimed at improving the
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Facts and Figures. Provisions for National Minority Education
· According to the Ministry for Education and Culture, the present network of national minority insti-
tutions contains 298 kindergartens and 370 regular schools.12 Some 56% of kindergartens teach
German, 23% Slovak and 11% Croatian. Other minority languages are each taught in under 5% of
the kindergartens. Similar figures apply to schools for older children.
· More than 60% of the institutions are in settlements of less than 5,000, and all Serbian, Romanian
and Slovenian educational institutes are in small townships and towns.
· German schools and kindergartens are represented in all types of settlements. 
· 60% of the nationality schools have less than 200 students, and 25% have less than 100 students.
· Bulgarians have one educational institution, which contains grades K-12 and was previously financed
by the Bulgarian government. It is now supported by both Hungary and Bulgaria. The institution
has 100-120 students per year.
· Greeks have only elementary and junior high schools, and it is provided in approximately six set-
tlements.
11 Normative Grant For Minority Education: See Annex 3, Budgetary Support for the Education of
National and Ethnic Minorities.
12 These figures do not include those institutions that provide education for Roma students, but
do include institutions training two nationalities at once.
situation of Roma schooling can only be successful if conducted as part of co-ordinated gov-
ernment efforts to mitigate the economic and social disadvantages of Roma communities.
Even though 7.12% of students in Hungary are of Roma origin, there is only one Roma
educational institute, the Gandhi High School in Pécs. Although the number of Roma who
have finished junior high school has increased since 1990, the ratio of those continuing
through secondary education is still very low. While more than half of non-Roma students
continue their studies in high school, only 3% of Roma students are admitted to high schools
and only 0.1% of these students continue on to higher-level education.
Roma students’ lack of success is not only due to their very poor social and econom-
ic situation. There are clear patterns of discrimination in the public education system, and
the government has not made any real effort to remedy the current situation or to pre-
vent discriminatory practices.
The Hungarian public education system has no tolerance for the Roma’s different cultural
background, and the emphasis on uniformity characteristic of governmental education sys-
tems is so strong that Roma students either drop out or are forced into so-called auxiliary
schools. Some new programmes have focused on helping Roma students to catch up. The ped-
agogical methods of these programmes, however, are not yet clear. Research has proven that
auxiliary and special education can actually constitute a form of institutionalised segregation.
HUNGARY 191
· Croatian-language education is carried out in 40 kindergartens and 41 elementary and junior high
schools, seven of which are bilingual. There are two high schools that have Croatian-language edu-
cation. There is no Croatian university education, but there are undergraduate four-year teacher
training courses in Pécs and Szombathely.
· Poles have one educational institute, which incorporates elementary, junior high and high school
classes and uses the current Polish curricula.
· There are 198 German-language kindergartens and 198 German schools. Nine of the latter are
high schools that are either independent or have nationality branches. German teaching degrees
may be acquired in eight institutions of higher education in Hungary. University-level training in
German is carried out at the University of Sciences in Pécs, and there is a four-year teacher train-
ing course in Szeged.
· During the 1995-96 academic year, Romanian-language education was carried out in twelve kinder-
gartens, eleven elementary and junior high schools—five of which are independent Romanian nation-
ality schools—and one high school. Romanian-language kindergarten teacher training is carried
out in Szarvas, grade school teacher training in Békéscsaba and general Romanian teacher train-
ing is available in Szeged and Budapest.
· Also during the 1995-96 academic year, an experimental Ruthenian-language education programme
commenced in a Ruthenian settlement with eighteen elementary and junior high school students.
· There are currently four Serbian kindergartens and eleven Serbian schools, one of which is a Serbian-
language high school in Budapest. Teachers are trained at the University of Sciences in Szeged, and
in Budapest.
· There are 74 Slovakian kindergartens, 67 elementary and junior high schools and two high schools.
Kindergarten teachers are trained in Szarvas and Esztergom. Slovak-speakers may acquire grade
school teaching degrees in Esztergom and Békéscsaba and general teaching degrees in Szeged and
Budapest.
· Slovenian-language education is present in five kindergartens and four schools; teachers are trained
in Szombathely.
192 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART II
Case Study 2. Discrimination in School
Perhaps Hungary’s most notable case concerning discrimination in education was the separate
graduation ceremony for Roma pupils in Tiszavasvári.*
The leaders of three Roma community organisations appealed to the President of the Republic to
take measures concerning the case of a primary school in Tiszavasvári that decided to organise a sepa-
rate graduation ceremony for Roma pupils. According to information published in the local press, Roma
pupils were not allowed to use either the school gymnasium or the school shop. The Parliamentary
Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) ordered the case to be investigated ex officio, and the
President of the Republic also began an inquiry.
One of the housing estates in Tiszavasvári is significantly populated by Vlach (Romanian) Roma,
whose children have always studied at Ferenc Pethe Primary School. The school has a tradition stretch-
ing back 40 years.
On 23 April 1997, on the basis of a resolution adopted by the majority of the faculty, the school
decided to organise a separate graduation ceremony for Roma students. The reason given for the
decision, was that, at that time, a high percentage of children were infected with various contagious
conditions ranging from lice to skin conditions, and the faculty meant to protect parents and guests
attending the ceremony from the risk of infection. The use of the gym was denied to Roma pupils
for the same reason, although no formal decision was made on the issue. Parents were informed
about the separate ceremonies at a parents’ meeting and during individual discussions.
The teachers’ reason for a separate ceremony—a high rate of infection among Roma students
—is placed under question by the fact that there was never any such measure taken earlier,
though there was a similar rate of infection. Due to the collective nature of the decision, the
result affected the infected and the uninfected alike. Although discriminatory intent as a motive
for the faculty’s decision cannot be proven, the incidents, including the lack of preparation and
the method of administering the ceremony, clearly appear to have led to discrimination.
The separate graduation ceremony for Roma students prevented others at the ceremony from
becoming infected, but the fundamental problem, i.e. the infection of most Roma children,
remained unresolved.
In one sense, the events described above could be regarded as the consequence of grave
social and sanitary conditions that cannot be dealt with in isolation, without also addressing the
root causes of the problem. As long as there is no change in the living conditions at the hous-
ing estate, sanitary risk may be used as an excuse for discriminatory educational measures.
The problem can only be solved through co-operation among Roma and non-Roma resi-
dents of the estate, the mayor, representatives of the local government, teachers, community
organisations, and various institutions and authorities. There is apparently a desire for such co-
operation in Tiszavasvári. The local board of representatives has urged constant co-operation
and mutual assistance between the institutions and organisations concerned.
Teachers agreed to take part in a training course in which they sought to widen their knowledge of
Roma culture.  At a reconciliation meeting, town administrators presented a package of measures to be
used to improve the living conditions of the estate’s Roma population, as far as the municipality’s resources
allow. It is to be hoped that as a result of these measures and continued co-operation the issue of the
segregation of the Roma minority in the community life of the estate can be resolved over time.
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Minority Rights significantly contributed to the final outcome
and solution of the issue by making recommendations to the municipality and to senior officials respon-
* Primary and secondary schools in Hungary traditionally organise a ceremonial farewell for grad-
uating students, who walk along the school corridors singing graduation songs.
Thus, auxiliary schools fail to promote equal opportunities for the Roma.13 At the same time,
any kind of special programmes for Roma face difficulties in the increasingly competitive envi-
ronment of Hungarian public education, because they require further budget resources.
These specialised programmes can only be successful if the economic and social dis-
advantages of regions inhabited by Roma are addressed through co-ordinated, overall
government efforts.
The key to the Roma population’s ability to integrate, without forced assimilation, is
a breakthrough in the field of education. Hungary’s pending accession to the European
Union means that language, computer skills and overall education are more important
than ever. If the Roma are excluded from the opportunity to acquire these skills, then the
huge gap between Roma and the majority could widen further—creating tensions that
are difficult or impossible to resolve.
4.7. Regulations to promote minorities in the media
The right to choose an identity is a key principle of Hungarian minority legislation. But
this choice can only be considered voluntary if it is based on conscious decisions by
autonomous individuals. In order to increase individuals’ understanding of what it means
to belong to a minority, it is essential that the minority’s distinctive language, culture and
traditions are made clear to a wider audience.
Paragraph 18 of the Minority Act says, ‘public radio and television—according to the
regulations of a separate law—has to provide for the creation and broadcast of national
or ethnic programmes’. The Constitution and the Minority Act both promote equal rights
to participation in public life and access to the media. Financial, procedural and organi-
sational regulations of the 1996/I Law on Radio and Television—referred to as the RTV
law—should help in creating a balanced and realistic picture of minorities.
The RTV Law implements a wide range of guarantees for minority rights by putting
most minority programming in the special category of a public service broadcast.
Information conveying the culture, life and viewpoints of minorities is classified as pub-
lic service broadcasting, and can be subsidised within the framework of the system.
One of the RTV Law’s basic principles is that public or private broadcasters may not
breach human rights or serve to incite hatred against minorities. Public broadcasters are
expected to be particularly vigilant in portraying minorities with respect and fairness.
Violations of these regulations can be sanctioned by the National Radio and Television
Public Board, with the most severe punishment being revocation of a broadcaster’s license.
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13 See the works of Ladányi and Csanádi and Havas and Kertesi.
sible for solving constitutional anomalies. The local board of representatives accepted provisions from
these recommendations, and used them to elaborate a detailed package of measures put together in the
form of a resolution  Both the Minister of Culture and Education and the Minister of Welfare welcomed
the Ombudsman’s proposals and specifically pledged to implement them in practice.
It is the duty of public broadcast providers to help maintain the cultures and lan-
guages of minorities and to offer regular information in their native tongues.
Regulations enforce this duty by insisting that the ratios of air time allotted to dif-
ferent minorities cannot be less than they were before the law came into effect, and
may not be changed arbitrarily.
National MSGs have significant rights in the public service media, such as determin-
ing how the broadcast time allotted to minorities is used. Their decision must be respect-
ed by the public service broadcaster. National self-governments may jointly delegate one
person to the advisory boards of Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television and the Hungarian
Television Public Foundation.
The RTV Law’s regulations are appropriate for shaping the depiction of minorities in
electronic media. The Law’s greatest merit is that it does not declare the rights of minori-
ties, but rather provides an appropriate order of procedures and sanctions against those
who breach those rights. It may also pave the way to for practical enforcement of previ-
ously established minority laws.
5. Forms of Minority Rights Protection
The Hungarian Constitution makes the protection of minority rights a fundamental ele-
ment of the entire legal system. Every governmental organisation is bound to protect
minority rights, and every citizen is bound to respect minority rights in the Republic of
Hungary. The breach of these rights may be remedied in court.
MSGs are the cornerstones of the system of institutions upholding minority rights. The
Parliamentary Commissioner for Minority Rights plays a key role in applying the
Constitutional protection of those rights to administrative issues.
NGOs and legal consulting offices dealing with minority rights protection help enforce
the practical implementation of those rights. These organisations are relatively well trust-
ed by citizens belonging to minorities and consequently have the opportunity to perform
certain forms of minority rights protection that governmental organisations cannot prac-
tice. Unfortunately, these institutions do not have sufficient government funding. They
maintain themselves through funds from domestic and international organisations, and
professionals working for them often volunteer for these tasks, receiving no financial com-
pensation.
The attitude toward international human rights watchdogs and other monitoring organ-
isations in Hungary has changed in recent years. Government organisations are now help-
ing these agencies, largely thanks to the Euro-Atlantic integration process, as reports from
these NGOs and international agencies can strongly influence how Hungary is viewed
abroad.
The Hungarian Constitution prohibits discrimination in general, and specific legal reg-
ulations take concrete steps against it. The 1996 amendment of the Penal Code has spe-
cial significance, because it provides an opportunity for authorities to use increased rigour
when dealing with violent actions committed against a group or an individual for reasons
of nationality, ethnicity, race or religion.
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5.1. Protection against discrimination
Ethnic conflicts appear to be growing in frequency and seriousness in Hungary, and dis-
crimination against the Roma population is particularly evident. Legislation to remedy
this discrimination can follow two courses: either ‘positive discrimination’ (affirmative
action) to reform the social circumstances that form the basis of discrimination; or ‘anti-
discrimination’ legislation, which effectively prohibits discrimination and punishes those
responsible for breaches of rights. A Draft Anti-Discrimination Law was submitted to the
Human Rights Committee of the Hungarian Parliament in October 2000.
Although Hungary has not had a specific anti-discrimination law, anti-discrimination
regulations are contained within the paragraphs of laws dealing with other scopes of inter-
est. The highest level of law, Paragraph 70/A, Section 1 of the Constitution states that:
‘The Hungarian Republic ensures human and citizen rights for all individuals within its
borders without distinguishing between any race, colour, gender, language, creed, polit-
ical or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other position’.
According to Judicial Decree 61/1992 (XI.20) AB, this section of the Constitution cov-
ers more than human rights and basic citizens’ rights. The prohibition of discrimination
covers the whole legal system. Hungary has accepted the obligation to prohibit and elim-
inate all racial discrimination against any person, group or organisation using all avail-
able tools—even legislation if necessary—in accordance with the international treaty on
the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination published in the Eighth Executive
Order of 1969. According to the 1993 Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities,
all kinds of discrimination against minorities are prohibited.
These laws, and the existing Constitutional protections, represent sufficient guaran-
tees for the elimination of direct legal discrimination against minorities. However, the
administrative aspect of the legal system can only be enforced in practice if it contains
other guarantees. There must be an appropriate system of regulations created for:
· exposure of discriminatory legislation;
· the control of potentially discriminatory legal relations;
· the resolution of existing breaches of rights;
· a system of compensation.
Minority protection and anti-discrimination legal regulations passed during recent
years have created the basis for this system, but this does not mean that the process of
administrative legislation can be considered complete.
5.2. Employment
Employment discrimination is especially significant, because unemployment poses a seri-
ous social problem in Hungary. Examples of discrimination in the field of employment
include the illegal, discriminatory refusal to establish an employment relationship and
discrimination in the rights and obligations of the employment relationship based on the
employee’s national or ethnic background.
Paragraph 5, Section 1 of the 1992/XII Law on the Labour Code states:
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It is forbidden to implement discrimination concerning the employment relationship
between the employees based on their gender, age, nationality, race, origin, creed,
political views, membership of employee’s federation or activities related, as well as
all other circumstances not related to the employment relationship.
The law transfers insurance obligations and burdens to the employer in the event of
an argument concerning discrimination. The trial date has to be set within fifteen days of
the labour court receiving the petition if no other measures are necessary. If the discrim-
ination takes the form of an illegal termination of the employment relationship, the employ-
ee has to be employed in his/her previous position upon request, and the arrears of pay
as well as other damages must be compensated. According to the 1996/LXXV Law on the
Control of Work Affairs, a fine of HUF 50,000-1,000,000 may be imposed on the employ-
er.
Paragraph 75, Section 1 of the 17/1968 (IV.14.) Governmental Decree on Transgressions
also regulates discrimination against the employee:
The employer, who
(a) illegally refuses employment based on gender, age, nationality, race, origin,
creed, political views, membership of employee’s federation or activities relat-
ed as well as all other circumstances not related to the employment relation-
ship;
(b) implements discrimination of employees according to section (a) may be pun-
ished with a fine of up to fifty thousand forints.
Pursuant to the provisions of Act III of 1952 on Civil Practice, effective 1 January 1999,
claims against unlawful discrimination by an employer may now be filed not only as a
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Case Study 3. Remedy for Discrimination in a Pub
A Roma MSG complained that Roma individuals were not admitted into a pub in the centre of
their town.
The county-level consumer protection authority, together with the Roma MSG, organised a
test purchase involving Roma customers in order to prove the act of discrimination. Subsequently,
the authority made a precedent-setting decision:
· it obliged the business to serve every customer regardless of ethnicity;
· it demanded the business to report on the relevant actions within 15 days; and
· it warned the business that failure to meet these obligations would result in the initiation
of temporary closure by the district administrator.
In legal terms, the decision was important because it was not only based on the Act on
Protection of Consumers but also on the discrimination prohibition contained in the Law on
the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities.
The procedure of the consumer protection authority creates a precedent as well, because it
used an effective method—test purchase by Roma customers—to reveal a case of discrimina-
tion for the first time in Hungary.
civil case; legal remedy can also be sought under the Labour Law. An amendment to the
Act extended the meaning of a ‘case under labour law’ to include cases arising during
negotiations preceding the actual conclusion of the labour contract. As a result, legisla-
tion that defends prospective employees—such as the reversal of their obligation to pro-
vide evidence, and the rule on the relevant court procedure to start within 15 days—now
also applies to labour cases initiated during employment.
This amendment is intended to provide job-seekers with a more effective means of
defence against potentially discriminative employers, though it is clear such negative dis-
crimination will not be eradicated by legal means alone. It is crucial that legislators gath-
er ever-more-accurate information on the extent of this important—though elusive and
subtle—social problem. A more profound knowledge of the situation can facilitate the
preparation of structural-organisational measures to fight job discrimination—and even
further amendments to the law, if necessary.
5.3. Police violence against Roma
The most serious forms of discrimination in practice are violent acts committed against
minorities. Among such acts, crimes committed against Roma by members of the police
force bear separate mention. Acts perpetrated against Roma by individual members of the
police force may not lead to the conclusion that the police as such are prejudiced against
minorities, but they do draw attention to the fact that training with respect to ethnic
minority issues and the screening of prejudiced candidates during police training.
Since it is legally possible to limit basic rights during police procedures, the use of
police powers in a prejudicial and abusive way may cause significant grievances. Measures
have to be taken to ensure a lawful state of affairs and to have those responsible answer
for their actions when any kind of discrimination is perpetrated by police.
Violent crimes committed by members of the police force are severely punished by
law. The penalty for assault during an official procedure is imprisonment for up to two
years, and this may be as much as five years in the case of forced interrogation. An offi-
cer found guilty of detaining someone illegally may be subject to five years imprisonment,
or up to eight years in an aggravated case. A fiduciary relationship between the police and
minorities, especially the Roma minority, can not be created solely by remedying breach-
es of rights—it requires a deeper change in attitudes.
6. Conclusions
The policy of protecting minority rights is new to the Hungarian legal system, so it may
seem surprising that that it already needs improvement. It should be understood, how-
ever, that the ‘experimental’ nature of the current legal system was apparent the minute
it was formed.
The unique Hungarian system that offers ‘half-municipal autonomy’ is a legislative
response to the question of whether minority communities that are in a state of advanced
assimilation are capable of independent, autonomous action.
HUNGARY 197
It has become evident after a few years of observation that it is not only possible to
revitalise minority communities, but the process has started spontaneously—especially
among groups with relatively large numbers, like Roma, Germans, Slovaks, Croats and
Romanians. The creation of the system of minority rights protection has merely helped
in this process.
The legal framework must be further expanded, in part through the creation of insti-
tutions that were ‘promised’ earlier and, in part, by making the existing system more
coherent. The best example of the former is the creation of the minorities’ representatives
in Parliament. An example of the latter is the need to make the theoretical aspects of auton-
omy real.
The minority right to parliamentary representation was first regulated through a 1990
amendment of the Constitution and later reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court. Yet, no
formula has been found that is acceptable both to political parties and minorities. The
common feature in the plans elaborated so far—including a proposal that was turned
down by Parliament in 1993—is that they make it easier for minority organisations to
nominate candidates, and minority candidates would not need the 5% of the vote required
for a typical Parliamentary mandate. According to the current plan, the least preferential
mandates would require 10,000 votes. This would offer a real chance of representation
to the ‘bigger’ minorities, like the Roma, Germans, Slovaks and Croats, but, unsurpris-
ingly, the smaller minorities object to the plan.
The creation of cultural autonomy for minority groups has already begun to some
degree. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Minority Rights suggested directions for
development in his 1996 annual report, which says that mechanisms for functional and
financial autonomy for MSGs should be gradually developed. Thus far, however, these
mechanisms have not been created. The local, and in some cases national, aspects of pub-
lic education and cultural services that relate to minorities should be delegated to the
MSGs, along with sufficient budgetary resources.
The true test of the viability of the MSG system will be whether Hungary is ready to
take this next step forward toward MSG autonomy.
7. Recommendations
1. The regulation of the competencies of MSGs must be as precise as possible, to avoid
unnecessary conflicts with local councils.
2. Special training programmes on minority law and conflict prevention should be
provided for local policy-makers and representatives of minority groups.
3. There should be well-organised, regular contact among the different actors in local
communities.
4. Two of the key issues in managing multi-ethnic communities are, on the one hand,
delegating power to the minority community in issues where it can decide
autonomously and, on the other, (re)integrating the community by allowing minori-
ties to participate in decisions on ‘common’ issues.
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5. The fundamental fields of local policy-making in multi-ethnic communities are
education and cultural issues. The education system and cultural services must
reflect the multi-cultural nature of the relevant community.
6. Although the issue of social welfare payments should not be devolved entirely to
MSGs, self-governments of the Roma minority should be allowed to comment on
the allocation of social aid for Roma.
7. Due to its broad social impacts, a nationwide investigation into the issue of edu-
cation for Roma is needed. The goal of this investigation should be to shed light on
controversial practices and arrangements in public education, and to devise regu-
lations to remedy them.
Only a properly functioning control system can efficiently diminish the vulnerability
of citizens, especially weaker groups in society that are less capable of defending their
own interests. The creation of such a control system is the constitutional duty of the state.
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ANNEX 1
1980 AND 1990 CENSUS DATA ON MINORITY GROUPS
Table A.1. Census Data According to Native Language
Minority Number of people Per cent of the
groups total population in
1980 1990 1990
Slovaks 16,054 12,745 0.1228
Romanians 10,141 8,730 0.0841
Croats 20,484 17,577 0.1694
Serbs 3,426 2,953 0.0285
Slovenians 3,142 2,627 0.0253
Germans 31,231 37,511 0.3616
Roma 27,915 48,072 0.4634
Armenians - 37 0.0004
Bulgarians - 1,640 0.0158
Poles - 1,370 0.0132
Ukrainians, - 674 0.0065
Ruthenians
Total 112,393 133,936 1.291
Note: National population:
in 1980 10,709,463 inhabitants
in 1990 10,374,823 inhabitants
Source: MAPSTAT Central Statistics Office (1992) Budapest.
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ANNEX 2
ESTIMATED MINORITIES IN HUNGARY
Table A.2. Estimated Population of Minorities in Hungary
Minorities Number of inhabitants
Roma 400,000 - 600,000
Germans 200,000 - 220,000
Slovaks 100,000 - 110,000
Croats 80,000 - 90,000
Romanians 25,000
Poles 10,000 
Serbs 5,000
Slovenians 5,000 
Bulgarians 3,000 - 3,500 
Greeks 4,000 - 4,500
Armenians 3,500 - 10,000
Ukrainians 1,000
Ruthenians 1,000
Total 790,500 - 1,085,000
Source: Ombudman’s Office.
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ANNEX 3
MINORITY EDUCATION IN HUNGARY
Table A.3. Budgetary Support for the Education of National and Ethnic Minorities
1980-81. 1990-91. 1997-98. 1997-1998.
Minority Education School year School year School year institution teachers
Pupils number
Kindergartens 11,082 14,009 20,470 386 993
Elementary Schools 35,482 44,545 53021 390 1,357
Secondary Schools 790 1,301 2310 27 179
Total: 47,354 59,855 75801 803 2,529
1998 1999
Earmarked state grant for one pupil: 75,000 86,000
Earmarked state grant allocated on the basis of quotas
1998. 1999. Number Grant
HUF/pers. person HUF 
(in millions)
Kindergarten 23,000 25,000 33,000 825
School 24,500 26,000 48,000 1,568
National minority 27,000 32,000 10,000 320
school
Total: 91,000 2,713 = 30,000
HUF/pers.
Earmarked state grant for Education of Roma:
‘Closing Up’ Roma 24,000 27,000 53,000 1,431
education
Grant for Roma 10,000 20,000 1,710 34
students, living in 
student-hostels
1,465 = 27,600 
HUF/pers.
Source: Hungarian Ministry of Education.
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ANNEX 4
HUNGARY’S COMMITMENTS IN THE THIRD PART OF THE
REGULATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN CHARTER ON REGIONAL AND
MINORITY LANGUAGES
Article 8
1. a) (iv)
b) (iv)
c) (iv)
d) (iv)
e) (iii)
f) (iii)
g)
h)
i)
2
Article 9
1 a) (ii) (iii) (iv)
b) (ii) (iii)
c) (ii) (iii)
2 a), b) c)
Article 10
1 a) (v)
c)
2 b) e) f) g)
3 c)
4 a) c)
5
Article 11
1 a) (iii)
b) (ii)
c) (ii)
e) (i)
f) (i)
g)
3
Article 12
1 a) b) c) f) g)
2
3
Article 13
1 a)
Article 14
1 a) b) 
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EQUALITY IN LAW, PROTECTION IN FACT:
MINORITY LAW AND PRACTICE IN POLAND
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EQUALITY IN LAW, PROTECTION IN FACT:
MINORITY LAW AND PRACTICE IN POLAND
Piotr Bajda,
Magdalena Syposz and 
Dariusz Wojakowski
Abstract
Systemic transformation in Poland has brought important changes for all parts of the pop-
ulation, including minorities. In the past ten years, most minority communities, with the
exception of the German minority, have been further disenfranchised in economic terms.
While some considerable improvements in minority protection have been made in Poland,
the process towards achieving equality in law, as well as in fact, is nowhere near com-
plete. For instance, there is no comprehensive anti-discrimination law in Poland. This
chapter focuses on local management of multi-ethnic communities in Poland both in law
and practice. It analyses the legal position of minorities after 1989, including Poland’s
obligations under international law, and then focuses on implementation of laws and poli-
cies at the local level and the management of multi-ethnicity and minority protection in
practice. The chapter includes case studies as examples of good practices, and concludes
with policy recommendations.
I. Introduction
1.1. Ethnic diversity in Poland 
Today, national minorities in Poland make up between 2-3% (official estimate)1 and 3.5-
4.5% (unofficial estimates) of the population of 38,654,561. According to the Minority
Rights Group’s World Directory of Minorities, there are 750,000-1,100,000 Germans (1.9-
2.8% of the population); 350,000-500,000 (0.9-1.3%) Ukrainians; 200,000-300,000
Belarussians (0.51-0.8%); Roma, whose estimated numbers vary from official estimate of
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1 The official estimates are according to Ministry of Interior and Administration, with the excep-
tion of Roma (see footnote 2). Post-WWII censuses have not included questions pertaining to
ethnic identity. 
2 World Directory of Minorities estimates the number of Roma in Poland at 15,000. This is low, con-
sidering that Polish Ministry of Education estimates it at 30,000 (Information Concerning the
Education of Children and Youths of Roma Origin in Poland, OSCE Human Dimension Implementation 
30,000 to unofficial estimate of 50,000-60,000;2 and smaller communities of Lithuanians,
Slovaks, Czechs, Greeks, Macedonians, Kashubs, Lemko Ruthenians, Tatars and Jews.3
Until World War II, Poland had, for centuries, a high proportion of ethnic and reli-
gious minorities. In the 17TH and 18TH centuries, religious minorities—particularly Jews—
fled to Poland to escape persecution. In 1795 Poland was partitioned between Austro-
Hungary, Russia and Prussia, and it regained independence only in 1918. Still, in 1918,
more than one-third of Polish citizens belonged to national minorities. In the 1931 cen-
sus, 68.9% Polish citizens declared Polish nationality (22,000,000 inhabitants), 13.9%
Ukrainian nationality (4,450,000), 8.6% Jewish (2,800,000), 5.3% Belarussian
(1,700,000), 2.3% German (750,000), 1% others (350,000) among them Russians,
Lithuanians, Slovaks, Czechs, Gypsies/Roma, Armenians, Tatars and Karaims.4 This diver-
sity and high proportion of minorities posed a serious political problem in Poland and in
relations with its neighbours. Minority protection was used as a pretext for justifying
German and Soviet aggression against Poland in 1939.
The ethnic structure of Poland was changed considerably during and in the aftermath
of World War II. During World War II, approximately 3,500,000 Polish Jews and hun-
dreds of thousands of Roma, together with approximately 3,000,000 ethnic Poles, were
murdered by the Nazis. Following WWII, the new Polish borders were moved about 500
kilometres westward to what had been German territory. As a result of the loss of terri-
tories in the east and on the basis of a bilateral repatriation agreement between Poland
and the Soviet Union 490,000 of the 600,000 ethnic Ukrainian and 36,000 ethnic
Belarussian Polish citizens were—often forcibly—moved to the Soviet Union in 1945-46.
The remaining 160,000 ethnic Ukrainians who had been concentrated in southeast Poland
were forcibly dispersed across northwestern Poland. ‘Operation Wisla’ was part of repres-
sion against what was perceived by the authorities to be a Ukrainian independence move-
ment. There is no agreement about how many ethnic Germans were expelled from the
new western territories during 1945-1949, but it is estimated that before WWII,
10,000,000 people lived on the lands which Poland acquired after the war. Minority Rights
Group estimates that 3,200,000 ethnic Germans were expelled.5 Between 1944-1950 mil-
lions of ethnic Poles were repatriated; this included 2,100,000 Poles from the USSR;
2,100,000 from Germany; and 200,000 from other western countries.6 They settled main-
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Meeting, October 2000, document 267; P. Liegois and N. Gheorghe put the figure at 50,000-60,000.
See: Liegois and Gheorghe (1997) Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority, London: Minority Rights
Group.
3 Minority Rights Group (ed.) (1997) World Directory of Minorities. 
4 P. Eberhard (1996) Miedzy Rosja a Niemcami. Przemiany narodowosciowe w Europie Srodkowo-
Wschodniej w XX w (Between Russia and Germany. Nationalities Changes in Central East Europe
in 20TH century), Warsaw, pp. 102-107.
5 World Directory of Minorities.
6 S. Lodzinski (1989) ‘Repatriacja osób narodowosci lub pochodzenia polskiego w latach 1989-1997.
Problemy prawne i instytucjonalne’ (Repatriation of persons with Polish orgins or Polish national-
ity between 1989-1997. Institutional and legal issues), in: Repatriacja osób narodowosci polskiej lub
pochodzenia polskiego w latach 1989-1997, Biuro Studiów i Ekspertyz Kancelarii Sejmu, Informacje
i opinie, pakiet IP – 76S, Warsaw, p. 9.
ly in the newly acquired western territories. As a result of war extermination, forced and
voluntary emigration, and assimilation policies, Poland has become one of the most eth-
nically homogeneous countries in Europe. 
The communist government considered national homogeneity as one of the funda-
mental goals and achievements of the new state. Throughout the communist period, the
Polish government did not have a uniform policy towards national minorities. The poli-
cies varied at different times and towards particular minorities, and hung on political move-
ments. However, in general, from 1945 to 1989 minorities were excluded from public life
on the basis of their ethnicity, had limited possibilities to maintain their own cultures and
were subject to the assimilationist policies of the state. From 1945 to the early 1950s, the
policies were overall the most repressive and extended to curtailing freedom of association
as well as curtailing freedom to preserve minority cultures and speak minority languages.
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the official attitude towards minorities was more open.
Minorities were allowed to establish their own socio-cultural organisations and had limit-
ed opportunities to teach and learn their native languages, with the notable exception of
the German minority who could not enjoy these rights. In practice, each minority could
establish only one socio-cultural organisation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs strictly con-
trolled minorities’ activities. In 1968 most of the remaining Jews were expelled, and thus
the authorities continued to fully realise the idea of a nationally uniform Poland. Throughout
the communist period, the Polish government treated Roma appallingly; it tried to forcibly
assimilate Roma, continued expelling Roma Polish citizens until the 1980s, and consid-
ered Roma to be a social problem and not part of society. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Poland underwent modernisation and industrialisation. This
included an intensive migration movement from the countryside to cities and the pro-
motion of mass culture in Polish (radio and television broadcasts). Migration into the
cities meant that more members of minority communities became dispersed; this con-
tributed to a reduction of opportunities for minority members to learn their mother tongues
and to participate in indigenous, local cultural activities.
1.2. The fall of the communist system in 1989
The protection of minority rights became a key issue in Poland after the democratic changes
of 1989. The most characteristic moment of this new attitude was the printing—in May
1989—of Lech Walesa’s letters addressed to the public on national minority issues, where
he declared that minorities should have rights not only to preserve but also to develop
their own culture and language.7
The first non-communist government was established as a result of June 1989 elec-
tions. The government made some effort to change the situation of national minorities.
A Department for National Minorities’ Culture was established in the Ministry of Culture
and National Heritage. The new department took over responsibility to support minori-
ty cultures from the Ministry for Internal Affairs. Still in 1989, the Polish Parliament adopt-
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7 Lech Walesa (1989) ‘Lech Walésa do wyborców w sprawie mniejszosci’ (Lech Walesa’s letter to
electors on minorities), Gazeta Wyborcza, No. 6, May 15, p. 1.
ed a new law on associations, which gave freedom to associate without any ethnic limi-
tations. In 1997 more than 130 national and ethnic minorities associations were regis-
tered in Poland; this included 9 Belarussian organisations, 8 Roma, 4 Lithuanian, 5
Lemko/Ruthenian, 76 German, 9 Ukrainian, 6 Jewish and others.8
The new political space created more positive conditions for the public activity of
minorities. Minority candidates took part in parliamentary elections in 1991, 1993 and
1997. In 1991-1993 parliamentary election laws were adopted which includes special
measures for effective participation of minorities: namely, election committees of regis-
tered minority organisations are not bound by thresholds based on the nationwide num-
ber of votes cast. As a result, the German minority has been represented in the Parliament
since 1991. Other minorities, such as Ukrainians and Roma, have not been able to ben-
efit from this law because they do not live in compact settlements.
Although it is rarely acknowledged, prejudice, racism, discrimination and xenopho-
bia are not uncommon within Polish society. Roma are, by far, the most marginalised
group in Poland. There have been several recent violent attacks and demonstrations against
Roma; in Mlawa in 1991, Sandomierz (1995), Kielce (1996) and Bielsko Biala (1998).
These are not isolated ‘disputes’ but manifestations of persistent discrimination and racism.
Furthermore, the incidents provoked little reaction from the general public. The Council
of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, in December 1999,
expressed concern about violence against the Roma, including allegations of police vio-
lence, lack of appropriate response by the authorities to cases of violence, and the fact
that prejudice in Polish society leads to discrimination in everyday life, including access
to education and employment.9 While Roma are most often the victims, discrimination
and prejudice extends to other ethnic groups. For example, in 1994 the Center for Research
of Public Opinion (Centrum Badania Opini Spolecznej—CBOS) conducted research ask-
ing ethnic Poles about their feelings for members of particular minorities. The most neg-
ative feelings were towards Roma and Ukrainians: 54% of those polled said that they dis-
liked them, 37% disliked Jews, 8% disliked Belarussians while 46% were indifferent, 28%
liked Germans while 30% disliked them. A similar poll was conducted by CBOS in 1999,
and more than one-third of those polled disliked Roma, Jews and Ukrainians.10 While
this proportion is still high, it is lower than in 1994 and might indicate a trend towards
greater tolerance. 
Currently, two important trends related to the protection of minorities are emerging
in Poland. For the first time in recent history, Poland is becoming a country of immigra-
tion. There are also many small religious movements emerging in this predominately
Catholic country. It will be important to see what provisions are made for the protection
of new minorities and small religious groups. 
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8 L. Adamczuk (1997) Wyznania religijne. Stowarzyszenie narodowosciowe i etniczne w Polsce 1993-
1996 (Religion and National and Ethnic Associations in Poland 1993-1996), Warsaw, pp. 169-
184.
9 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (2000) Second Report on Poland, June.
10 Slawomir Lodzinski (2000) The Policy of Multiculturalism in Poland in the 1990s. National
Minorities and Immigrants). Legal Solutions and Social Perceptions. Paper presented at World
Conference Against Racism Regional Seminar, Warsaw, July 2000.
2. The Legal Position of Ethnic and National Minorities 
After the Democratic Transition in Poland
2.1. The legal and institutional framework for minority protection in Poland
Protection of minority rights is based on constitutional principles and relevant interna-
tional legal and political instruments.11
2.1.1. Constitutional provisions 
The 1952 Constitution did not include minority rights provisions but solely general prin-
ciples of equality and nondiscrimination (Articles 67 and 81). Such weak protection was
due to lack of importance of the Constitution in the communist state, and to government
policies which considered ethnic homogeneity as an asset. 
The new Polish Constitution was adopted in 1997. Article 32 guarantees everyone
equality before the law and includes a general anti-discrimination clause, stating that ‘no
one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason what-
soever’. National minorities are officially recognised by the Polish Constitution, as is the
‘multi-cultural character’ of the Polish state. The Polish Constitution takes an individual
approach to minority protection, and restricts protection to Polish citizens. Specifically,
Article 35 reads:
1. The Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic
minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain
customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture;
2. National and ethnic minorities have the right to establish educational and cultur-
al institutions, institutions designed to protect their religious identity, as well as to
participate in the resolution of matters connected with their cultural identity.
Article 60 ensures all citizens the right to equal access to public services. Significantly,
Article 79 guarantees citizens the right to complain to the Constitutional Tribunal against
the legal basis of administrative decisions that violate any human rights and freedoms
written in the Constitution. It is too soon to assess the effectiveness of Article 79, but
potentially it could prove a useful instrument for minority rights protection. Undoubtedly,
the 1997 Constitution improved the position of national and ethnic minorities. But, while
these steps are positive, the current level of legal protection is not sufficient (see draft law
issue below).
Poland also has an Ombudsman for Human Rights. He has dealt with cases of minor-
ity protection on the basis of individual petitions.
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11 For a comprehensive overview of international minority rights instruments, see: Patrick
Thornberry (1997) ‘Contemporary Legal Standards on Minority Rights’, in: Minority Rights
Group (ed.) World Directory of Minorities. See also: Gudmundur Alfredsson and Goran Melander
(1997) A Compilation of Minority Rights Standards, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law.
2.1.2. International obligations 
Poland has ratified a range of international human rights instruments that provide mini-
mum standards for minority protection. This was primarily for two reasons: (1) a desire
to join European institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union,
and (2) a desire for good relations with its neighbours. According to the Constitution, a
ratified international treaty constitutes part of the domestic legal order to be applied direct-
ly, unless its application depends on enactment of a statute (Article 91). International law
takes precedence over domestic legislation. International instruments ratified by Poland
include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ratified in 1993); the International Covenant for the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (1968); and the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for
the Protection of National Minorities, or FCNM (2001).12 Poland has also adhered to the
UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities (1992), and the OSCE Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension (1990). Poland has not signed the European Charter
of Regional or Minority Languages.
Bilateral treaties are also an important element of minority protection in Poland. Poland
has entered into bilateral treaties with all its neighbours, notably Germany and Ukraine,
as well as other countries.13 All treaties confirm the main principle of international law:
that it is a matter of choice of persons belonging to minorities whether to identify as such
and exercise minority rights and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise or nonex-
ercise of such choice. These treaties are important because they codify principles enshrined
in OSCE documents and they address the use of minority languages in private and pub-
lic, learning of the mother tongue, freedom of religion, freedom of association and rights
to maintain peaceful contacts across frontiers.14 Weaknesses of such bilateral treaties are
the fact that each treaty refers only to specific minorities and that different treaties offer
different levels of protection. There is also the danger that minority protection might be
provided on the basis of reciprocity and not as a matter of right.
In 1993 Poland signed a Concordat with the Holy Sea. As a result, religious celebra-
tion and teaching in minority languages can be organised in the Catholic Church. 
2.1.3. Draft Law on National and Ethnic Minorities 
There is no effective institutional framework for the protection of national minorities in
Poland. Minority rights have been built into general legal provisions and this results in
lack of consistency of provision in certain legal acts and a lack of co-ordination among
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12 Poland has entered a declaration that FCNM only applies to Polish citizens. 
13 Poland has signed and ratified treaties on good relations with the following countries: Federal
Republic of Germany (1991), Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (1991), Hungary (1991),
Ukraine (1992), Russian Federation (1992), Belarus (1992), Latvia (1992), Estonia (1992), Spain
(1992), Romania (1993), Bulgaria (1993), Lithuania (1994). Recently Poland signed treaties with
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 
14 For a detailed discussion see, A. Bloed and P. van Dijk (eds.) Protection of Minorities through
Bilateral Treaties: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe, The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
different organs of state administration responsible for their implementation.15 This is
why most minority organisations and other human rights NGOs advocate for the adop-
tion of a comprehensive Law on National and Ethnic Minorities. Unfortunately, the
Constitution does not refer to the adoption of a special statute. However, such a law is
seen by minority representatives as a necessary condition for effective protection. It was
also initiated in an attempt to improve the human rights protection system in Poland.
A Parliamentary Commission for National and Ethnic Minorities was established in
1989 and has drafted a Law on National and Ethnic Minorities, with the aim of provid-
ing effective protection for national minorities, which has been debated in the Parliament
since 1993 (the newest Draft was submitted to the Sejm, or lower house, in 1998). The
Draft defines an ethnic or national minority as a group of Polish citizens who wishes to
preserve its language, culture, tradition and national (or ethnic) consciousness and who
remains in minority in relation to the rest of society (Article 2).16
The Draft focuses on the protection of cultural identity, and it does not contain pro-
visions on political representation or administrative autonomy, beyond recognising the
right of persons belonging to national minorities to participate effectively in public life.
It proposes the creation of a governmental Office for National Minorities, which would
support minority cultures, propose and execute national policy towards minorities, liaise
with minority organisations and co-ordinate the work of other governmental bodies in
this respect. The government has proposed to create an Ombudsman for National
Minorities instead. Both proposals may not effectively address issues of participation and
institutional discrimination. The Draft also proposes the recognition of minority languages
as auxiliary languages, specifically to be used in public, courts, names of cities and streets.
It contains positive obligations of the state to support minorities’ education and culture.
The Draft Law also contains a provision guaranteeing access to information in minorities’
mother tongues, and provides that one of the tasks of public broadcasting is promoting
knowledge about life, history and culture of national minorities as well as producing and
transmitting programmes in minorities’ mother tongues. Since 1993, there has not been
political will to adopt the Draft. Passing the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities is cur-
rently the most debated minority issue in the Parliament; the delay in preparation of this
law is seen by many minority representatives as one of the most important legal barriers
to the protection of their rights.
2.2. Affirmative action or positive discrimination
Poland has recognised the well-established principle of international law that the prohi-
bition of discrimination is not sufficient for the effective protection of minorities. Where
discrimination is entrenched, special measures are needed to ensure equality in law as
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15 Jerzy Kranz (ed.) (1998) Law and Practice of Central European Countries in the Field of National
Minorities Protection after 1989, Center for International Relations.
16 S. Lodzinski and P. Bajda (1995) Ochrona praw osób nalezacych do mniejszosci narodowych
(Protection of persons belonging to national minorities groups), Warsaw, p. 164.
well as in fact. So far, Poland has only adopted special measures in three areas: (1) minor-
ity participation in public life, limited to minority representation in Parliament, (2) edu-
cation, and (3) protection and promotion of minority cultures.
2.2.1. Electoral law and representation of minorities in the Parliament
The Parliament is the highest legislative body in Poland. It is bicameral. The Sejm (lower
house) is made up of 460 members who are elected through a mixed system of propor-
tional representation system and direct majority. The Senate (upper house) is made up
of 100 members who are elected by direct majority. In 1991-1993 parliamentary election
laws were passed which contained special measures to try to enable minority participa-
tion. Thresholds needed to eligible for election, based on the nationwide number of votes
cast, are set at 5% for all political parties and 8% for coalitions. Electoral committees of
registered national minority organisations are exempt from the thresholds. As a result of
1993 and 1997 elections, only the German minority has held seats in Parliament (4 in
the Sejm and 1 in the Senate from 1993 to 1997, and 2 in the Sejm since 1997). The con-
sistent success of the German minority is possible mainly because ethnic Germans live in
compact communities. Therefore, while the special measures enable some minority rep-
resentation, they do not adequately address the needs of all minorities.
2.2.2. Access to education and the right to learn in mother tongue
Education in Poland is regulated by 1991 Act on the System of Education. Education is
within the scope of activities of local governments. However, special legal measures to
ensure equality between minority and majority children are detailed below. 
The Education Act specifies that schools cannot make admission and teaching condi-
tional upon a child’s race, religion or nationality. There is a lack of data on whether minor-
ity children are discriminated in access to and quality of education in practice; indeed, in
1999 the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance has recommended that
the government develops a reliable monitoring system.17 It is, however, clear that Roma
children face particular disadvantages and many do not complete primary education. This
is likely due to a combination of factors, including exclusion and discrimination in the
classroom, family poverty, teachers’ lack of respect for Roma culture, children’s poor
health, children’s poor knowledge of Polish and parents’ lack of value for formal educa-
tion.18 Thus, the nondiscrimination provision in the Education Act—even if it is effec-
tively implemented, and of which we cannot be certain of given the absence of monitor-
ing—is not sufficient to ensure equality in access and provision, at least for the Roma
minority. 
It must be iterated that education is one of the most important ways in which minor-
ity groups preserve and develop their identity, including the preservation of mother tongue.
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17 European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (1999) Second Report on Poland,
December.
18 For a comprehensive analysis of why many Roma children perform poorly in schools or drop
out in a number of European countries, see: N. Gheorghe and P. Liegois (1997) Roma/Gypsies:
A European Minority.
Education in and of minority languages is regulated by the 1991 Education Act and
by Minister of Education’s Resolution on the Organisation of Educational Programmes
Enabling Minority Pupils to Retain their Sense of National, Ethnic and Linguistic Identity
(1992). The Resolution specifies that classes with minority language as medium of instruc-
tion may be organised when parents of at least seven children express interest at the pri-
mary level, and when at least fourteen students are interested at the secondary level.
When there are not enough students establish a ‘minority class’, teaching of a minority
language may be provided when at least three pupils in one locality express interest. If
this is the case an ‘interschool’ group is established to teach the appropriate language.
The Guidelines also provide for issuing bilingual certificates. Minority classes, minority
schools and interschool groups were financed by the central government’s budget until
1999. Between 1996-1999, responsibility for and financing of education, including
minority education, was devolved to local governments. Currently, comprehensive edu-
cation reform is under way in Poland.
In the 1996-1997 school year, minority languages were offered in 440 institutions,
either in schools or interschool groups.19 In some of these institutions, instruction in
minority languages was offered. This compared to 121 institutions offering minority lan-
guage education in 1989.20
With the notable exception of the Roma, the recent changes in minority language
education can be seen as positive from the point of view of minority rights to preserve
their identity. But there remain a glut of problems, which vary from region to region.
These include finances, typical of the entire education sector in Poland. In addition, there
is a lack of textbooks and qualified teachers for minority classes. Textbooks are import-
ed from minorities’ kin states and distributed among pupils for free; this is particularly
the case in German, Lithuanian and Slovak minority primary schools. Teachers and writ-
ers from minority communities have also prepared textbooks and educational curricu-
la for approval by the Ministry for Education. Within the Ministry, a Special Office for
Minority Education and Bilateral Textbooks Committees was established to verify the
contents of textbooks, particularly geography and history, and appoint experts to pre-
pare books and curricula. 
2.2.3. Supporting minority culture and language
The Department for National Minorities’ Culture operates within the Ministry for Culture
and Art. The Department provides support for cultural activities of minority commu-
nities, including newspapers and books. Until 1994, the Department was involved in
a broader range of activities than those within its formal mandate, especially the polit-
ical participation of minorities. However, over time, and partly as a result of the estab-
lishment of the Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities, the role of the
Department has diminished. Now, the Department supports activities of minorities in
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w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Ministry of Education, Information paper on the education situa-
tion of national minorities in the Republic of Poland), Warsaw, 1994, table 1.
a narrow cultural sphere. Some claim that this leads to the ghettoisation of minority
cultures.21 Furthermore, according to new finance regulations, governmental bodies
are not allowed to support the permanent costs connected with functioning of non-
governmental organisations (such as salaries for full-time workers, equipment, rents,
telephone costs, etc.). Therefore, the Department support is limited to concrete activ-
ities and events. Minority NGOs are forced to look for additional financial sources to
survive. 
2.3. Political and public debate on minorities issues
Public debate on minority issues is relatively infrequent in Poland. But this is not because
there is no discrimination and no problems; rather it is because national minorities make
up a relatively small proportion of the population. The most important debates are on
discrimination against the Roma, anti-semitism, immigrants and newly emerging reli-
gious minorities. At times, minorities are portrayed in a very negative light. For exam-
ple, if a politician is Jewish, or is perceived to be Jewish, other politicians and some media
frequently use their ethnicity to discredit them. An important political debate on rights
took place during the drafting of the 1997 Constitution, and more recently in relation
to the Draft Law on National and Ethnic Minorities. In addition, two cases are detailed
below.
2.3.1. Different interpretations of history: The Polish-Ukrainian case
In southeast Poland, some members of the Ukrainian minority erected monuments
which were perceived by some ethnic Poles as commemorating a guerrilla movement
responsible for killing Poles in eastern Poland during WWII. The monuments, built
without permission in 1994, met with strong opposition, mainly from WWII veterans’
organisations. To resolve this conflict, voivodship (regional) authorities established a
negotiation team made up of minority and majority representatives. The difficulties
resulted from the conflict between the Ukrainian community’s need to commemorate
dead soldiers and the feelings of Poles about experiences during WWII. This disagree-
ment, called by the mass media ‘the battle for monuments’, highlighted the different
interpretations of history by the Polish and Ukrainian communities. The ‘battle for mon-
uments’ showed that one main source of minority-majority conflicts in Poland is con-
nected to cultivating the collective memory regarding modern history and its symbol-
ic meaning.22
2.3.2. Dual citizenship and loyalty
According to the German Constitution (Article 116), every displaced person that had
German citizenship before WWI has the right to have their German citizenship recog-
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nised. This right is inherited by children of displaced persons.23 At the same time the Law
on Polish Citizenship (1962) neither recognises nor forbids dual citizenship. Dual citi-
zens are treated as if they were Polish citizens only.24 Approximately 170,000 persons
have both German and Polish citizenship.25 Some dual citizens stayed for an extended
period of time in Germany, allegedly to evade military service in Poland. Some persons
belonging to the majority have used the dual citizenship issue to question the loyalty of
the German minority.
2.3.3. Positive Developments
Positive trends in the debate on minority issues should also be noted. As a result of demo-
cratic changes in 1989, minority questions are no longer a taboo subject. Many people in
Poland agree that the protection of minorities is connected to everyone’s rights, and should
not be on the basis of reciprocity. One positive signal in political life is the fact that, in a
few cases, members of minority groups are invited by mainstream political parties to rep-
resent the parties at the national and local levels. For example, a Ukrainian MP in the Sejm
represents the Union of Freedom; another, a Belarussian, represents the Alliance of Social
Democrats. 
3. Local Authorities and the Managing of Ethnicity
3.1. The local government system in Poland
The aim of this section is to present an overview of the local government system and to
focus on the competencies of local authorities that are important from the perspective of
managing multi-ethnicity.
Poland’s Constitution provides the legal basis for the local government system. It spec-
ifies that Poland is a unitary state and that public authority is decentralised through the
local government (Articles 15 and 16). The Constitution also regulates relations between
state administration and local government. The prime minister, voivodes (heads of regions)
and regional accounting chambers supervise local government. Local government units
are legal entities and have the right to own property. Importantly from the perspective of
managing multi-ethnicity, the Constitution also stipulates that local governments have
the right to form associations, participate in international associations of local and region-
al communities and work with other countries’ local governments. The process of decen-
tralisation and the reform of local government system in Poland began in the early 1990s
and it is still under way.
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Table 1. The Local Government System in Poland29
Levels of self- Self-govern       Legislative Competencies and tasks of the self-
government ment bodies     executive government connected with managing 
multi-ethnicity
Region / Voivodship Voivodship · formulation and realisation of a strategy 
Voivodship Assembly Board (zarzad for regional development, in that a strat- 
(wojewodztwo) (sejmik wojewodztwa) gy of cultural and educational develop-
wojewodzki) headed by ment
chair/speaker 
(marszalek)
County County County Board · co-ordination of the popularisation
(powiat) Council (rada (zarzad powiatu) of culture;
powiatu) headed by chair · allocation of funds for cultural 
(starosta) development of powiat; 
· protect some cultural institutions 
(museums, theatres); 
· running and controlling secondary 
schools; 
Municipality Municipal Municipal Board · including in the commune plans the tasks 
(gmina) Council (rada (zarzad gminy) directed towards popularisation of 
gminy) headed by the culture; 
mayor · allocation of commune funds for cultural 
(wojt/burmistrz/ development; 
prezydent) · co-ordination of culture popularisation; 
· making investments of cultural character; 
· running elementary schools and 
gymnasiums, ensuring teachers and 
methodology do not discriminate;
· preservation of monuments;
· supervision over historic architecture;
· assigning names to streets, localities 
and others
A three-tier local government system has been established by the 1990 Act on Local
Self-Government,26 the 1998 Act on County Self-Government and the 1998 Act on
Voivodship Self-Government. The three tiers are municipality (gmina), county (powiat)
and region/voivodship (wojewodztwo). The municipality (gmina) is the primary and the
smallest unit of local government. There is no formal rural urban division of municipal-
ities; there are approximately 2,500 municipalities in Poland which range in size from a
few villages to the largest cities, with the exception of Warsaw.27 The second tier is the
county (powiat). There are more than 300 counties in Poland; each consists of several
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municipalities. The third level of local government is the region or voivodship (wojew-
odztwo); there are 16 voivodships in Poland. Each level is governed by legislative coun-
cils and executive boards, with one person at the head of each board. Legislative author-
ities at all three levels are elected directly. An official appointed by the prime minister,
the voivode (wojewoda) is the chief of state administration at the voivodship level.28 A
decentralised system of self-government also offers more opportunities for minorities to
participate in decision-making processes. Minority representation in elected bodies and
participation in decision-making processes is discussed later in this chapter and present-
ed in Table 1.
The strength of local government in Poland is determined not only by administrative
decentralisation but also by decentralisation of the budget and devolution of power.
Approximately 40% of revenues collected locally are allocated to local authority budgets
at different levels of local government.30 A very important source of income for the local
government is its share of personal and corporate income tax. These revenues are trans-
ferred to each local budget according to the budgetary power of the municipality via a
central redistribution system. The implication for municipalities in the poorer eastern part
of Poland—where Belarussian and Lithuanian minorities are concentrated and where
many ethnic Ukrainians also live—is that they get less tax revenue than their counter-
parts in the richer western part of Poland, including the regions where the German minor-
ity is concentrated. While cross-regional subsidies may not be the way forward for polit-
ical reasons, something has to be done to develop these lagging, underdeveloped regions.
Other important sources of income include earnings from council rents, sale of commu-
nal property and property tax. In addition, local governments receive state grants, which
in 1997 amounted to 38.7% of the total municipal revenue structure.31
According to the Constitution and the 1990 Local Self-Government Act, local gov-
ernmental structures have inter alia the following tasks within their jurisdiction: health
care, social services, housing and infrastructure (roads, water supply). Importantly from
the perspective of managing multi-ethnicity, the self-government—particularly munici-
pal authorities—has large competencies in the field of development of education, and
protection and development of culture. 
The most important tools which can be used by municipal authorities to create their
own policy of managing multi-ethnicity are: 
1. Protection of minority language rights by assigning names to streets and localities;
2. Protection of minority cultural rights by including in the commune plans the tasks
directed towards maintaining and making accessible minority cultures; allocation
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31 A. Kowalczyk, op. cit.
of commune funds for cultural development; co-ordination of directions of culture
popularisation to reflect the multi-cultural character of the municipality; invest-
ment in cultural activities. Municipalities are also responsible for graves and war
cemeteries, preservation of monuments, register of monuments and supervision of
historic architecture. 
3. Protection of minorities’ economic and social rights by ensuring equal access to
employment and health services. 
4. Protection of education rights—including the right to learn the mother tongue—
by means of running elementary schools and gymnasiums and control of teachers
and methodologies used in schools run by a commune do not discriminate or
exclude pupils.32
The competencies of county authorities are parallel to competencies of municipal
authorities. The county co-ordinates the promotion of local culture, allocates funds for
cultural development and protects some cultural institutions (museums, theatres). The
county also plays an important role education because it is responsible for secondary sec-
ondary schools.33
The main task of the regional/voivodship self-governmental authorities is to formulate
and execute a strategy of regional development. One of the goals of the regional devel-
opment strategy is ‘to cultivate the Polishness and development of national, civic and cul-
tural consciousness’.34 Therefore, the voivodship authorities have an important role in
determining whether ‘Polishness’ reflects the multi-cultural character of a region. This
strategy also contains the development of education. The regional authorities cannot direct-
ly influence schools or cultural organisations. But if these authorities formulate their own
regional policy of managing multi-ethnicity (in the framework of the regional strategy of
development) they will affect the functioning of the lower levels of local self-government
as well as allocate some funds for realising minorities’ needs.
As detailed above, the scope of activities of municipalities somewhat overlaps with the
scope of activities of the county and voivodship. Furthermore, the central government
still has many territorial offices (biura rejonowe) which remain from the former centralised
system and carry out some similar tasks. The territorial offices, however, are being phased
out. Some changes in the local, county and voivodship acts are needed to clarify the com-
petencies. 
This presentation shows the significant role local government has (or rather will have)
in improving inter-ethnic relations. Local government in Poland has not only decision-
making powers but also owns resources to support minority education and culture. From
1990 to 1999, the local self-government functioned only at the level of municipality. Thus
municipalities already have some experience managing multi-ethnicity. In contrast, we
cannot say anything about such policies at the regional/voivodship level, because region-
al policies and plans are still being developed. Some municipalities have drawn up worse
or better strategies for multi-cultural management. Therefore, if we want to examine the
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management of multi-ethnicity in Poland, we must base it on the actions taken up on the
level of municipality. The reform of public administration gives an opportunity to use
these experiences by authorities on other levels. 
Although there were no self-governments on the county and regional/voivodship level,
the process of democratisation of the state offered possibilities for multi-ethnic manage-
ment (in academia, journalism, some public institutions) as well as building inter-ethnic
bonds in regional communities. 
3.2. Tensions between central and local authorities
Using the examples below, we will attempt to illustrate the tensions between central and
local government policies and their relevance to managing multi-ethnicity. These exam-
ples also show that both local and central authorities can have a positive or negative impact
on intercommunal co-operation. 
A crucial dispute between central and local authorities took place in Opole region in
1998. Central government experts—who prepared the reform of administrative structure
which would cut the number of voivodships from 49 to 16—proposed that the Opole
voivodship be dissolved. Opole is in western Poland, and it is one of the main regions
where the German minority live; approximately 30% of the region’s population are eth-
nic Germans. The proposal was to attach Opole Silesia to neighbouring Katowice Silesia.
The reasons given were mainly economic (Opole is comparatively better-off than Katowice),
but regardless of the motivation, the consequence of the restructuring would alter the eth-
nic proportions of the population. The percentage of ethnic Germans in the new larger
voivodship would have been lower. Warsaw governmental officials and experts did not
expect the response of people who lived in the Opole region. Poles and Germans togeth-
er started a huge campaign against removing the Opole voivodship from the administra-
tive map of Poland. The action was supported by Polish and German minority NGOs,
representatives of local governments and even the central government’s delegate to the
Opole region. Identification with the Polish majority or the German minority within the
region was replaced by identification with ‘we’—the inhabitants of Opole region—and
‘others’—representatives of central government and members of Parliament interested in
dissolving the Opole voivodship. The inhabitants of the voivodship won their battle with
the central government and preserved the voivodship in the new administrative system.
Interestingly, co-operation between Poles and Germans did not finish with this lobbying
campaign and the subsequent positive decision of the Polish Parliament. It has continued
during local elections when a new multi-ethnic local majority was formed. In Opole, local
identity combines with and complements ethnic identity.
The case of Przemysl, however, shows that local authorities are, at times, unwilling
or unable to promote co-operation between ethnic groups. Central government has
occasionally played a positive role in this respect. Przemysl is a city in southeast Poland
where representatives of local government did not stop a campaign by residents against
the Ukrainian minority. The conflict was concentrated on the case of an illegally erect-
ed monuments dedicated to the UPA (Ukrainian Uprising Army), which was active dur-
ing WWII. Polish veterans’ associations criticised the monuments and organised a media
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assault against the Ukrainian minority. Complaints were mainly directed against the
inscriptions on the monuments. 
Animosity from this conflict finally immersed the local Ukrainian Cultural Festival,
organised since 1995. The veterans’ organisations saw the Festival of Ukrainian Culture
as an attempt at re-Ukrainisation of the region. The local government did not react and
allegedly secretly supported the veterans’ demands. This caused Ukrainian minority-Polish
majority relations to suffer.35 The reluctant attitude of local authorities also was evident
in 1997, when the next Ukrainian Cultural Festival was organised. The authorities of
Przemysl opposed and obstructed the organisation of the festival. It led to the direct inter-
vention of the central government in support of the festival. In fact, there was an open
conflict between central and local authorities.36
While there are important similarities between Opole and Przemysl, such as a rela-
tively high proportion of minority residents and recent antagonism between the different
communities, there are also important differences. One is that Opole is a wealthier region
than Przemysl. But the crucial difference in the way that these two disputes were han-
dled has to do with minority participation in local goverment structures. The German
minority is well represented at all levels of local goverment in Opole, while the Ukrainian
minority is underrepresented in local government structures in Przemysl. An important
factor which enabled intergroup dialogue and co-operation in Opole was effective minor-
ity participation in local government. 
3.3. Participation of national minorities in local governments
3.3.1. 1990-1998
There is no special provision for national minorities in the Local, County and Regional
Election Laws (1990, 1998 and 1998 respectively). Nevertheless, candidates nominated
by national minority NGOs were successful in the 1990 local elections and many won
seats in local councils. The German minority in the Opole region was the most success-
ful mainly because the Gerrmans live in compact communities. They collected about 30%
of valid votes in Opole voivodship (which corresponds with the proportion of ethnic
German population) and gained 380 seats (out of 1440) which gave them majority in 26
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of 61 local councils.37 In the next local election in 1994, German minority representa-
tives received fewer votes and seats in local councils, but they have proven that they are
a strong political power in the region.38
The Belarussian minority was also able to achieve good results in local elections. In a
few local councils, members of the Belarussian minority composed the ruling coalition
(for example, Bielsk Podlaski, Hajnówka, Gródek and Narewka).39 They had more than
70 seats in local councils. The Lithuanian minority had a dominant position in Punsk
(northeast Poland). They had also members of councils in the nearest ethnically mixed
territory. Like Germans, Belarussians and Lithuanians live in compact settlements.
The Ukrainian minority was in a much more difficult situation because they are dis-
persed across Poland. Ukrainians had minority representation in local councils (more
than 70 seats) but nowhere were they part of the ruling coalition. 
In the case of the Roma, virtually no political participation has been possible.
3.3.2. Current situation as a result of 1998 local elections 
The ongoing reform of administrative structure and formation of new levels of local admin-
istration in 1998 brought a challenge for national minorities living in Poland to partici-
pate in decision-making bodies at any level higher than the municipality (gmina). National
minorities met with two primary difficulties during elections. First, the 1998 campaign
was dominated by national political parties and political fighting between the ruling coali-
tion (Solidarity Election Action and the Union of Freedom) and opposition post-com-
munist parties (the Alliance of Left Democrats and the Peasant Party). National minority
committees operating in local circumstances as well as other local committees were not
able to compete with strong nationwide political parties. Secondly, the Law on Local
Elections (1990) does not include any special provision to enable minority participation.
Furthermore, it is necessary to receive more than a 5% total of votes cast to be eligible for
seats in the county and voivodship councils. All these conditions decreased the chances
for minorities to gain seats in higher levels of local government. And although represen-
tatives of national minorities held their positions in the lowest level of local government
(municipality), they found it very hard to gain seats in county and voivodship councils.
The exception was the German minority who performed unexpectedly well. 
In the 1998 local election, the German minority received approximately 600 seats in the
Opole voivodship in all three levels of local government structure (out of a total number of
1,980 seats). Now representatives of the German minority hold 13 seats (of 45) on the voivod-
ship council. This was the second best result in the whole voivodship.40 Members of German
minority are part of ruling coalition in the Opole voivodship together with Solidarity Election
Action (11 seats) and the Union of Freedom (4 seats). Such a decent result was possible because
of the concentration of German minority in the Opole voivodship and, to a lesser extent, their
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campaign tactics and composition of candidate lists. Local leaders based their campaign on local
solidarity rather than basing it only on ethnic self-identification. Candidates focused on issues
important for all inhabitants of Opole regardless of nationality. Often the German minority can-
didate lists also included ethnic Poles, sometimes in first place.41
The leaders of the Ukrainian minority had to use other tactics. Because Ukrainians are
dispersed, their representatives tried to build partnerships with majority local or party
committees. The Ukrainian minority has now one representative in the voivodship coun-
cil of Warmia and Mazury (northeast Poland) and more than 10 seats in different coun-
ty councils. This is very low, considering that the Ukrainians are the second largest minor-
ity in Poland, at 250,000-350,000 (official statistics) or 350,000-500,000 people (unofficial
estimates).42
The Belarussian and Lithuanian minorities were able to gain seats only in municipal
councils and very rarely in county councils. To this day, there is virtually no Roma rep-
resentation in local government structures. 
The size of a minority and its territorial distribution are important factors for minori-
ty participation in political life at the local level; other factors are likely to be traditions of
self-rule, political elite, intercommunal relations, populations ties to the region and eco-
nomic factors.
3.4. Financial support for minority culture
There are three potential sources for financing minority cultural activities. The most sta-
ble source is the Department for National Minorities’ Culture within the Ministry for
Culture and Art (see Section 2.2.3. for details). 
The second source of money for minority culture is local governmental budgets. The
scale and the kind of support for minority cultural activities differ by region. They often
depend on relations between the minority community and the majority in local councils
and boards. The most favourable conditions are in places where a minority rules or is part
of the ruling coalition at the local level (e.g. Lithuanians in Punsk, Germans in Opole
Silesia). In these cases, the minority can decide on the local budget and the plan of expen-
diture. 
Generally, minority cultural organisations function as NGOs. One of the tasks of local
authorities is co-operation with NGOs. Local authorities support NGOs through direct or
indirect financing of cultural activities. Some local authorities also organise multi-cultur-
al events and lend municipal equipment and premises for minorities’ cultural activities.
The range of help of local authorities is limited by their financial abilities. Most of the areas
inhabited by Belarussians, Lithuanians and many Ukrainians are in the poorest part of
Poland (called the ‘Eastern Wall’). Local self-governments have problems with financial
support of cultural institutions. But they can help. In Zagorz in southeastern Poland, a
Ukrainian ‘Festival on the Oslawa River’ is organised by the local branch of Association of
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Ukrainians in Poland. The local authorities have lent musical equipment to Oslawiany, a
Ukrainian folk group, and Oslawiany have used an artistic adviser, who is employed by
local self-government. Co-operation between local authorities and minority organisations
has provided support for minority cultural activities. The problem is that this co-opera-
tion is often limited to the cultural sphere and, as such, stays at a symbolic level.
More and more minority organisations rely on private donors. Many important events
organised by minority communities are supported by private businesses or foundations.
3.5. Minority access to the media
Minority access to public mass media is guaranteed by the Act on Public Radio and
Television Broadcasting. Article 21 states that ‘duties of the public radio and television shall
include in particular ... the consideration of the needs of national minorities and ethnic
groups’.43 Minority access to mainstream and minorities’ own media has improved con-
siderably in the 1990s, with increased access both to electronic and print media. However,
there are problems. For example, in addition to national TV and radio, Poland is divided
into seventeen regions for the purposes of electronic media. Each region has a Council for
Radio and Television Programming. The councils are responsible inter alia for the content
of the programmes. There is no provision for minority participation in these Councils and
only two (Bialystok and Silesia) include some minority representation. Minority access to
mainstream TV varies from region to region. Management in a number of TV regions states
that they are co-operating with minority communities; however, most organisations rep-
resenting national minorities claim that they are, in reality, very often ignored by public
TV staff.44 The volume of radio programming in minority languages varies from 1 hour
per week for each minority language (in Bialystok in Belarussian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian),
to 25 minutes a week in German in Opole, to no programming in minority languages in
several regions. TV broadcasting varies from no provision to 10 minutes a month in
Ukrainian in most TV regions to 20 minutes a month in Belarussian in Bialystok. The lead-
ers of Belarussian, Ukrainian and other minority communities would like more broadcast
time in minority languages, and broadcasting at more viewer-friendly times according to
a set schedule. It is common practice that the times of minority-language programmes
change from month to month, information about the changes is not widely available in
advance, and the programmes are broadcast at unfriendly hours, such as early on Sunday
mornings.45 Minority journalists are usually involved in the production of minority-lan-
guage programmes, but with important exceptions, such as TV programmes in Belarussian
in Bialystok. However, often minority journalists are employed on short-term contracts
and thus have no job security, less access to equipment and no access to training. 
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Channel 5 of Polish Public Radio broadcasts programmes in the official languages of
neighbouring countries. The programmes contain information about Poland and are aimed
at audiences in neighbouring countries. Because the programmes are in minority languages,
persons belonging to national minorities are part of the listenership. However, because of
technical difficulties (Channel 5 uses different frequencies than other radio programmes
in Poland), these programmes cannot be received in some regions where minorities live.
Showing the problems of minorities, bringing cultures closer together and striving
against negative attitudes toward minorities are all important goals for media in the con-
text of managing multi-ethnicity. 
3.6. Use of minority languages in public administration
Article 27 of the Constitution states that ‘Polish shall be the official language in the Republic
of Poland. This provision shall not infringe upon national minority rights resulting from
ratified international instruments.’ But there is no law on the use of minority languages
in public administration. Consequently, there is almost no provision. The Draft Law on
National and Ethnic Minorities includes considerable provisions, including the recogni-
tion of minority languages as auxiliary languages, and use of minority languages in pub-
lic, in courts, and to name cities and streets. 
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Case Study 1. Media and Prejudice
The issue: Media have a strong influence on any society’s attitudes. Media can create positive or
negative attitudes towards minorities. It can play an important role in the integration of a multi-
ethnic community.
Actors involved: 1) regional and local journalists; 2) Ukrainian minority representatives. 
Good practice: Local weekly newspaper Zycie Przemyskie (Life of Przemysl) works to overcome
prejudices in Przemysl. Przemysl is a town in southeastern Poland. Ethnic Ukrainians were
concentrated in the Przemysl County before they were expelled and forcibly dispersed in 1947
as part of ‘Operation Wisla’. Przemysl County was also the center of the Ukrainian under-
ground movement during WWII. Today, Polish-Ukrainian relations are very tense in Przemysl.
In 1997, on the 50TH anniversary of Operation Wisla, Zycie Przemyskie publishers organized a
round table to begin to discuss different perceptions of history. Publishers also organised a
discussion in the weekly about the co-operation between Polish and Ukrainian underground
movements after WWII. Ethnic Poles and Ukrainians participated in both initiatives, and
excerpts of the discussions were published in Zycie Przemyskie. These initiatives enabled read-
ers to encounter an unknown history of Polish-Ukrainian relations which is far from the stereo-
typical vision of permanent conflicts. Zycie Przemyskie aims to create a good atmosphere for
Polish-Ukrainian contacts in Przemysl and to show other leaders, including local authorities,
that Polish-Ukrainian dialogue is possible, even on issues which have been a main source of
conflict since WWII.
Sources: Zycie Przemyskie (1997) 23 and 30 April; Zycie Przemyskie (1998) 7, 21 and 28 January
3.7. Education in mother tongue
Minority-language education, together with cultural activities, were the only two areas of minor-
ity rights tolerated by the communist regime. With the exception of the German minority, minor-
ity children could learn their mother tongue in some form in public schools since 1952. The
new post-1989 political context, combined with a tradition of mother-tongue education, offered
possibilities for improved regulation and provision. As detailed in Section 2.2.2., education in
Poland is governed by 1991 Act on Education. Education in and of minority languages is regu-
lated by the 1992 Education Minister’s Resolution on the Organisation of Educational Programmes
Enabling Minority Pupils to Retain their Sense of National, Ethnic and Linguistic Identity.
The education system is decentralised. Preschools and primary education are the respon-
sibility of municipal governments; secondary and vocational education are the responsi-
bility of county governments; and higher education is the responsibility of regional/voivod-
ship governments. In practice, educational provision in and of minority languages varies
from region to region. 
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Case Study 2. German Minority Education
The issue: German minority children in Opole Silesia could not learn or study in their mother
tongue until 1990. This caused serious problems with preservation of mother tongue among
the 250,000 ethnic Germans. 
Actors involved: 1) Polish government; 2) German government; 3) German minority NGOs. 
Good practice: Between 1945-1989, learning and using the German language was forbidden in
the Silesia region and western territories acquired by Poland after WWII. This is the region
where the German minority lives. Using German in public was heavily fined. The government
banned learning German as a foreign language in primary and secondary schools in Silesia and
western Poland (while German as a foreign language was taught in other parts of Poland). As
a result, in 1990 there were neither German-language teachers nor textbooks. Furthermore,
research conducted in the early 1990s showed that only 30% of the native population in Silesia
declared German as their first language. This group was made up mainly of people over 65. It
was obvious that any action taken by German minority NGOs together with the Ministry for
Education would not be enough to make up for lost time. On the basis of a bilateral agree-
ment between Poland and Germany, a group of German teachers were sent to Silesia and west-
ern Poland to teach German language in primary and secondary schools. Two teacher train-
ing colleges were established to prepare Polish teachers to teach German. This brought positive
results as early as the 1990-91 academic year when German as a native language was taught
in 184 primary schools, and by 1993-94, in 268 schools in the Opole voivodship alone. In
the 1994-95 academic year, German was taught to more than 6,100 students; the number of
schools which offer German increases every year. These schools are also open to Polish stu-
dents, as any public school. Graduates of these schools may continue their education in any
universities in Poland. As the result of Polish-German bilateral agreement and co-operation
between German minority organisations and the two governments, an effective system of minor-
ity-language education has been developed in Opole Silesia. This gives the German minority
an opportunity to maintain their own language. 
Sources: T. Urban (1994) Germans in Poland. History of the minority in the 20TH century, Opole, pp.
150-151; D. Berlinska (1993) ‘Realisation of decisions of the Treaty between Poland and Germany
In addition to educational provision, schools in multi-ethnic communities can perform
important functions to enhance inter-ethnic co-operation. Schools can help to integrate
minority groups into wider communities, while offering minority students possibilities to
maintain their own language and culture (see Case Study 3 below). Furthermore, schools
can help to overcome prejudices and offer opportunities for majority pupils to learn about
minority culture and history. Textbooks, curricula, training methodoligies and teachers
play a key role in determining whether a school fulfills these additional functions. 
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Case Study 3. Public Schools for Minority Groups
The issue: The Polish state organises the system of ethnic minority education, a potentially good
opportunity for local communities to maintain their own language and culture.
Actors involved: 1) the management and teachers of minority schools—Lithuanian and Ukrainian;
2) local communities.
The strategy: The integration of a local minority community and maintaining its culture and lan-
guage are some of the most important functions of public schools for ethnic minorities. The
model realising these functions is found in a Lithuanian-language secondary school in Punsk.
Research shows that the pupils have a strong awareness of ethnic identity and the school gives
them competence in their native culture. Lithuanian language is used in the school at all times.
All interaction between teachers and pupils is in Lithuanian.
The school also influences the local community: ‘The teachers’ subjects important for preser-
vation of identity (e.g. Lithuanian literature, music education) are the animators of the cultural
life in the community. They use traditional elements of the Lithuanian culture and folklore in
their work with the pupils. For example, around All Saints’ Day teachers and pupils together
organise evenings devoted to the memory of community members—open to everyone in town.
The school balances an unprejudiced philosophy while instilling youth with cultural com-
petence (fluent knowledge of Polish language). This is a deliberate technique to avoid ‘the syn-
drome of the ethnic ghetto’. 
A public minority school may also positively influence a larger, regional community, as in
the case of a Ukrainian school in Przemysl. In Podkarpacie, the Ukrainian minority is small
and dispersed in a large territory. The school in Przemysl plays an important role in the local
Ukrainian community and, at the same time, it animates the educational activity of other
Ukrainian communities in the region. 
The role of ethnic minority school is not only to teach the minority culture and language.
Such a school is also a local cultural centre which may play an important role in enhancing
co-operation between communities
Sources: Miroslaw Sobecki (1997) Ethnic-Cultural Function of Ethnic Minority’s Schools. Bialystok:
TransHumana, p. 168-175; Dariusz Wojakowski (1996) ‘The Teaching of the Ukrainian
Language in the Southeastern Poland’, in: T. Lewowicki, B. Grabowska (ed.) Borderland
Communities. Multiculturalism. Education, Cieszyn: Uniwersytet Slaski, p. 184-193.
on good neighbourly relation and friendly co-operation in the context of human rights’, in: Poles
and Germans on Common Ground and Normal Relations. Priesthood and Education, Opole, p. 88;
Information Paper on Education Situation of National Minorities in Republic of Poland (1995) Ministry
of Education; National Minorities in Poland in 1994, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, p. 224.
While there is no accurate monitoring of whether minority children face discrimina-
tion in education, it is certain that Roma children have less access to and poorer quality of
education than majority children. In approximately twenty places in the south of Poland
experimental classes have opened for Roma children. It is difficult to present the exact
number: many of these initiatives were organised by NGOs or individuals in co-operation
with local authorities and local representatives of the education administration. The main
idea of the programme is to give a chance for Roma children to finish primary school and
to prepare them for admission exams for secondary schools. In the past, Roma children
very often dropped out of school at the beginning of their primary education for a variety
of reasons, among them language barriers and a lack of teachers’ skills or will to help them
integrate into the classroom. Authors of the project, which was accepted by the local edu-
cation authority in 1993, organised a special compensatory course in the Polish language
for Roma children at the beginning of primary school. It is not always a success; sometimes
there are not enough qualified teachers (the schools are often in small villages or towns)
or some parents do not send their children to those classes. Some Roma leaders now crit-
icise the idea because of the danger of furthering segregation between Roma and Poles at
schools. Undoubtedly, these initiatives raise the question of how to organise a system of
education which is inclusive of and effective for all children. In the near future, we can
expect the Ministry for Education to present an official programme for the integration of
Roma children into schools.
3.8. Searching for a new self-government policy
Five of sixteen regions/voivodships in Poland have a relatively high proportion of minori-
ties. These regions are: (1) Katowice Silesia—where ethnic Germans are concentrated, (2)
Opole Silesia—Germans, (3) Podkarpacie—Ukrainians, (4) Podlasie—Belarussians and
Ukrainians, and (5) Warmia and Mazury—Ukrainians, Germans, Lithuanians. It is too
early to present a comprehensive assessment of policies of regional management in the
new (post-1998) administrative system as yet. Some local and regional authorities have
yet to present their development strategies. However, in the five multi-ethnic regions dur-
ing the past ten years, local leaders have been implementing more or less explicit policies
towards minorities. We will use selected examples to show ideas and possible methods
which can be used to develop effective regional policies for managing multi-ethnicity. 
In Podlasie and Opole Silesia, the largest minorities live in compact settlements (approx-
imately 250,000-300,000 ethnic Belarussians in Podlasie or 30% of population, and at
least 250,000 ethnic Germans in Opole Silesia, or 30% of the population).46 In the other
regions minorities are smaller and territorially dispersed. The composition of the popu-
lation in the regions makes a real difference in how multi-ethnicity is managed. This is at
least partly because, in Poland, more effective minority participation in local government
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46 See: Andrzej Sadowski (1991) Great and Little Nations. Belarussians in Poland, Krakow: Nomos,
p. 121-122; Maria Szmeja (1998) ‘Historical and Social Underpinnings of Development of German
Minority and Silesian Nation in Poland’, Warsaw: Studia Socjologiczne, No. 4 (151), p. 55. 
structures has been possible for large and compact minorities. Participation in decision-
making processes is an important factor for effective management of multi-ethnicity and
good relations between groups. 
Uniquely Opole Silesia has a multi-ethnic leadership at all levels of local government.
In addition to special measures for the protection of minority rights (e.g. in education),
regional policies have been addressing issues important to both ethnic Germans and eth-
nic Poles (e.g. economic development). Working together towards common goals has
brought people from different ethnicities closer together. Other factors in Opole which
seem to be important include: the local population’s strong ties to the region (in contrast
with neighbouring Katowice Silesia where a large proportion of the current population
came to Katowice during industrialisation in the 1960s and 1970s), a strong economy (in
comparison to Podlasie, for example) to which the German minority contributes dispro-
portionately because of its ties with Germany, and a tradition of self-management (albeit
as part of both Germany and Poland). 
Local leadership makes a difference. While minority participation in government struc-
tures at all levels is the most effective, an engaged community leadership—elected or
informal—can make an important contribution to, or hinder, effective management of
multi-ethnicity. This is illustrated through the cases of Katowice Silesia and Podlasie. 
In Katowice Silesia, the German minority is smaller than in Opole and dispersed
within big cities. After 1989 community leaders have made efforts to know and under-
stand the minority’s problems and needs and to build social agreements to overcome
ethnic divisions. Sociologists from the Silesian University in Katowice have been engaged
in systematic research of the native inhabitants in this region. Their research has pro-
vided important (also from the perspective of a political practice) information about
attitudes, needs and the social situation of the German minority.47 In 1995 most sig-
nificant Silesian decision-makers—including government and informal community lead-
ers—have signed a political agreement—the Regional Contract for the Voivodship of
Katowice Silesia—which is perceived as an important success in determining the future
of the region. One party to the agreement is the central government; the second party
is composed of regional trade unions, economic organisations, local self-governments
and regional political and social associations, including German minority associations.
The Regional Contract includes inter alia plans for economic development of Silesia,
formation of a new regional self-government and development of education. Local lead-
ers and decision-makers initiated the idea of the Regional Contract and this idea brought
them closer together.48
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47 Here the most important works should be mentioned: Jacek Wodz (ed.) (1990) Upper Silesia
from the Upper-Silesians’ Point of View, Katowice: Uniwersytet Slaski; Kazimiera Wodz (ed.) (1993)
‘Ours’ and ‘Aliens’ in Upper Silesia, Katowice: Uniwersytet Slaski; Kazimiera Wodz (ed.) (1995)
Regional Identity—Regional Consciousness. The Upper Silesian Experience, Katowice: Uniwersytet
Slaski; Krzysztof Lecki, Kazimiera Wodz and  Piotr Wroblewski (1997) Social World of Silesians.
Reconstruction of the Common Consciousness, Katowice: Uniwersytet Slaski.
48 Marek S. Szczepanski (1996) ‘People without Local Homeland and the Regional Education’, in:
T. Lewowicki, B. Grabowska (ed.) Borderland Communities. Multiculturalism. Education, Cieszyn:
Uniwersytet Slaski, pp. 167-170. 
As a result of the Regional Contract, a Postgraduate School of Knowledge of the Region
was established within the framework of the Silesian University in 1996. The goal of this
institution is training of teachers to teach a new school subject entitled Knowledge of the
Local Homeland. The aim of the introduction of this subject in schools is the study of
regional history and traditions and to emphasise the values which are common for most
inhabitants of the region. This initiative can be perceived as an interesting example of
building inter-ethnic (or ‘over-ethnic’) bonds in the region. The Postgraduate School of
Knowledge of the Region was founded by teachers from Silesian University. The classes
are in Polish but the students are taught the regional dialect. The curriculum contains:
sociology (local communities, social integration in Silesia, Silesian identity), economic
transformation, ecology, culture (regional dialects, regional literature, music and art) and
history (history of nation-building processes in the region, issues of autonomy). The School
is financed by the Polish government and partially by students.49
Community leaders and decision-makers in Podlasie (where the Belarussian minority
is concentrated and many ethnic Ukrainians live) are less engaged in the protection of
minority rights and promoting diversity. Similarly to Katowice Silesia, in Bialystok
(Podlasie) academics also research issues related to the Belarussian minority and try to
publicise problems.50 But decision-makers and community leaders, including the media,
regional authorities and church authorities, are not responsive to the research findings.51
Lasting stereotypes persist in Podlasie—a nationality is identified with a religious denom-
ination and a political orientation. These stereotypes give a false picture of a communi-
ty’s real situation. The stereotypes reinforce isolation among both ethnic Belarussian and
ethnic Polish leaders.
Podkarpacie is a voivodship in southeastern Poland where Ukrainians have tradition-
ally lived. Now, the ethnic Ukrainian population is relatively small and dispersed. The
question of Ukrainian minority has always been a local question—in Przemysl, Jaroslaw
or Sanok. Local leaders are engaged in building good inter-ethnic relations at the local
level in these municipalities. But regional leaders have not been active in trying to effec-
tively manage multi-ethnicity. One recent initiative is that the governor of Podkarpacie
has set up an Office of the Governor’s Plenipotentiary for the Ukrainian Minority. While,
this Office should work to resolve the Ukrainian minority’s problems in the region, its
competencies are unclear. Furthermore, the governor has no competencies to create region-
al cultural and educational policy; this is a role of the regional self-government, namely
the Voivodship Board.52
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49 Ibid., pp. 162-167,170, 173-175.
50 Since 1991 the University in Bialystok has edited the social studies journal Borderland devoted
the ethnic problems in the region. Until 1997, six volumes of this journal have been edited. See
also: Andrzej Sadowski (1995) Polish-Belarussian Borderland: Identity of its Inhabitants, Bialystok:
TransHumana. 
51 See: Maciej Tefelski (1995) Press on the Borderland, in: A. Sadowski (ed.) Eastern Borderland from
the Perspective of Sociology, Bialystok: TransHumana, p. 217-228; W. Maziarski (1998) ‘Sleepily,
silently, threatenly’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5-6 September, p. 16-19.
52 Such office also existed in the former Przemysl Voivodship, but it was not influential in moder-
ating ethnic conflicts in Przemysl. 
4. Conclusion
Systemic transformation in Poland has meant the process of building a democratic state
based on the rule of law and protection of human rights, and building a market econo-
my. This transformation has also brought the process of decentralisation to government.
Important changes have taken place for all parts of the population, including minorities.
Most minority communities, with the exception of the German minority, have been fur-
ther marginalised in economic terms. On the positive side, since 1989, the protection of
minority rights and issues connected with managing diversity have been discussed in pub-
lic for the first time since World War II. The 1997 Polish Constitution offers a higher level
of protection of minority rights than under the previous system. Poland has also ratified
and is bound by relevant international instruments. 
While some considerable improvements in minority protection have been made in
Poland in the last ten years, the process towards achieving equality in law as well as in
fact is nowhere near complete. Ten years on, there is no comprehensive anti-discrimi-
nation legislation in place. There is also no effective institutional framework for minor-
ity protection. Problems with implementation of international minority rights standards
and constitutional provisions do exist, particularly in the sense that minority protec-
tion varies from region to region and often depends on local conditions. As regards local
management of multi-ethnic communities, there are examples of good practices, includ-
ing minority participation in decision-making processes, and co-operation between
majority and minority communities. This is particularly the case in Opole Silesia. At
the same time, the conflict continues to simmer at the local level in Przemysl and
Bialystok.
Several factors important for the future of minority protection in Poland should be
highlighted. One is the process of decentralisation; this process has offered opportunities
for some minorities to participate in local government structures. Finding ways to man-
age multi-ethnicity at the local level will be key. A second factor will be the adoption of
a comprehensive law to protect national minorities; most minority representatives advo-
cate for the adoption of the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities, which has existed as
a draft since 1993. Finally, international pressure can play an important role in ensuring
a minimum level of minority protection. Here, the European Union can have particular
leverage in the context of accession negotiations, and treaty-monitoring bodies can also
play an important role. 
5. Recommendations 
1. The Parliament should immediately pass the comprehensive Law on National and
Ethnic Minorities. Representatives of minority communities and other human rights
activists stress that this Law is a necessary step towards effective protection. This Law
should include articles which would specifically oblige regional and local authorities
to support minority cultures and education. The Polish government should then take
steps to ensure the effective implementation and monitoring of the Law.
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2. Poland should be reminded of its obligations under international law to effectively
implement international instruments it ratified, including the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities, which provides minimum standards of pro-
tection.
3. Local governments should—on the basis of Poland’s as well as other European states’
experiences—build new policies for the protection of minorities and build the poli-
cies and institutional framework necessary for managing multi-ethnicity.
4. Local governments, in consultation with minority leaders, should work towards ensur-
ing effective participation of minorities in decision-making processes at the local level
in areas where participation needs to be improved. 
5. Local governments should adopt programmes for multi-cultural education in prima-
ry and secondary schools where history and culture of minorities should be taught.
Minority issues, as well as migrant and refugee issues, should be discussed. They should
also set up initiatives to raise the awareness of minority rights among the adult popu-
lation, including government employees, police and judges.
6. As recommended by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance,
Poland’s government should set up procedures to monitor whether there is discrimi-
nation, for example, in access to education.53
7. Central and local authorities—together with Roma community leaders—should devel-
op a programme of integration of Roma into society at large. A key to any such pro-
gramme will be active participation of Roma leaders from programme inception through
implementation.
8. The government should set up an institution at the central level to co-ordinate and
promote good practices in management of multi-ethnic communities at the local level. 
Further reading
Alfredsson, Gudmundur (1998) Minority Rights: International Standards and Monitoring Procedures
in: Minority Rights Handbook, Latvian Human Rights Quarterly, No 5/6.
Kowalczyk, Andrzej (2000) ‘Local Government in Poland’ in: Tamás Horváth (ed.) Decentralisation:
Experiments and Reforms, Budapest: OSI/LGI, pp. 297-342.
Liegois, P. and N. Gheorghe (1997) Roma/Gypsies: A European Minority, Minority Rights Group.
Lodzinski, Slawomir (2000) The Policy of Multiculturalism in Poland in 1990s (National Minorities
and Immigrants), Legal Solutions and Social Perceptions, Paper presented at World Conference
Against Racism Regional Seminar, Warsaw, July 2000.
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ANNEX 1
MINORITY POPULATION IN POLAND
Table A.1. Minority Population in Poland
1920-1990
National Census data on Estimate census on Estimate census by the Minority 
minority minority minority population Rights Group (1997)3
group population by Parliamentary 
of 19311 Research Office (1993)2
Germans 748,300 (2.2%) 350,000 – 400,000 750,000 – 1,100,000 (1.9–2.8%)
Ukrainians 5,042,500 (15.7%) 250,000 – 350,000 350,000 – 500,000 (0.9-1.3%)
Belarussians 1,956,600 (6.1%) 250,000 – 300,000 200,000 – 300,000 (0.5-0.8%)
Jews 3,050,000 (9.5%) 8,000 – 10,000
Slovaks 10,000 – 15,000 10,000 – 20,000 (less than 0.1%)
Czechs 5,000 – 10,000 5,000 (less than 0.1%)
Lithuanians 15,000 – 20,000 10,000 – 30,000 (less than 0.1%)
Roma/Gypsies 20,000 – 25,000 15,000 (less than 0.1%)
Others* 309,700 (1%) 2,000 
* Others: Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, Macedonians, Russians
1 P. Eberhard (1996) Miedzy Rosja a Niemcami. Przemiany narodowosciowe w Europie Srodkowo-
Wschodniej w XX w (Between Russia and Germany. Nationalities Changes in Central East
Europe in 20TH century), Warsaw, p. 106.
2 S. Lodzinski (1994) Poland’s Policy towards National Minorities 1989-1993, Warsaw, p. 1.
3 World Directory of Minorities (1997) London: Minority Rights Group,p. 237.
234 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART II
ANNEX 2
SELECTION OF LEGAL REGULATIONS RELATING TO MINORITIES
IN POLAND
(unofficial translation)
Protection of National Minorities
Law of 2 April 1997; Constitution of the Republic of Poland
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) of 1997, No. 78, item 483
Article 27
Polish shall be the official language in the Republic of Poland. This provision shall not infringe on
national minority rights resulting from ratified international agreement.
Article 32
1. All persons shall be equal before the law. All persons shall have the right to equal treatment by
public authorities. 
2. No one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic life for any reason what-
soever. 
Article 35
1. The Republic of Poland shall ensure to Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities
the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions,
and develop their own culture.
2. National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to establish educational and cultural institu-
tions, institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolu-
tion of measures connected with their own cultural identity.
Article 60
Polish citizens enjoying full public rights shall have a right of access to public services based on the
principle of equality. 
Article 79
1. In accordance with principles specified by statute, everyone whose constitutional freedoms or
rights have been infringed, shall have the right to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal for its
judgment on the conformity to the Constitution of a statute or another normative act upon
which basis a court or organ of public administration has made a final decision on his freedoms
or rights or on his obligations specified in the Constitution. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 above shall not relate to the rights specified in Article 56. 
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Law of 22 July 1952; Constitution of the Republic of Poland
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 7, item 36, with subsequent amendments
Article 67
2. Citizens of the Republic of Poland shall have equal rights irrespective of sex, birth, education,
profession, nationality, race, religion, social status and origin.
Article 81
1. Citizens of the Republic of Poland, irrespective of nationality, race or religion, shall enjoy equal
rights in all fields of public, political, economic, social and cultural life. Infringement of this
principle by any direct or indirect privileges or restrictions of rights by reference to nationality,
race or religion shall be punishable.
2. The spreading of hatred or contempt, the provocation of discord, or humiliation of man on
account of national, racial or religious differences, shall be prohibited.
Law of 20 June 1997; Penal Code
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 88, item 553
Article 256
Whoever in public propagates a fascistic political system or other totalitarian systems or exhorts to
hatred on the basis of national, ethnic, racial or religious differences or on the basis of not having
a religious affiliation shall be subject to the penalty of fine or deprivation of liberty for up to 2 years.
Article 257
Whoever in public insults a group of people or an individual person by reason of their national,
ethnic, racial or religious differences or their not having a religious affiliation, or for those reasons
violates personal immunity of other people shall be subject to the penalty of deprivation of liberty
for up to 2 years.
Protection of Language Rights of National Minorities
Decree of 30 November 1945 on the Official Language of Government and Self-Government
Administrative Authorities
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 57, item 324
Article 1
The official language of the Republic of Poland is Polish. The official language is to be used by all
government authorities and administrative offices.
Law of June 14,1960; Code of Administrative Procedure
Uniform text in Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 9, item 26 with subsequent amendments
Article 69
§2 Transcripts of testimony, which was offered in a foreign language, must include the identity and
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address of the interpreter who rendered the translation; the interpreter must also sign the court
transcript.
Law of 17 November 1964; Code of Civil Procedure
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 43, item 296 with subsequent amendments
Article 265
§1 The court may appoint an interpreter in order to examine a witness who does not possess a
sufficient command of the Polish language.
Law of 19 April 1969; Code of Criminal Procedure
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. l3, item 96 with subsequent amendments
Article 62
If the defendant does not know Polish, decisions regarding pending criminal charges, the criminal
complaint and final verdicts as well as those subject to further appeal will be communicated to the
accused together with a translation.
Article 159
§1 An interpreter will be summoned if the need arises to examine:
1) (... ),
2) a person who does not possess a sufficient command of the Polish language.
§2 An interpreter will also be summoned if the need arises to translate a document written in Polish
into a foreign language.
Article 354
If the court communicated with the accused through an interpreter, before the accused makes
his/her final statement, the accused shall receive a translation of at least the concluding remarks of
the prosecutor and the defence attorney.
Law of 29 September 1986; Law of Civil Registry
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 36, item 180
Article 20
If a person who is obliged to register a birth or death cannot communicate either orally or in writ-
ing with the chief clerk of the civil registry by reason of physical disability or inability to speak
Polish, the chief clerk shall summon an expert or an interpreter.
Article 50
1. The chief clerk of the civil registry shall refuse to register a child if the name chosen by the child’s
parents is ridiculous, indecent, in diminutive form or does not indicate the sex of the child.
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Resolution of the Minister of Internal Affairs of 14 February 1987 on Civil Registry Records,
Administration and Control of Civil Registry Records, their Preservation and Security
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 7, item 43
§2 The civil registry should be organised carefully and legibly; each individual entry should be clear
and in conformance with obligatory orthographic norms, except for names, which can be record-
ed using the traditional spelling used by the person so named.
Education Rights of National Minorities
Law of 7 September 1991 on the Educational System
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No. 95, item 425
Article 13
l. Public schools shall enable pupils to retain their sense of national, ethnic and religious identi-
ty, and in particular shall make it possible for them to learn their own language, history and
culture.
2. At the request of the parents, the educational instruction in paragraph 1 may be conducted in:
1) separate groups, section or schools,
2) groups, sections or schools—with additional language lessons and conducted on history
and culture.
3. The Minister of Education emphasises, in executing this resolution that the Minister shall deter-
mine the way in which the schools organise the classes outlined in paragraphs I and 2, and in
particular shall establish the minimum number of children needed to organise such classes.
4. In carrying out their educational function, public schools shall ensure retention of regional cul-
ture and tradition.
Resolution of the Minister of Education of 24 March 1992 on the Organisation of Educational
Programs Enabling Minority Pupils to Retain their Sense of National, Ethnic and Linguistic
Identity (1992)
Dziennik Ustaw (Journal of Law) No.34, item 150
§1
1. Public preschools and schools shall provide for pupils conditions under they retain their sense
of national, ethnic and linguistic identity, as well as their own history and culture.2. The condi-
tions from paragraph 1 shall be created in the course of generally accessible curricular in extracur-
ricular instruction.
§3
1. Native language instruction for minority pupils as well as other classes outlined in paragraph 2
will be organised on a volunteer basis. The school (preschool) principal at the request of the
parents or legal guardians shall organise these classes. If students above the elementary level
express a desire to participate in such classes, the students themselves may submit this request.
§6
A minority native language class (section) may be organised if at least 7 elementary school pupils
from one class or 14 upper-level pupils declare an interest in forming such a class.
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§7
1. If the number of children declaring an interest is less than the number in paragraph 6, native
language classes can be organised with students from different grades or class sections, subject
to the following:
1) a class composed of pupils from different sections, (for example third-grades from sec-
tions A and B) must have at least 7 pupils,
2) a class composed of pupils from different grades (for example second and third grade)
will function as a combination class and should have at least 3 but no more than 14 pupils.
3) if a single pupil from one class declares an interest in participating in native language
instruction, he or she may attend class together with a bilingual class or a combination
class.
2. If it is impossible to organise a native language class because of an insufficient number of chil-
dren or lack of teachers, the school principal shall draw up a list of children who have declared
an interest in native language education and present it to the appropriate educational authori-
ties. They in turn will organise inter-school groups for native language education, taking into
consideration transportation possibilities. The number of pupils in such a group cannot be small-
er than 3 nor bigger than
§14
In schools with native language instruction, report cards shall be written in Polish and in the native
language.
§15
Graduates of native language schools shall have access to upper-level Polish schools.
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Abstract
This chapter constructs a typology of the principal minority groups in Romania, incor-
porating three types—the Hungarian minority, the Roma minority and the ‘smaller’ minor-
ity groups (comprised of fewer than 100,000 members). The purpose of this typology is
to highlight the fact that the various minority groups in Romania should not simply be
‘lumped together’ in one monolithic category. These three types of minority groups in
Romania are highly distinct and are characterised by varying degrees of social, political
and economic integration. Furthermore, these three groups have diverse needs and enjoy
disparate levels of political mobilisation. The chapter puts forth the argument that
Romanian policy-makers and administrators must take into account the plurality of the
country’s minority groups when addressing challenges and issues relevant to these three
diverse types. This kind of typology can be useful to policy-makers at both the local and
central level of government, and can inform those responsible for the management of
multi-ethnic communities in Romania. The chapter analyses and assesses both centrally
directed and locally initiated minority policies in Romania since 1989, emphasising par-
ticular problem areas and policy challenges in the fields of legislation relevant to minor-
ity communities, minority rights, the institutional framework for minority protection,
minority issues in post-1989 public administration reform and minority education. The
study concludes by offering a number of policy recommendations for each of these issue
areas. 
1. Introduction
Romania presents a fascinating case for the study of the management of multi-ethnic com-
munities. Ethnic minorities comprise more than 10% of Romania’s total population. At least
sixteen different minority groups can be identified, exhibiting a great variety of cultural,
political and demographic profiles. Minority groups in Romania enjoy varying degrees of
social, political and economic integration. These distinct groups have also employed dif-
ferent political strategies and have pursued widely divergent policy goals in the post-com-
munist period. An analysis of this diversity can access the particular problems faced by
Romania’s minorities as they attempt to reproduce their cultural and ethnic identities.
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This chapter advances the argument that, in dealing with minority issues, Romanian
policy-makers must recognise the important cultural, political and demographic differ-
ences that exist among the various minority groups. In policy and in practice, the central
government has thus far failed to do this to a significant degree, and instead has tended
to lump together the questions and problems posed by these diverse groups. As this paper
will demonstrate, this kind of unitary policy-approach is inappropriate given Romania’s
ethno-cultural complexity. A more sensitive approach is necessary—one which takes into
account the plurality of the needs and demands of Romania’s minorities. 
We suggest that it can be useful to distinguish at least three separate types of minori-
ty groups in Romania based on the following attributes: size, territorial concentration,
degree of political mobilisation, political objectives, historical status and socio-econom-
ic status. The three types we discern in our analysis are: (1) the Hungarian minority, (2)
the ‘smaller’ minority groups, (comprised of fewer than 100,000 members), including
Germans, Ukrainians, Lipovans and others, and (3) the Roma. The construction of this
kind of typology, we will argue, can be useful to policy-makers at both the local and cen-
tral levels of government in dealing with issues related to the multi-ethnic community
management in Romania.
1.1. Demographic characteristics
According to the 1992 census, minorities make up more than 10% of Romania’s total
population (Tables 1 and 2). The largest minority group is the Hungarian (7.1% of
Romania’s total population), followed by the Roma (1.8%) and the German (0.5%) com-
munities.1 The minority population in Romania has gradually decreased over the past few
decades (Table 2). This decrease is largely due to significant emigration on the part of
Hungarians, Germans and Jews—a process that has accelerated since 1989.2
It should be noted at the outset that the term ‘nationality’ rather than ‘ethnic minori-
ty’ is used in the 1992 census to refer to the various ethno-cultural identities of Romanian
citizens. In Romanian political discourse, the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ are used
interchangeably. Although this paper is not primarily concerned with semantic issues, it
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1 During the census in 1992, many Roma individuals hesitated to officially declare themselves as
Roma due to widespread negative prejudice against them. Their actual number is therefore sig-
nificantly higher than the number calculated in the census. A number of nongovernmental organ-
isations estimate that between 1-1.5 million Roma live in Romania—a figure comprising more
than 5% of the country’s total population.
2 In 1992 they represented only one-fifth of the number of Germans registered in 1930. During
the period between 1977 and 1992, 228,252 emigrants of German origin were registered. The
number of Hungarian emigrants in the period between 1977 and 1992 was greater than 68,000—
more than half of them leaving the country between 1988 and 1990. See: A. Radocea (1995)
‘Structura etnicá a populatiei României si evolutia ei în ultimele decenii’ in Recensámântul popu-
latiei si locuintelor din 7 Ianuaria 1992. Structura etnicá si confesionalá a populatiei, Comisia Nationalá
pentru Statisticá, pp. VII – LXXI.
is important to distinguish between ethnicity and nationality if we are to avoid plunging
into the terminological chaos that plagues so much social science literature. For our pur-
poses, we will make a simplified distinction between the two terms: nationality involves
a higher degree of political mobilisation and coherence than ethnicity and often (though
not necessarily) implies a more confrontational relationship between the given group and
the state. Throughout this paper, however, we will make a concerted effort to use the
more neutral term ‘minority group’, whenever possible, for no clear set of criteria has been
instituted in Romania to determine which communities are national groups and which
are merely ethnic groups.
According to the census, the degree of native-language use varies significantly among
the different minority groups (Table 5). The Hungarian population has the highest per-
centage of members who speak Hungarian as their mother tongue (97.8%). In marked
contrast, more than half of the Roma surveyed declared Romanian as their first language.
Among the other minority groups, fewer than 70% of Armenians, Jews, Greeks and Poles
declared a mother-tongue language correspondent with their minority group.
Table 1. Ethnic Structure of Romania’s Population 
Censuses of 1930, 1956, 1966, 1977 and 1992
Population
Census year 1930 1956 1966 1977 1992
Total 14,280,729 17,489,450 19,103,163 21,559,910 22,810,035
Romanian 11,118,170 14,996,114 16746,510 18,999,565 20408,542
Hungarian 1,423,459 1,587,675 1619,592 1,713,928 1624,959
German 633,488 384,708 382,595 359,109 119,462
Roma 242,656 104,216 64,197 227,398 401,087
Ukrainian 45,875 60,479 54,705 55,510 65,764
Serb, Croat* 50,310 46,517 44,236 43,180 33,493
Lipovan 50,725 38,731 39,483 32,696 38,606
Jew 451,892 146,264 42,888 24,667 8,955,
Tatar 15,580 20,469 22,151 23369 24,596
Slovak 50,772 1,930 4,165 4,681 2,342
Turk 26,080 23,331 1,956 2309 4,028
Bulgarian 66,348 14,329 22,221 1,966 452
Czech** 0 12,040 18,040 21,286 1,977
Greek 23,161 11,821 11,193 23,422 19,594
Polish 15,804 11,166 9,978 10,372 29,832
Armenian 12,175 7,627 9,088 7,683 9,851
Other 49,182 6,441 5,860 6,262 5,797
Undeclared 5,052 13,357 3,436 4,641 3,940
* Until the 1992 census, Slovenes were also included in this group; in 1992 they were includ-
ed in ‘Other nationalities’.
** In the 1930 census, Czechs were included among Slovaks. 
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With respect to religion, significant differences can be observed along ethnic lines
(Table 3). The vast majority of Romanians (94.7%) are Orthodox Christians, while most
Hungarians and Germans belong to the Roman Catholic Church or to various Protestant
denominations. With respect to the other smaller minorities, approximately 68% belong
to the Orthodox Church. Religious differences between the majority and the minorities
have been a source of tension and conflict, within both social and institutional contexts.
Over the past ten years Protestant and Catholic churches have received significantly less
financial support from the Romanian state than have Orthodox churches. This discrep-
ancy is in part the result of the ambiguous relationship between church and state in
Romania. 
The regional distribution and the degree of urbanisation of the various minority groups
are also important to consider because each helps to determine the degree to which the
groups are able to maintain their specific cultural identities. The more concentrated a
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Table 2. Ethnic Structure of Romania’s Population
Censuses of 1930, 1956, 1977 and 1992 (in per cent) 
Population percentages
Census year 1930 1956 1977 1992
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Romanian 77.85 85.74 88.12 89.47
Hungarian 9.97 9.08 7.95 7.12
German 4.44 2.20 1.67 .52
Roma 1.70 .60 1.05 1.76
Ukrainian .32 .35 .26 .29
Serb/Croat* .35 .27 .20 .15
Lipovan .36 .22 .15 .17
Jew 3.16 .84 .11 .04
Tatar .11 .12 .11 .11
Slovak .36 .01 .02 .01
Turk .18 .13 .01 .02
Bulgarian .46 .08 .01 .00
Czech** .00 .07 .10 .01
Greek .16 .07 .11 .09
Polish .11 .06 .05 .13
Armenian .09 .04 .04 .04
Other .34 .04 .03 .03
Undeclared .04 .08 .02 .02
* Until the 1992 census, Slovenes were also included in this group; in 1992 they were includ-
ed in ‘Other nationalities’.
** In the 1930 census, Czechs were included among Slovaks.
minority group is in a given area, the higher is its chance to use its mother tongue in every-
day communication and in the public sphere. Further, urbanisation is important—in as
much as urban settings make the concentration of financial and administrative resources
necessary for the maintenance of cultural and educational institutions easier—and facil-
itates political mobilisation. 
The bulk of Romania’s minority population is concentrated in Transylvania, where
Hungarians represent 21% of the region’s population and constitute a majority in two
counties (see Table 4).3 Most of the smaller minorities, with the partial exception of the
Germans and a number of small urban Jewish and Armenian communities, live in rural
areas. The Roma generally live in rural rather than urban settings.
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Table 3. Ethnic and Religious Structure of Romania’s Population 
Census from1992 (in %)
Religion Total Romanian Hungarian Roma German Ukrainian
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Orthodox 86.81 94.68 1.71 85.30 6.80 80.35
Roman Catholic 5.09 1.77 41.20 4.81 59.42 0.94
Reformed 3.52 0.08 47.10 4.39 2.34 0.10
Greek Catholic 0.98 0.94 1.44 0.89 1.59 2.57
Pentecostal 0.97 0.99 0.27 1.97 0.42 7.66
Baptist 0.48 0.46 0.79 0.23 0.37 0.33
Adventist 0.34 0.32 0.51 0.42 0.29 1.57
Unitarian 0.34 0.01 4.56 0.23 0.14 0.14
Muslim 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.01
Christian Evangelic 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.23 1.86 0.29
Evangelic Augustan 0.17 0.02 0.44 0.06 22.86 0.01
Christian Old Style 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.18
Orthodox Old Style 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.01 3.53
Evangelic Presbyterian 0.09 0.01 0.79 0.01 2.39 0.01
Mosaic 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06
Other 0.25 0.19 0.73 0.22 1.12 1.96
Atheists 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05
No religion 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.80 0.17 0.16
Undeclared 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.08 0.07
3 See Figure 1. 
Table 4. Ethnic Structure of Romania’s Population by Districts. (Percentages)
District Romanian Hungarian Roma/Gypsy German Other P*
Alba 90.10 5.98 3.06 .78 .07 T
Arad 80.51 12.51 2.73 1.93 2.32 T
Arges 98.91 .06 .95 .03 .06
Bacáu 98.03 .63 1.11 .03 .20
Bihor 66.54 28.44 3.41 .25 1.36 T
Bistrita Násáud 90.43 6.45 2.76 .29 .07 T
Botosani 99.14 .03 .44 .02 .37
Brasov 85.98 9.38 2.43 1.56 .64 T
Bráila 98.06 .05 1.08 .02 .79
Buzáu 97.78 .03 2.15 .01 .02
Caras-Severin 86.56 2.09 2.07 3.17 6.11 T
Cálárasi 96.37 .04 3.40 .01 .18
Cluj 77.59 19.85 2.22 .19 .15 T
Constanta 91.66 .18 .62 .07 7.47
Covasna 23.40 75.24 1.13 .11 .12 T
Dâmbovita 97.69 .07 2.01 .02 .21
Dolj 97.48 .05 2.37 .04 .07
Galati 98.72 .07 .99 .03 .19
Giurgiu 96.48 .04 3.42 .01 .06
Gorj 98.75 .13 1.07 .02 .03
Harghita 14.05 84.72 1.10 .06 .07 T
Hunedoara 91.84 6.09 1.02 .66 .39 T
Ialomita 96.53 .03 3.22 .01 .20
Iasi 98.73 .06 .73 .03 .45
Maramures 81.10 10.17 1.24 .63 6.87 T
Mehedinti 97.50 .13 1.50 .12 .75
Mures 52.05 41.41 5.70 .75 .08 T
Neamt 99.06 .07 .67 .02 .17
Olt 98.87 .04 1.06 .01 .02
Prahova 98.64 .11 1.13 .05 .07
Satu Mare 58.52 35.03 2.45 3.58 .42 T
Sálaj 72.17 23.67 3.46 .05 .65 T
Sibiu 87.71 4.24 4.14 3.78 .13 T
Suceava 96.68 .06 .73 .34 2.19
Teleorman 97.78 .02 2.18 .01 .01
Timis 80.17 8.98 2.12 3.82 4.92 T
Tulcea 88.68 .04 .48 .05 10.75
Vaslui 99.37 .01 .56 .01 .05
Vâlcea 99.03 .10 .78 .05 .03
Vrancea 99.03 .04 .88 .01 .04
Bucuresti 97.53 .36 1.40 .19 .51
*Counties marked with a ‘T’ are in Transylvania.
248 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART II
1.2. Historical background
Without question, the diverse historical experiences of the various minority groups in
Romania must be taken into consideration when looking at the degree to which they have
been integrated into the domestic social and political systems. Rather than offering a
detailed analysis of the history of each minority group—a task that would be well beyond
the scope of this paper—a brief overview of the Romanian state-building process and its
impact on minority communities will be presented.
The first year of the modern Romanian state is generally considered to be 1859, the
year in which the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia (including Oltenia and Muntenia)
were united. In 1878 Romania was officially recognised as a sovereign principality (later
kingdom). Transylvania, which had previously been part of the Habsburg Empire, was
ceded to Romania after World War I. Bessarabia, formerly part of Russia, was also award-
ed to Romania after 1918, but was taken by the Soviet Union in 1940 and has, since 1991,
been a part of the Republic of Moldova.4
With the acquisition of the Transylvanian lands in 1918, Romania—up to that point
largely ethnically homogeneous—inherited a substantial minority population, comprised
Figure 1. The Historical Regions of Romania
Note: What is conventionally understood as Transylvania includes the provinces of Banat,
Crisana and Maramures.
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4 World Directory of Minorities (1997) London: Minority Rights Group, pp. 240-244.
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of Hungarians, Germans and others. Crucially, though self-government was promised for
the region’s minorities in 1918, no such concession was made. 
The regions incorporated in 1918 brought with them significantly different historical
and administrative traditions than those of the core regions of Moldavia and Wallachia.
In the western provinces, due to the influence of several centuries of Habsburg rule, the
development of a modern administration was far more advanced than in the rest of the
country. These different administrative and legislative histories continue to resonate today,
even after nine decades of Romanian governance. For example, land property registers
(cadastru funciar) were institutionalised in Transylvania at the beginning of the 20TH cen-
tury, but this type of administrative and juridical system was introduced in the rest of the
country only very recently.
When the western territories were incorporated into Romania, the rulers of the Old
Kingdom, ‘long acclimatised to using the administrative machine for paying for services ren-
dered, were not anxious to forgo the large opportunities for patronage and influence that the
new territories offered’.5 Thus, the relationship between the newly incorporated territories
and the Old Kingdom could be described as a form of internal colonisation, through which
the central administrative structure was used to exploit the newly integrated periphery.6
Table 5. Romania’s Population According to Mother Tongue
Mother Tongue
Minority Group Minority Group Language Romanian Other
Romanian 99.87 – 0.13
Hungarian 97.87 2.03 0.10
German 78.91 11.16 9.93
Roma 40.86 54.31 4.83
Ukrainian 91.97 7.11 0.92
Serbian 89.63 9.40 0.97
Lipovan 78.79 20.97 0.24
Jewish 9.46 72.09 18.45
Tatar 93.20 7.19 0.61
Slovak 91.46 6.18 2.36
Turk 90.63 9.08 0.29
Bulgarian 85.47 13 1.53
Czech 83.47 11.39 5.14
Greek 61.17 37.59 1.24
Polish 69.07 26.51 4.42
Armenian 44.86 49.72 5.42
Source: A. Radocea, idem., p. XLIV.
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5 R. J. Crampton (1994) Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge, p. 108.
6 On the concept of ‘internal colonialism’, see: M. Hetcher ([ ]) Internal Colonialism: The Celtic
Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966, London: Routledge.
Historically, the Old Kingdom’s administrators did little to protect the cultural diver-
sity of their subjects. Before 1918, only 8% of the total population of Romania belonged
to ethnic minority groups (the two main groups being the Jews and the Roma), and their
treatment was poor in comparison with Romanian citizens. For instance, the state refused
to grant citizenship to Jews living in Romania. Given this legacy of insensitivity to minor-
ity issues, the political and administrative elite faced a significant challenge in 1918. With
the acquisition of the Transylvanian lands, ethnic minorities—largely Hungarians and
Germans—constituted 30% of the Romanian population. 
Although self-government was promised for the region’s minorities in 1918, no such
concession was made. Instead, the Romanian government opted for overly assertive edu-
cational and cultural policies that generated discontent among the minorities.7 Rather
than integrating minority communities through efficient judicial and administrative
processes, the central government pursued assimilationist policies and made extensive
use of nationalist rhetoric that emphasised the spiritual unity of all Romanians.8
This assimilationist legacy continued, despite a brief period of limited accommodation,
during the communist period. Beginning in 1945, relations between the Hungarian minor-
ity and the majority actually improved. Hungarians were allowed to maintain an extensive
network of Hungarian-language schools, including a Hungarian university. Furthermore, a
measure of formal administrative autonomy was granted to Hungarians in regions in which
they represented a majority of the population. Smaller minorities were also granted a lim-
ited degree of cultural autonomy. The German minority, however, was treated severely, for
Germans were blamed for Romanian collaboration with the Nazis during World War II.
Large number of Germans were forced to emigrate, many deported to labour camps in the
Soviet Union. The third group in our typology, the Roma, remained politically and social-
ly marginalised and economically disadvantaged throughout the communist period. 
Beginning in the 1970s, conditions worsened for all minority groups as Ceausescu
increasingly began to rely on the use of pugilistic, nationalistic rhetoric in order to bol-
ster his declining legitimacy.9 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Ceausescu regime
gradually deprived Hungarians of the limited degree of autonomy they had been grant-
ed in the previous few decades, dramatically reducing the amount of Hungarian-lan-
guage education available and closing the Hungarian university in Cluj. Education in
other minority languages was also curtailed. Ethnic Romanians were promoted to key
political and bureaucratic positions at the expense of minorities, and the issue of minor-
ity rights was raised only to serve as evidence of ‘secessionist plots’ and promote xeno-
phobia among the majority. 
The collapse of communism in December 1989 has provided new opportunities for
the management of inter-ethnic relations and the reform of public administration. Many
significant challenges remain, however, and policy-makers and administrators at both the
central and local levels of government must confront the difficult burden of recent histo-
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7 I. Livezeanu (1995) Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic
Struggle, 1918–1930, Ithica: Cornell University Press.
8 See C. Durandin (1995) Historire des Roumains, Librarie Artheme Fayard.
9 K. Verdery (1991) National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s
Romania, Berkeley: University of California Press.
ry. Romanian politicians and policy-makers have inherited an unenviable combination of
elements: dissatisfied minorities, no real tradition of protecting cultural diversity and
accommodating minority demands, and a surfeit of nationalistic ideology and rhetoric at
all levels of public discourse. What is beyond doubt is that established patterns of gover-
nance and long-standing attitudes about cultural and ethnic diversity must change if con-
ditions for Romania’s minority communities are to improve in any meaningful way.
1.3. Political mobilisation of minority groups 
As we have seen, Romania’s ethno-cultural map is too complex to view all minority groups
as part of a single category. In terms of political mobilisation, clear differences can be
observed between the three types we have identified:10
· The Hungarian minority is currently attempting to its renegotiate its political status
with the Romanian State. The major political goal of the Hungarian minority com-
munity, expressed repeatedly in the public sphere since 1989, is the achievement
of greater cultural and political autonomy. The Hungarian minority also desires to
be considered a ‘co-nation’ along with the Romanian nation. In other words, the
Hungarian minority desires to be considered an equal but distinct and autonomous
constituent of the Romanian political community. Hungarians hope to acquire ‘offi-
cial’ status for the Hungarian language, and to establish a coherent political and
institutional framework that will guarantee greater administrative autonomy and
more favourable cultural and educational policies for the their community. Finally,
and most radically, they hope to gain some form of territorial autonomy for the
regions in which large communities of Hungarians are concentrated.
· The ‘smaller’ minority communities (comprised of fewer than 100,000 people) face unique
problems in attempting to preserve their cultural identities largely because of their size.
They are integrated into the political system through specific mechanisms of repre-
sentation (see the section below on the political participation of minorities). In clear
contrast to the Hungarian minority, their needs and demands can, in general, be sat-
isfied within the political and administrative systems currently in place in Romania.
They have not demanded official language status or a separate university. When
expressed, their grievances do not usually generate major political and public debates.
· The Roma minority, residing throughout Romania, is socially and culturally margin-
alised, faces discrimination and, occasionally, violent aggression from the local major-
ity communities. Having only a very limited stratum of political and intellectual elites,
the Roma minority is characterised by a strikingly low level of political mobilisation.
Crucially, their concerns are not articulated to a sufficient degree in the political sphere.
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10 For a different typology, see: Ted Gurr (1993) Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical
Conflicts, United States Institute of Peace Research. This can be found through the Minorities at
Risk Project Web site at: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/trgpvs.html.
The Hungarian and Roma minorities clearly present the greatest challenges in politi-
cal terms to the Romanian state. The fundamental political objectives expressed by the
Hungarian minority conflict with the underlying ideologies in the Romanian political
ethos and the vision of the ‘unitary state’ upheld by the Romanian political and adminis-
trative elite. With respect to the Roma, the state lacks the necessary know-how, institu-
tional and material resources to lessen tensions between the Roma and other citizens at
the local level. The Roma remain socially and politically marginalised and their integra-
tion into mainstream Romanian society will be a difficult task. 
2. The Legal Framework for the Protection of National Minorities
Several key legal documents comprise the nascent legal framework for minority protection
in Romania. This section will analyse this framework on two different levels: the domes-
tic and the international. As regards the former, we will analyse two dimensions: (1) con-
stitutional provisions referring to the status and protection of minority groups, and (2) the
discourse surrounding the proposed draft Law on Minorities.11 At the international level,
we will look principally at European legislation on human and minority rights. 
2.1. Constitutional provisions
The Romanian Constitution,12 adopted in 1991, is both generous and limiting in its pro-
visions on minority protection and has contributed to a great deal of confusion in public
and political discourse on minority issues. It should be noted at the outset that the framers
of the Constitution made the explicit decision to consider minority rights on an individual and
not on a community basis. The treatment of individuals rather than groups as the subject
of minority rights legislation has been fairly consistent over the past decade, much to the
chagrin of the Hungarian minority.
A number of constitutional contradictions have hindered the political process of estab-
lishing and implementing the legal framework necessary to ensure consistent and reli-
able protection of national minorities.13 For example, according to the Constitution,
minorities are granted the right to ‘preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cultural,
linguistic, and religious identities’ (Article 6.1).14 In marked contrast to this provision,
however, the Constitution clearly defines Romania as an indivisible, unitary state with
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only one official language—Romanian. 
The Constitution declares that Romania is a ‘nation-state’, implying that the relationship
between individuals and the state is based first and foremost on ethnic and cultural crite-
ria. This ethno-cultural definition of citizenship is apparent in a number of the Constitution’s
articles, particularly those which address the fundamental rights and freedoms of Romanian
citizens and describe the nature of the Romanian state. However, in contradiction to this
unitary definition of the state and exclusive concept of citizenship, the Constitution stipu-
lates that all citizens of Romania are to be treated equally, ‘regardless of their nationality’.15
The Constitution contains a number of important provisions that, directly or indi-
rectly, affect the situation of national minorities. These provisions and their impact upon
minority groups are described in the table below.
Table 6. Romanian Constitutional Provisions Relevant to Minorities
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Constitutional Provisions (Articles)
Romanian state defined as a unitary national state (1.1.).
Explicit provision of equality of citizens, and non-discrimina-
tion on the basis of nationality. (4.2.and 16.1).
Recognizes and provides the right to preserve, express and
develop specific national identities (6.1.) of citizens, but the
measures of protection are limited, stating that the measures to
promote this identity could not discriminate against the majori-
ty (6.2 and 16.1).
The only language having official status is Romanian (13) No
explicit provisions regarding the status of minority languages. 
Minorities have the right to acquire their mother tongue
through public instruction and the right to be instructed in their
mother tongue(32.3)
Special facilities are accorded to the representative organisations
of minorities failing to obtain the necessary votes to appoint a
representative to the parliament (59.2.)
Only conducted in Romanian (127.1). Upon request, translators
are provided for those who do not speak Romanian (127.2.).
The notion of collective rights is not accepted. The terminology
used with respect to minority rights is rights of "persons belong-
ing to national minorities" (see, for example, Article 6.)
International legislation on human rights, signed and ratified by
the Romanian Parliament take priority over the internal legisla-
tion if the former and the latter conflict (20.)
Explicit provision stipulating that articles concerning the
national and unitary character of the state, and those regarding
the official language may not be changed (148)
Relevant Themes
Fundamental character of
state/ political community
Constitutional status of
national minorities
Right to national/ethno-cul-
tural identity
Linguistic status of 
minority languages
Use of minority 
languages in education
Political representation of
minorities
Legal procedures
Individual/collective rights
Status of international 
legislation
Limitations regarding possi-
ble amendments to the
Constitution
By including both the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of ethnicity, nation-
al affiliation or language and a unitary, monolingual definition of the Romanian state, the
Constitution is highly ambiguous as to the precise nature of the legal relationship between
citizenship, ethno-cultural identity and the state. Contrary to the spirit of multi-cultural-
ism that underlies several constitutional provisions, the use of the term nation-state evokes
an image of the state as the expression of a historically constituted human community,
bounded together by common ethnic origin, language, culture and religion.16 This sends
an important symbolic message to Romania’s minority population and raises crucial ques-
tions about the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of Romanian citizenship so defined. National
identity is thus presented as an ethno-cultural given rather than a civic construct. The
‘nation’ is rooted in ethnic and cultural ties, and not in the ‘every day praxis of citizens
who actively exercise their civil rights’.17
In addition to their symbolic dimensions, the aforementioned constitutional provi-
sions have worked to hinder the overall political process of negotiations between ethnic
minorities and the majority. For example, in a heated debate on education legislation in
1998 the ‘nation-state’ concept was evoked in political rhetoric in order to disallow the
use of minority languages in Romanian history classes.
2.2. Draft laws on minorities
At the moment there does not exist a single corpus of law regulating the rights of minori-
ties in Romania that includes provisions on political participation, language use, educa-
tion and other relevant issue-areas. Although most of these issues are addressed to some
degree in other legislation, the creation of a separate law on minorities could serve as an
important political precedent and confidence-building measure between minorities and
the majority. 
In the immediate aftermath of Ceausescu’s overthrow and execution in December 1989,
the provisional government of the National Salvation Front (NSF)18 promised to draft a
law on national minorities. Soon after this promise, however, the NSF began to make
extensive use of nationalist rhetoric in order to bolster its political support base (in light
of its waning legitimacy in the months following the December Revolution).19
Under these circumstances, and under the continuing leadership of ex-communist
official Ion Iliescu, no law on minorities was seriously debated. Moreover, progress on
minority issues was stifled by the Iliescu government’s continuous use of reactive nation-
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alism, particularly when dealing with the increasing demands of the Hungarian minori-
ty for cultural and administrative autonomy. Thus, instead of negotiating with the minor-
ity groups (especially the Hungarians), discussing the sources of their expressed dissatis-
faction over a range of issues and looking for workable solutions, the government adopted
a highly defensive line, accusing minority groups of disloyalty, and secessionist or irre-
dentist motives.
Following the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections, and particularly begin-
ning in 1993, the integration of Romania into Euro-Atlantic institutions was declared as
a foreign-policy priority for Iliescu and his party (now the Party of Social Democracy in
Romania—PSDR), and the central government began to pay more attention to minority
rights issues.20 As a result of this shift in policy, the Iliescu government’s response to
minority group demands and proposals became somewhat more sensitive. A new insti-
tution for the representation of minorities was created—the Council of National Minorities
(CNM)—and a commitment to adhere to European standards of minority protection was
expressed.
In light of the seemingly more favourable climate for negotiations on minority issues,
two key minority organisations—the German Democratic Forum (GDF) and the
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR)—and several NGOs focusing on
human rights issues produced drafts for a Law on National Minorities. Although seven
draft laws were ultimately produced, not a single draft has been debated in Parliament.
This neglect of minority issues has sent a powerful message to minority groups that their
persistent efforts have been in vain, and has prompted many members of minority groups
to accuse the central government’s expressed interest in minority issues as mere ‘window
dressing’ for external (i.e. European and American) observation.
Although some problems raised by minorities have been addressed by other laws,
which we will discuss in our analysis of the institutional framework for minority protec-
tion and minority-language use in education, a number of formidable legal challenges
remain to be tackled. For example, the official legal status of minorities has yet to be clear-
ly defined, and a clear procedure has not been established through which an ethno-cul-
tural group can establish itself as a ‘national minority’, and thus benefit from a different
set of legal and institutional mechanisms. 
But perhaps the most pressing issue in need of a proper legal and regulatory frame-
work is the continued social exclusion of and widespread discrimination in numerous
areas against the Roma population. Although a draft law on the prohibition and elimina-
tion of all forms of discrimination has been debated in public, it is still waiting to be
included in the agenda of the Parliament. Clearly, serious legal measures will be neces-
sary to combat the pervasive discrimination against the Roma and to facilitate their inte-
gration into Romanian society.
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2.3. International legislation
As discussed in the previous section, international legislation on Human Rights adopted
by Romania (signed and ratified), in theory, takes priority over domestic legislation where
the two conflict. In practice, however, the Romanian political elite has been reluctant to
accept international recommendations on minority rights issues.
Table 7. International Documents (Multi-lateral and Bilateral Treaties) Signed by Romania
Document Note
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
Declaration of 18 December 1992, of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities
The Copenhagen Document of the CSCE Conference on the Human 
Dimension
The Recommendation 1201/11993 of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages signed/not ratified
The European Charter of Local Self-Government signed/not ratified
Treaty between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany on 
Friendly Co-operation and Partnership in Europe
Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourhood and Co-operation between 
Romania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1996)
Treaty on Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourhood 
between Romania and the Republic of Hungary (1996)
Treaty on Good Neighbourhood and Co-operation between Romania 
and Ukraine (1997)
The debate that surrounded the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Recommendation
1201 (1993) is illustrative. Although all political parties represented in Parliament con-
sented to ratify the Recommendation in 1993, and thereby incorporate its provisions into
domestic legislation, no action was taken in this direction until 1996. Two of the
Recommendation’s articles in particular—Articles 11 and 12—began to raise difficulties
for Romanian politicians as they entered into negotiations on a bilateral treaty with
Hungary. These two provisions, concerning the delegation of administrative autonomy
and special political status to ethnic minorities and the granting of collective rights to
minority groups, were viewed by a number of parties in Parliament as stepping-stones on
the path to the territorial dissolution of Romania. Although Recommendation 1201 was
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ultimately signed, it was only accepted with the reservation that the document should not
be interpreted in such a way that minorities can be granted territorial autonomy.
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) was
signed and adopted by Romania in 1995 but this initiative was largely motivated by a
desire to take advantage of those provisions of the Framework Convention which offered
a lower degree of minority protection than the Romanian Constitution.21 Two other
European documents have not yet been ratified by Romania: the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages and the European Charter of Local Self Government.
3. The Institutional Framework for Minority Protection
At the level of government institutions, we will look closely at two dimensions of minor-
ity protection: (1) minority representation in the legislature, and (2) the means by which
minority groups are able to influence decision-making in the executive. It is important to
note at the outset, however, that the effectiveness of either of these institutional mecha-
nisms is highly dependent upon the political configuration of the ruling coalition at any
given time.
3.1. Representation in the legislature
The Constitution guarantees political representation for minorities in the legislature through
Article 59.2, which stipulates that, regardless of the number of votes they obtain, minor-
ity organisations have the right to one deputy seat each. This provision is qualified by the
Electoral Law for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate—Law No. 68/1992—which
states (Article 4) that minority citizens must obtain at least 5% of the average number of
votes at the national level in order to enter the Chamber of Deputies.22 According to this
provision, those officially recognised minority organisations23 are registered as ‘associa-
tions’ rather than political parties and can participate in general and local elections. In
general elections, those minority organisations which obtain the highest number of votes
(but just one for each minority) benefit from the aforementioned constitutional provision.
This provision applies only to the lower house (Chamber of Deputies) of Parliament. There
is no equivalent provision for the Senate.24 The requirement that only one organisation
can represent a given minority in Parliament creates a highly undesirable ‘winner takes
all’ dynamic and inhibits co-operation by the various organisations that claim to speak
for a given minority group. In the case of the Roma, for example, a number of different
organisations and personalities, often with contrasting policy proposals and ideological
258 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART II
21 Weber, p. 205-206.
22 Article 4, Law No. 68/1992.
23 These organisations have the status of nongovernmental organisations. 
24 In real terms, this means a relatively small number of votes. In the 1992 general elections, the
Bulgarian Union from Banat-Romania managed to obtain parliamentary representation with
1,906 votes (0.02% of the total vote).
standpoints, claim to represent the Roma community. The fact that only one Roma organ-
isation can have access to political power is exclusionary and can be politically counter-
productive. 
Since the general elections in 1996, 13 deputies in total have represented the smaller
minorities (one for each registered smaller minority group) in the Lower House of
Parliament. None of these deputies received enough votes to be directly elected, but were
allocated seats according to Article 59.2. These deputies account for 4.3% of the total par-
liamentary vote. No non-Hungarian minorities are represented in the Senate. The
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, supported by the overwhelming major-
ity of ethnic Hungarians, hold 25 seats in the lower house and eleven in the Senate, all of
which were directly elected.
3.2. The Council of National Minorities
In the spring of 1993, against the backdrop of Romania’s application for membership in
the Council of Europe, the central government announced its decision to establish a ‘con-
sultative body’ on minority issues. This body—the Council of National Minorities (CNM)—
was intended to facilitate consultations between minority representatives and both local
and central government, and enable minority groups to offer recommendations to the
government on issues of direct concern to them. Among the Council’s other prerogatives
was the administration of financial support to minority organisations and the initiation
of draft legislation on minority issues.25
The Council operates on the basis of equality among minorities. Thus, regardless of the
size of a given minority, a similar number of representatives from each of the minorities’
organisations is appointed. This procedure clearly reflects the mentality of the PSDR-led rul-
ing coalition in 1993, which stressed that minority issues should be approached from a
human rights perspective (i.e. on an individual rather than a group basis). From this per-
spective, it was argued that political or administrative measures that benefited one minori-
ty group in particular were not justified. This rhetoric, though, only thinly masked the pri-
mary goal of the pre-1996 ruling coalition: to use the presence of the smaller minorities on
the Council as a counter-balance against the political agenda of the Hungarian minority.26
The pursuit of this strategy by the PSDR was made possible by the extensive control
exercised by the ruling coalition over the various smaller minority organisations. This
control was based primarily on the lack of clear-cut regulations on the allocation of bud-
getary resources for these minority organisations. In practice, therefore, the allotment of
funds to minority groups was highly politicised and rarely impartial.27
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The Council’s lack of political independence and authority soon became clear to the
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians, which quickly withdrew from the body in September
1993, only six months after it had joined. Soon after, the Council’s Roma representative
decided to withdraw from the organisation when the central government failed to act
decisively following a serious of violent attacks against a Roma settlement in Transylvania.
The ruling coalition’s thinly veiled attempts to manipulate the Council and the withdrawal
of the representatives of the two largest minority groups greatly undermined the institu-
tion’s credibility and effectiveness.
Following the change in government in 1996, the Council was renamed the Council
for National Minorities, and three major changes were instituted that directly affected its
modus operandi. 
First and foremost, the new government established the Department for the Protection
of National Minorities (DPNM) that operated within normal government channels (i.e.
the DPNM is not simply a ‘consultative body’ but a functioning government department
headed by a Minister for National Minorities). Since its establishment, the DPNM has pro-
moted recommendations made by the Council, thereby giving the body more opportu-
nities to shape government minority policies. 
Another government initiative which served to empower the Council was the estab-
lishment of a special Inter-Ministerial Committee on National Minorities, whereby rep-
resentatives of different government ministries can participate in Council meetings.28
A third important institutional change relates to resource allocation. The Council
receives annual funding from the central government, and the Council’s members decide
how these funds should be allocated. As of 1996, no government minister is allowed to
intervene in this process where content is concerned. The only supervisory role given to
the Minister of the DPNM is to ensure that no Council decisions on financial matters con-
travene Romanian law. While this shift in procedure may appear subtle, its implications
are important. As a result of this change, the financial means of political control exercised
by the ruling coalition before 1996 have been eliminated. 
3.3. The Department for the Protection of National Minorities
As mentioned above, the Department for Protection of National Minorities (DPNM) was estab-
lished in 1996 with the mandate of facilitating co-operation between the Council of National
Minorities and various government agencies. The Department also plays a significant role in
the implementation of relevant legislation and programs in the field of minority protection.
Five DPNM territorial offices (located in Arad, Cluj-Napoca, Constanta, Suceava and Turnu
Severin) have the power to monitor local authorities regarding the uniform implementation
of legal provisions on the protection of national minorities.29 This deconcentration was aimed
at increasing the Department’s impact at the local level, and to facilitate communication
between regional minority organisations and both local and central authorities.
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Although the DPNM is an officially recognised department, it does not enjoy the same
status as most departments in the Romanian government, as it is subordinated under the
Office of the Prime Minister. Despite this never happening in practice, the prime minis-
ter therefore has the authority to intervene and block decisions reached by the DPNM,
and the capacity to seriously hamper its effectiveness as an institution. Additionally, this
institutional arrangement means that the Department has no financial autonomy.
Nonetheless, the Department has its own minister and is, therefore, represented in the
Cabinet. Through this representation, the DPNM is involved in the executive policy-mak-
ing process and can exert a great deal of influence on issues relating to minority interests
and the protection of minority rights. Indeed, since its inception, the DPNM has become
one the most influential actors in shaping policy on minority issues.
In 1997 the Department created a separate National Office for Roma in order to
develop better communication with Roma organisations and other governmental agen-
cies whose mandates directly or indirectly affect the social integration of the Roma
minority. The Office’s mandate is to handle all issues related to the situation of the
Roma. It maintains contacts with all organisations dealing with Roma issues, prepares
and co-ordinates central government strategy toward Roma issues, and co-ordinates
inter-ministerial Roma subcommittees. The Office does not have a separate budget,
but is financed by the DPNM.30 Although the body is extremely small (only two full-
time employees), its establishment reflects a positive policy-approach in that it is a
specialised body designed to deal with the particular problems of a unique minority
group.
3.4. Specific issues
In accepting a lower threshold of votes for the minority organisations in parliamentary
elections, a form of positive discrimination on behalf of minority groups has been pro-
moted through which the smaller minority communities can promote their specific inter-
ests in the legislature. While this provision is undoubtedly to the advantage of the small-
er minority groups, it presents several problems in terms of their representation, as it
encourages competition rather than co-operation between the various groups that claim
to represent different minority communities.
Because in general elections only one organisation can represent a given minority, a
‘zero-sum’ or ‘winner takes all’ situation has arisen, excluding potential minority actors
and organisations. This is particularly damaging in the case of the Roma community, for
which a number of organisations, often with highly different policy programs and objec-
tives, claim to represent the Roma population in Romania. By recognising only one organ-
isation as the ‘legitimate’ representative of the Roma, many issues of concern to this minor-
ity may be overlooked. Further, although any minority organisation is entitled to funding
from the Council of National Minorities, only officially recognised minority ‘associations’
can make decisions regarding the allocation of funds for minority organisations.
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This system of minority representation is based on the false presumption that minority
groups are unitary political actors. This assumption must be abandoned and the system
should be reformed to allow for more participation of various minority organisations. (A
number of policy recommendations will be discussed at the end of this paper that address
the issue of political representation for minorities.)
Another fundamental problem related to the institutional framework of minority pro-
tection is its centralised character, which directly contributes to the lack of local empow-
erment of minority groups. In particular, when minority communities are very small, they
are not in a position to participate in the political processes and decisions that often direct-
ly affect them (for example, decisions on the maintenance of cultural and educational
institutions). The process of administrative decentralisation is crucial in this respect. As
more powers are ceded from central to local authorities, minority interests are likely to
be better represented and minority groups are less likely to be left out of political deci-
sion-making on issues that concern them. It should be noted, however, that decentrali-
sation on its own is not necessarily sufficient to guarantee greater participation for small-
er minority groups at the local government level. Larger minority groups now living in
compact settlements will benefit more from decentralisation than small or dispersed
groups. Thus, in addition to decentralisation, complementary forms of political partici-
pation, such as consultative bodies, could alleviate this problem.
In as much as the regional offices of the Department for the Protection of National
Minorities reflect a systematic attempt by the Department to increase contact between
representatives of minority organisations and local authorities, it is progress towards the
institutionalisation of minority protection. 
4. Local Public Administration in Romania 
The process of restructuring Romania’s public administration system was initiated imme-
diately following the December 1989 Revolution. The Adoption in 1991 of Law No.
69/1991 on local public administration, Law No. 70/1991 concerning local elections, and
Articles 119-120 of the new Romanian Constitution established the necessary framework
within which serious administrative reform could begin. These laws and constitutional
provisions made possible a degree of power devolution from the central to the local admin-
istrative level. On paper, at least, a considerable degree of local administrative autonomy
has been sanctioned. At present, a number of public services are administered locally,
including: social services, heating, water, electricity and the maintenance of public build-
ings. In addition, some taxes are collected at the local level. In general, however, public
administration in Romania remains very centralised. The central administration still con-
trols the police, personnel from the Ministry of Education, agricultural directorates, forestry
staff and even cultural policy and subsequent posts.
Broadly speaking, in Romania, the central public administration develops activities of
national interest throughout the country to be carried out by the executive, the ministries,
those central authorities subordinated to the executive and the ministries, and deconcen-
trated territorial bodies. Local public administration develops activities of local importance
within local administrative-territorial units. Local administration is comprised of a two-
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tiered system: the local level and the county level. The local authorities are the local coun-
cil, the county council and the mayor. Central and local administrative authorities co-oper-
ate and maintain communication through government representatives called prefects.
Appointed by the cabinet, prefects are government representatives present in each coun-
ty who supervise the public services of ministries and other deconcentrated administrative
functions (police, agriculture, health, education, environment and social protection).31
Another key mandate of the prefect is to ensure that all decisions made in the local admin-
istrative bodies are in accordance with Romanian law. During the period between 1992
and 1996, instead of acting as public functionaries with clearly delimited competencies (as
defined by the Constitution), prefects tended to promote the political agendas of the par-
ties that backed their appointment. In practice, prefects spent much of their time com-
peting with local political actors for effective authority over a range of activities.32
Prior to 1996, the law on public administration seriously limited the effective exercise
of local autonomy. Since 1996, the process of revising and expanding Law No. 69/1991
on local administration and the relevant system of public finances has been underway,
but the results have been highly ambiguous. Emergency Act 22/1997 introduced several
key changes in minority-language use in public administration. This Act and its relevance
for minority communities will be discussed in the following section. Regarding public
finance reform, a new Law on Local Public Finances was adopted in November 1998 and
became effective in January 1999.33 Two positive steps in the direction of fiscal decen-
tralisation were initiated through this new law:
· A certain percentage of personal income tax is now allocated to local and county-
level administrative bodies, representing a new source of local revenue.34
· Local administrative bodies now can exercise full autonomy in the management of
local public funds, including tax collecting (in 1999 local governments established
their own tax revenue offices).
Another important dimension of public administration reform relates to the presence
of minorities in public administration—a sensitive issue in Romania due to the ethnical-
ly selective personnel recruitment policies carried out during the communist period. The
communist regime did not simply use nationalistic rhetoric for self-legitimisation,35 but
also promoted a policy of ethnically preferential recruitment, unequally distributing admin-
istrative positions to ethnic Romanians even in regions where Hungarians represented a
majority of the population. According to the 1992 census, ethnic Hungarians comprise
only 3.73% of people working in the fields of public administration and social security—
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a figure well below their percentage of the total Romanian population (7.1%).36 This serves
as a clear example of the underrepresentation of minorities in public administration.
Problems arise when minority groups account for a very small percentage of the local pop-
ulation. In those cases, minorities often fail to obtain adequate political representation,
and no special institutionalised mechanisms exist through which their particular inter-
ests can be promoted. 
The situation is particularly difficult for the Roma community, in spite of its large num-
bers. This group, often representing a substantial percentage of the population in differ-
ent localities, typically enjoys no representation in the local or county councils. Thus, far
from being able to promote their specific interests, they are not even in a position to put
their issues on the local political agenda.
Two attempts to place the Roma problem on the agenda of the local administration
and in the public eye should be mentioned:
1. In Odorheiu Secuiesc, two foundations (CIVITAS from Romania and ‘Fekete doboz’
from Hungary) initiated, in co-operation with the local cable company. a training
program for the Roma with the intention of promoting TV journalists originating
from the local Roma community. The goal is to place the special problems of this
community in the public eye, and to highlight the projects and solutions proposed
by local policy-makers.
2. The Roma Office of the Department for the Protection of National Minorities admin-
istrates a fund intended to help those local administrations willing to make invest-
ments to help improve the social conditions of the Roma communities. This finan-
cial incentive has prompted many local administrations to redesign their investments
in order to serve the interests of Roma inhabitants.
These efforts, though symbolically important, only scratch the surface of the problem
of Roma exclusion from mainstream social and political life. In summary, it can be argued
that, following the fall of the Ceausescu regime in December 1989, minority communi-
ties in Romania viewed the possibility of redesigning Romania’s system of local adminis-
tration as providing an opportunity for minorities to improve their political standing and
to renegotiate power-sharing at the local level. This has not happened to the degree that
minority groups anticipated a decade ago. Undoubtedly, minority and majority percep-
tions have differed and continue to differ as to what exactly ‘minority representation’ or
‘minority presence’ in public administration entails.
4.1. Minority language use in local administration
As seen in the introductory chapters to this volume, minority groups consider language
to be one of the most important aspects of their culture: the general tendency of the var-
ious minority communities is to maintain their specific languages. The existence of an
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‘official language’ and minority language use in public administration have long been, and
continue to be, two of the most controversial topics related to minority protection. In
more general terms, designating a particular language as ‘official’ has always had a major
social and political impact when a number of cultures co-exist within a single state, region
or local community. Whenever the state promotes a given language as the means of offi-
cial communication they undermine the actual and symbolic importance and legitimacy
of other languages used.37 Without question, the various language policies that have been
pursued in the past decade in Romania have served nationalistic purposes. Against this
cultural backdrop, government policies on language-use have resulted in intense public
and political debates in the past decade.
The concept of minority language use in public administration was rejected outright
in Law No. 69/1991 on Local Public Administration. This law was adopted when the
National Salvation Front (Ion Iliescu’s original post-1989 party) held a 75% majority in
Parliament. The law did not facilitate the use of minority languages in public adminstra-
tion through the employment of bilingual or multi-lingual public administration func-
tionaries. In addition, written communication in native languages was only possible if an
offical Romanian translation was attached. This thus entailed the use of Romanian even
in localities where the vast majority—or even the entire population—belonged to a minor-
ity community.38
A relevant example of a problematic aspect of the 1991 Law as far as minorities are
concerned is that, although it allows minorities to submit documents to local authorities
in their mother tongue, the law requires that they attach official Romanian translations of
the documents.39 According to the Law, translation fees had to be paid by those individ-
uals submitting the documents. In the case of verbal communication, if an administrator
did not speak the given minority language, a translator was required, also at the minori-
ty citizen’s expense. Thus, the imposition on minorities of the financial burden of obtain-
ing ‘official translations’ offers a clear example of preventing equal access for minorities
to services provided by public authorities.
In spite of the demands of minority parties for a more precise and extensive law on
minority-language use, and the pressure exerted by different international institutions,40
no real progress was made until 1997, when the 1991 Law on Local Public Administration
was modified by emergency decree.41 Emergency Act No. 22/1997 provided solutions to
four issues concerning the use of minority languages in local administration. The Act was
applied to those territorial-administrative units in which at least 20% of the population
belonged to a minority community. The Act provides for:
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38 Zsuzsa Bereschi, interview, October 2000 
39 Law No. 69/1991, Art. 54
40 See the recommendations made by the High Commissioner on National Minorities on 9
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· Bilingual notices (signs and inscriptions);
· Use of minority languages in communications with local authorities, both written
and oral;42
· Publication in minority languages of information of general interest by local author-
ities;
· Use of minority languages during local or district council meetings if at least one-
third of the members of the council belong to a minority group (Romanian trans-
lation must be provided).
The debate over this Emergency Act has been stormy. The Senate did not approve its
adoption with the necessary majority, and the Constitutional Court declared the entire
Act unconstitutional. To make matters more complicated, Romanian jurisprudence is
deeply divided as to whether the Act is now effective, or whether the original 1991 law
remains effective. The Constantinescu government (elected in 1996) has since elaborat-
ed a Draft Law on the General Provisions of Local Autonomy and the Organisation and
Functioning of Local Public Administration, that contains the four above measures. The
Draft Law was adopted by the Senate in May 1999 and approved by the Commission of
Local Public Administration in the Chamber of Deputies in March 2000, but it has still
not made it through Parliament as a whole. It remains unlikely that the law will be adopt-
ed before the 2000 general elections. 
5. Minority-language Education
Minority-language education in public schools in Romania is another important compo-
nent of public administration and of multi-ethnic community management. The debate
over Hungarian-language public education in particular has been highly charged over the
past decade. The question of whether the government should allow for the establishment
of separate Hungarian-language public schools and universities remains unresolved and
politically loaded. The creation of a separate Hungarian public university remains close-
ly tied to Hungarian demands for greater ‘cultural autonomy’—i.e. greater decision-mak-
ing and administrative power on issues related to the preservation and promotion of
minority cultures. 
In response to increased minority demands in the realm of public education after 1989,
a significant part of the Romanian political elite quickly began to question the institution-
al separation of schools based on the language of instruction, and the extent to which moth-
er-tongue education for minorities was necessary. In 1990 the Romanian government ini-
tiated a far-reaching process of minority public educational reform. Minority groups,
particularly Hungarians, immediately began to call for the separation of higher education
institutions based on the language of instruction, and, in the case of the Hungarians, the
re-establishment of a separate Hungarian-language public university. As a result of this
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pressure, a number of schools previously merged with Romanian ones were re-established
as separate institutions with Hungarian as the language of instruction.
Beginning in 1990, a number of public universities that had previously offered
Hungarian-language instruction began to re-establish Hungarian faculties and programmes.
However, in the absence of clear legal and institutional norms regarding the administra-
tive organisation of Hungarian-language education within these universities, the atmos-
phere in these faculties became highly politicised. Furthermore, minority groups argued
that a more clear and uniform legislative framework was necessary in order to protect
minority rights to education in their mother tongues. In 1994 the DAHR initiated a Draft
Law on Native Language Education of Minorities. The Draft Law guaranteed minorities the
freedom to organise autonomous, public educational institutions at all levels. Although the
Romanian Constitutional Court ruled that the DAHR’s legislative initiative was constitu-
tional, it was never debated in Parliament. This neglect sent a clear message to the Hungarian
community that efforts to promote their interests through legal and democratic means
would simply be ignored. This lack of consideration prompted widespread Hungarian
demonstrations and civil disobedience campaigns. This ultimate result of this publicly
expressed outrage was the passage of a new Law on Education in 1995.43
The 1995 Law allowed for the establishment of separate minority-language educational
units through the secondary level. With respect to university-level public education, how-
ever, no form of institutional autonomy (not even at the level of departments and facul-
ties) was permitted. Another limiting provision of the new Law was the stipulation that,
beginning at the secondary level, both Romanian history and Romanian geography must
be taught only in Romanian. Further, and most controversially, the new Law required
that all university entrance examinations be issued and taken in Romanian, regardless of
the native language of the students seeking admission. The limitations of this can be exam-
ined on two basic levels:
· The maintenance of ‘double-standards’ between the organisation of Romanian and
minority-language education; 
· The limited extent to which the teaching of minority languages is permitted at all
levels of education.
These explicit limitations of the Law produced intense opposition by the Hungarian
community and, in combination with external pressure (from the European Union and
other European institutions to which Romania had begun to apply for membership), the
government suspended the entrance exam provision. 
One of the first initiatives of the newly elected government in 1996, due to significant
pressure by the DAHR,44 was to amend the 1995 Law. Several provisions considered unac-
ceptable by minority groups were altered or eliminated and the Law was adopted. According
to the amended Law (effective in 1999), education in the Romanian language must be
organised according to regional needs and demands. University entrance exams can now
be held in the language in which students obtained their secondary degrees. Most impor-
ROMANIA 267
43 Law No. 84/1995.
44 In 1996 the DAHR became part of the ruling coalition—an unprecedented political event in
Romania.
tantly for the Hungarian community in particular, Article 123 of the law specified that sepa-
rate private minority-language universities could be established. Although the Law did not pro-
hibit the establishment of public minority-language universities, it stipulated that ‘com-
plementary legislation’ was needed to address the issue. This ambiguous wording angered
many Hungarians, who argued that Hungarian (or other minority) universities should be
established and maintained by public funds like any other university in Romania.45 This
claim has been rejected outright by majority politicians and public opinion.
The only alternative solution that arose out of the heated political debates on the issue
has been a proposal, made in 1998, to establish ‘multi-cultural universities’, though no
political consensus was reached on a definition of the term ‘multi-cultural’. 46 Mainstream
Romanian opinion considers the status quo (i.e. tolerance of Hungarian-language instruc-
tion within Romanian university structures) to be multi-cultural, whereas the Hungarians
viewed a multi-cultural solution as implying greater institutional separation within mixed
universities.47 No mutually acceptable solution to this disagreement has yet been found.
While the Hungarian minority remains dissatisfied with the current situation, the small-
er minorities have made less noise about educational issues and have not demanded sep-
arate public universities. Although the issue of mother-tongue education at lower levels
remains important to these minority groups, their small size has made it easier for the
government to accommodate them. The Roma community presents a particularly diffi-
cult challenge in terms of education and, as such, we will take a closer look at Roma edu-
cation in the next section.
5.1. Special educational measures for the Roma population
As we make clear in our typology, the Roma community, in spite of its large size, is the
most culturally and socio-economically marginalised minority group in Romania. In terms
of public education policies, the institutional and legal measures that have benefited the
other minority groups in the past decade (extension of the rights to learn in mother tongue)
have not been sensitive to Roma needs. One of the most pressing problems is their low
level of integration into the education system. The rate of illiteracy among the Roma is
extremely high. According to research conducted in 1993, 44% of Roma males and 59%
of females are unable to read.48 According to the Ministry of Education, approximately
80% of school-age children not attending school are of Roma origin.49
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Various circumstances have contributed to this bleak situation. Most crucially, the fact
that many Roma families are not registered in a given administrative territory makes it
very difficult for their children to attend local schools. More than 7% of Roma children
do not have birth certificates, and many adults do not possess ID cards giving proof of
residence in a particular town. Further, much of the Roma population in Romania has a
semi-nomadic way of life, making the enrollment of children in local schools difficult if
not impossible in the medium to long term. 
In light of these difficulties, the Ministry of Education initiated several programs aimed
at increasing the sensitivity of local administrators and to facilitate the integration of Roma
children into the public school system. Serious efforts have been made to appoint Roma
school inspectors at the level of each county school, who are responsible for Roma issues.
At present, there are 38 Roma inspectors—only four school districts do not have one.50
Efforts have also been made (separate entrance quotas, curriculum development designed
to reflect the particularities of the Roma culture) to include Roma in special training schools
for elementary school teachers. Additionally, special entrance quotas for Roma students
have been established at a number of universities in departments specialising in social
work and pedagogy.
In order that Roma students can benefit from the right to receive instruction in their
mother tongue, a special Department for Romany Language has been established at
Bucharest University, and several Romany textbooks and other teaching materials have
been compiled. Although a number of positive policy developments have been initiated
to help address the challenges presented by Roma education, many obstacles remain to
the integration of this community into Romania’s education system, and persistent dis-
crimination continues to hinder efforts in this direction.
6. Conclusion
Although the management of ethnic and cultural diversity in Romania is often viewed as
a success, particularly when compared with the policies pursued over the past decade in
the former Yugoslavia, a number of serious challenges remain with respect to minority rep-
resentation, protection and integration in the political, social, commercial and education-
al spheres. This paper has argued that, although conditions in Romania have improved
since 1989 for minority groups, significant political and administrative reforms have been
hampered by the tendency of the central government to lump all minority groups togeth-
er, ignoring their significant political, demographic and socio-economic differences. Through
the creation of our (imperfect) typology, we have demonstrated that monolithic minority
policies fail to meet the diverse needs and objectives of the Hungarian minority, the small-
er minority groups and the Roma. Additionally, this paper has argued that minority rights
protection in Romania has a long way to go in terms of minority-language use in public
administration, minority-language instruction in public schools and minority political par-
ticipation. Minority representation in local politics and administration remains minimal in
many parts of the country. In sum, although significant progress on minority issues has
been achieved since Romania’s transition in 1989, serious work remains to be done, par-
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ticularly with respect to the highly marginalised Roma population. Both legislative and
institutional reforms are needed to improve minority rights and ease tensions among minor-
ity groups (namely, the Hungarians and the Roma) and the majority population. These
challenges are not insurmountable and we therefore propose a number of policy recom-
mendations that might help to improve the situation of ethnic minorities in Romania. 
7. Recommendations
With respect to the legislative framework for the protection of minorities and minority
groups the following changes should be made:
· Exclusionary constitutional provisions including the definition of Romania as a
‘nation-state’ and the designation of Romanian as the only ‘official language’ should
be replaced by less exclusive wording, as they exacerbate the ambiguity in the rela-
tionship between the state, citizenship and ethnicity in Romania and make peace-
ful negotiations for legitimate power-sharing impossible.
· The amendments to Law No. 69/1991 on Local Public Administration (as manifest
in Emergency Act No. 22/1997 and the subsequent Draft Law) should be passed
by Parliament as quickly as possible, in order to begin the process of standardising
the use of minority languages in local public administration.
The following recommendations pertain to the institutional framework for the protec-
tion of minorities:
· Forms of institutional collaboration between organisations representing a given
minority should be initiated.
· Institutional mechanisms must enable the implementation of relevant legislation on
minority issues. To that end, training of public administration officials on inter-eth-
nic issues must be conducted.
With respect to public administration reform, the following measures are recommended:
· The language barrier that exists in the relationship between local administrators
and minorities must be overcome by shifting the financial responsibility for trans-
lation of documents and conversations from minority individuals to the local admin-
istration.
· Serious measures must be taken to end the legacy of ‘ethnically preferential hiring’
in public administration and to ensure the ‘de-ethnicisation’ of certain sectors of
public administration. To that effect, bilingualism and multi-lingualism among pub-
lic administration officials should be considered as an important resource, and
should be taken into consideration when hiring public employees.
· State-sponsored training programs for local public administrators should be initi-
ated that focus on minority issues and multi-ethnic community management in
order to sensitise local administrators to minority concerns and better equip them
to mediate in the case of ethnic conflicts.
In terms of minority-language education, the following recommendations are offered:
· Legislation establishing the right of minorities to establish separate public schools
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at the primary and secondary levels must be consistently implemented.
· Clearer legislation should be drafted and passed that establishes what level of
Romanian-language education is necessary for minorities to be integrated into
Romanian society.
· Greater legislative clarity is also required with respect to the rights of minorities in
mixed schools to receive instruction in their mother tongue.
· Consensus should be reached regarding a working definition of ‘multi-cultural uni-
versities’ as a first step towards resolving the controversial issue of the establish-
ment of a separate public Hungarian-language university.
The following recommendations relate to special educational measures for the Roma:
· Ministry of Education policies should enable greater administrative flexibility in
the registration of Roma children at public schools. The absence of identification
cards should not be used as a pretext to exclude Roma children from the public
school system. In spite of the circulation of a Ministerial Letter prohibiting this
practice, its enforcement is limited. Further steps allocating resources, training offi-
cials and implementing policies aimed at the integration of the Roma into the pub-
lic school system must be taken.
· The nascent system of ‘positive action’ for Roma students seeking to enter univer-
sities should be expanded and developed.
· A greater amount of public funding for Roma education initiatives is necessary to
encourage the development of new strategies aimed at integrating the Roma com-
munity into the school system, increased publication of Romany textbooks, the cre-
ation of Romany-language departments at universities and training Roma teachers.
· Innovative solutions to the challenge of Roma education—such as the establish-
ment of mobile ‘caravan schools’ compatible to the semi-nomadic lifestyle of some
of the Roma population should be further explored. This kind of educational exper-
iment should be researched (by NGOs and think tanks, as well as by the Ministry
of Education) and subsidised in order to open the door to new policy initiatives on
this critical issue. 
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SOLUTIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN SLOVAKIA
Ján Bucek
Abstract 
The present study summarises various approaches towards minorities in the dynamics
of central/local relations in Slovakia since 1989. It documents the growing role of the
local level in addressing the needs of the different ethnic groups living in Slovakia. In
this context, the national government and the international environment are powerful
actors capable of shaping change. Therefore, attention is given to central decisions try-
ing to misuse the local electoral legislature and to redraw the existing territorial-admin-
istrative division. This leads to the underrepresentation of local minority populations
in regional governments and undermines mother-tongue education. It will be shown
that the local public administration can improve the situation of minorities and help
foster ethnic co-existence in localities where minorities directly participate in the local
management of their community. From this perspective, the stable political represen-
tation of the Hungarian minority and insufficient representation of the Roma minority
is reviewed. In addition, a growing search for more flexible means and ways of inter-
ethnic communication outside mainstream local institutions, such as informal self-gov-
ernments, traditional leaders and minority political parties will be presented. It will be
concluded that, in general, despite a wide range of possibilities for local initiatives
responding to the needs of minority communities, the scarcity of financial resources—
linked with the lack of meaningful local powers and competencies—limit their success.
Effectiveness in addressing minority issues at the local level is documented by some rel-
evant cases in the fields of education, culture, housing and living environment, employ-
ment and social security. Future changes should include meaningful decentralisation,
the establishment of more responsive and more professional local governments with
the extensive participation of the various local ethnic communities coupled with a series
of reforms in sectoral policies, i.e. in employment policies, housing and the social secu-
rity system.
1. Introduction
In Slovakia, a significant part of the population belongs to various non-Slovak ethnic
groups. Institutional instruments and policies need major restructuring if they are to suc-
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cessfully solve problems concerning ethnic co-existence, participation and representation
for Slovakia’s minority communities. Pressure to prepare for candidacy for the European
Union has been instrumental in starting a process of reform on the part of local and nation-
al officials to address the interests and needs of minority communities. This process was
stifled in the mid-1990s due to the presence of a neo-totalitarian/nationalist regime in
Bratislava headed by Prime Minister Meciar that actively resisted any form of pressure to
improve the status of minority groups. Measures taken by the Meciar government met
with strong international disapproval and domestic opposition, especially on the part of
minorities. However, neither of these sources of pressure could significantly alter the
implementation of the planned political changes. Only with the election of a reform-ori-
ented coalition government in 1998 did this situation begin to transform into an accept-
able scenario for minorities.
Multi-ethnic relations in Slovakia are dominated by the Slovak ethnic group. Dispersed
among this majority are minority groups that make up 15% of the population. A sample
of current minority groups includes: Hungarians, Roma, Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Germans,
Poles, Jews, Czechs, Silesians and Moravians. 
The situation of minorities—including their own policies, their influence on both local
and national levels as well as the central policies directed towards them—greatly depends
on a series of factors. These factors include: (1) the deeply embedded historic memories
of the various communities in the field of majority/minority relations, which influence
current attitudes and policies on all sides; (2) the size and demographic development of
various minority communities; (3) territorial distribution, i.e. concentration or disper-
sion, of a particular minority population; and (4) socio-economic differences based on
ethnic grounds. All the above mentioned factors can help in understanding some basic
dimensions in the complexity of majority-minority relations. At the same time, it has to
be understood that these factors can be easily politicised and misused in furthering mis-
interpretations, prejudices and stereotypes which deepen and manipulate divisions among
the various ethnic communities. 
In the 1990s the major inter-ethnic disputes in Slovakia coalesced around heated polit-
ical debates on the use of minority languages in public, education of minorities in their
mother tongue and public administration reforms involving new territorial divisions that
have had an impact on the ethnic composition of regions where minorities live. These
disputes were in fact bipolar as they mainly involved representatives of the Slovak major-
ity and those of the Hungarian minority. However, due to growing international pressure
in the second half of the 1990s, more and more attention has been paid to the situation
and treatment of the Roma. Against the background of the increased commitment of the
new government to look at minority needs, public understanding of the political partic-
ipation of minorities at all levels and of the role of the local level in the effective manage-
ment of Slovakia’s multi-ethnic society has grown significantly. It can be said that the
majority of society has needed time to understand and acknowledge that effective democ-
racy can only be established by and through the often tiresome process of gaining the
consent of Slovakia’s minority population. 
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1.1. A brief history of inter-ethnic co-existence
Most minority groups living in present-day Slovakia are deeply rooted in Slovakia’s nation-
al history (see Table 1). From the perspective of inter-ethnic relations, it is important to
note that Slovakia was an integral part of the Hungarian Kingdom for more than nine cen-
turies. The Slovak population, along with other ethnic communities, was the subject of
intense ‘Magyarisation’ beginning in the second half of the 19TH century. In the 20TH cen-
tury, following more than seven decades of co-existence between Czechs and Slovaks,
Slovakia declared its independence on 1 January 1993. In this section, however, attention
will be paid to processes related to three historical periods including: (1) the establishment
of Czechoslovakia as a multinational state, (2) events related to World War II and (3) the
treatment of minorities under the communist regime. These processes and events help to
explain the various dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in contemporary Slovakia.
During the interwar years, the Czechoslovak Republic respected some basic minority
rights, especially in the field of the use of minority languages in public. Minority languages
were allowed for official use in courts, public administration and cultural institutions.
They were the languages of instruction in settlements where the minority population con-
stituted more than 20% of the population. In cases when an ethnic group made up more
than 50% of the local population, its language became an official language.1 At the same
time, numerous restrictions were introduced against the Roma, including mandatory
police registration, legislation prohibiting their nomadic way of life, as well as forced inter-
nal population transfers and the dissolution of many of their settlements.2 During this
period, Slovaks consolidated their national identity in reaction to the Magyarisation poli-
cies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
As a consequence of the Munich Treaty of 1938, which lead to the disintegration of
Czechoslovakia and the 1939 annexation of southern Slovakia to Hungary upon her
request, an independent Slovak state was declared. Slovakia entered World War II as an
Axis Power. The annexation brought about the closure of Slovak schools, forced expul-
sion of Slovaks and confiscation of Slovak and Czech property on this territory. All of
these events are among the main sources of historic grievances on the Slovak side.3 But
the most catastrophic events of this period included the deportation of 70,000 Slovak
Jews to extermination camps by the Slovak state in 1941. Much of the Roma population
was concentrated into working camps which, after the occupation of the Slovakia by
German troops in 1944, became the sites of numerous massacres. The majority of the
Slovak Roma survived, however, though in an extremely poor socio-economic state.4
Postwar developments in Czechoslovakia are remembered with bitterness, especially
by the Hungarian minority. Among the most dramatic events were the population exchange
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1 Based on The Languages Act 122/1920. J. Plichtová (1993).
2 Various cases are documented, e.g. from Gemer region by Gecelovsky, 1992.
3 This part of history is often misused by nationalists for rising tension among Slovaks and
Hungarians. We can find brief comments on this historical period, e.g. in Cierna-Lantayova
(1992); Janics (1994).
4 For more details, see: e.g. Rícan (1998); Kollárová (1991); or UNDP National Report on Human
Development Slovakia (1998). There are no reliable data on all Roma victims in Slovakia during 
between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the forced resettlement of the Hungarian pop-
ulation from its traditional habitat in southern Slovakia to Czech lands. The anti-Hungarian
measures included re-Slovakisation policies5 and the confiscation of agricultural land.
Hungarian institutions and a network of Hungarian schools were liquidated, and the use
of Hungarian language in public was curtailed in the period of 1945-1949.6
During the communist period, some opportunities were created for education in
Hungarian and Ukrainian, but not at the university level (with the notable exception of
teacher training). A few Hungarian and Ukrainian institutions, newspapers and journals
were supported by the state. The Ruthenian minority was not officially recognised and
they were formally considered Ukrainians. As a result of this forced ‘Ukrainisation’,
Ruthenian schools were closed, along with the Greek Catholic churches to which they
belonged. Ruthenians were forced to attend the Eastern Orthodox Church.7
The communist regime adopted a strictly assimilationist policy with respect to the
Roma, turning this group into a faceless socio-economic ‘problem’. As a consequence of
anti-Roma legislation and policies, the traditional nomadic way of life of the Roma was
prohibited and their settlements liquidated. They were forcibly moved to high-rise hous-
ing complexes and dispersed among the rest of the population. The ethnic identity and
culture of the Roma were suppressed. As such, the results of this paternalistic ‘social engi-
neering from above’ were highly negative.
In conclusion, it can be said that Slovakia’s present ethno-cultural map reflects com-
munist ideological engineering, forced migration and expulsion that occurred during the
re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after World War II. This traumatic history, common
throughout Central and Eastern Europe, helps to explain much of the underlying tensions
based on mistrust and fear that dominate inter-ethnic relations in Slovakia today.
1.2. Demography
The most recent representative data on minorities in Slovakia is found in the results of
the Statistical Census held in 1991. According to this census, minorities compose 14.3%
of the population. From the perspective of their size, minority communities in Slovakia
can be divided into three major groups. Hungarians and Roma are the most numerous
minority communities and, as such, much of this analysis focuses on the situation of these
two groups. Other smaller minority groups include Czechs, Moravians, Silesians,8
Ukrainians, Germans, Jews9 and Poles. The smallest minority groups, such as Croatians
and Bulgarians, compose the final tier.
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World War II. Unfortunately, it has long been a forgotten issue for Slovak historians, only inves-
tigated now.
5 The aim of re-Slovakisation was to ‘restore’ the Slovak nationality of ethnic Hungarians who were
supposedly victims of previous ‘Magyarisation’. See Olejník and Sutaj (1998).
6 For more details concerning the situation of the Hungarian minority after World War II, see: e.g.
Bacová (1996); Janics (1994); Huncík (1999).
7 For selected details about the situation of the Ruthenian minority see, e.g. Jurová (1992); Zelová
Bacová (1993); Plichtová (1993); Sisak (1997); Zubriczky (1998).
The Hungarian minority has 570,00 members and comprised 10.8% of the total Slovak
population in 1991. Comparing this with data from the same year on native languages,
more than 600,000 Slovak citizens declared the Hungarian language as their mother
tongue. This number corresponds to almost 12% of Slovakia’s total population (Bakker
1997). These figures illustrate the strength of the Hungarian identity and its resistance to
assimilation. 
It is difficult to compile reliable data about the Roma. Only in the 1991 Statistical
Census were the Roma given the chance to freely identify their ethnic affiliation.
Unsurprisingly, only 1.44% of Slovak citizens identified themselves as Roma. Most of the
Roma chose to declare themselves as Slovaks or Hungarians. Due to historical experi-
ences, such as anti-Roma legislation and widespread discrimination, they feared the con-
sequences of openly declaring their ethnic identity.
Census officials collected data on the Roma unofficially during statistical censuses
under the communist regime. According to data from 1980, Roma composed 4% of the
population. More precise data is available from the registry of state administration from
1989 (Bacová 1993), when it was estimated that the Roma made up 4.8% of the total pop-
ulation. Present estimates (from 1998) suggest figures between 300,000 and 400,000
(about 7% of the total population).10
As of 1995, almost 40% of the Roma population was below reproductive age. The high
birth rate of the Roma minority is generally considered to be the most serious obstacle to
its peaceful co-existence with the majority and other ethnic groups. As the Roma gener-
ally suffer from severe poverty, illiteracy and unemployment, they are simply considered
as a burden by much of the Slovak population (UNDP National Report on Human
Development Slovakia 1998).
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8 The size of the Ruthenian and the Ukrainian minorities is frequently discussed. According to esti-
mations there are somewhere between 100,000 and 130,000 Ruthenians living in Slovakia. These
estimates are based on mother tongue and historical interpolations, and they present nearly the
entire population with Ruthenian roots. Ruthenian was declared as the mother tongue of 50,000
citizens. Russian Orthodox religious affiliation was declared by almost 40,000 and Greek-Catholic
affiliation by almost 190,000 citizens (both with very close ties to the Ukrainian or the Ruthenian
population) in the Statistical Census of 1991. See: Duleba (1997). 
9 The size of the Jewish community is estimated at 3,000 people, living mostly in cities (Salner
1998), although the 1991 Census recorded only 134 persons who considered themselves Jewish.
See: Olejník and Sutaj (1998).
10 The highest estimation for the size of the Roma population in Slovakia was mentioned at 480-
520,000 by D. Ondrusek (1999) Centre for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Pravda, 24 April;
and at 480-500,000 by the Chairman of the Slovak Parliament’s Commission for Solving the
Roma Issue, I. Tóth (1999) SME, 24 June.
Table 1. Population Development by Nationality
Slovak Hungarian Roma Czech Ruthenian German Polish Other 
Moravian Ukrainian and un-
Silesian declared
1930 Abs. 2,337,816 571,952 Na 121,696 90,824 148,214 7,023 44,509
% 70.4 17.2 Na 3.7 2.7 4.5 0.2 1.3
1961 Abs. 3,560,241 518,776 Na 45,700 35,411 6,266 1012 6,640
% 85.3 12.4 Na 1.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 0.2
1991 Abs. 4,519,328 567,296 75,802 59,326 30,478 5,414 2,659 14,032
% 85.7 10.8 1.44 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.27
1997 Abs. 4,614,547 568,291 87,779 59,005 32,496 5,365 3,186 16,981
% 85.56 10.55 1.63 1.1 0.6 0.1 0.06 0.31
Na – Data not available
Note: Data for 1930, 1961 and 1991 are the results from statistical censuses. Data for 1997 is the
result of the population movement register.
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic 1992,1998; Podolák, 1998.
1.3. Territorial distribution
The territorial dispersal of a minority population strongly influences its political partici-
pation at different levels. The Hungarian minority is concentrated in the southwestern,
southern and southeastern part of Slovakia, in districts near the Hungarian border. In sev-
eral towns (Dunajská Streda, Komárno, Galanta and Stúrovo), Hungarians constitute the
majority, making up more than 50% of the local population. Their spatial concentration
and large proportion in the local population support the Hungarian minority’s demands
for various types of autonomy, including territorial and administrative forms.
The Roma are scattered throughout the country but are concentrated to some degree
in south-central and eastern Slovakia where there are some 300 Roma settlements. Roma
quarters can also be found in larger cities where their compact settlement (in ghettos) and
poor living conditions often lead to ethnic segregation. In practice, these settlements have
become ghettos sequestered on the edges of various towns.
Overall, it can be concluded that regional concentration is significant only in the case
of the Hungarian minority, which is comprised of compact settlements in several coun-
ties of southern Slovakia, such as Dunajská Streda and Komárno, where approximately
87% and 73% of the respective populations are Hungarian. Nevertheless, at the level of
communes, local concentration of other minority populations can also be identified. Tables
2 and 3 illustrate in greater detail the presence of minorities in communes. As the total
number of municipalities in Slovakia exceeds 2,800, it can be said that between one-third
and one-half of the total number of localities have minority populations that constitute
more than 10% of their total populations.
Currently, minority status at the national level is often juxtaposed with a local majority.
This discrepancy concerning minority representation has yet to be addressed in legislation.
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Table 2. Hungarian Minority Population in Municipalities (Statistical Census 1991)
Share of Hungarian population in municipalities (%) Number of municipalities
0.01-0.9 792
1.0-4.9 125
5.0-9.9 23
10.0-24.9 31
25.0-49.9 60
50.0-74.9 118
75.0-89.9 244
90.0-100 76
Total municipalities with Hungarian population 1,469
Share of Hungarian population in the total population (%) 10.8
Source: Podolák (1998).
Table 3. Minority Population in Municipalities (Statistical Census 1991)
Share of national Number of municipalities with minority population
minorities in 
municipalities (in %)
Roma Czechs Ruthenians Ukrainians Germans Poles
Silesians
Moravians
0.01-0.9 442 1,672 274 528 337 580
1.0-4.9 349 376 56 90 13 6
5.0-9.9 137 6 28 36 7 0
10.0-24.9 102 1 66 44 5 0
25.0-49.9 33 0 45 11 1 0
50.0 and more 9 0 11 1 0 0
Total municipalities 1,072 2,055 480 710 363 586
Share of total 1.44 1.1 0.32 0.25 0.1 0.05
population (in %)
Source: Elaborated from Podolák (1998).
1.4. Socio-economic indicators
It is difficult to directly evaluate the social and economic situation of minority groups. In
general, the main socio-economic indicators are not aggregated from the perspective of
minority populations and relevant research is rare. One possible method of research is to
identify situations that combine poor economic and social conditions with a large minor-
ity population.11
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High unemployment rates are typical for the Hungarian minority in south-central and
southeast Slovakia and for the Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities in east and north-east
Slovakia. In general, however, it is the Roma who are by far in the worst situation mea-
sured by any indicators (unemployment, education, health).
A large number of districts with a higher share of minority population combine inher-
ited underdevelopment with problems related to the transition period, including untapped
human potential, inadequate technical infrastructure, the closure of old industrial plants
and changes in agriculture. The age structure and/or lower education level, characteris-
tic of almost all minority populations in comparison with the Slovak majority, have dimin-
ished opportunities for external support of development (new private investments) and
possibilities for local initiatives from below.
2. The Legal Position and Political Participation of Minorities at the
Central Level
While the importance of the national level cannot be underestimated in the protection of
minorities, the role of the international environment has had an increasing impact in this
field over the last decade. Of course, it is the domestic legal environment and political
arena that are responsible for the formulation of a general framework of multi-ethnic co-
existence both at the centre and locally. But processes related to globalisation and Slovakia’s
commitment to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures, including the European Union
and NATO, have greatly influenced domestic minority policies, not in the least for secu-
rity reasons. The role of bilateral treaties concluded by Slovakia with her neighbours is
very important from this perspective, since most minorities, with the notable exception
of Ruthenians and the Roma, have kin-states in the region which act as advocates on behalf
of their interests.
2.1. Constitutional guarantees
The Slovak Constitution guarantees the principal rights of minorities living in the Slovak
Republic. The Slovak Constitution made great progress in granting rights unprecedent-
ed in Slovak history (Bakker 1997). A series of rights are mentioned explicitly: the use of
minority languages is granted under Article 6 and shall be determined by law. Article 12
guarantees basic rights and liberties regardless of nationality or ethnic adherence and
Articles 33 and 34 guarantee full development for minorities. These articles define the
rights of minorities on the individual level, or as rights realised in groups.12 While some
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11 Rare attempts to characterise the social and economic situation of the Hungarian minority in
Slovakia is presented in: Bakker (1997) or Huncík (1999).
12 Sutaj and Olejník (1998) explain: ‘The legal norms of the Slovak Republic aim at the protection
of national minorities; however, they do not create a special mechanism for the protection of
minorities. All rights of national minorities are guaranteed as individual rights’.
authors (Cic et al., 1997) interpret these articles as preferential approaches to minorities
(regarding culture, access to information, associations, education and language), it must
be noted that ‘affirmative action’ or ‘positive discrimination’ is not explicitly mentioned
in the Slovak Constitution. Article 34 also protects the state’s interests: minority rights
guaranteed by the Constitution may not threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Slovak Republic or discriminate against other citizens. This wording is extremely
problematic and can be easily used to restrict minority rights.
The main obstacle concerning constitutional provisions for minorities is the lack of
subsequent legislation developing important rights declared in the Constitution. Article
34 is compromised by the phrase ‘and shall be fixed by law’. While the Constitution can
only be amended by a two-third majority of the Slovak Parliament, the indicated acts pro-
scribed in its articles are susceptible to the whims of a simple majority. Although at first
glance it appears to be a highly flexible mechanism, it also allows for a new round of polit-
ical wrangling for minority rights protection in Parliament, systematic political fights over
ethnic issues and disputes with the state administration. From 1994 to 1998, minority
rights were actively undermined in Slovakia. Many constitutional principles were not
implemented. There is a some chance that the new constitution being drafted in 1999-
2000 will also redress the mentioned deficiencies concerning minority rights.13
2.2. Participation at the central level 
The size of a minority and its ability to mobilise its resources during parliamentary elections
is strongly related to its political influence at the national level. The ability to exercise polit-
ical influence depends largely on surpassing the 5% threshold for any political party to gain
representation in the Slovak Parliament since the Slovak Electoral Law does not contain any
special provisions for the representation of minorities in the Slovak Parliament. Under this
Electoral Law, only Hungarians (given their size and degree of political mobilisation) have
been represented in the Parliament. The Roma minority is active but fragmented and, in
spite of its large size, cannot actively participate in and influence decision-making at the
central level. For other minorities, the political participation of their members is not based
solely on ethnicity. Many minority citizens are members of nonminority parties. These
minorities’ interests are negotiated with political parties through cultural associations and
organisations, a phenomenon more applicable locally than nationally.
2.2.1. Hungarians
Since the beginning of the post-communist transition, several parties have emerged to
represent Hungarians. They include the national-liberal party, Co-existence (Spoluzitie),
the liberal Hungarian Civic Party (Madarská obcianska strana or MOS) and the conserv-
ative Hungarian Christian Democrat Movement (Madarské krestansko-demokratické hnu-
tie or MKDH). Their position was originally strengthened by the dissident credentials of
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13 The approval of a new constitution of the Slovak Republic is one of the main aims of the coali-
tion government ruling since 1998.
many of their leaders. The permanent presence of their members in the Slovak Parliament
since 1990 documents the solid popular support of these parties. To increase their influence
in the Slovak political arena, these three parties formed a coalition before the 1994 gen-
eral elections. This coalition was then turned into a single political party—the Hungarian
Coalition Party (Strana Madarskej Koalicie—SMK). They receive about 10% of the total
national votes in each parliamentary election, consolidating their position as legitimate
political representatives of the Hungarian minority. Following the 1998 elections, the
SMK entered into a coalition with its rivals, thus gaining the central government posts of
Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Environment and Minister of Construction and Public
Works. The Hungarian Coalition defined co-operation as its priority. Its success is due
to the precise definition of minority interests and responsive leaders. This pragmatic strat-
egy needs to be replicated among other minority communities. Owing to the importance
of the coalition-building process in Slovak political life, Hungarian political representa-
tion is influential and the Hungarian party is attractive as a coalition partner. The pres-
ence and lobbying of Hungarian politicians in the central government provides opportu-
nities for the establishment of an improved local-level co-existence framework that benefits
all minorities. However, it is important to note that, despite being part of the governing
coalition, Hungarian politicians face difficulties in fulfilling their primary policy goals
related to the use of the mother tongue in public, the establishment of higher level edu-
cation in the mother tongue and the granting of special status to regions where Hungarians
live in a majority (including the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages, changes in the Constitution, territorial-administrative division, etc.).
2.2.2. Roma
The Roma minority has not had representatives in the Slovak Parliament or in any cen-
tral government since 1989. Its political representation is poorly organised, fragmented
and burdened by unco-operative political leaders and numerous political ideologies. The
Roma Civic Initiative (Rómska Obcianska Iniciatíva or ROI) was created immediately after
1989. Though the most influential Roma political party, ROI achieved only very margin-
al political results. It also sought support from the Meciar administration (Drozd 1998)
and therefore has been somewhat discredited. A more critical voice was founded in 1996—
the Roma Intelligentsia for Co-existence (Rómska inteligencia za spolunazívanie), or RIS.
The RIS has preferred democratic political elements and has gained more influence since
the 1998 elections. Until the Roma build a coalition, or one party succeeds in garnering
votes from other ethnic groups (unlikely given the negative stereotypes of the Roma that
pervade the Slovak population at large), they will not be able to capitalise on opportuni-
ties for minority participation under current rules for entering Parliament. Even a small
parliamentary presence would give the Roma important negotiating and coalition-build-
ing power on a national scope. 
Until now, Roma parties have lacked the ability to mobilise support among their own
constituencies, have failed to clearly formulate or articulate their interests to their own
communities and have not built the trust necessary for real political leadership. Despite
the poor performance of Roma parties, they remain the representatives of the Roma minor-
ity. The consequence of this situation has been that various Roma political groups have
attempted to affiliate themselves with the main political parties. The Hungarian Coalition
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has been the most receptive to Roma interests. They fielded four Roma candidates for the
1998 parliamentary elections, though none were elected. Representatives of the Roma
community have made inroads into the state administration (Office of the Prime Minister,
Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education). A Roma representative was nominated to the
Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Government for Solving the Problems of Roma Minority
in 1999 (V. Danihel). Roma parties must address their ability to co-operate, organise, for-
mulate problems and strategies, negotiate and communicate. The last attempt to form a
large Roma political block was the signing of an agreement on joint electoral program by
14 Roma political parties and 29 Roma nongovernmental organisations, with the aim to
gain seats in the next parliamentary elections for Roma political representation. This ini-
tiative has yet to be tested by political praxis.14
2.3. The international environment and bilateral treaties
Article 11 of the Slovak Constitution emphasises that ‘international treaties in regard to
human rights and liberties, ratified by the Slovak Republic, have precedence over its laws
if they secure a greater range of basic rights and liberties’. This measure gives an appro-
priate role to any international document. The most important binding international
document is the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, signed
and ratified by Slovakia in 1995. A positive shift influencing the role of local govern-
ments was the ratification of the European Charter of Local Authorities in 1999. It is also
expected that the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages will be ratified
during this electoral period. Nevertheless, various deficiencies mentioned in this chap-
ter prove that the integration of international documents into domestic Slovak law has
yet to be completed.
A crucial positive step in Slovakia’s bilateral relations was the signing of the bilater-
al treaty with Hungary in 1995.15 The treaty has some problematic aspects, however
(despite the above mentioned constitutional commitment). For example, Article 15 says
that the Contracting Parties should respect Recommendation 1201 of the Council of
Europe. Critical Article 11 of the Recommendation has never been fully respected by
Slovak legislation.16 It was considered as an expression of the Hungarian minority’s aspi-
rations for territorial autonomy and evoked memories of the revision of Slovak bound-
aries in 1938.
International organisations have played a significant role in the accommodation and
resolution of ethnic conflicts, especially during the Meciar government, and they sys-
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14 Kotian (2000).
15 The Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Co-operation between the Slovak Republic
and the Republic of Hungary.
16 Article 11 of Recommendation 1201: ‘In the regions where they are in a majority the persons
belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local
or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and terri-
torial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state’. For more details in
Slovak-Hungarian context, see: e.g. Sándor (1996), Olejník and Sutaj (1998).
tematically monitored the situation, identified key problems, evaluated relevant legisla-
tion and mitigated inter-ethnic conflicts by raising public awareness. The most active par-
ticipant has been the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities. Thus far, the
international pressure has been only partially successful (for example, in leading to the
modification of the administrative reform process and more systematic approaches toward
improving the position of Roma). By increasing activities related to European integration,
the role of various EU institutions is rapidly growing.
3. Central – Local Relations and Local Initiatives Addressing Minorities
The role of local public administration in addressing minority issues depends on the over-
all structure of state government and the dynamics of central-local relations. This section
addresses a series of important political issues concerning the position of minorities in
Slovakia that has come to the forefront of debates about local government. Among the
many issues relevant to minority interests, the most highly debated have been:
· the Local Electoral Act and its amendments, 
· territorial-administrative division and the reform of state administration,
· the Act on the Use of Minority Languages, combined with its effect on the official
state language,
· alternative schooling and requirements to study the official state language.
These debates have reflected the attempts of the 1994-1998 governing coalition to
intervene into the lives of minorities at the local level, to change principles of local gov-
ernment and to dissolve local government functions serving minority communities. These
attempts brought about the strong criticism of the domestic political opposition—par-
ticularly the Hungarian parties—and were partially responsible for the political dis-
qualification of Slovakia as a European Union accession country in the first round. At the
December 1997 EU summit meeting in Luxembourg, the Slovak Republic was moved
from the first to the second wave of applicant countries. 
3.1. The dual model of local public administration 
The Slovak Republic adopted a dual model of public administration after 1989. This con-
sists of two separate entities: (1) the local government and (2) the state administration. Local
governments operate in each village and city. District and regional state administration con-
sists of district and regional offices for general state administration, as well as several offices
directly under the control of various ministries (for example, tax and custom offices). Selected
sections of administration with specific functions were transferred to public self-governing
bodies and/or underwent a process of ‘de-etatisation’ during the last decade. Bearing in mind
problems of post-communist transition, the most important institution has been the National
Labour Office (NUP), with nationwide networks of district labour offices (see Figure 1).
Responsibility for the majority of Slovakia’s technical infrastructure is still under the con-
trol of state monopolies (electricity, gas, water and sewage).
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Figure 1. Basic Model of Local Public Administration in Slovakia (since 1996)
3.2. Local public administration: structure and competencies
The scope of decentralisation and the territorial distribution of minorities are two major
factors that influence the efficiency of local government in addressing minority needs.
During the first phase of public administration reform—from 1990 to 1993—the ten-
dency of decentralisation of power and competencies to the local level prevailed. The fol-
lowing phase (from 1994 to 1998) was characterised by the strengthening of the state
administration, deconcentration and the marginalisation of minority issues.17 Their lim-
ited degree of power has prevented local self-governments from playing a more influen-
tial role in satisfying minority needs. Local governments are the main actor in the admin-
istration of certain local matters, but usually play a role in all areas of local life. District
and regional state administration offices are responsible for many important competen-
cies relevant to minorities (including nearly all aspects of educational administration and
planning at the primary and secondary levels,18 health care and social security), as well
as financing from the state budget (See Table 6). Local state administration can only act
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17 The most visible proof of the predominance of deconcentration is the introduction of the new
regional state administration and the postponement of the introduction of regional self-govern-
mental institutions.
18 The state administration has nearly complete legal authority over the school curriculum, the pay-
ment of teachers and building maintenance of public schools. There is some space, however, for
strictly within the law, and it is too dependent on central level guidelines. Furthermore,
it suffers from a lack of opportunities to initiate specific or innovative approaches toward
minority issues.
The most important asset of local governments is the degree of autonomy they are grant-
ed.19 Local governments are legal entities that, according to the law, administer their own
property and their own financial resources.20 Local autonomy is therefore protected by
law, and municipalities can only be given duties and set limits by acts approved by the
Parliament. The right to approve local by-laws confirms the right for initiatives. The best
case documenting the potential strength of local autonomy was the local referendum in
Stúrovo, realised in spite of strong opposition from the central government.21 Local auton-
omy is only restricted in the sense that, if local by-laws are in disagreement with the Slovak
Constitution or valid legislature, they are overturned by the Constitutional Court. 
The main failure of this arrangement is the limited degree of local financial autonomy.
Its advantage has been confirmed in cases when local governments have adjusted previ-
ous local by-laws that limited minority rights. Attempts were made, for example, to refuse
incoming Roma the right to settle down in the city of Jelsava, and local by-laws in Nagov
and Rokytovce (communes in eastern Slovakia) banned Roma from entering their munic-
ipalities.22 The importance of constitutional and legal guarantees for local public adminis-
tration that aim to meet minority needs is well documented in the ‘Komárno Document’.23
This document stresses the need for more extensive decentralisation, including: the trans-
fer of powers that are important for minorities (in the fields of education, culture, public
safety, health and environment) to the local level, the transfer of financial and material
resources, and the right to use Hungarian in oral and written communication with public
administration officials wherever Hungarians make up at least 10% of the population.
Special status for the regions where Hungarians make up the majority is advocated. 
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activity on the part of local governments through local school boards on smaller issues such as
small maintenance issues and personnel issues.
19 The mentioned approach to local autonomy is inspired by Clark (1984), who emphasises two
values: initiative and immunity. 
20 Although Slovak local self-governmental municipalities are defined as economically independent
entities, in practice they depend on transfers from the annually approved state budget.
21 The referendum in Stúrovo became a symbol of resistance against central government. The local
self-government organised a local referendum that replaced the national referendum cancelled
by V. Meciar (on the direct election of the president, and on joining NATO). For details, see:
Hrabko (1999).
22 Bancansky (1999); SME (1998) 28 November.
23 For more details on this very important document for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia in
English, see: Bakker (1997). While part of this document was modified later, many of the declared
conditions have remained among the main political goals of the parties representing the Hungarian
minority.
3.3. The Local Election Act
Among the most important issues concerning minority groups has been the heated debate
surrounding the drafting of a new Local Election Act. The Meciar coalition government
attempted to usurp civic principles with nationalist and ethnic principles in order to
strengthen the role of its political affiliates in local elections and local policy-making. The
District and Regional State Administration** in:
General internal administration, management of state
property, public tendering and trade licensing, interna-
tional co-operation, control
Fire protection, state defence, civil protection
Small entrepreneurs, consumer protection
Regional development and regional planning, strategy of
regional development
Education
Primary schools, primary art schools (district)
Secondary schools, secondary vocational schools, spe-
cial schools, youth and sport
Environmental administration and protection, water
management, territorial planning, construction order,
waste management, landscape protection, air protection
Social affairs, social care, state social payments distribu-
tion, state social facilities network, co-operation with
humanitarian institutions 
Culture—museums and galleries, regional and district
libraries, cultural heritage protection
Health care administration, health centres, hospitals,
clinics state veterinary care 
Transport and road management 
Cadastral register and land ownership changes
Agriculture, forestry and hunting
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Local self-government*
General administration,
Municipal enterprises and budgetary
organisations
Administration of local taxes and
fees, administration of own property
Regulation of economic activities,
local economic development 
Planning documentation preparation
and approval
Administration and maintenance of
local roads and parking sites, public
spaces, public green spaces, public
lighting, market places, cemeteries
Waste collection and disposal, water
supply, sewage and water cleaning
stations, street cleaning, central 
heating
Kindergartens, health ambulances,
elementary day-care social services,
personal services for elderly
Administration and operation of local
cultural and social facilities, sport
and leisure facilities 
Support in the fields of education,
historical heritage protection, cultur-
al and art activities, sport
Support of humanitarian activities
Support of housing
Local police and fire brigades
*   the scope of involvement of local self-government depends mostly on the size of the com-
mune.
** competencies of general state administration without separated lines of state administration
and quasi-public institutions with nationwide network (the most important is the National
Labour Office).
Sources: Act No. 369/1990 the Communities Act; Act No. 222/1996 Coll. on Organisation of
Local State Administration, Nemec et al. (2000).
Table 4. Distribution of Key Powers among Main Lines of Local Public Administration
government often cited the insufficient representation of the Slovak minority in local coun-
cils in southern Slovakia in order to bolster and justify its efforts to guarantee better posi-
tions at the local level for its coalition member parties (Meciar’s Movement for Democratic
Slovakia, the Slovak National Party and the Association of Slovak Workers). 
The new Local Election Act contained special measures for municipalities with ethni-
cally heterogeneous populations. According to this Act, the number of local councilors
must be obligatorily distributed according to the ethnic composition of the population.
Minorities must be represented proportionally in localities where their share of the pop-
ulation exceeds 5% (and by at least one councilor). This system of proportional repre-
sentation based on ethnic composition was highly criticised by municipal associations,
opposition parties and the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max van
der Stoel. In their opinion, the new Act would prevent candidates for local councils from
having equal access to local seats. Under the Act, ethnic groups would have predeter-
mined shares of seats on local councils, contributing to highly polarised elections and
removing opportunities for moderate party candidates. Further, this forced ‘ethnicisation’
of local councils would reduce space for political compromise. 
Another problem resulted from the fact that ‘ethnic composition’ was determined
according to the results of the 1991 Statistical Census, which were highly inaccurate.
Notably, a fair representation of the Roma minority could not have been achieved by this
mechanism as many Roma declared themselves as other nationalities during the census.
The Local Election Act (No. 302/1998) was approved by the Meciar coalition before
parliamentary elections in 1998, in spite of strong protests by opposition parties and
organisations representing Slovakia’s communes and cities. This act was never applied,
however, thanks to the decision of the Constitutional Court, which declared several of
the Act’s articles unconstitutional, and because of the change of government after the 1998
elections.24 The consequence of this development has been that all local elections since
1990 have been conducted according to almost identical legal regulations. Their most
typical features have been the majority principle, the direct election of mayors, the use of
‘multimember constituencies’25 in the election of local councilors and greater opportuni-
ties for independent candidates to compete.
3.4. Representation of minorities in local public administration
The representation of minorities in local public administration opens opportunities for
more effective participation and a stronger influence in decision-making. Local govern-
ments also offer a useful platform for the solution of minority problems: the local level is
generally more sensitive to minority needs and is more likely to understand the dynam-
ics of local inter-ethnic relations better than central government officials.
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24 The new parliamentary majority of the former opposition amended this Act immediately fol-
lowing the elections.
25 Larger communes are divided into several multi-member constituencies, for which a certain num-
ber of council seats are allocated. 
Despite the absence of precise information on minority representation in state
administration, it seems that the participation of the Hungarian Coalition in the cen-
tral government has led to wider participation of Hungarians in both regional and dis-
trict state administration. Members of the Hungarian minority had limited access to
higher positions in local state administration under the previous government, but this
is changing. 
The position of minorities in local self-governments can be examined through the local
participation of their political parties. While the Hungarian minority has a long tradition
of participation in local power, the Roma are only now strengthening their position step-
by-step after a long history of disenfranchisement.
The 1990 elections offered a long-anticipated opportunity for parties representing
minorities to gain political office. Three active Hungarian parties were successful and
achieved good results. The total number of mayors representing the Hungarian minor-
ity during the first period of free local self-government was 164 (6% of a total of 2,727
mayors elected in Slovakia). The number of local Hungarian councilors elected was 4,052
(10.5% of a total number of elected councilors). Hungarian parties and their candidates
also supported other candidates in many localities, notably those of VPN (Public Against
Violence Movement), and independent forces that had pushed for democratic change.
Roma parties were not nearly so successful and only gained two mayoral posts (0.07%
of total mayors) and 88 local councilors (0.2% of total councilors).
Table 5 documents the results of two main minority communities in two consecutive
local elections (1994 and 1998). The representation of the Hungarian minority is quite
stable. The Roma minority remains strongly underrepresented, although its results have
improved. Six candidates of the Roma Civic Initiative were elected mayors in 1998. A fur-
ther two mayorships were also gained in coalition. The local elections of 1998 have pro-
vided several excellent examples of inter-ethnic co-existence. In Nové Zámky, the mayor
is Hungarian even though Hungarians are in the minority in this town, while in Stúrovo,
a town with a Hungarian population of over 70%, a Slovak mayor was elected. These can-
didates ran for office independently.
Table 5. Position of the Two Largest Minorities’ Political Parties in Local Self-Government
Election Minority Mayors Mayors** (in %) Councillors Councillors** (in %) 
1990 Hungarian 164 6 4,052 10.5
Roma 2 0.07 88 0.2
1994 Hungarian 249 8.9 4,404 12.5
Roma 2 0.07 72 0.2
1998 Hungarian 227+25* 8.7 3,841+324* 11.8
Roma 6+2* 0.3 100 0.3
*   elected candidates of minority parties plus candidates of coalitions with minority parties.
** percentages in comparison to the total number of mayors/councilors elected in Slovakia.
Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (1990, 1994, 1998). Local self-government
election results.
SLOVAKIA 291
3.5. Territorial division and public administration reform
The Slovak Parliament accepted new territorial divisions in 1996. Act No. 221/1996 on
the Territorial and Administrative Division of the Slovak Republic introduced eight new
regions and 79 districts. This reform only concerned state administration. Discussion of
self-governance issues was postponed. The divisions were presented as a rational tech-
nocratic solution justified according to the standard of ‘economic viability’, leaving plen-
ty of room for gerrymandering against minorities and political opponents.
Pressure came from opposition parties, most notably the Hungarians, and interna-
tional bodies to change or repeal the divisions.26 Without question, the aim of this terri-
torial-administrative re-division—that also intended to establish electoral districts with-
in the new boundaries—was the fragmentation of the Hungarian ethnic minority.
Hungarian regions have been divided in such a way that the number of primary and sec-
ondary administrative regions with a Hungarian majority or a Hungarian population share
of more than 20% has diminished drastically.27
Carrying forward the process of public administration reform—including new region-
al divisions—has continued to be a major aim of the new government. In the present stage
of political development, power-sharing is generally accepted at the local level, but there
is a reluctance to apply full-scale power-sharing at the regional level (in regions with more
than 50% Hungarian inhabitants). One of the potential outcomes of the debates on ter-
ritorial division is the acceptance of more regions with greater than 20% minority popu-
lations, combined with an extended minority rights framework at the regional level. This
could improve the position of the minority population and its representation, preserve
the rationale of the regional division (its multi-criterion principle) and prevent the instinc-
tive majority fear of potential minority secessionist movements.28
3.6. Communication and co-operation 
Communication and co-operation with minorities in local life are needed even in the case
of their absence in locally elected bodies. They can be improved by using minority self-
governing institutions, local minority political party organisations and activists, and tra-
ditional leaders.
In some localities, these links were developed with Roma communities, their main goal
being improved communication between the minority and the local authorities (e.g. in the
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26 Under the original proposal, e.g. Nové Zámky district, having a Hungarian numerical majority,
should have been split into three new districts (Krivy 1997). Finally, the administrative bound-
aries of the districts with the highest share of Hungarian minority were not changed (e.g. Dunajská
Streda, Komárno, Nové Zámky).
27 For details of the 1996 administrative territorial division, see: e.g. Bakker, 1997.
28 Nevertheless, Slovak representatives should respect Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities and avoid territorial changes that change share of ethnic minorities in administrative
units. For details on international aspects of territorial administrative changes, see: Kusy (2000).
towns of Prievidza, Michalovce, Zarnovica).29 The formation of local Roma minority self-
governments depends on local conditions and is not always successful. The main obstacle
to their establishment is the internally divided local Roma community and the undiffer-
entiated, untapped human potential that makes the creation of a political class very
difficult.30 Local minority organisations are usually informal, depending on the presence
of local activists and natural leaders. Their legitimacy can easily be challenged—by the
minority community itself and by other local actors. Attempts to use traditional Roma lead-
ers (vajda) for this purpose face similar difficulties. The traditional organisation of the Roma
community has often dissolved and the size of many local Roma communities is often too
big for monocratic control by one leader. Some representatives of the Roma minority at
the local level are self-elected (political party activists, natural leaders), with respected posi-
tions as part of the local minority community. They serve as consultants in the articulation
of local minority community needs to local institutions. They become regular members of
various special committees in local public administration and organise the participation of
the minority communities in local life. A similar initiative is the establishment of the District
Roma Council in Kezmarok district (eastern Slovakia).31 Functioning communication links
and co-operation with local administration prevents conflicts and the worsening of Roma
living conditions (but is still missing in many localities).
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29 SME (1996) 7 December; Piecka (1999).
30 As it is confirmed in the Project Svinia’s case. This project is supported by the Canadian gov-
ernment and other western organisations. Despite of its successes in other fields, the attempts to
form a well-functioning Roma self-government have faced difficulties. See: Borszék (1998);
Hospodárske noviny (1999) 8 June.
31 Pravda (2000) 24 January. 
Case Study 1. Participation, co-operation and communication
The issue: What are effective tools leading to effective co-operation and communication with the
local Roma community.
The actors involved: Mayor of Zbudské Dlhé, traditional Roma leaders (vajda), local councilors
The issue proceeding and strategy: This is the case of Zbudské Dlhé, a small village in eastern
Slovakia (Humenné district), with a majority of the Roma population (57%) living in their
own settlement. There are five Roma local councilors out of a total of twelve. This official line
of co-operation is multiplied by the activity of the vadja (a nonmember of the local council).
He is in regular direct contact with the mayor, informing her of the Roma community’s needs
and problems. The most pressing of these problems is that the entire Roma settlement is served
by a single well, and therefore receives poor quality water.
The results: The participation of Roma in local self-government and the regular communication
with the vajda has improved their participation in all spheres of local life. Roma co-operate in
local voluntary work projects, as well as in local cultural festivities (having their own music
group). But the most important achievement is that one of the local self-governments’ priori-
ties is to finish the construction of a water-pipe system and an access road leading to the Roma
settlement.
Table 6. Main Sources of Income of Local Self-Government in 1996
Item SKK (Millions) Per cent of Local Budget
Tax incomes 10,163.1 39.9
Shared taxes 5,857.3 23.0
Local taxes (real estate tax) 2,878.9 11.3
Other (local fees, road tax) 1,426.9 5.6
Non-tax incomes 8,992.6 35.4
Own property, entrepreneurial activities 633.8 2.5
Administrative fees 1,370.1 5.4
Capital incomes 2,265.9 8.9
Other non-tax 4,722.8 18.6
Central grants 3,608.7 14.2
General grants 1,377.4 5.4
Capital grants 2,231.3 8.8
Incomes from credits and borrowing 93.8 0.4
payments, sold shares
Credits received 2,565.7 10.1
Total Incomes 25,423.9 100
Source: According to Bercík (1998).
3.7. Local finances 
Finances hinder local governments’ attempts to play an active role with respect to minor-
ity issues. Two aspects of local finances are important to consider: (1) financial autono-
my, and (2) resources available for activities aimed at and fulfilling minority rights and
needs. Limited local tax revenue (real estate tax) and local fees collection (maximum lim-
its defined by law) have hampered local attempts to generate revenue. Municipalities are
strongly dependent on shared taxes and specific grant transfers from the state budget.
Resources from suitable municipal property management are available only for larger
localities. This serves as a substantial barrier against more active local self-government in
the area of minority relations.
The worst financial situation is found in small communes. A large percentage of their
expenditures go to operational costs rather than to programs and initiatives that address
community issues. Minority groups are especially concentrated in such small communes.
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Lesson: A series of links can be used for effective co-operation with minorities, for their full inte-
gration in all spheres of local life. Official structures of local self-government together with
effective traditional leaders can create efficient ways to address Roma problems.
Source: J. Hrubovcák (2000) ‘S Rómami nemáme ziadne problémy’ (We have no problems with
the Roma), Obecné Noviny, No. 3, p. 20.
Financial scarcity at the local level quite simply limits good intentions with respect to
minority needs. More sophisticated co-operation between state and local administrations
could help to solve this problem. Local state administration also suffers from a long-term
lack of financial resources in the most sensitive areas for minorities: education, culture
and health. These strained resources inhibit chances for experiments and new approach-
es to local government. 
3.8. Education and use of minority languages 
Issues of education and mother-tongue instruction are the two primary concerns of minor-
ity groups. They directly influence the protection and survival of minority languages and
cultures, and serve as a basis for group identity formation. Major issues related to minor-
ity schooling are available levels of mother-tongue education (kindergarten, elementary,
secondary, university level), the number of subjects offered in minority languages (all sub-
jects, selected subjects), minority teacher training and the existence and accessibility of
school facilities. On the other hand, good teaching in the Slovak language, suitable for
minority school students, is also a crucial factor contributing to the social and economic
advancement of minorities.
3.8.1. The school system serving minorities
The Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities have well-developed and stable networks of
kindergartens and elementary schools.32 The Hungarian minority also has a network of
secondary schools with various vocational trainings. In addition, Slovakia has a strong tra-
dition of mixed schools, hosting classes ‘under one roof’ with both Slovak- and minority-
language instruction. The network of Ukrainian schools also constitutes a ‘good practice’:
in addition to the schools presented in Table 8, there were 26 schools hosting 74 classes
in which Ukrainian was the language of instruction in 1996-97.33 The teaching of the
Ruthenian language as a mother tongue was accepted as of the 1997-98 school year (the
written form of the Ruthenian language was constituted in 1995), but was instituted only
in seven schools (eight classes with 66 pupils), reflecting the lower interest of parents in
Ruthenian-language education.34 The future expansion of schooling in this language will
be supported by the Ruthenian Department established at Presov University in 1999.35
The miserable level of education among the Roma minority group is one of the major
factors contributing to the group’s gritty social and economic position. Roma children are
educated in Slovak, despite the fact that they live within their own linguistic community
(or combine the Romany language with other local languages). Their basic right to be edu-
cated in their mother tongue is not fulfilled. Roma children are generally unsuccessful in
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32 The number of kindergartens decreased as a consequence of the economic transformation after
1989. The number of schools serving minorities have increased, with the exception of the schools
with Ukrainian-language instruction. See: Gabzilová (1994).
33 According to information of UIP MS SR (1998).
34 According to UIP MS SR (1997).
35 SME (1999) 20 April. 
school and are considered ‘backward’.36 There is no network of education facilities in the
Romany language and there are insufficient capacities and resources (prepared teachers,
full collection of teaching materials) to establish such a network at the present time.
Two successful policy initiatives aimed at the improvement of Roma education are cur-
rently being expanded: (1) the preparation of Roma children in so-called ‘zero’ classes or
in kindergartens, and (2) the introduction of teacher assistants for Roma children in some
classes with a higher proportion of Roma pupils. These initiatives have been combined
with afternoon centres for children (and their mothers). In the past few years, many local
councils have decided to support local kindergartens in their effort to prepare Roma chil-
dren for Slovak schools. Both mixed and entirely Roma kindergartens function in vari-
ous municipalities. Schools serve as centres for the delivery of public goods (e.g. hygiene,
health, school lunches) and as training centres for future employment. 
Table 7. Structure of Local Self-Government Expenditures (1996) 
Expenditure SKK (Millions) Per cent
Economy 3,547.7 15.3
from this: transport 2,346.1 10.1
Banking operations and technical services 2,518.6 10.9
Education 131.5 0.6
Sport 397.0 1.7
Culture 1,076.4 4.6
Housing 5,232.4 22.6
Health 200.3 0.9
Local services 2,227.0 9.6
Social security 392.3 1.7
Environment 1,385.7 6.0
Other social services 103.0 0.4
Security 487.9 2.1
Administration 5,014.7 21.7
Other 439.2 1.9
Total 23153.7 100
Source: According to Bercík (1998).
The main centres for university-level, minority-language studies and teacher training
are Comenius University, the University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra (includ-
ing a Department of Roma Culture and an affiliate in the Spis region) and Presov University.
The Hungarian minority’s attempts to establish university-level education in the Hungarian
language have not yet been realised. In Komárno and Kralovsky Chlmec, ‘city universi-
ties’ were established at the initiative of the local governments, with the participation of
universities based in Hungary. Their legal status is not fully recognised and the Ministry
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36 Magdolenová (1998).
of Education vigorously opposed their establishment during the 1994-1998 period. In
1998 Comenius University offered talented Roma minority students the opportunity to
apply for places reserved exclusively for them. This type of ‘positive action’ was more or
less a gesture of goodwill without success. There is an outstanding need for more elabo-
rated and complex initiatives to increase the number of Roma university applicants. In
1998, only two Roma students attended the biggest Slovak higher education institution—
Comenius University—according to the Foundation ‘InfoRoma’.37
Table 8. School Network According to Minority Language of Teaching in 1997
Hungarian Ukrainian Slovak and Slovak and German
Hungarian Ukrainian
Kindergartens 283 35 104 3 1
Elementary 274 8 30 1 0
Grammar 14 1 8 0 0
Secondary vocational 5 0 20 1 0
Secodary vocational 6 0 26 0 0
apprentice training
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic (1998).
3.8.2. Disputes over education in minority-languages 
The most sensitive issues in the field of education have been attempts to introduce the so-
called ‘alternative schooling’ model and to cancel bilingual certificates in schools with
Hungarian-language instruction. According to the alternative schooling model, some of the
subjects (e.g. history, geography) had to be taught exclusively in Slovak. The main argument
for this provision was the need for the improvement of minorities’ proficiency in Slovak. The
Hungarian political parties and other Hungarian institutions, such as the Association of
Hungarian Teachers, with the broad support of parents, opposed this initiative as a blatant-
ly assimilationist policy. Alternative schooling was applied only in a very small number of
schools and it was not successful. An initiative requiring that only Slovak teachers can teach
Slovak-language classes in Hungarian-language schools was similarly unsuccessful.
The decision to replace bilingual study certificates with certificates only in Slovak (as
a result of the 1995 Act on State Language) also caused great commotion. Bilingual
certificates had been issued since 1921 and have important symbolic value. In spite of
the state administration’s decision, some schools did not stop delivering bilingual study
certificates, and in other schools students refused to accept study certificates in Slovak.
Teachers and parents organised protests and submitted petitions and, as a result, some
teachers and school directors were fired and others received reduced salaries. The conflict
was fully resolved in 1999 by returning to official bilingual certificates.
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37 SME (1998) 15 April.
It should be noted that these initiatives were combined with legislation that strength-
ened the role of state administration in managing schools. School directors were granted
only very limited powers, depending in most matters on the approval of the state admin-
istration. Parents’ associations and local self-governments served only in consultative posi-
tions. The state administration used its new rights to remove school directors from office
if they opposed these policies or refused to implement them. The situation was reversed
in November 1999, when a new Act38 balanced the position of the state administration
and self-governing institutions in education. Reconstructed school councils now act as
powerful self-governing institutions working at each school and in district and in region-
al offices. The councils have advisory status and the right to initiate new programmes.
These councils represent the interests of parents, local self-governments and teachers in
the fields of the quality of education, personnel issues, facility-use and future develop-
ment. School activities can therefore be modified according to local needs and serve as
important local community centres.
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38 Act on State Administration in Education and School Self-Government
Case Study 2. Slovak as a Second Language 
The problem: Improvement of Slovak teaching in schools with Hungarian language of instruction
The actors involved: Two Hungarian teachers (Rózsa Skabela, Irén Bóna), ‘Foundation Forum’
(later the ‘Forum Institute’—a Hungarian organisation)
The issue proceeding: One of the best examples of initiatives in the field of minority schooling is
the introduction of the innovative Skabela-Bóna method for the teaching of Slovak in Hungarian-
language schools. This was the best response to the Meciar government’s assimilationist ten-
dencies and the Ministry of Education’s attempts to introduce alternative schooling that would
have meant teaching of selected subjects in Slovak instead of Hungarian. One of the most often
cited reasons for these measures was Hungarian students’ poor knowledge of the Slovak lan-
guage limited their chances for success in public life. Two Hungarian teachers developed a
new, more efficient and modern method of teaching Slovak in Hungarian schools. This ini-
tiative attracted the attention of the Foundation Forum (later Forum Institute) and received
basic support from it. After the method’s final elaboration, due to its good references, Forum
Institute took over also the management of its dissemination.
The result: In the first, experimental stage the method was introduced in 20 schools, and in four
years this number raised at 260. This meant teacher training and delivery of four years’ com-
plete teaching materials for 20,000 pupils. This initiative grew into a massive movement for
substantial modernisation, and was instituted in the majority of Hungarian schools. This pro-
gram was elaborated without the support of the 1994-1998 Ministry of Education, although
it was fully in agreement with the Ministry’original aims for more communicative teaching of
Slovak in minority schools. Enormous work was conducted without state support—largely on
a volunteer basis. Only in November 1998, after the change of government, did the Ministry
of Education offer its official support for this initiative. This program will continue with state
support and a full range of applications in schools. The highly constructive and responsive
approach of the Hungarian teachers’ representatives, combined with third sector support, doc-
uments one of the best cases of dealing with existing problems and interest for good co-exis-
tence.
3.8.3. Use of minority languages
The Act on the Use of Minority Languages was not adopted until 1999, in spite of repeat-
ed requests by minority groups, international pressure and the promises of the central
government. To the contrary, Meciar’s government approved a new Act on State Language
of the Slovak Republic (valid since 1996) under the pressure of its nationalist, right-wing
coalition partners. This Act replaced the earlier Act on Official Languages, which allowed
the use of minority languages in official matters. The new Act limited the use of minori-
ty languages in many fields (in public administration, minority media and education).
After intense international protests, the governing coalition was urged to prepare legisla-
tion on the use of minority languages. At the end of 1997, however, the government pro-
claimed openly that the existing legal framework was sufficient for the regulation of the
use of minority languages. Many local self-governments in southern Slovakia responded
to the restriction in the use of Hungarian by applying Article 34 (see Section 2.1) of the
Slovak Constitution. They adopted their own by-laws allowing the use of Hungarian in
official conduct. One example is the city of Samorin, where the city council adopted mea-
sures according to which citizens have the right to use either Hungarian or Slovak in pub-
lic.39 A similar approach was adopted by approximately 40 other local governments.
3.9. Central – local co-operation in public works
The organisation of local public works is an example of good co-operation in the field of
employment between the state administration and local governments. This co-operation
was a reaction to high levels of local unemployment and was especially suitable for the
Roma minority. Unemployment among the Roma has been estimated at 90%, and in many
local communities it is 100%. Attempts to improve this situation have been limited by
informal discrimination in the labour market.40
Many local governments formed working groups with unemployed people. In some
cases these groups were composed entirely of Roma and their leaders were also Roma.
Public works were largely financed by the National Labour Office and organised by local
self-governments. The town of Trnava created eleven jobs for Roma residents in street
cleaning and road maintenance. A similar approach was applied in the town of Kolárovo.41
Unemployed people were frequently channelled into projects aimed at improving the
local environment and infrastructure, including improvement works in Roma settlements.
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39 Sutaj and Olejnik (1998).
40 SME (1998) 7 January; Hospodárske Noviny (1998) 17 December.
41 Krajcovic (1997); Tóth (1998); see also case study on Kolárovo later in this section.
Source: Based on a speech of Károly Tóth, director of Forum Institute, Dunajská Streda, delivered at
a seminar in the presence of Milan Ftácnik, Minister of Education of the Slovak Republic and László
Szigeti, State Secretary of Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic, Komárno, 28 Nov. 1998.
In spite of the limited number of jobs created in this way, public works provided selec-
tive support for the local Roma population. The project also helped improved relations
between local governments and local Roma communities.
3.10. The social security system according to local needs
The state plays a major role in the social security sphere. Its competencies include direct
state social support, such as family allowances; nationwide institutions, such as Social
Insurance (pensions, sickness allowances); and the National Labour Office (support for
unemployed). Social allowances constitute a substantial portion of the income of many
Roma families. Approximately two-thirds of Slovak Roma live well below the national
standard of living.42 The general rules of the distribution of social allowances by the state
administration cause some problems in targeting the specificity of particular minority
communities. Social security allowances are easily accessible and allow the distribution
of resources without actively motivating anyone to improve his or her personal situa-
tion.43 Despite the existence of many types of social benefits, they are still not elaborated
enough in addressing specific minority problems (e.g. housing).
Many local governments operate their own social support schemes. Due to the limit-
ed local resources, they are delivered occasionally, they cannot be obligatorily demand-
ed and often they are distributed on a case-by-case approach. Local offices can be more
flexible and successful when addressing families in trouble. As local self-governments can
freely decide about the forms of delivering social benefits from the local budget, they often
combine financial support with other forms of distribution (food, clothing). The main
impediments to local self-governments playing a more active role are the scarcity of
resources, narrow personnel capacities at local offices and the very large size of some
minority communities needing support.44
A promising form of state social benefit delivery is the ‘special recipient’, developed in
attempt to avoid misuse of social payments distributed by direct financial transfers (on
alcohol, gambling).45 This form allows the distribution of allowances through local self-
governments (for covering selected basic expenditures, e.g. meals in schools, housing).
The beneficiaries receive vouchers for buying specific goods and services (food, pharma-
ceuticals, etc.) in local shops. They receive the rest of the payments in cash. This co-oper-
ation between the local state administration, local self-governments and local businesses
helps to stabilise the situation of many families. The deficiencies of these alternative forms
of distribution are dependency on local services and the local price level. In some rele-
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42 In his interview. Cernanská (1999).
43 Some discrepancies in the Slovak social security system are outlined by Bodnárová (1999). It
concerns, e.g. small difference between the official minimal wage and living minimum, easily
accessible various forms of support, opportunities to combine various forms of social allowances,
which altogether can be sufficient for Roma with lower living ambitions.
44 We can hardly expect more active social approach from communes with hundreds of poor house
holds under the present financial and personal capacities of local self-governments.
45 For example,in Velká Ida in eastern Slovakia (Stark, 1998).
vant cases, the monthly distribution of social payments should be reconsidered and dis-
tributed every week, as some households spend the received cash during the first few days
after delivery, suffering throughout the rest of the period.46
3.11. Housing
For socio-economically deprived Roma households, it is almost impossible to meet their
housing needs without external help. Roma—who own minimal property, are unem-
ployed and live on social allowances—have minimal opportunities to save enough money
or receive loans. The majority of these households are financially excluded from these
possibilities and the standard financial options are not accessible to them (building soci-
eties, mortgages, etc.). The higher cost of housing that emerged following the deregula-
tion of the real estate market has worsened the housing situation of the Roma. The pres-
sure for their relocation or their voluntary retreat from expensive locations has lead to
their concentration in marginal localities or unsuitable areas on the outskirts of towns and
cities.47
The poor housing conditions and rapid population growth of the Roma have forced
local self-governments to act (e.g. Lucenec, Martin, Spiská Nová Ves). The minimal local
and state resources available have allowed for the construction of an insufficient number
of new houses. They have consisted mainly of various forms of simple, smaller housing
units, fulfilling basic housing standards. In order to satisfy Roma housing needs, inex-
pensive building materials have been used, as well as movable housing units or wooden
houses. In some cases, these housing projects attempted to respect the specific needs of
the Roma population, but in other cases new housing was not co-ordinated with local
Roma requests and did not properly address the needs of the local community. For exam-
ple, Roma in Cicava (in eastern Slovakia) were not satisfied with the new social housing
in small cabins.48 The most suitable technologies, forms of financing and the involvement
of Roma are being developed only now.
Many local governments have developed projects for the improvement of the living
environment in Roma settlements (including improved drinking water, sewage and gas).
Communes can receive subsidies from the State Environmental Fund. Bringing these ser-
vices to isolated Roma settlements is an extremely expensive investment. Nevertheless,
the poor finances of local administration is used as an excuse to ignore the abysmal liv-
ing conditions in some Roma settlements. Even simple, inexpensive solutions could
improve their dismal standard of living (fixing roads and wells, collecting waste, improved
access to public transport).
A further problem is the fact that Roma settlements were often built on land that did
not belong to them, without building permission or planning documentation. Under such
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46 It could also diminish the role of Roma usurers. Poorer Roma households have problems with
long-term planning of households expenditures, so they borrow money from usurers. They have
to return this money after receiving social benefits.
47 Some problems with relocations, segregation are outlined, e.g. in Rícan (1998).
48 Pravda (1999) 14 August.
conditions, substantial improvement of these settlements is restricted by legal constraints.
Issues of land ownership, planning and the depreciation of Roma housing facilities are sen-
sitive issues among the majority population, which also suffers from housing shortages.
3.12. Cultural institutions
A number of minority cultural institutions (theatres and museums that often function as
minority departments of Slovak institutions) are financed by the state through regional
state administrations. The state also subsidises other important minority cultural institu-
tions (cultural associations, media, cultural events). Between 1995 and 1998, state financ-
ing in this area stagnated, and in some cases many of these institutions did not receive
already approved resources.49 Local self-governments cover the costs of local cultural
institutions like libraries and local museums. They also support local art groups, folk
ensembles and cultural festivals, and create the possibility for different types of cultural
activities. Many of the local cultural institutions are festering due to the poor condition
of many local government budgets, but minority communities have their own cultural
associations that oversee a wide range of activities.
The activities of local self-governments serve the needs of Slovaks and Hungarians in par-
ticular (these two groups usually form a majority in local councils and have a strong history
of co-operating with local governments). Local self-governments and local activists can request
state support for local cultural activities from the Pro-Slovakia Cultural Fund, but the resources
of this state fund are very limited. In many ethnically heterogeneous communities, the cul-
tural activities of all local groups receive support. One of the best cases of such local co-oper-
ation can be found in the town of Levoca and its local elementary art school, where talented
Roma children study music, painting and drama. This initiative is also supported by foreign
resources and provides good opportunities for Roma children to advance in education.
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49 According to: ‘Správa k implementácii Rámcového dohovoru Rady Európy na ochranu národ-
nostnych mensín v Slovenskej republike za MK SR’, 1999. In fact it was not stagnation. Due to
inflation it was a remarkable decrease of state expenditures spent for minority culture.
Case Study 3. Ruthenian Revival
The problem: Ruthenians suffered strong Ukrainisation under the communist regime.
Ruthenians wanted to revitalise their identity through an association for cultural, education-
al and religious needs. 
The actors involved: ‘Ruthenian Revival’ Association, Greek Catholic Church, World Congress
of Ruthenians.
The issue proceeding: All Ruthenians were made Ukrainians by an official declaration in the late
1940s. Forced ‘Ukrainisation’ started in 1952 with massive state support for Ukrainian infra-
structure. This policy led to the closure of the Ruthenian school network (almost 250 ele-
mentary schools), the banning of the Greek Catholic Church in favour of the Russian Orthodox
Church, and collectivisation of agriculture. This solution was refused (i.e. Ruthenians turned
to Slovak schools and the Roman Catholic Church). Miraculously, after almost 50 years, the
3.13. Nongovernmental organisations
A major source of support for minority groups has come from the ‘third sector’. This
sphere has attracted numerous active citizens, often dissatisfied with political develop-
ments and the political culture in Slovakia. They are sensitive to various local problems
that have not been dealt with effectively, mostly due to the lack of resources and limited
capacities of local administrations. The voluntary sector initiates various projects target-
ed at minority communities in the fields of education, culture and living environments,
and uses resources from various donors. Local governments usually co-operate with these
voluntary organisations and often co-finance third-sector projects in their localities, or
offer other forms of support for their activities (office space, facilities, services, etc.). 
4. Conclusions
4.1. Participation 
Effective work to improve the situation of minority communities is not possible without
the direct involvement of and co-operation with minority groups and their leaders. All
policies that aim to address minority issues efficiently must be organised in co-operation
with local authorities. Local public administration cannot operate in a schematic way with-
out any sensitivity to specific local features.
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small Ruthenian minority in Slovakia survived. Ruthenian-sponsored initiatives to improve
their position have played a crucial role in supporting their interests and cultural associations,
with the Ruthenian Revival Association as its key ‘umbrella’. (Another organisation also formed
in 1989 is the Association of Ruthenian Intelligentsia in Slovakia.) The Ruthenian Revival has
its centre in Pre_ov; it has its own local and regional branches, especially in northeastern
Slovakia. In Bratislavia, Ruthenian representatives develop wide-ranging activities in building
the position of its minority in comparison to other minority communities in Slovakia. There
are difficulties due to some conflicts with Ukrainian minority representatives. 
The results: The Ruthenian Revival Association, in co-operation with other Ruthenian associa-
tions, strengthened the minority’s position within Slovak society. They developed good ties
with local government in their subsequent districts and municipalities. Their activities have
helped the revival of Ruthenian identity in the whole of Central Europe, especially in the field
of Ruthenian language. Ruthenians are represented in the Council of the Slovak Republic for
National Minorities. Teaching in the Ruthenian language began again, as well as teachers’ train-
ing. The Theatre of Alexander Duchnoviè (Divadlo Alexandra Duchnovièa) began to give per-
formances in Ruthenian. Slovak Public Television broadcast special programmes only in
Ruthenian. The debate and initiatives in 1999-2000 address problems with broadcasting in
Ruthenian on Slovak Radio (public) and Ruthenian as a liturgical language.
Source: ‘Sixth Congress and Changes in Leadership of Ruthenian Revival’ (1999) Narodny Novinky
(in Ruthenian), No. 24-26, pp 1-2.
More participatory forms of government at the local level should be applied that can
lead to solutions acceptable for both minority and majority populations. Various formal
and informal minority advisory bodies should co-operate with local public administra-
tion institutions, partly as a training field for future minority leaders. Local public admin-
istration should be able to co-operate and support multi-faceted activities with private
and third-sector actors willing to act in favour of minorities.
4.2. Decentralisation and deconcentration
Because of its important role in meeting minority needs, the power, autonomy, financial base
and personal capacities of local public administration must be expanded. Public administra-
tion reform should reduce the overly strong position of state administration. The regional level
of government should be introduced and the administrative-territorial division rethought.
4.3. Local finances
Local self-governments should be given the freedom to make decisions without financial
impediments so they can address minority issues. Expenditures can be controlled and
directed to the relevant fields by local councils including fields also covered by the state
administration. Municipal resources can be combined with private finances in the for-
mation of new legal entities, and municipalities can combine their resources in various
forms in intermunicipal associations.
4.4. Flexible local state administration
The competencies of local state administration must be organised in a more flexible and
co-operative way. State administration should retreat from its bureaucratic and passive
position, based on the uniform application of particular policies or the distribution of
allowances to minorities through district offices, according to rules assigned by the cen-
tral government. Suitable evaluation procedures should address project administration,
creating opportunities for their correction and reshaping. The atmosphere of dependen-
cy in some minority communities, policies based on ‘giving’ and not on ‘working togeth-
er’, should be revised. Local minority communities are diverse and are interested in dif-
ferent issues. The success of many policies depends on the identification of suitable
participants and their will to participate.
4.5. Strong local self-government
A stronger role, more power and more resources should be granted to local self-govern-
ments. They can be more effective than state institutions and are better able to design
locally appropriate social and housing policies. The selective, direct and deliverable dis-
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tribution of social allowances requires decentralisation and reorganisation. Because this
type of distribution depends on local information, local self-governments should play a
much more active role. 
4.6. Professionalism
In local public administration, a better trained staff would ideally cope with minority issues.
They should be trained in communication, negotiation, developing and sustaining co-oper-
ation with minority communities and their leaders, and in understanding the specific fea-
tures and needs of minorities. Special training has to address local mayors and councilors
representing minorities as well. The professional work addressing minority needs should
include the preparation of high-quality strategies, as well as efficient administrative prac-
tices. Special, better-aimed and well-designed programmes and allowances should be quick-
ly implemented to address concrete needs (e.g. planned housing allowances).
4.7. The value of diversity
The various ethnic groups living in Slovakia should be better informed about each other’s
specific features, history, co-existence, rights and responsibilities within society. The school
system should prepare specialists addressing minority problems at the local level (e.g.
social workers, teachers, specialists in minority culture). Initiatives targeting Roma edu-
cation should be reconsidered according to the interests of local Roma communities,
including specific forms of adult training (both in Romany and Slovak languages).
4.8. Active employment policies
Local administrations should formulate their own strategies for ‘equal employment oppor-
tunities’ in the public sector (including local bureaucracies and the police). The institu-
tions of public administration and private companies should define fields for preferential
treatment (‘positive action’) for particular minorities or should strictly respect the appli-
cation of equal opportunities to improve the chances of minority population in employ-
ment (including actions against discrimination in the labour market). Initiatives that
penalise employers refusing to employ Roma and reward employers with a particular per-
centage of Roma employees (for example, through lower taxation and better access to
public contracts) should be considered.
The existence of an active employment policy based on co-operation between local self-
governments and labour offices should be protected. More co-operation should be required
between allowance givers and receivers in the local community, which can be organised
effectively by local self-governments. The training of the unemployed for continuous
employment should be organised according to local needs. A special fund for the support
of Roma businesses should be created that could help to improve access to credit for Roma
entrepreneurs and create workplaces for the Roma in particular regions and localities.
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4.9. Contracting of municipal services
The contracting of municipal services and public projects to companies employing relatively
high numbers of Roma workers provides a means of employment protection. In the private
sector the support of Roma employment is limited and should be reconsidered. In the pub-
lic sector the number of Roma employees in public administration should be increased,
including offices responsible for the most sensitive issues for the Roma (social security,
labour offices, health services and general public administration). Such a policy would
improve communication and develop trust between minority and majority communities. 
4.10. Land, ownership and living conditions 
Public administration should initiate the clarification of the ownership rights over the
land and housing of the Roma population. Planning documentation should be prepared
especially for poorer settlements with the participation of local minority communities.
The location of new Roma housing only in local, compact, built environments and dis-
criminatory practices on the land and real estate market should be deterred. Housing
problems, especially those of Roma households, can be solved only by combining the
activities and resources of the state, local self-government and minority population (includ-
ing self-help). Special programs should address isolated Roma settlements. Local self-gov-
ernment can play a crucial co-ordinating role in numerous activities addressing the liv-
ing environment of minorities at the local level.
Further reading
Bacová, Viera (1996) Etnická identita a historické zmeny (Ethnic identity and historical changes),
Bratislava: Veda.
Bakker, Edwin (1997) Minority Conflicts in Slovakia and Hungary, Capelle a/d Ijssel: Labyrinth
Publications.
Brusis, Martin (1997) ‘Ethnic Rift in the Context of Post-Communist Transformation: The Case of
the Slovak Republic’, International Journal on Group Rights, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 3-32.
Bordás, Sándor and Huncík Péter (1999) SPON–Systém prognózovania ohnísk nap‰tia (EWS - Early
warning system), Dunajská Streda and Bratislava: Vydavateµstvo NAP Kiadó and Sándor Márai
Foundation.
Huncík, Peter (1999) ‘Madarská mensina ve Slovenské republice’ (Hungarian minority in Slovak
Republic), in: Gabal, Ivan et al., Etnické mensiny ve strední Evropi (Ethnic minorities in Central
Europe), Praha: G plus G, pp. 204-218.
Kusy, Miroslav (1998) Co s nasimi Madarmi (What about our Hungarians), Bratislava: Kalligram.
Mann, Arne B. (ed.) (1992) Unknown Romanies, Bratislava: Ister Science Press.
Meseznikov, Grigorij, Michal Ivantysyn and Tom Nicholson (eds.) (1999) Slovakia 1998-1999. A
Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs.
Sutaj, Stefan and Milan Olejník (1998) ‘Slovak Report’, in: J. Kranz and H. Kupper (eds.) Law and
Practice of Central European Countries in the Field of National Minorities Protection after
1989.,Warsaw: Center for International Relations, pp. 269-321.
Zelová, Alena (ed.) (1994) Etnické minority na Slovensku v procesoch sociálnych premien (Ethnic minori-
ties in Slovakia under the processes of social changes), Bratislava: Veda.
306 DIVERSITY IN ACTION ·· PART II
A STATE TO BUILD, A NATION TO FORM: 
ETHNO-POLICY IN UKRAINE
Viktor Stepanenko
Contents
Abstract  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .309
1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .310
1.1. Roots of ethnic diversity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .310
Table 1. The Largest Ethnic Minorities in Ukraine
and their Main Characteristics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311
1.2. Socio-historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .312
2. Recent Policy Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313
2.1. The perspective on territorial autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .314
Case Study 1. Territorial Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .315
2.1.1. A special case: Crimean Administrative Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316
2.1.2. Politicisation of the Crimean Tatars  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .318
2.2. Linguistic Rights of the Russian Minority  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .319
2.3. Migration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .320
3. A Difficult Bargain: Legal Instruments and Institutions 
Promoting the Rights of Minorities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .323
3.1. Process of European integration: influence of international law  . . . . . . . . . .323
3.1.1. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities  . . . .324
3.1.2. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages  . . . . . . . . . . . . .324
3.2. Bilateral treaties  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .325
3.3. Constitutional and internal legislative guarantees  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .325
3.3.1. Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, 1991  . . . . . . . . .325
3.3.2. Law on National Minorities in Ukraine, 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .326
3.3.3. Law on Citizenship of Ukraine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .326
3.3.4. Law on Local Government in Ukraine, 1997  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .327
3.3.5. Law on Education  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .327
3.3.6. The Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea  . . . . . . . . . .328
307
3.4. State Programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .328
3.5. Central Institutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .328
3.5.1. Constitutional Court  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .328
3.5.2. Committee of Human Rights, National Minorities and 
International Relations in the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine . . .329
3.5.3. The Parliamentary Commissioner of Human Rights (Ombudsman)  . . .329
3.5.4. State Committee for Nationalities and Migration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .330
3.5.5. Council of Representatives of Civic Associations of National Minorities 330
4. Implementation of Ethno-policy at the Local Level  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .331
4.1. State involvement in local ethno-policy issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .331
4.2. Main actors and mechanisms of ethno-policy implementation  . . . . . . . . . . .332
Case Study 2. A Failed Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .333
4.3. Representation of minorities in local government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .335
Table 2. The Ethnic Characteristics of the Deputies of Ukraine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .336
4.4. Political organisation of minorities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .337
Case Study 3. Moderating Extremism  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .337
4.5. Financial issues in the field of minority protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .339
4.6. Minority education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .340
4.7. Local policy on socio-economic and cultural empowerment 
of the Roma community  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341
5. Conclusion and Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .342
5.1. Legal framework for minority protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .342
5.2. Decentralisation and public administration reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343
5.3. Political participation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343
5.4. Cultural autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .344
5.5. Public finances  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .345
5.6. Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .345
5.7. Capacity-building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .345
Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .346
Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .381
308
A STATE TO BUILD, A NATION TO FORM: 
ETHNO-POLICY IN UKRAINE
Viktor Stepanenko
Abstract
This chapter will analyse relations between the Ukrainian state and ethnic groups liv-
ing within its borders by looking at the strengths and weaknesses of the country’s
policy on minority issues. The Chapter will also attempt to recommend improve-
ments in Ukrainian ethnic policy. Unlike most countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, Ukraine does not have a stable and developed historical tradition of inde-
pendent statehood, and thus it has a less clearly defined national identity than some
of its neighbours. As a result, the process of democratic state-building is inextricably
linked with the process of nation-building. The overlap of these two processes is the
source of various political ambiguities, which have created a disadvantageous situa-
tion for certain minority groups.
The government’s responses to recent challenges to its authority have produced
several ambiguous policies. The fear of secessionist movements has significantly slowed
down the reform of public administration decentralisation, as well as the introduc-
tion of self-governance at the local level. For example, some members of the Russian
ethnic minority have perceived recent efforts to strengthen the status of Ukrainian as
the official state language as being unfriendly to minorities and discriminatory against
those seeking public work.
Meanwhile, a group of Crimean Tatars, most of whom are re-settling in Ukraine
after past deportation to Uzbekistan, have become more politicised in response to
their perception that the government is not doing enough for them. Tatars have
complained that they have not received sufficient support in re-settling, and that
the process of acquiring citizenship has excluded many of them from participa-
tion in elections.
Other minority issues need to be addressed in Ukraine as well, and they can
probably be best handled at the local level. As this chapter will attempt to show,
one of the greatest current weaknesses in Ukraine’s existing policy on minorities
is a centrist approach. By leaving local authorities with only limited funding and
decision-making powers, the policy eliminates a potential effective tool for ensur-
ing minority rights.
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1. Introduction
1.1. The roots of ethnic diversity
In contrast to Russia and the majority of Central European and Baltic states,
Ukraine does not possess a stable or developed historical tradition of indepen-
dent statehood. Until now, Ukraine has only enjoyed two brief periods of inde-
pendence in the modern era: for a few years after the Cossack rebellion of 1648,
and under a succession of weak governments between 1917 and 1921.1 Ukraine
occupies a position on the border between Central and Eastern Europe and
Russia. By virtue of this geographical location, and its historical development,
the country is a crossroad of political, cultural, historical, ethnic and religious
influences between the east (Russia) and west—and between the south (Turkey,
the Balkans) and the north (the Baltics and Scandinavia). 
One of the most important demographic features of Ukraine is its broad range
of ethnic groups. There are more than 130 minority ethnic groups residing in
the country, representing 28% of the total population. Thus, Ukraine accom-
modates a wide range of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity. According
to the results of the 1989 census,2 Ukraine’s population is 51.4 million, of which
Ukrainian nationals make up about 72% (37.4 million). Russians are the sec-
ond major ethnic group, making up more than one-fifth of Ukraine’s popula-
tion (11.3 million).
Other major ethnic groups—each making up less than 1% of the popula-
tion—include Jews, Belarussians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars,3 Bulgarians, Poles,
Hungarians and Romanians. Minorities whose total population within Ukraine
is between 50,000 and 100,000 consist of Greeks, Volga (or Kazan) Tatars,
Armenians and Germans. Even smaller groups include the Roma, Gagauz,
Georgian, Chuvash, Uzbek, Mordvin, Slovak, Czech, Bashkir, Latvian,
Lithuanian and Estonian peoples. These groups represent an extremely colour-
ful picture of linguistic, cultural and religious diversity. (See Table I.)
It should be stressed that ethnic Ukrainians themselves do not form a
homogenous community. Their identity varies due to the diverse historical her-
itage of different parts of the country. Factors in variations of ethnic Ukrainians
include:
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1 Taras Kuzio (1992) Ukraine. The Unfinished Revolution, London: Alliance Publishers, p. 7.
2 Apart from the statistics on the Crimean Tatars all the data is from the latest 1989 Soviet
census ‘Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR’ (The national composition of the USSR) (1991)
Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, pp. 134-136.
3 According to the statistics of the State Committee for Nationalities of the ARC on 1 October
1996. See: Buznytsky et al. (1997) ‘Stability and Integration in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea: The Role of International Community’, Kiev: International Renaissance
Foundation, pp. 10-11.
Table I. The Largest Ethnic Minorities in Ukraine and their Main Characteristics
Nationality Number (in Character of Type of Religion Region(s) 
thousands) distribution distribution of living
and per cent (compact or (city or 
of total dispersed) village)
Russians 11,355 Dispersed, but More than 80 per Russian East (Donbass), 
(22.1%) regionally cent live in cities Orthodox south, Crimea
concentrated and industrial 
regions
Jews 486 Dispersed Overwhelming Judaism Cities and 
(0.9%) majority is urban towns 
population (Odessa, Kiev,
Kharkiv, etc.)
Bela- 440 Predominantly Predominantly Greek Rural popula-
russians (0.8%) dispersed urban with a Catholic/ tion in north-
share of rural Russian west regions 
population Orthodox (Polissya and 
Volyn)
Moldovans 324 Predominantly Predominantly in Orthodox Southwest 
(0.6%) compact rural areas (Odessa region)
residence
Crimean 260 Compact Predominantly in Islam Crimea
Tatars (0.5%) residence rural areas
Bulgarians 233 Compact Predominantly in Orthodox Southwest 
(0.45%) residence rural areas and (Odessa and 
Catholic Kherson 
regions)
Poles 219 Dispersed, but Predominantly in Catholic Northwest 
(0.4%) regionally urban areas regions 
concentrated (Polissya and 
Volyn)
Hungarians 163 Compact Predominantly in Catholic Trans-
(0.3%) residence rural areas and Carpathian 
Protestant region
Romanians 134.7 Compact Predominantly in Orthodox Bukovyna 
(0.26%) residence rural areas (Chernivtsi 
region)
Greeks 98.6 Compact Urban and rural Orthodox South (Odessa, 
(0.19%) residence population Zaporiszhya 
regions)
Germans 51 Predominantly Predominantly in Protestant South and 
(0.10%) compact rural areas Trans-
residence Carpathian 
region
Roma 47.9 Predominantly Urban and rural Trans-
(0.09%) compact population Carpathian 
residence region and 
southeast
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· The main polarities are the strongly nationalist-oriented western part of the coun-
try, on the one hand, and the ‘Russified’ Southeast, on the other.
· The main language used in the Southeast, especially in the cities, is Russian, while
Ukrainian is dominant in the western area.
· Divisions include the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church, which has historically
been dominant in the west; the Russian Orthodox Church; the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church; and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which
succeeded from the Moscow patriarchate in 1992.
It should be noted that, due to socio-political and cultural factors in the development
of a historically divided Ukrainian society, the political cultures of the eastern and west-
ern parts of the country are different. The eastern regions of the country accommodate a
large Russian population and traditions of Soviet-Russian administration are stronger,
whereas in the western regions, Ukrainians form the majority and a more liberal nation-
al consciousness has developed.
1.2. Socio-historical background 
The roots of Ukrainian nationalism stem from the beginning of the 20TH century, when
Ukrainian intellectuals agitated for an independent state. The struggle for independence
succeeded in 1917, when the Bolshevik Revolution broke up the Russian Empire. Ukraine
had a brief and anarchic period of independence beginning in 1917, at which time the
Ukrainian People’s Republic was proclaimed in Kiev. In 1918, the new state adopted the
law on national-personal autonomy,4 which provided a legal avenue for ethnic minori-
ties to establish their autonomies. These plans were never implemented, however, because
Ukraine was one of the first countries to be forcibly seized by Russia as the Bolsheviks
asserted their power. Successive political and military attempts to restore the indepen-
dent status of Ukraine failed, and in 1922, most of Ukraine became part of the USSR as
one of Soviet republics. (Certain western parts of Ukraine did not join the USSR then,
because at that time they belonged to Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia.)
From the late 1920s, the Soviet leadership repressed both the Ukrainian community
at large and its minorities. The Stalinist regime, claiming to pursue the political goals of
collectivisation and the struggle against a ‘class enemy’, created a deadly famine in
Ukraine—with the aim of crushing the independent peasantry and the last vestiges of
Ukrainian nationalism. More Ukrainians died during the 1932-33 man-made famine than
during the Second World War. From that time to the middle of the 1980s, the best rep-
resentatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were assassinated or deported to Siberia on the
basis of political accusations of being ‘bourgeois nationalists’.
Various ethnic groups were expelled from Ukraine to remote parts of Central Asia and
eastern regions of Russia. During and after the war, almost 450,000 ethnic Germans and
about 200,000 Crimean Tatars, as well as more than 38,000 Crimean Greeks, Bulgarians
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4 National-personal autonomy refers to the concept of self-government for minorities.
and Armenians,5 were deported from eastern Ukraine to Central Asian regions of the USSR
and Siberia. Under Nazi occupation during the war, Jewish and Roma minorities were
exterminated en-masse in western Ukraine. In Babiy Yar, now part of Kiev, about 100,000
Jews, Roma and other people were assassinated by Nazis.
In the postwar period, nationality policy in Ukraine and the rest of the former
Soviet Union was strongly centralised in the hands of the Communist Party appara-
tus. Despite the fact that the Ukrainians were the official titular nation and the pre-
vailing ethnic majority in the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, they, and
other non-Russian nationalities, were subjected to ‘internationalist policies’. The ulti-
mate goal of these policies was the merger (slijanie) of different ethnic groups in
order to form a new historical community of ‘Soviet people’. At the same time, social
and political upward mobility in the Soviet Union was informally linked to ethnic
origin. The famous fifth point of Soviet passports declared the ethnic origin of the
bearer. Ethnicity was often the reason for hidden discrimination, particularly towards
Jews. Typically, there was a traditional minority network in places with a high con-
centration of minorities—like Hungarian and Romanian schools in Trans-Carpathia,
and Gagauz and Bulgarian schools in Odeska oblast. But educational policy during
the postwar era served as the main tool in implementing ‘internationalist policy’.
During the postwar period, Russification severely impacted non-Russian Slavs,
Ukrainians and Belarussians.
The declaration of an independent Ukrainian state in 1991, and the ratification of the
Constitution in 1996, were the final steps in the quest for Ukrainian independence. In
order to foster greater support for independent Ukraine among national and ethnic minori-
ties, the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine, as well as the Declaration of the Rights
of Nationalities of Ukraine (November 1991), included provisions to protect minority
rights. Soon after, a Law on National Minorities in Ukraine (1992) was adopted.
During the first years of independence, Ukrainian lawmakers aimed at achieving broad
support for statehood among the populace by adopting the concept of a ‘civic nation’,
which would include all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin. In 1996, with the adop-
tion of the new Constitution, came the ratification of the political and legal framework
for development of the ‘civic nation’. The constitution defines this concept as ‘the Ukrainian
people—citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities’.
2. Recent Policy Challenges
Ethnic policy in Ukraine faces three major challenges:
1. The issues of state decentralisation and territorial autonomy for minority groups.
(This is especially important with regard to Crimean Autonomy and the rights of
the Crimean Tatars.)
2. The linguistic rights of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine.
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5 Y. Belukha (ed.) (1999) Deportovani krymski tatary, bolgary, virmeny, greky, nimtsi. Zbirnyk doku-
mentiv (1941-1998), Kiev: Abris, p. 3.
3. Issues related to policy and legal provisions for immigrants and refugees coming
into Ukraine.
These challenges set the stage for current state-ethnic relations in Ukraine, and deter-
mine the main trends in ethno-policy6 and power-sharing. Ukrainian policy-makers view
these challenges in the context of the dilemma over political priority: the desire to create
an inclusive multi-ethnic state versus the desire to promote Ukrainian national identity.
The unresolved issue of state decentralisation—including the complex question of ter-
ritorial autonomy for minority groups—demands territorial-administrative reform, along
with profound reforms in local government. These changes must include an alteration of
the traditional, strongly centralised model of policy-making. There is a need for institu-
tionalised power-sharing that considers the interests of minorities as stake-holders. Such
a strategy corresponds to the model of an inclusive, multi-ethnic state.
The dilemma of Ukraine’s task of nation-state building is also revealed in the unset-
tled problem of the language rights of the country’s Russian-speaking population. The
problem has already generated dangerous tensions between central and local authorities.
One controversial case involved legal precedents for local governments’ decisions on a
declaration of Russian as a second official local language, in the eastern Ukrainian local-
ities of Kharkiv, Lugansk and Luganska oblast in 1998-1999.
The growing legal and socio-economic problems of refugees and immigrants, espe-
cially illegal immigrants, reveal the absence of a clearly elaborated state migration poli-
cy—as well as a lack of co-ordination between central and local authorities in dealing
with these issues. The limited autonomy of local self-governments means that local pol-
icy on immigrants and refugees is likely to be ineffective. Meanwhile, the central author-
ities demonstrate their inability in dealing with migrants’ problems and in initiating real
political efforts on prevention of human trafficking at the international level.
2.1. The perspective on territorial autonomy
In the range of internationally recognised means for implementing special minority rights,
only the right to territorial autonomy is not provided under current Ukrainian legisla-
tion.7 The ambitious proclamations of the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of
Ukraine of 1991, in which the Ukrainian state guaranteed ‘the right of all nationalities to
preserving their traditional settlements’ and promised ‘to provide an existence of nation-
al administrative units’, were not included in the Law on National Minorities (1992) or
in the 1996 Constitution.
Claims for various degrees of territorial autonomy by various ethnic groups living
in compact areas are apparently considered to be a threat to a unitary state in Ukraine.
From the state’s perspective, the main problem with territorial autonomy is the absence
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6 Ethno-policy is a term used to refer policies towards national and ethnic minorities in Ukraine,
and does not include policies towards religious and other minorities.
7 Crimea is not a case of national territorial autonomy; Crimean autonomy is based on the admin-
istrative-territorial principle.
of legislative guarantees to prevent the kind of separatism that could potentially threat-
en the country’s territorial integrity.8 In regions with compact national minorities, the
issue of power decentralisation can be turned into a question of extending the minor-
ity’s right of local self-governance to the point where it becomes a right to territorial
autonomy. This is exactly the question that arose when voters initiated local referen-
dums on autonomy.
Local referendums in 1991—in the Bolgradskiy district of Odeska oblast and in the
Beregivskiy district of the Zakarpatska oblast (Trans-Carpathia)—supported the idea of
national territorial units in these areas. However, central authorities simply ignored the
results of the local initiatives taken by ethnic minorities—Bulgarians and Gagauzes in the
first case and Hungarians in the second. The contradiction between the promising
Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of 1991, which fed minorities’ aspirations on
territorial autonomy, and current legislation on minorities, which does not mention auton-
omy, may create a dangerous clash of rights and interests of different groups in Ukraine.
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Case Study 1. Territorial Autonomy 
Issue: The right of ethnic minorities regarding territorial autonomy.
Subjects studied: 1) national organisations of ethnic Hungarians in Trans-Carpathia; 2) local self-
governments of the Beregovskiy district and Zakarpatska (Trans-Carpathia) oblast—the
Beregivskiy district council, the Zakarpatska oblast council; 3) the Ukrainian government.
Proceedings of the case: On 1 December 1991 a local referendum on the creation of the Hungarian
autonomous unit in Beregivskiy district took place. A total of 82% of the voters supported the
idea of autonomy. On 25 April 1992 a plenary meeting of the district council approved the
draft of law ‘On a Hungarian Autonomous Unit’. The central authorities simply ignored the
referendum and the draft law that followed it. Since that time, the issue of a Hungarian
autonomous unit has been repressed by the central government and kept out of the national
media. However, the national organisations of ethnic Hungarians have not dropped the idea. 
The issue of national territorial autonomy came up in the last elections, when some candi-
dates said they favoured the idea. But given the current political climate in Ukraine, efforts
aimed at the peaceful creation of national territorial autonomy seem unlikely to succeed.
Lessons: 1) Inconsistency in legislation and the lack of certainty with respect to minority rights
can create dangerous tensions between local and central authorities. 2) The central authori-
ties’ strategy of simply ignoring the issue pushes the conflict into a latent stage. Such an approach
can only further tensions and ensure that the issue does not disappear until it is appropriate-
ly addressed.
Sources: Mykhailo Tovt (1997) ‘Problemy Ugorskoi natsionalnoi menshyny u suchasniy Ukraini’
Kiev: Nova Polityka, Vol. 3, pp. 24-28; J. Marcsuk (1999) ‘Az autonomia nem utopia’, Karpati
Igaz Szo, 26 June.
8 Political decisions and practical measures on decentralisation in the exercise of state power in
favour of extending a level of regional self-governance (while preserving state unity) is one of the
most significant and problematic issues in the post-communist transformation in Ukraine.
According to state law, Ukraine is a unitary state, composed of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea and 24 territorial administrative units, or oblasts (regions). Thus, the
only case of autonomy is in Crimea, but its autonomy is administrative, not national. Since
1991, when the state rejected the initiatives of Hungarian and Bulgarian-Gagauz minori-
ties to establish national territorial units, the idea of national-territorial autonomy was
also raised in the political movement of the Crimean Tatars. Aside from these instances,
there have been no other visibly significant political manifestations on the issue of nation-
al-territorial autonomy from Ukraine’s other ethnic minorities. The Russian minority is,
however, particularly active in claiming rights to cultural autonomy, with special empha-
sis on linguistic rights.
In terms of local self-government, the rights of minorities are satisfied in local com-
munities where they constitute the majority of voters. This is the case with Hungarians
in the Beregivskiy district of Transcarpathia, Romanians in rural areas of Bukovyna and
Bulgarians in the Bolgradskiy district of Odeska oblast. In these locations, the ethnic
minorities have been able to elect a majority in their local self-governments.
2.1.1. A special case: Crimean Administrative Autonomy
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) enjoys administrative autonomy within the
territorial structure of Ukraine. The Crimean case represents a ‘reverse’ ratio in the major-
ity-minority relationship in Ukraine: Ukrainians in Crimea are an ethnic minority, mak-
ing up only 25% of the peninsula’s population, while the Russian majority is 63%. The
demographic situation in Crimea is also complicated by the process of active repatriation
of formerly deported nations apart from Crimean Tatars, including Armenians, Bulgarians,
Greeks, Germans, Crimchaks, Karaims and other peoples.
The history of political and ethnic relations in Crimea is complex and turbulent. In
the 16TH and 17TH centuries, the Crimean peninsula belonged to the Crimean Khanate. As
a result of Russo-Turkish wars, it was annexed by the Russian empire in 1792. The Soviet
power was established in Crimea in 1921, with the creation of the Crimean Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic (Crimean ASSR), part of Soviet Russia. During the early years of
the Crimean ASSR, Crimean Tatars, who made up 25% of the Crimean population in the
1926 census, enjoyed a high level of national cultural autonomy. This relative autonomy
came to an end in late 1927, when a ‘struggle against bourgeois nationalism’, country-
wide collectivisation and an anti-religious campaign led to mass political repression against
the Tatar intelligentsia and Muslim clergy. During and after World War II, the Crimean
Tatars—as well as small numbers of Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, Crimchaks
and Karaims—were accused of having collaborated with Nazi Germany, and then forcibly
deported to Central Asia and eastern regions of Russia. The new settlers moving to the
peninsula, which was considered a desirable place to live, were mostly ethnic Russians.
Crimean administrative territorial autonomy was abolished in 1946.
In 1954, administration of Crimea was officially transferred from Russia to the Ukrainian
Soviet Republic. Therefore, when Ukraine declared independence in 1991, Crimea auto-
matically became a part of the new state. The new and uncertain position of the Russian
postwar immigrants and their descendants, a socio-economic crisis and other factors,
compounded by a mass return of Crimean Tatars, created a volatile clash of expectations
among the different ethnic groups inhabiting Crimea. The territorial status of the penin-
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sula also turned into one of the more difficult issues in Russian-Ukrainian inter-state
debates over the post-Soviet legacy. The Ukrainian leadership’s decision to restore the
autonomous status of Crimea and hold a referendum on Crimean autonomy helped defuse
the situation.
After a lengthy negotiation process between the Ukrainian and Crimean governments,
the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine defined the main political and legislative regulations
for the autonomous status of the Republic of Crimea. In accordance with the Ukrainian
Constitution, the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was adopted by
the Crimean parliament in October 1998, and approved by the Verkhovna Rada (nation-
al legislature) of Ukraine in December 1998.
The Crimean Constitution generally adheres to principles of minority protection con-
tained in the Constitution of Ukraine. One major difference, however, is that the Crimean
Constitution gives special status to the Russian language. Although Ukrainian is recog-
nised as the state language, and the Crimean Republic guarantees protection for the Tatar
language, the Crimean Constitution classifies Russian as ‘the language of the majority’,
which functions as the language of inter-ethnic communication in the public sphere. This
provision has a discriminatory effect towards Tatar and Ukrainian. The use of these lan-
guages for public matters is only allowed if it is acceptable for all interested parties. The
Crimean Constitution does, however, guarantee the right of all citizens to be educated in
their mother tongue.
The Crimean Constitution has been strongly criticised by the leaders of the Crimean
Tatars. They are dissatisfied with the Constitution because:
1. It does not recognise the Crimean Tatars as one of the indigenous peoples of Crimea.
2. It does not legitimise the Kurultay (National Assembly) and the Mejlis—the elect-
ed representative bodies of the Crimean Tatars.
3. It does not ensure the effective representation of the Crimean Tatars as integral
members of the power structure in Crimea.
Indeed, the Crimean Constitution does not provide any guaranteed quotas for politi-
cal representation of minorities in the Crimean legislature. According to the Constitution,
a person elected to the Crimean Parliament must be a Ukrainian citizen who has lived in
the country for no less than five years. Because the Crimean Tatar population is mostly
recent returnees, about a half of the adult Tatar population were not Ukrainian citizens
by the beginning of 1998.9 Even by the middle of 2000, an estimated 14,000 to 20,000
adult Tatar returnees, including 13,700 from Uzbekistan, were still considered to be de-
jure stateless people, according to UNHCR data.10 Although more Crimean Tatars are
receiving citizenship, many still do not meet residence requirements, so that the whole
Crimean Tatar minority of around 260,000 people could conceivably be legally repre-
sented by a mere 150,000 eligible voters.
Thus, the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea falls short in enshrin-
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9 From an interview with a leader of the Crimean Tatars, Mustafa Dszamilyov, Nezavisimost, 20
January 1998
10 UNHCR office in Ukraine. Online. Internet: http://www.un.kiev.ua.
ing the political rights of Crimean Tatars. This situation will likely increase tensions
between the Tatars and Crimean authorities, and also between Tatars and the Ukrainian
central authorities. This problem, along with the Ukrainian majority’s strategic interrela-
tion with the largest ethnic minority—Russians—poses the greatest threat to peaceful eth-
nic relations in Ukraine.
At the same time, the case of Crimean autonomy proves the effectiveness of accom-
modating and power-sharing strategies in dealing with separatist trends.11 Crimean auton-
omy plays a significant role as a legal and institutional precedent in the development of pub-
lic administration reform in Ukraine.
2.1.2. Politicisation of the Crimean Tatars 
It is an axiom that government neglect or discriminatory policies toward ethnic minori-
ties leads to ethnic mobilisation and the politicisation of those minorities. This can be wit-
nessed in the Ukraine, where there is a growing political mobilisation of Crimean Tatars,
who have returned en-masse from Central Asia and Siberia more than 45 years after their
exile. The repatriates have found insufficient provisions for their adaptation process and
have experienced a high level of unemployment. These factors created a strong econom-
ic impetus for political mobilisation and self-organisation by the Tatar community.
To some extent, both the Crimean and the Ukrainian governments were unprepared
for the scale and pace of the Tatars’ repatriation movement. Authorities had hoped for an
organised and gradual return of the formerly deported people. There were plans to pre-
pare housing and greater social infrastructure for re-settlers. But things happened more
quickly than officials expected.
By the end of 1992, about 190,000 Crimean Tatars had resettled in Crimea of their
own accord. This influx of people has generated enormous problems for central and local
governments. The radical change of the ethnic situation in Crimea has also generated seri-
ous tensions between the existing local population, who are mostly ethnic Russians, and
the incoming Tatars. Crimean authorities are often guilty of both tacit and explicit dis-
crimination towards Tatars.
All of these factors have encouraged Crimean Tatars to create their own political and
governmental structures at all levels. (The issue of the Crimean Tatars’ local self-govern-
mental structures are presented in further detail below.) In fact, political mobilisation of
the Crimean Tatars began with the repatriation process in 1991. The main aims of the
Tatars’ political organisations are to achieve political privileges for the Crimean Tatars,
based on their historical status as an indigenous people, and to establish the Tatars’ nation-
al-territorial autonomy in Crimea.
The Crimean Tatar case, which has the potential to lead to open ethnic conflict, involves
the clash of the interests of different ethnic groups. The aspirations and claims of the polit-
ically mobilised ethnic minority can only be realised within limits before they begin to
violate the rights of other ethnic groups.
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(1999) CSS-CEMES, pp. 53-81.
2.2. Linguistic Rights of the Russian Minority
The interaction of ethnic Ukrainians with the Russian minority—which makes up
81% of the non-ethnically Ukrainian population—is a politically sensitive and strate-
gic issue for the stability and unity of the state. Historic, religious and linguistic
affinity between Ukrainians and Russians have forced this issue to the forefront of
domestic politics.
About 63% of Ukraine’s ethnic Russians live in Crimea. Elsewhere, the central,
and especially the western, regions of the country are overwhelmingly Ukrainian in
terms of ethnic and linguistic composition. Nonetheless, the Russian language plays
a major role in everyday communication in the cities of central Ukraine, including
the capital, Kiev.
The official status of Russian as the second state language in Ukraine is one of most
problematic policy issues at both the central and local levels. This issue is not only
important to ethnic Russians, but also to ‘Ukrainian Russophones’. Many ethnic
Ukrainians have assimilated the Russian language, due to a policy of ‘Russification’
that began under the tsars and continued in the Soviet regime.
Although many Ukrainians might prefer a ‘one state, one language’ ideology, the coun-
try is in fact bilingual, and Russian may actually be the dominant language. Nonetheless,
according to the current Law on Languages, Ukrainian is the only official language at the
political and legislative level.12 Ukrainian alone was granted official language status, while
Ukrainian, Russian and other languages were proclaimed the languages of ‘inter-ethnic
communication’. Though Russian was not given distinct status, a free usage of Russian
and other national languages is guaranteed.
Practical application of the law places stronger emphasis on the implementation of
Ukrainian in all spheres of public life, particularly in education. As a consequence of this
so-called ‘policy of Ukrainisation’, the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian schools was changed
in favour of the latter during the early years of independence. According to data from the
Ministry of Education, during the first four years of Ukrainian independence, the num-
ber of pupils who studied in Ukrainian increased from 45 to 56.5%.13 According to gov-
ernment data from 1998, 65% of students in Ukrainian secondary schools studied in
Ukrainian and 34.1% studied in Russian.14
However, Ukrainisation has not occurred as rapidly as some authorities had hoped, in
part because of the way Ukraine’s population is distributed. The majority of students study-
ing in Ukrainian live in rural Ukraine, in western and central parts of the country. While
in Crimea, where about 25% of ethnic Ukrainians live, 98.1% of the students study in
Russian. A similar situation prevails in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of Ukrainian instruction for Ukrainisation is not clear. Many
children who study in Ukrainian schools in central, eastern and southern Ukraine prefer
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14 The Bulletin of the State Committee on Nationalities and Migration of Ukraine (1999) p. 110.
to communicate with each other and their families in Russian. This is particularly true for
senior pupils in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev.15
Despite its inconsistent results, the policy of Ukrainisation produced strong criticism
and resistance from the representatives of the Russian-speaking community. Though the
law guarantees citizens the right to use their national languages, Russians demanded that
their language share equal footing with Ukrainian as Ukraine’s second official language.
The debate over the use of the Russian language—and, implicitly, the linguistic
rights of Ukraine’s Russian minority—has already been actively explored in two pres-
idential election campaigns. In 1994, three-quarters of the Ukrainian-speaking com-
munity supported Leonid Kravchuk. Meanwhile, three-quarters of the Russian-speak-
ing community backed the eventual winner, Leonid Kuchma. As Andrew Wilson
concludes, ‘of all elections in 1990-1994, the presidential elections of the summer of
1994 showed the polarisation between Ukrainian historical regions most sharply’.16
In the parliamentary election of 1998, eight political parties actively used the lan-
guage issue in their political agendas. The relative success of one of them—the
Communist Party—demonstrated that the unresolved issue of the linguistic rights of
Russian-speakers may augur an uncertain destiny for the democratic transformation
of Ukraine and the existence of its present borders.
2.3. Migration
As elsewhere in modern Europe, external migration has recently become a demographic
factor in Ukraine’s inter-ethnic relations. Though the number of immigrants entering the
country is almost equal to the level of emigration,17 migration has changed the country’s
ethnic composition. While most Germans and Jews18 have left Ukraine since the mid-
1980s, there is large-scale immigration of formerly deported ethnic groups, especially
Crimean Tatars.
The growing legal and socio-economic problems caused by the influx of illegal immi-
grants, deported people and refugees reveals the absence of a clearly elaborated state migra-
tion policy. It is also obvious that there is a lack of co-ordination between central and local
authorities in dealing with these issues. The situation has produced tension among the pop-
ulation of a country that was essentially closed to the outside world a short time ago.
The prospect of EU enlargement, and the new visa regimes it will bring to Ukraine’s
immediate neighbours, could further aggravate tensions surrounding migration. Illegal
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Germans out of 37,800 left the country in 1991-1996. And 350,000 Jewish people emigrated
in the period between 1984-1995. Ibid., p. 61.
immigrants and refugees, who used to consider the Ukraine a stopping point on the way
west, will find it harder to leave the country. These migrants could create a substantial
financial burden for Ukraine, and there is no clear legal provision for EU assistance with
this problem.
It is possible to distinguish three main flows of immigrants into the country:
1. Repatriation of Crimean Tatars and other deported peoples. This is the most significant
source of immigration into the Ukraine. Apart from the Crimean Tatars, returnees
include Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Germans, Crimchaks, Karaims and other
peoples of the Crimea. Active repatriation began when the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR adopted the Declaration of 14 November 1989, which recognised the repres-
sive acts against the deported peoples and removed the obstacles to their return.
Since the late 1980s, more than 250,000 formerly deported people or their descen-
dants have returned to Crimea, and immigrants now constitute about 10% of the
population of the peninsula. The massive wave of returnees has created enormous
socio-economic difficulties for both central and Crimean authorities. This has not
stopped the Ukrainian government from supporting repatriation and allocating bud-
getary resources for the process—though local authorities are still overburdened. 
2. Refugees from the former Soviet Union. Since 1991, Ukraine has assimilated about
150,000 ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, Armenians and people from other ethnic
groups within the former Soviet republics.19 The socio-economic problems these
refugees face are exacerbated by the ambiguity in the Ukrainian laws on immigrants
and refugees. Many of these people do not fit into any of the four judicial categories
for migrants in need of assistance.20 This is especially a problem for ethnic
Ukrainians, who are either fleeing ethnic conflict or were denied citizenship in the
Baltics or other parts of the former Soviet Union. Further, even those who do man-
age to qualify as refugees have only received limited government support.
3. Refugees from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. As much as 85% of the refugees
from these regions are Afghans, and the rest are citizens from about 20 African and
Asian countries. The first officially registered refugees from this category, mostly
Afghans, were former students who applied for refugee status after the breakdown
of the USSR. Experts estimate that there are about 3,000 people from this group
who are currently registered as refugees, while there are at least 15,000 undocu-
mented migrants, most of whom are concentrated in Kiev.21
Due to its location, Ukraine has also become a destination for numerous illegal immi-
grants, many of whom consider the country a gateway to the west. Insufficient Ukrainian
laws regarding immigrants, and an unwillingness of central and local authorities to deal
with the problem, has resulted in a huge growth in illegal immigration. There is, howev-
er, considerable discrepancy between official and actual data on the situation. According
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21 Ethnic Conflict and Migration in Europe. First Report of the Ethnobarometer Programme (1999) CSS-
CEMES, p. 202.
to the experts’ estimates, the total number of illegal immigrants and persons with indef-
inite status varies between 70,000 and 500,000.22
Ukrainian officials admit that they lack a clear migration policy.23 The laws are inade-
quate, there are complex bureaucratic procedures for registration—and there is a weak and
under-funded system for immigration control and statistical registration. Although a law on
refugees was adopted in 1993, its implementation only began in March 1996, with the first
officially recognised documents for refugees. Until then, inexperienced local officials were
forced to make decisions about refugees, without clear legislative guidance. Experts suggest
that the social status of refugees would improve if there was a simpler registration proce-
dure at the local level, coupled with stronger controls on entry into the country.24
Thus, in summary, Ukraine’s ethno-policy since 1991 has faced three major challenges:
(1) territorial autonomy for minority groups, (2) the linguistic rights of the Russian-speak-
ing population and issues related to immigrants, and (3) refugees entering Ukraine.
Efforts to establish territorial autonomy by Hungarian and Gagauzes in 1991 were
unsuccessful, and claims for autonomy by various ethnic groups living in compact areas
are generally low on Ukraine’s political agenda. The only exception is the Crimean Tatars,
who have organised and increased their political voice. But the state still seems to con-
sider any claims for territorial autonomy by ethnic groups as a potential threat that could
lead to separatism and eventually threaten the country’s territorial integrity.
Given current political circumstances, minorities with compact residence could bene-
fit by working toward local government reform. By pressing for much needed decentrali-
sation, and thereby empowering local governments, minorities with compact localised pop-
ulations can achieve a higher level of self governance. This is particularly the case for
Hungarians in the Beregivskiy district of Trans-Carpathia, Romanians in rural Bukovyna
and Bulgarians in Odeska oblast, who constitute the majority in their local communities.
The Ukrainian government did achieve some success in using power-sharing strategies
to defuse potential separatist trends by establishing Crimean territorial-administrative auton-
omy. But, because the Crimean Constitution does not do enough toward recognition of
the Crimean Tatars, that group has become more politicised. The case of the Crimean
Tatars, involves competing interests between different ethnic groups. Therefore, the aspi-
rations of the politically mobilised Tatars can only be realised to a certain extent without
violating the rights of other groups.
The quest for language rights among the Russian speaking population of the country
is another potential source of conflict in Ukraine. The problem has already generated ten-
sions between the central government and some local authorities, who have sought to
give the Russian language official legal status. Attempts by the government to encourage
‘Ukrainisation’ have been unsuccessful, because they ignore the realities of the country’s
population distribution. 
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3. A Difficult Bargain: Legal Instruments and Institutions
Promoting the Rights of Minorities
While the Ukrainian state has done well to achieve relative stability and avoid openly vio-
lent conflicts, efforts on the part of ethnic minorities to preserve their identities have been
one of the most sensitive political issues in Ukraine. Some of the policies aimed at pro-
moting Ukrainian language and culture have had discriminatory effects on minority mem-
bers.25 This section will look at the existing international and Ukrainian legal instruments
affecting minority issues in the country, and analyse the successes or failures of these mea-
sures.
3.1. Process of European integration: influence of international law
The Ukrainian political leadership has officially proclaimed a policy of seeking strategic
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The government has already taken steps in this
direction, including membership in the Council of Europe, participation in the OSCE, a
partnership co-operation agreement with the EU and a special charter on partnership with
NATO. At the same, however, Ukrainian foreign policy also seeks a strategic partnership
with Russia. This somewhat inconsistent foreign policy reflects geo-political ambivalence
of the Ukrainian political elite and the population at large. Surveys indicate that the west-
ern regions of the country traditionally show prevailing western orientation, while the
more populated eastern and southern regions demonstrate a strong socio-political and
cultural affiliation with Russia.26
From the perspective of ethnic minorities, Ukraine’s membership in the Council of
Europe and other international obligations are considered helpful channels for the pro-
tection of basic rights. Russian minority political activists, for example, take advantage of
the opportunities afforded by Council of Europe membership as a tool for international
advocacy of their cultural-linguistic identity rights.27
As a member of the Council of Europe, Ukraine is obligated to ratify the main statutes
of this organisation by specified dates. The Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities was ratified by the Parliament in 1997. The European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages was ratified at the end of 1999, but, in a controversial
decision, the Constitutional Court annulled this ratification on procedural grounds.
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3.1.1. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM)
Ukraine signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in
September 1995. When Parliament ratified it in 1997, the minority provisions of the con-
vention became part of national legislation.
Joining the Convention has prompted several pro-minority activities, which were out-
lined in the materials for the report,28 on the implementation of legal provisions of the
Convention that Ukraine submitted to the Council of Europe. The report cited progress
in improving relations with Crimean Tatars, including the April 1999 presidential decree
creating the Council of Representatives of Crimean Tatars. 
The report also noted progress in self-organising activities of ethnic minorities at both the
regional and national levels. The Association of National-Cultural Communities and Societies
of the Crimea, the Confederation of National-Cultural Communities of Western Ukraine and
the Association of National-Cultural Communities of Odeska oblast were created. The sec-
ond All-Ukrainian Congress of National Communities of Ukraine was conducted in 1999.
The All-Ukrainian Congresses, and meetings of Jews, Greeks, Germans, Poles and Crimean
Tatars of Ukraine, were conducted by national societies of these ethnic minorities.
The report also pointed out some failures related to the implementation of minority
rights. It admits that socio-economic issues relevant to deported peoples of Crimea are unre-
solved, and only 51% of returnees are provided with satisfactory housing. The report cited
instances of discrimination and ethnic intolerance, including anti-Semitic publications.
3.1.2. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages includes several state obliga-
tions designed to guarantee the use of minority languages in education, legal and admin-
istrative proceedings, the media and other areas of daily life.
Ukraine signed the Charter in 1996, though the Ukrainian Parliament only ratified it
in December 1999, following much debate. Ukrainian nationalists opposed ratification,
claiming the Charter would promote the dominance of Russian language and culture.
According to member of Parliament Mykhaylo Kovach, a Hungarian, even representatives
of the State Committee for Nationalities supported an anti-minority position in the debates
over ratification.29
This victory for minority rights was short-lived, however. The endorsement of the
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was repealed in the summer of 2000, when
the Constitutional Court ruled that Parliament breached the ratification procedure. It
seems apparent that the court’s decision was a political one, designed to foster exclu-
sionary language policies.
The Constitutional Court’s repeal of ratification of the Charter, and the new trend in lan-
guage policy, were strongly criticised by representatives of the Russian ethnic community,
who consider the decision illegitmate and purely political. The decision set a dangerous legal
precedent, which casts ambiguity on the Charter’s ratification, and its legitimacy in Ukraine.
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3.2. Bilateral treaties 
Bilateral international agreements, particularly with neighbouring countries, can be con-
sidered an important method to internalise minority rights legislation. Since indepen-
dence, the Ukrainian government has concluded such agreements with Hungary,30 Poland,
the Republic of Moldova and Lithuania. Bilateral treaties with Russia and Romania, rati-
fied in 1997, are particularly important because of the complex relations between Ukraine
and these neighbouring countries. The treaties involve the protection of respective minori-
ties’ rights, including the right to cultural autonomy. 
Ukrainian experience demonstrates that implementation of bilateral treaties strengthens
international trust and contributes to regional stability in Central and Eastern Europe. In
the framework of the treaties, representatives of Ukraine and its neighbouring countries,
meet annually to discuss concerns of ethnic minorities. The practical results of the bilater-
al interrelations for Ukraine are: mutual regular intergovernmental monitoring of minority
rights implementation; the development of inter-border regional co-operation; facilitating
of economic support of ethnic minorities abroad by their kin-states; and development of
cultural and educational initiatives, which aim at provision of minority cultural autonomy.
3.3. Constitutional and internal legislative guarantees
The 1996 Constitution is the source of the most important rights and guarantees for
minorities. This includes the right of legal equality, the prohibition of discrimination and
the right to develop minority culture and preserve ethnic identity. The Constitution also
provides for protection against hate crimes.
According to Article 10 of the Constitution, the official language is Ukrainian. The
same article also guarantees the free development, use and protection of Russian and other
languages of the minorities of Ukraine. However, the Russian community of Ukraine is
dissatisfied with the unofficial status of Russian and the debate over whether to make it
an official language is one of the most serious inter-ethnic issues in the country. 
The Constitution confirms state support for the development of ethnic minorities, and
obliges local authorities in places of compact minority residence to ensure the imple-
mentation of national and regional programs for minorities’ national and cultural devel-
opment. The document also includes the prohibition of discrimination, including ‘posi-
tive discrimination’, or affirmative action.
3.3.1. Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine—1991 
The first major document regulating the principles of Ukraine’s ethno-policy, the
Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, was adopted by Parliament on 1
November 1991. It proclaimed the equality of all people and ethnic groups in Ukraine—
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and helped the new government gain broad support. When a popular referendum on
Ukrainian independence was held a month later, voters overwhelmingly backed the idea,
even in regions in which ethnic minorities were concentrated. In some districts where
ethnic Romanian and Moldovanian populations are predominant, over 90% of the elec-
torate voted in favour of Ukrainian independence.31
Though the Declaration does not provide mechanisms for the implementation of minor-
ity rights, it still preserves its significance as one of the first politically important docu-
ments and as a guarantee of state obligations toward minorities.
3.3.2. Law on National Minorities in Ukraine—1992 
This law guarantees minorities the right to national and cultural autonomy, including rights
to: form associations, receive education in their native language, practice their religion, use
national symbols, commemorate minority holidays and develop national traditions.
The law guarantees that, in regions where a minority group predominates, their lan-
guage can be used in tandem with the official state language of Ukrainian for all institu-
tions and government bodies. These provisions have been mostly implemented: Hungarian
and Ukrainian are the languages used by public institutions in some Trans-Carpathian
regions; Romanian is used in ‘ethnic Romanian’ regions of Bukovyna; and Russian is broad-
ly and predominantly used in government and public institutions in eastern and south-
ern Ukraine and in Crimea.32
The law provides for the political rights of minorities by guaranteeing equality of the
individual rights of the persons belonging to ethnic minorities rather than by guarantee-
ing the minorities’ collective rights. Ukrainian legislation does not provide special norms
for political representation of ethnic minorities, such as electoral quotas. Although there
are some provisions which can help territorially concentrated groups—like Hungarians
and Russians—gain minority representation in central and local government, these mea-
sures do not benefit dispersed groups, like Crimean Tatars and Roma.
The Law on National Minorities in Ukraine allows minorities to participate in gov-
ernment through their associations—which can nominate candidates for central and local
elections. However, there is some ambiguity in the implementation of this right, because
it was not mentioned in the recent law on local self-government.
The law implies that the interests and needs of ethnic minorities are also represented
through advisory bodies, which consult with the government on minority issues. However,
these bodies can only advise, and lack the necessary authority to provide for true politi-
cal involvement of minorities in the decision-making process.
3.3.3. Law on Citizenship of Ukraine
The Law on Citizenship was adopted in 1991, and it ensures the equality of all perma-
nently residing citizens before the law, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, linguist or reli-
gious identity. The inclusive character of the law was based on the so-called ‘zero-option’
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approach, which automatically granted Ukrainian citizenship to citizens of the former USSR
who permanently resided in Ukraine at the moment of the declaration of independence.
Naturalisation for Ukrainian citizenship demands five years of continuous legal resi-
dence and renunciation of foreign citizenship. This legal norm affected deported people
who had returned and established their residence in Ukraine and the process of acquir-
ing citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in elections. Progress was
recently made in this respect, due to a 1999 agreement between Ukraine and Uzbekistan
that simplified the procedure of renunciation of Uzbekistan citizenship for Tatars seek-
ing to become Ukrainian citizens.
3.3.4. Law on Local Government in Ukraine—1997 
The Constitution and the Law on Local Government of 1997 legitimise the local territo-
rial community as the subject of local governance. The law does not provide any special
regulations regarding possible ethno-cultural specificity of these territorial communities.
But it does provide a powerful tool for minorities who are concentrated in one region,
and make up the local voting majority.
The law grants local governments specific rights in facilitating a renaissance of nation-
al-cultural traditions and in providing broad possibilities for education in the mother
tongue of local people. The local government manages the communal property of its dis-
trict, but the issues of control over local budget revenues and of the separation of power
between decentralised government and the local state administration are not clearly elab-
orated in the law.
3.3.5. Law on Education
The Law on Education guarantees the right of minorities to education in their mother
tongue.
In the 1998-99 school year, 13% of all state schools in Ukraine offered instruction in
the ethnic minorities’ language of choice. 11.6% of the secondary schools in Ukraine are
bilingual. Russian is taught as a subject in 90% of all state secondary schools. Since the
Soviet period, minority schools have been created in regions where Ukraine’s ethnic
minorities are situated, in accordance with the decisions of local administrations and the
wishes of the local populations.
Implementation of educational policy has remained highly centralised and it still places
stronger emphasis on the affirmation of the Ukrainian language. Education policy follows
the dubious premise of establishing correspondence between the language of instruction
and the ethnic composition of the region. This policy has a discriminatory effect with
respect to ethnic Russians, Ukrainian Russophones and some highly Russified ethnic
minorities—such as Jews and Belarussians.
Hungarians or Romanians are not particularly affected by this nationalising edu-
cational policy. However, their representatives still express concern about recent ten-
dencies to strengthen the centralised, ‘top-down’ approach of educational policy
towards minorities, which they say does not take into account the traditions of rela-
tive educational autonomy.
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3.3.6. The Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 
Because of its special provision for the Russian language, the Crimean Constitution has a
certain discriminatory effect towards other ethnic minorities of Crimea, mainly Ukrainians
and Crimean Tatars. There are only three schools in Crimea that use Ukrainian language
for instruction and nine Crimean Tatars’ schools, even though Crimean Tatars make up
about 10% of the Crimean population.
Other serious shortcomings in the Crimean Constitution include its neglect of politi-
cal and representative rights of the Crimean Tatar population and the legislative refusal
to recognise the Crimean Tatars as one of the indigenous peoples of the Crimea. 
The exclusive character of the Crimean Constitution is likely to increase tensions—
both locally and with the Ukrainian central authorities. 
3.4. State Programmes
There are a number of special state programmes intended to be realised in the sphere of
current ethno-policy in Ukraine, including:
· The National Programme for the Renaissance and Development of Education of
Ethnic Minorities for 1994-2000;
· The National Programme for the Development of Cultures of Ethnic Minorities by
2000;
· The National Programme on the Adaptation and Integration in Ukrainian Society
of Crimean Tatars and Other Deported Peoples;
· The ‘Ukrainian Language’ Programme.
These programmes are elaborated by the government and ratified by the Parliament.
Implementation is financed through the state budget, though the government seeks addi-
tional financial support from other sources. This particularly relates to the implementa-
tion of the programme on the adaptation of deported peoples, where international sup-
port is sought. The main implementing governmental agency is the State Committee on
Nationalities and Migration. Ethnic minorities can advise on the elaboration and imple-
mentation of these state programmes through the involvement of the Council of
Representatives of Civic Associations of National Minorities.
3.5. Central Institutions
During the past ten years, various institutions have been set up to design and implement
policies regarding minorities. This section provides an overview of those institutions.
3.5.1. Constitutional Court
Control over the effective implementation of various guarantees of rights is exercised by
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and by courts of general jurisdiction. However, the
country’s judicial system is still not fully independent, and its control upon governmen-
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tal agencies is insufficiently developed. The central government’s influence over the
Constitutional Court, particularly in the sphere of ethno-politics, has prompted minori-
ty activists to complain that the Court acts as a tool for the government’s goal of
Ukrainisation. The Court struck down the Ukraine Parliament’s endorsement of the Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages on the grounds that there were procedural flaws in
the vote. It seems obvious, however, that the court’s decision was a political one, designed
to foster exclusionary language policies.
The Constitutional Court’s bias was also apparent in another recent ruling on the use
of state language in government institutions and educational process in Ukraine. This case
appeared to be a reaction to decisions by some local governments in eastern Ukraine to
give Russian the status of official language. In its 14 December 1999 ruling, the
Constitutional Court declared Ukrainian to be the state language and the obligatory means
of communication in governmental institutions for the whole territory of Ukraine. By this
ruling, Ukrainian was also defined as the language of instruction in all educational insti-
tutions, though the court permitted other languages to be studied concurrently with
Ukrainian.
3.5.2. Committee of Human Rights, National Minorities and International Relations in the
Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine
This committee is the main body specialising in minority rights provision in the nation-
al legislature. The Committee elaborates and supervises legislative initiatives on minori-
ty issues. Members of the Committee are usually representatives of ethnic minorities, and
are often the activists on behalf of their national communities.
3.5.3. The Parliamentary Commissioner of Human Rights (Ombudsman)
In January 1998, the Ukrainian president signed a law creating the Parliamentary
Commissioner on Human Rights, a constitutionally-mandated independent human rights
ombudsman. The Parliament elected Nina Karpachova as the first ombudsman in April 1998.
By law, the ombudsman can initiate investigations into implementation of human
rights by any public/governmental institution. However, the law created a weak position
with limited enforcement power. The Commissioner of Human Rights can, however, pro-
vide the government with recommendations to amend existing laws or practices.
Although the issues of minority rights are still not the focus of the work of the
Commissioner on Human Rights, the ombudsman was involved in the inter-governmental
debate over Russian-language issues. Responding to criticisms of the Ukrainian govern-
ment’s plans for wider use of the Ukrainian language, Nina Karpachova said that she had
not received a single complaint of discrimination against the Russian language since a
Ukrainian-Russian human rights agreement took effect in 1999. She also stated that eth-
nic Russians in Ukraine are afforded many cultural and linguistic protections,33 and com-
UKRAINE 329
33 Quoted in: P. Byrne (2000) Ukraine, Russia clash over language. Kiev: Kyiv Post, 24
February.
plained that ‘there is not a single school, theatre, library, newspaper, magazine or TV pro-
gram for millions of Ukrainians residing in Russia’.34
It seems that the ombudsman’s office is not entirely independent, and highly sensitive
issues of ethnic minorities are interpreted in a political way. This fact indicates a lack of
development of democratic traditions in the country.
3.5.4. State Committee for Nationalities and Migration
The State Committee is a central executive institution dealing with national minority rights,
issues related to the Ukrainian diaspora and migration. The committee has regional branch-
es attached to regional governmental executives. The mandate of this committee is to
design and implement activities to prevent ethnic conflicts, and to elaborate national
ethno-policy. It also has a role of co-ordination between various activities of the state in
promoting inter-ethnic peace.
The Committee has often been criticised by representatives of ethnic communities for
its bureaucratic and ‘declarative’ approach toward minority issues. Ethnic minority lead-
ers charge that having a committee, instead of a full ministry, for minority rights—and
lumping ethnic and migration issues together—transgresses the Law on Minorities. They
add that this Committee’s existence is evidence of the simplistic approach taken by the
state towards minorities and migration.
3.5.5. Council of Representatives of Civic Associations of National Minorities
The Council is an advisory body to the central government, composed of 25 representa-
tives from minority organisations that have countrywide status. The Council takes part
in elaboration of legislative initiatives and in implementation of state programs on minor-
ity issues, but it can only make recommendations.
Despite its purely advisory character, the Committee plays an important role in pro-
viding a channel of communication and co-ordination between the government and minor-
ity organisations, and between minorities themselves. The opportunity for minority rep-
resentatives to participate in governmental meetings on minority issues increases
transparency of state policy in this field. The role of the Committee can be substantially
increased by giving it the function of a ‘minority audit commission’, which would be
allowed to monitor state policy on minority issues, observe implementation of minority
rights provisions and offer legally binding expertise on evaluation of state ethno-policy.
Minorities therefore have a weak position vis-à-vis the Ukrainian state, as their role is lim-
ited in political decision-making, and their representative body enjoys only a consulta-
tive role in the policy process.
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4. Implementation of Ethno-policy at the Local Level
The system of public administration in Ukraine involves two verticals of power—the
appointed executive branch and the elected legislative and self-governmental branches.
The relationship between these two verticals is rather complicated, particularly at the local
level. At the top of the executive vertical, the president appoints his representatives at the
regional and district levels. The gubernators, or heads of local state administration, who
are often appointed on the basis of loyalty to the president, have the real power in the
regions and are mainly accountable to the president and the Cabinet of Ministers. 
The local state administrations are also formally accountable to the elected local coun-
cils. But issues of this accountability, as well as of authority delegation, are ambiguous
and undeveloped in national legislation. In fact, the Ukrainian system has a strongly cen-
tralised executive vertical, from ‘top to bottom’, which is often justified as being modelled
after the French system. In truth, the country’s recent experience with an omnipotent
Communist Party structure is probably the main inspiration behind the current system.
The system of self-government involves an elected council at the municipal level. The
deputies, and leaders, of these councils are elected for a four-year term by community
residents. The citizens also elect the deputies of district and regional councils, but the
leaders of these bodies are elected by the council deputies. Deputies of the self-govern-
mening councils elect their own executive bodies, which often delegate authority to par-
allel executive structures of the appointed local state administration. Control of the local
budget, which consists of local and state contributions, is even more complicated and
vague under current legislation. 
The elected local self-government formulates and suggests the local agenda of the bud-
get, and the appointed local executives are the implementing agencies, which control
practical decision-making. In addition, local state administrations are fully responsible
for implementation of state programs at the regional level. This means that the appoint-
ed local state administrations are in charge of implementing both state or local policies
pertaining to minorities. According to the law, the local self-governments officially have
wide opportunities to conduct local ethno-policy, but their role is substantially dimin-
ished by the usually limited local budgets. 
4.1. State involvement in local ethno-policy issues
The experience of post-communist transition in Ukraine involves a profound transfor-
mation of the traditional model of ‘top-down’ policy-making. This process implies a reform
in the interaction between the central authorities and local communities in every sphere,
including inter-ethnic relations. Though the traditional scheme of centrally-planned pol-
icy-making is still politically and psychologically strong in Ukraine, the process of demo-
cratic decentralisation of power has begun. 
When discussing ‘local government’ in Ukraine, unless otherwise specified, we mean
the system which combines the institutions of the state local administration (local exec-
utives) and the local self-governmental agencies. The principal question is: who is the
main actor in conducting ethno-policy at the local level? The answer, as we will try to
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demonstrate, very much depends on the concrete cases, regions and issues involved. In
general, the centralised approach still prevails in Ukraine. 
Though fully effective local self-government in Ukraine is still only an ideal,35 the
Constitution and the 1997 Law on Local Self-Government provide norms, principles and
forms of direct governance by territorial communities at the municipal level. While these
laws do not expressly provide for ethno-cultural specificity in self-government, the law
does guarantee local self-governments the right to facilitate a renaissance of national-cul-
tural traditions, as well as allowing broad opportunities for education in the local moth-
er tongue. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the budgets of local self-governments are
small and poorly regulated. This is a serious shortcoming for the implementation of local
initiatives concerning minority needs.
The inherent contradiction in ethno-policy in Ukraine is that the central state is still the
main actor in this policy at the local level, but the state is interested in building a Ukrainian
nation-state.36 In the Ukrainian context, this apparent conflict of interest substantially reduces
the possibility of power-sharing with ethnic minorities, particularly from the perspective of
national-territorial autonomy for some ethnic groups.
Nationalist Ukrainian politicians justify this contradiction by arguing that it is the best
approach to counter the threat to a unitary Ukrainian state from a developing economic
crisis, on the one hand, and increasing political rights of indigenous peoples of Ukraine,
on the other.37 From this perspective, dominant in Ukrainian political discourse, even if
ethnic issues appear locally, they have state significance, and therefore must be settled
from the point of view of the state’s interests. As a result, the implementation of ethno-
policy at the local level can be highly complex.
4.2. Main actors and mechanisms of ethno-policy implementation 
The mechanism for implementing ethno-policy at the local level, the main actors in this
implementation and their relationship may vary in different cases. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to describe the most typical scheme of implementation of ethno-policy at the local
level in Ukraine. 
The main state executive institution in the sphere of ethno-policy is the State Committee
of Ukraine on Nationalities and Migration. Attached to the Committee is an advisory body,
the Council of Representatives of Civic Association of National Minorities of Ukraine,
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which fulfills a mostly representative role. State ethno-policy is mainly articulated through
state programs. The Committee implements its policy through the system of its regional
representation at the local level. The Committee departments are incorporated into the
structure of the state local administration. In the more ethnically heterogeneous regions,
the second vice deputy of the head of local state administration is usually responsible for
the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. 
Minority education policy is controlled and implemented by the Ministry of Education,
through its own executive bodies at the local level—which include oblast, district and
municipal departments of education.
The practical functions of the State Committee on Nationalities, and its regional exec-
utive branches, are often reduced to supervision of local executive administrations in con-
ducting ethno-policy—along with attempts to co-ordinate the ethno-policy activity of
executive bodies, self-government institutions and national cultural societies. The
Committee also provides assistance to the departments of local government that are respon-
sible for conducting inter-ethnic policy in the regions.
National cultural societies of minorities tend to become the representative bodies of
ethnic minorities in their interaction with central and local state agencies.38 Even more
importantly, countywide organisations of ethnic Hungarians, Jews, Crimean Tartars,
Germans and other ethnic communities become the basic form of self-organisation, and
often play the role of ethnic self-government in these communities.
A typical, centrally dictated approach to ethnic issues is described by the following
case study on the support of the Karaims.39 In this more representative case, bureaucrat-
ic difficulties have led to the failure of the ‘centralised strategy’. 
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39 Karaims are one of ancient indigenous peoples of the Crimea. The Karaim language belongs to the
Turkish language group. Their religion is Karaimism, based on the Old Testament. Karaims are
becoming an extinct ethnic group, which is currently numbered at 2,602 persons, living in the ter-
ritory of the former USSR, according to the 1989 census. In 1989, 1,404 Karaims lived in the Crimea,
but according to newer data, the number of the Crimean Karaims was reduced to 800 by 1996.
Case Study 2. Financing Minority Education: A Failed Project
The problem: Karaims are becoming an extinct ethnic group, and they need measures to protect
their national cultural identity.
The actors involved: 1) National cultural association of Karaims ‘Krymkaraylar’; 2) the State
Committee of Nationalities; 3) the local authorities of the Crimea.
The issue proceedings and failed strategy: In 1995 the Karaims’ national cultural association
‘Krymkaraylar’ submitted a program for the protection of the historical and cultural legacy of
Karaims, and support of their ethno-social development, to the State Committee (then the
Ministry) of Nationalities. Based on this proposed program, the Cabinet of Ministers ordered
seven ministries to prepare projects concerning the issue. The projects prepared involved the
creation of classes with Karaim-language instruction, the preparation of the Karaim cadres,
restoration of Karaim libraries and even the restitution of the Karaim cultural and art relics
taken from the Crimea to Russia.
The Karaims’ case proves that centralised management of inter-ethnic issues is losing
its effectiveness. The problem is simply that this approach lacks one crucial traditional
factor: sufficient centralised state subsidies, which can be controlled and distributed at
the regional level.
Despite this weakness, the political and psychological inertia of thinking that only the
centre can settle the problems of ethnic minorities is still strong. The situation could also
be taken as an indication that the issues of ethnic minorities are of marginal importance
in state and local policy, especially in budgeting issues. In the opinion of the leaders of
ethnic communities, the argument of lack of financial resources becomes a sort of official
justification for the situation.
The experience of the German community in Ukraine is an example of ethnic self-
organisation and self-government that effectively deals with concrete issues of local pol-
icy.40 The German agencies of self-determination in Ukraine include the Association of
Germans of Ukraine, German Youth of Ukraine, the Volksrat (People’s Council) of
Ukrainian Germans and its executive structure, ‘Volksparlament’.
These institutions of ethnic Germans successfully co-ordinate their efforts in local pol-
icy with local self-governments of the regions where ethnic Germans live: Trans-Carpathia,
the Odeska oblast and the Crimea. In co-ordination with the Federal Republic of Germany
and German national societies of Ukraine, the regional state administration of Odeska
oblast deals with four projects designed to create job opportunities in the village of
Kudryavska, a settlement of German migrants. The German case, however, is exception-
al due to the better organisation and mobilisation of this minority group relative to other
groups and the financial support of the German state for ethnic Germans abroad.
As can be seen from the comparison of these two cases, without adequate financing,
the promise of self-government as outlined in the 1997 Law, is an empty promise indeed. 
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40 A. Belyakov (2000) ‘Integration processes of ethnic and so-called Russian Germans in Ukraine’,
LGI database. Online. Internet: http://www.osi.hu/lgi/ethnic.
It was supposed that the project would begin in 1998 and would be financed by Crimean
local authorities. However, the expenditure on the Karaim project was not adopted by the
Crimean government, mainly because of lack of funding. Furthermore, the project was still
not approved by the Ukrainian central authorities because of the time-consuming bureaucratic
procedures and the change of government. Consideration of the entire project had to begin
again. And even if the programme is adopted by the government, it has to be approved by the
Parliament of Ukraine.
Lesson: Inefficiency of the state’s ‘centralised’ strategy, lack of co-ordination between central and
local authorities and the lack of political will in dealing with the minorities issues prevented
important ethno-policy from being implemented.
Source: Ukraina moloda (1998) 16 June.
4.3. Representation of minorities in local government
While the Law on Local Self-Government gives ethnic minorities living compactly the
opportunity to elect their own representatives to the bodies of local self-government, some
officials see the situation as a potential threat to multi-ethnic local communities. If one
ethnic group gains local control, it could encourage ‘positive discrimination’ to the ben-
efit its own members, at the expense of other ethnic groups. In other words, ‘the issues
of local policy and its commissions can not be dependent on the nationality of the mayor
of a city, but they should be strictly regulated by the law’.41
Current legislation is meant to prevent this situation by providing sufficient opportu-
nities for representation of minorities in the governmental structures of all levels. In gen-
eral, certain academic studies confirm that the legislation is working. The authors of a
1996 survey concluded that ‘the official characteristics of nationality of the heads of local
self-government involved in the study mostly corresponds to the ethnic composition of
the country’.42
The level of involvement and the index of representation43 of ethnic minorities
in the representative bodies—at all levels, from local village councils up to the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (excluding the Republic of Crimea44)—are represented
in Table 2. According to the index of representation, Russians, Belarussians, Jews,
Poles, Germans, Kazan Tatars and some other ethnic groups are underrepresented
in the structures of representative power, while the percentage of Ukrainians,
Moldovans, Hungarians, Romanians and Bulgarians in regional and local self-gov-
ernment exceed their share in the ethnic composition of the country. These statis-
tics demonstrate that the ethnic groups that live compactly have some advantage in
governmental representation in comparison with the groups that are predominant-
ly dispersed.
The low representation of Russians does not appear to be the result of open dis-
crimination against them, but rather can be explained by several factors, including
the phenomenon of ‘shifting identity’. (Many individuals who previously identified
themselves as Russians now identify themselves as Ukrainian.) The surveyors dis-
covered that some ethnic Ukrainians who occupied high positions in the state and
administrative structures in the former Soviet Union indicated their nationality as
Russian during the Soviet period, perhaps because they perceived this identity would
assist in upward mobility under the previous policy of Russification. The same peo-
ple now, during Ukrainisation, identify themselves as Ukrainians.45
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41 I. Prokopchuk (1998) ‘The Issues of Self-Government in Odessa Region’, Golos Ukrainy, 26
November.
42 Y. Saenko, A. Tkachuk et al. (1997) Local Self-Government in Ukraine: Problems and Perspectives,
Kiev.
43 The ratio between a percentage of total number of deputies of a given ethnic group and its per-
cent in the ethnic composition of Ukraine
44 The complex case of the Crimea and the facts of open discriminatory policy towards ethnic
minorities, particularly Crimean Tatars will be demonstrated next. 
45 Ibid.
The national composition of some territorial communities, in which ethnic minorities are
numerically dominant, gives a legal advantage for these national minorities to be propor-
tionally represented in institutions of local self-government, particularly at the level of village
and district councils. The phenomenon of ‘ethnic’ district and village councils can already by
observed in Ukraine. Thus, in the local elections of 1994 in Bolgradskyi district, Odeska
oblast, Gagauzes were elected in 11 village councils from 17 councils in the district.46
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Table 2. The Ethnic Characteristics of the Deputies of Ukraine (March 1998)* 
Nationality Number Per cent of total number Per cent of the ethnic 
of deputies composition of
162,445=100 per cent Ukraine and 
index of representation
Ukrainians 147,126 90.5 72–1.26
Russians 9,900 6.1 22.1–0.28
Moldovians 1,123 0.7 0.6–1.17
Bulgarians 998 0.6 0.45–1.33
Hungarians 711 0.44 0.3–1.47
Romanians 586 0.36 0.26–1.38
Belarussians 532 0.33 0.8–0.4
Poles 434 0.27 0.4–0.67
Greeks 316 0.19 0.19–1
Jews 181 0.11 0.9–0.12
Gagauzes 95 0.05 0.062–0.8
Azerbaijani 54 0.033 0.07–0.47
Germans 53 0.033 0.10–0.33
Armenians 42 0.026 0.10–0.26
Kazan Tatars 29 0.02 0.17–0.12
Total 162,445 100 100–1
Source: Statistical account of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 29 March
1998; M. Tomenko (1998) ‘Ukrayinskyi parlamentarizm’ (The Ukrainian parliamentarianism)
Kiev: Khronika 2000, Vol. 27-28, pp. 239-240.
Note: Apart from the representatives of ethnic groups indicated in the table, the deputy corps of
Ukraine include: 29 Albanians, 25 Georgians, 19 Czechs, 13 Latvians, 12 Uzbeks, 12 Tadjiks,
11 Lithuanians, 9 Kazakhs, 9 Turkmens, 8 Mordvins, 7 Osetins, 6 Chuvash, 5 Slovaks, 5
Chechens, 5 Udmurts, 5 Roma, 4 Lezgins, 3 Avars, 3 Crimean Tatars, 2 Bashkirs, 2 Estonians,
2 Koreans, 2 Dagestanis, 2 Turks, 2 Tabasarans, as well as one Swede, Ingush, Marian, Assirian,
Tuwin, Komi, Cherkess, Agul, Finn, Ujgur and Kirgiz.
46 P. Nadolishnij (1998) Ethno-national Factor of Administrative Reform in Ukraine, Kiev, p. 140.
However, there are more blatant signs of open discriminatory politics with respect to
minorities. According to the statistics presented by Mustafa Dzsamilyov, a leader of the
Crimean Tatars, at the third Kurultay (National Assembly) in 1996, the Tatars, who make
10% of the Crimean population, only had 0.5% representation in the bodies of executive
power and were practically absent from Crimean self-governmental structures.47
4.4. Political organisation of minorities
Ukrainian independence was accompanied by the growth of ethnic self-awareness among
Ukrainians and other ethnic groups resident in the country. As self-awareness was trans-
lated into a desire for activism, there was considerable growth in the number of national
societies and associations. According to official statistics, as of 1 November 1999,48 429
national cultural societies and civic associations, including 25 organisations with coun-
trywide status, have been registered. The number of national societies has almost dou-
bled between 1995 and the end of 1999.
Most of these national societies of ethnic minorities declared themselves as cultural
associations, whose main purpose was the realisation of minority rights to cultural auton-
omy. In most cases, however, this legal aim was not converted into the political context,
and these associations were not politicised. Exceptions include the case of the Rusyn cul-
tural society, (described in the case study below), ethnically based parties of the Hungarian
minority and the Crimean Tartar National Movement.
Perhaps one reason why so few associations became political organisations was the
successful ‘open’ strategy of the democratic political parties and movements of Ukraine
in the early 1990s. Groups like the Popular Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), facilitated, to
some extent, the political and civic integration of the different democratically oriented
parts of society, including minority groups, around the idea of democratic reforms.
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47 V. Vyzgrin (1998) ‘Crimean Tatars: Discrimination and the consequences of smouldering con-
flict’ Problemy migratsii, Vol. 2.
48 State Committee on Nationalities and Migration (1999) Evropeiskiy orientyr etnonatsionalnoi poli-
tyky Ukrainy, Bulletin, Vol. 3., p. 20.
Case Study 3. Moderating Extremism
The problem: The development of a cultural society into a political organisation promoting an
extremist, destabilising message.
The actors involved: 1) the Society of Carpathian Rusyns; 2) local authorities of Sub-Carpathia;
3) Ukrainian central authorities.
The issue proceedings: The Society of Carpathian Rusyns, founded in 1990 as ‘a regional cultur-
al educational society’, came forward with a declaration of regional independence of Trans-
Carpathia in 1990. The leaders of the Society formed the ‘Government of Trans-Carpathian
Rus’ in 1993, with the political aim of restoring the 1938 borders between Ukraine and (for-
mer) Czechoslovakia. Radical political forces in Slovakia and Hungary supported the move-
ment. Due to indifference from the local government and noninterference by Ukrainian cen-
Nevertheless, motivations still exist for the political organisation of minorities. The
Ukrainian experience proves that:
1. The issues of culture, education, ethno-cultural development and, especially, minori-
ties linguistic rights, are extremely important and can be easily politicised.
2. Unresolved ethnic issues inevitably lead to active political mobilisation of ethnic
groups. In particular, the processes of ethnic mobilisation and self-organisation of
German and Crimean Tatars’ have resulted in the creation of parallel systems of
government for these ethnic communities.
The controversial issues of local self-government (through local mejlises, or councils) of
Crimean Tatars is particularly interesting. Acting unilaterally, the Crimean Tatars have
established 250 local mejlises, which function as a system of parallel self-governmental and
executive bodies of Tatar government at the local level. The mejlises were mostly created
as the result of the inability or unwillingness of central and, above all, local authorities to
deal with the difficult issues facing Crimean Tatars. The mejlises were also a reaction to
the local authorities’ open, and hidden, discrimination towards Tatars. (See Section 2.) The
mejlises at all levels are unrecognised by state and local authorities, though the authorities
do not forbid or interfere with mejlises activities. These bodies are therefore exclusively for
the self-government of one ethnic community. In their structure and principle, the local
mejlises are elected bodies. They deal with the whole spectrum of everyday issues affect-
ing Tatars. Depending on the issue, a local mejlise may resolve the problem by dealing with
official administrative structures of the same level—or the mejlise could pass the issue on
to a higher meljise, who can deal with officially recognised authorities on a higher level.49
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tral authorities, the ‘Rusyn issue’, which was apparently initiated by a ‘cultural society’ with
about 200 members, quickly grew beyond its regional borders and united extremist political
forces in a movement that threatened regional stability and security.
The strategy used to address the problem: Because the Rusyn political arguments were mostly drawn
from unorthodox interpretations of history, language and identity of the Trans-Carpathians,
a number of scientific conferences were organised by local and central authorities, with the
aim of providing counter-arguments. The tension was mostly defused by the mid-1990s.
However, it seems that a more effective settlement of the ‘Rusyn issue’ involves removing
motives for destabilisation by developing inter-regional economic co-operation among neigh-
bouring countries in the region.
The result: Because of the Rusyns’ political manifestation, well-intentioned plans for social and
economic development of the Trans-Carpathian Ukraine through increased regional autono-
my were partly discredited. These ideas are still perceived by central Ukrainian authorities
with a dose of suspicion. Ultimately, the development of the local self-government in the region
was hampered.
49 D. Ablyamitov (1994) ‘The Bodies of National Self-Government of Crimean Tatars’, Local and
Regional Self-government of Ukraine, Kiev, Vol. 4 (9), p. 42.
Mejlises do more than the official local government in dealing with the specific needs
of the ethnic community. Furthermore, they can act as mediators between official gov-
ernment structures and Tatars. One possible drawback of this practice is that the exis-
tence of a ‘parallel’ local government can reinforce the isolation of Tatars in multi-cultural
Crimea and have an effect of ‘self-ghettoisation’ of this ethnic group.
The increasing political mobilisation of the Crimean Tatars, who now openly declare
the achievement of territorial autonomy in the Crimea as the objective of their political
movement, is a classic example of unresolved ethnic issues leading to political mobilisa-
tion of minority groups. Another such example is the politicisation of the issue of lin-
guistic rights of Russians living in Ukraine. 
4.5. Financial issues in the field of minority protection
Financial support of ethnic minorities is one of the biggest problems in the field of minor-
ity protection in Ukraine. Financing the special needs of minority groups often receives
low priority in state and local budgets. In fact, the very principle of financial support for
ethnic minorities is now debated at the official level in Ukraine. This spending, and some
other so-called ‘mandatory expenditures’ implied by current legislation, are put in doubt
by the state’s inability to fulfill its obligations because of the regular budget deficit.
The situation is similar at the local level. Schools for ethnic minorities and public cul-
tural institutions used by national societies are financed through the existing state infra-
structure, and new needs and initiatives can hardly be covered by tiny local budgets. The
local government is generally responsible for the co-ordination and facilitation of projects
initiated by national societies, which are largely self-financed. Significant financial support
for some national societies, such as German, Jewish, Hungarian and others is provided by
government and private organisations in their kin-states.50 International donor organisa-
tions and institutions also provide financial support for ethnic minority initiatives.
As we have pointed out, the structures of local self-government are not well developed
and the important issue of financial independence is not entirely regulated by current leg-
islation. Further, even when local governments do finance the special needs of minori-
ties, the distribution of funding is often not carried out in the legally prescribed manner.
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50 However, there are also some problems with financial assistance from abroad. As one of the
leader of the ethnic Hungarian community admits, ‘“external” financial and economic support
of Hungarian organisations of Ukraine due to different reasons (including the lack of trans-
parency and information on financing, different systems of accountability, discrepancy in the
tax and custom rules etc.) often turns into a personal profitable business for local ‘activists’ and
foreign “bureaucrats”’. See: Mykhaylo Tovt (1997) ‘The Problems of the Hungarian Minority in
a Contemporary Ukraine’, Kiev: Nova Polityka, Vol. 3, p. 27.
4.6. Minority education 
Beginning in December 1991, the Ukrainian state launched a state policy on education,
requiring that all schools, including those with minority languages, follow state guide-
lines. The current law on education also proclaims state control over educational institu-
tions of all types, including minority and private schools.
Most of the minority schools in Ukraine are public schools. Many of these schools were
established in minority regions during the Soviet period, in accordance with the decisions
of local administrations and the wishes of the local populations. Since 1991, a network
of minority national schools has been developed, in part because of the considerable
increase in the number of Sunday and private schools organised by minority national soci-
eties. But the policy towards national schools has remained centralised. There is a single
state curriculum for all schools. The only difference between Ukrainian schools and schools
for national minorities is the language of instruction and the courses on native language
and literature.51
A positive development in education with respect to minority needs is the emergence
of Sunday schools for minorities, organised by their national societies. According to offi-
cial statistics, in 1993 there were 26 minority Sunday schools, and by 1998 there were
twice that amount.52 The increase of these schools indicates that minority organisations
are becoming a positive force in minority education policy, and that they can influence
the decision-making process at the local level. As a result of successful partnerships between
local governments and national societies, advanced schools (gymnasiums and lycees) for
minorities have recently been established. One gymnasium with Bulgarian-language
instruction was opened in Odessa oblast and two Romanian gymnasiums and a lycee
opened in Chernivtsi oblast.53 Since independence, four gymnasiums with Hungarian-
language instruction were added to the existing 50 Hungarian schools. Three of the
Hungarian gymnasiums were founded by the Trans-Carpathian Reformist Church. The
first nongovernmental high school for national minorities, the Zakarpatskyi pedagogical
institute, was also founded in Beregovo, Trans-Carpathia.
Despite this progress, representatives of ethnic communities are worried by the recent
trend toward strengthening the centralised ‘top-down’ approach in educational policy for
minorities. A project on ethnic education policy, prepared by the Ministry of Education
in 1997, called for more study in Ukrainian, and for the preparation of exams in Ukrainian.
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51 The state programme ‘Education: Ukraine of the 21ST Century’, adopted at the First All-Ukrainian
Congress of Teachers in 1992.
52 V. Troszynskyi (1997) ‘Poshuky zgody’ (The search for consent), Viche, Vol. 10, p. 41.
53 According to Ukrainian official figures in respect of Romanian minority, there are 104 schools
with Romanian language of instruction (there are schools in practically all Romanian villages).
Romanian pedagogical cadres study at the departments of the Chernivtsi and Uszhorod univer-
sities and in Chernivtsi pedagogical college. In comparison, 66,000 officially registered and about
200,000 ‘unofficial’ Ukrainians of Romania have the possibility to attend only one a ‘half-
Ukrainian’ lycee (40% of classes are with Ukrainian language of instruction) and 70 schools with
the Ukrainian classes (Interview with the Head of the Department of the State Committee on
Nationalities of Ukraine, A. Popko (1998) Ukrainske slovo, 5 March.
Representatives of ethnic minorities, particularly the Hungarian and Romanian groups,
say the new policy, which had not even been put forward for discussion among the rep-
resentatives of ethnic minority groups, does not take into account their traditions of rel-
ative educational autonomy.
Another obstacle to minority-language education, enforced through Ukrainian-lan-
guage requirements, is a shortage of dictionaries and textbooks for teaching Ukrainian to
minority-language speakers. Some observers consider the delay in materials to be a masked
attempt by the Ministry of Education to indirectly push national minorities toward enrol-
ment into schools offering instruction in the Ukrainian language.54
Another inter-ethnic sticking point is the issue of Russian-language schools. While
Russians constitute about 22% of the national population, about half the schools in the
Soviet Ukraine were Russian—in the period from 1970 until the late 1980s—because
many ethnic Ukrainians consider Russian their native language. The new educational pol-
icy of Ukrainisation has resulted in an increase in Ukrainian schools and a decrease in
Russian ones. The reasoning given by authorities is that there should be a correspondence
between ethnic composition and educational structure.
During the first four years of independence, the number of students studying in
Ukrainian increased from 45% to 56.5%.55 Although the changes often involved a mere
change in a school’s title—particularly in the regions of eastern and southern Ukraine—
it brought strong criticism from the Russian community and a considerable number of
Ukrainians in traditionally ‘Russian’ regions of the country.56
The Ukrainian handling of school language policy is an example of a centralised
approach to ethno-policy that does not take into consideration regional, historical and
cultural specificity. This has lead to growing tensions between the central government
and minority populations.
4.7. Local policy on socio-economic and cultural empowering 
of the Roma community
The socio-economic crisis affecting the whole population of the country has had the most
severe impact on the Roma community. The problems of the Roma in Ukraine are simi-
lar to problems of their ethnic counterparts in other countries. These include unemploy-
ment, illiteracy, a high child mortality rate, a higher incidence of diseases from unsani-
tary conditions and infectious diseases and and social isolation and exclusion, which
exacerbate the difficulty of obtaining minimal social benefits.
Official statistical data on the Roma population of Ukraine—numbering about 48,000,
according to the 1989 population census—does not correspond to current reality. The
European Roma Rights Center estimates that 55,000 Roma live in Ukraine. Roma groups
themselves believe that the real figure is at least twice this. The discrepancy in data is charac-
teristic of the neglect and poor understanding that typifies the situation of the Roma in Ukraine.
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55 M. Zgurovskyi (1995) ‘The High Mission of the Ukrainian Teachers’, Osvita, 15 June. 
56 My Motherland (1998) 17 June.
The first major attempt to support the socio-economic empowerment of Roma com-
munities was the Integrated Rural Community Development Program, elaborated by the
Renaissance Foundation and the Carpathian Foundation in 1996. The principal aim of
the program was to facilitate co-ordination and partnership between local government,
civic organisations, NGOs and private business structures in socio-economic develop-
ment of communities.57 Further attempts to empower Roma communities are ongoing.
A first, symbolic, achievement has been the election of the first Roma representative to a
local council of Uzhgorod in Trans-Carpathia.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
Since 1991, an inclusive nationality policy has been combined with the visible articula-
tion of a policy that supports an ethnic Ukrainian state. Contradictory decisions on admin-
istrative Ukrainisation were made at the beginning of the 1990s; conversely, during the
same period advanced legislation on minority rights was adopted. Official political move-
ments—which involved attempts to form a democratic, social and legal state and a ‘civic
nation’—were accompanied by a trend toward neglect of minority rights. This ambigui-
ty in the nation-state-building strategy can be explained by the unresolved political con-
flict between the desire to creating an inclusive, multi-ethnic state and the desire to pro-
mote a Ukrainian national identity. 
Other reasons for both a negligent state policy on minorities and an ambiguous nation-
state-building strategy include: 
1. the lack of developed democratic traditions among democratic institutions; 
2. limited democratic local self-government; and 
3. minimal public participation in the decision-making process by all of citizenry,
including minorities.
With this political and legal backdrop in mind, the following policy recommendations
are proposed for a number of key issue areas relevant to the situation of minority groups
in Ukraine.
5.1. Legal framework for minority protection
National legislation on minority rights is approaching accepted international legal norms
and agreements in the sphere of human and minority rights. However, numerous ambi-
guities and shortcomings in the legal framework in this sphere are:
· The limited legal possibilities for direct political participation by minorities in deci-
sion-making at both national and local levels, particularly with regard to the issues
concerning their own interests.
· The absence of legal provisions for collective and socio-economic rights of minori-
ties.
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57 A. Sofyj (2000) ‘Partnership’ LGI database. Online. Internet: http://www.osi.hu/lgi/ethnic.
· The lack of systematic links between legal positions on minorities, and inconsis-
tencies within the corpus of relevant laws.
· An unsatisfactory implementation of minority legislation which is dependent large-
ly on political consensus at both national and local levels.58 Recently, there have also
been some worrying trends that can best be characterised as willful neglect, by cen-
tral and local authorities, of the pressing issues surrounding minority rights.
Without question, greater legislative clarity on issues of concern to minorities, includ-
ing minority language education, rights to cultural and/or territorial autonomy, citizen-
ship issues, the status and rights granted to Ukraine’s large immigrant communities and
other relevant topics is crucial. To that end, the numerous contradictions between the
1991 Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities and current legislation on minorities should
be resolved. 
5.2. Decentralisation and public administration reform 
Institutional reform also implies the search for an optimal model—ranging from a uni-
tary state to a federative state with significant local self-governance, up to territorial auton-
omy for some ethnic minorities. However, a fear of territorial separatism is still predom-
inant in Ukrainian political discourse. The unresolved dilemmas within Ukrainian
state-building hinder the process of the implementation of minority rights, as well as insti-
tutional and administrative reforms.
Even in the present climate of unfinished administrative reforms, Ukraine’s experience
shows that a local ethno-policy performed by local self-government is more effective than
the traditional, centralised approach. As public opinion illustrates, the local level can be a
bridge in building trust between state and minority interests. Local action can provide bet-
ter opportunities for minorities to satisfy their own needs themselves through self-govern-
mental participation. Public administration structures must be given the appropriate author-
ity and financial autonomy necessary to meet the needs of local ethnic communities.
5.3. Political participation
In the Ukrainian context, the policy of accommodation implies the political and partici-
patory empowerment of ethnic minorities and broadening their level of involvement in
the political decision-making process, both at the central and local levels of government.
The aforementioned ‘top-down’ administrative approach in dealing with the issues of eth-
nic minorities still prevails in Ukraine. The state strategy on ethno-policy in Ukraine treats
ethnic communities, and their organisations, as the objects of influences—rather than
full-fledged partners in shaping and conducting ethno-policy. Ukraine’s transition process
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communist transformation. Particularly, participants of the LGI workshop ‘Local Governance in
Multi-ethnic Communities of Central and Eastern Europe’ point out that ‘there is the tension in
the transition period between the imperative of the rule of law, and the realisation that law oper-
ates within a broader social and political context—in which the law is not always implemented’.
could be enhanced by encouraging the establishment of local civil society through com-
munity development and self-organisation of independent groups, including minorities.
· There must be constant participation of minority representative councils in the
process of local policy-making, particularly in regard to policy concerning the inter-
ests of ethnic minorities in multi-ethnic communities.
· Regular public hearings on minority issues, and other feedback methods, must be
employed, to ensure that local policy is transparent and accountable for local peo-
ple, particularly for the minority groups.
· ‘Hot issues’ of inter-community relations, such as the language regime in local
schools, must be settled through negotiations. The participation of minority com-
munity representatives in the negotiations is a crucial condition.
5.4. Cultural autonomy
Ukraine’s experience in dealing with inter-ethnic issues demonstrates that:
· The issues of culture, education, ethno-cultural development and linguistic rights
are emotionally charged and can be easily politicised.
· Unresolved ethnic issues and neglect of these issues by central and local authori-
ties, can readily lead to active political mobilisation of ethnic groups. Most notably,
the processes of ethnic mobilisation and self-organisation of ethnic German and
Crimean Tatar communities have resulted in the creation of so-called ‘parallel sys-
tems of government’ in these communities.
· Inter-regional and international co-operation in the border regions should be devel-
oped and economic links with neighbouring countries whose minorities are living
in Ukraine should be strengthened. The establishment of Ukrainian-Hungarian,
Ukrainian-Romanian and Ukrainian-Polish local co-operation, initiated by local
communities and co-ordinated by local governments of neighbouring countries,
can be mentioned as successful examples.
The controversial issue of the linguistic rights of minorities (particularly the large Russian
minority) must be resolved. A new law on languages is being developed, and this could do
much to solve the problem—but only if the law eschews the principal of Ukrainisation. 
· The new law should be based on the principles of equality of the two main lan-
guages of the country, and on the inalienable right of free language identification.
· The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages should be ratified.
Further efforts to protect the cultural autonomy of minority groups can include sym-
bolic (and inexpensive) measures that demonstrate the local authorities’ commitment to
minorities’ needs. Such measures can include:
· listing street names in two main languages;
· conducting cultural festivals for ethnic minorities;
· facilitating the work of national-cultural societies by providing accommodations
for their activities, granting local taxation privileges or reducing their payments for
communal expenses;
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· facilitating the organisation of Sunday schools for minorities, as well as other cul-
tural and educational events;
· employing all legal possibilities for displaying ethnic symbols in local municipali-
ties in which ethnic minorities are dominant.
5.5. Public finances
Clear and predictable rules for financing cultural initiatives and organisations must be
implemented. More specifically:
· Both local and central governments must provide physical space and transparent
rules for the distribution of subsidies.
· Legal and transparent forms of control and accountability on distribution of funds
for minority cultural initiatives must be achieved by allowing for an independent
minority audit by authoritative members of local minority communities.
· More funding is needed for returning peoples such as the Crimean Tartars and oth-
ers, in order to build permanent housing, basic infrastructure, adequate education
services, sufficient heath care and promote employment among these immigrant
populations.
5.6. Education
To date, Ukraine’s highly centralised education policy has in many cases been used as an
instrument of ‘Ukrainisation’. This does not bode well for minority cultural protection
and for positive inter-ethnic relations. The policy of Ukrainisation is incompatible with
adequate protection for minority rights to education in their mother tongue. Equally
important, the development of Ukraine’s education system in a way compatible with
minority rights is hindered by the high degree of centralisation of education policy. 
· A bottom-up, decentralised policy approach is necessary to improve both majori-
ty and minority education. 
· Policy decisions affecting school curricula, the employment of teachers, teachers’
salaries, school maintenance and other relevant education issues should be made
at the local level, or in greater co-operation with local authorities.
5.7. Capacity-building
· Best practices at the national and international levels should be studied. 
· Training courses and seminars on multi-ethnic management and conflict prevention
strategies should be organised for local officials. A school on municipal management—
part of which can be multi-ethnic issues—was opened in Sudak, on the initiative of
local self-government. This is the first serious achievement in this direction.
· Special training programs and regular meetings of state officials and minority organ-
isations may serve as confidence-building measures between majority and minor-
ity communities and may serve to undermine the current attitude among govern-
ment officials that state security interests are inherently contradicted by the interests
of minority groups.
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In conclusion, it should be noted that some ‘success stories’ of self-governmental man-
agement of ethnic issues—particularly in the Trans-Carpathia, Chernivtsi and Odessa
regions—are partly founded on maintenance of local traditions, together with the every-
day practice of inter-ethnic tolerance. Ukraine is mercifully still free of serious ethnic con-
flict—not because of, but rather despite, the dominant centralised approach to ethnic issues.
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Accountability: Sometimes distinguished from responsibility. One actor is accountable
to another if the latter may sanction and forbid his or her actions. Chains
of responsibility run downward by delegation, chains of accountabil-
ity run upwards. Accountability is a concept closely linked to good
governance.
Acculturation: The process whereby an individual or group acquires the cultural char-
acteristics of another through cultural contact. Acculturation is a one-
way process, in which one culture absorbs another, and is to be dis-
tinguished from the two-way process of assimilation, in which
homogeneity results from changes in both.
Active Employment
Policies: Policies aimed at increasing employment of long-term unemployed
job-seekers. AEPs also represent an effort to create realistic opportu-
nities for those whose access to the labour market is limited and to use
public tenders preferentially to ensure the employment of job seekers
with ‘job placement difficulties’. AEPs involve government action, not
only regulations and incentives.
Affirmative Action/
Positive Discrimination: Public and private sector policies designed to incorporate racial and
ethnic minority group citizens and women into a variety of political,
social, educational and economic institutions. The aim is to compen-
sate for past discrimination or historical disadvantage. These policies
have been adopted in a large number of democracies, but the term is
usually applied to the United States, where the policy has been the sub-
ject of considerable debate.
Arbitrariness: The exercise of power is called arbitrary when no legitimate reason can
be given for its use which has weight for anyone other than the person
who exercises it. A power applied through law is not arbitrary. The
instruments and culture of democracy are notionally the most effec-
tive means of curbing arbitrariness and making the state responsive to
the aspirations of citizens.
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Assimilation: A two-way process of cultural homogenisation in which different groups
come to resemble one another more closely. Assimilation aims at the
creation of a common ethnic identity through the merging of cultural
and other differences.
Autonomy: Living under one’s own laws or control over one’s own actions.
Autonomy of the individual is to be distinguished from autonomy of
the state, of regions, groups or institutions. Types of autonomy with
particular importance for minorities include: administrative, cultural,
political and territorial.
Bottom-Up Policies: Policy measures or programmes initiated at the local or community
level that can have a broader impact at the regional or state level.
Bureaucracy: A concept crystallised in the early nineteenth century used to refer to
‘rule by officials’. Various slants have been attached to the definition
depending on whether the collective body of individuals or the insti-
tutions of such rule should be the centre of attention. Its use has since
been extended to cover the administration by trained professionals not
just of the state but of all large organisations and is often used as a syn-
onym for ‘large organisation’ that is resistant to change.
Central/Local Relations: In analysing central-local relations within a state’s administration, the
following key points should be considered: the scope and variety of
the functions administered by the centre, localities and special agen-
cies; the number and size of different local units and their relationships
with one another horizontally and vertically; their relative shares of
public revenues; the constitutional status of the various actors; and the
political, economic and administrative controls over local units avail-
able to the centre or its agents.
Centre of Government
Institutions: Core executive units of government. Depending on the prevailing con-
stitutional system, these can be either the President’s or Prime Minister’s
Office, or a combination of both. (Term introduced by the OECD Public
Management Service.)
Citizenship: The term denotes the full and responsible membership of an individ-
ual in a state. In social science it has been used primarily to denote the
status of individuals in the development of modern nation-states.
Citizenship refers to rights which a state confers upon certain or all
individuals in a territory over which it has control. Conditions of citi-
zenship are determined within each state in accordance with its own
legal provisions. Citizenship denotes a relationship between an indi-
vidual and a state by which the individual owes allegiance and the state
owes protection.
Civil Society: A broad definition is appropriate for the purposes of this book—the
whole range of civic action independent of formal political institutions.
Civil society thus includes cultural and recreational groups and asso-
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ciations, religious organisations, economic relations, labour unions and
other activities not owned or directly controlled by the state. It should
be noted, however, that civil society and the state are not necessarily
in opposition to one another but, ideally, should complement one
another.
Clientelism: The term used to describe informal power relations between individ-
uals or groups in unequal positions, based on the exchange of bene-
fits. Persons or groups of higher status (patrons) take advantage of their
authority and resources to protect and benefit those with inferior sta-
tus (clients). Clientelism has been particularly noticeable in transitional
societies, undergoing rapid modernisation.
Consociational
Democracy: As the principal alternative to the more familiar majoritarian or
Westminster-style type of democracy, consociational democracy is par-
ticularly suitable for the governance of plural societies that are deeply
divided by religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or
ethnic differences and which form clearly separate segments. Its four
basic principles are: executive power-sharing in the form of a grand
coalition government; proportional representation; community auton-
omy; and minority veto.
Corruption: The use of the resources of public office for improper ends.
Council of Europe (CoE): The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 as a European
Organisation for intergovernmental and parliamentary cooperation. Its
statutory principles are pluralist democracy, respect for human rights
and the rule of law. It has over 40 member states.
Cultural Reproduction: A means by which communities achieve continuity, self-recognition
and are recognised by others as self-sustaining. Examples of tools of
cultural reproduction are spoken and written language, symbols (such
as flags), myths, memories, religious practices, rituals, written and oral
histories.
Decentralisation: A system of governmental organisation that involves placing actual
decision-making in the hands of units outside of the centre of power,
either geographically or organisationally. The dispersal of authority and
implementation from a central government to more specific jurisdic-
tion, agencies or locations.
Deconcentration: The decentralisation of central government ministries. Deconcentration
with authority means that regional branches of central government
offices are created with limited ability to make independent decisions.
Deconcentration without authority occurs when regional offices are
created with no independent capacity for decision-making. All devia-
tions from normal practice must be approved by the centre.
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Democracy: Derived from the Greek demos (people) and kratia (rule or authority),
hence ‘rule by the people’. Although the root meaning is simple, both
‘rule by’ and ‘people’ have been interpreted in markedly different ways.
Discrimination: Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference related to ethnic-
ity, race, religion, gender, socio-economic status or other means of dif-
ferentiation which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of all rights
and freedoms. Discrimination can be practiced by individuals, groups
or institutions.
Dual Subordination: System of local-central government relations in which the local self-
governing authority is subject to the control of both the local political
party administration and to the control of the next level of public admin-
istration.
Dual System of Local
Government: System in which local self-governing authorities are institutionally sep-
arated from state administration institutions; the state administration
does not have a representative at local self-governing authorities.
Equal Opportunity Policy: A concept closely linked to affirmative action and which aims at the
attainment of a representative public service (bureaucracy) depending
largely on the extent to which various groups in society have equal
access to employment in the public service. It includes government
programs that promote equal opportunities for segments of the popu-
lation which historically have been underrepresented.
Ethnic Group: A concept which is both controversial and difficult to define but most the-
orists agree that an ethnic group is self-aware and possesses some degree
of coherence and solidarity, and is composed of people united by com-
mon interests, common real or perceived origin and historical memory.
European Union (EU): First established as an organisation of economic co-operation in 1951
between six European countries. After fifty years and four waves of
accession, the EU today has fifteen member states and is preparing for
a fifth enlargement towards Eastern Europe. The EU’s main institutions
are: the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the Committee
of Permanent Representatives, the European Court of Justice and the
European Parliament. Over the past fifteen years, political issues and
broader integration have become increasingly important.
Federalism: The constitutional division of power between a central or national gov-
ernment and a series of subnational governments. Federal systems
accommodate both regional diversity and political unity.
Fiscal Decentralisation: The division of public expenditure and revenue between levels of gov-
ernment, and the discretion given to regional and local governments
to determine their budgets by levying taxes and fees and allocating
resources.
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Fused System of Local
Government: System in which a representative of the state administration either directs
or is part of the executive body of local self-governing authorities.
Globalisation: At a minimum, globalisation can be described as primarily an economic
process in which the globe is rapidly becoming a single, fused eco-
nomic unit, driven partially by the formation of regional trading blocs,
but increasingly across the globe. This is made possible by the current
communications and information technology. In addition, efforts to
bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues
that go beyond capacities of states join this economic process.
In-Service Training: Training of officials that have already worked for a certain period in
the Administration, with the purpose of improving their capacities or
as part of a promotion system.
Initial Training/
Pre-Service Training: Training directed at those aspiring to be civil servants. If this training
is directed at civil servants that have been recruited but have not yet
taken up their position in the administration, the term ‘post-entry ini-
tial training’ is also used.
Integration: A social, economic and political process through which distinct iden-
tities of various groups are preserved and respected to a certain degree,
but are brought into mainstream society. To be distinguished from
marginalisation, segregation, acculturation and complete assimilation.
Inter-Cultural Education: A type of education in which pupils from different backgrounds are taught
in the same classroom or system, and are able to learn about each other’s
as well as their own culture and history, in the language of the majority
or in mixed schools administered in the language of the majority.
Legitimacy: A concept denoting one or more aspects of the lawfulness of a regime,
its representatives and their ‘commands’. It is a quality derived not from
formal laws or decrees but from social acceptance (or acceptability)
and appropriateness. It has become central to debates over how and
whether rulership, government or power is validly exercised, and about
the extent, grounds and sources of such validity.
Minority: There are no internationally agreed definitions of what constitutes a
minority, but it is generally acknowledged that it is not for the state to
determine who is a minority. Most often, minorities are identified by
both subjective and objective criteria, including self-identification with
the group, national, racial, ethnic, linguistic and religious elements which
distinguish the minority from other population groups in a country.
Minority Self-
Government (MSG): Institutions established in Hungary to protect the cultural autonomy
of minorities. MSGs are elected by minorities who have a right of con-
sent over issues that are of primary concern to them, such as culture,
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education, languages and the media. On other matters that directly
affect them, they are given consultative rights. These bodies may also
establish and maintain cultural and educational institutions. MSGs
exists at both local and national levels.
Marginalisation: The state of being excluded from social, economic, political and other
spheres of mainstream society, on grounds of race, religion, ethnicity,
gender, culture or other distinction.
Multi-Cultural Education: Multi-culturalism highlights pluralism and the need for separate ‘spaces’
within which groups can develop their own culture. Multi-cultural edu-
cation implies a need for teaching in minorities’ own languages, cul-
tures and histories, potentially in separate environments.
Multi-Culturalism: A concept that highlights pluralism and the need for separate ‘spaces’
within which groups can develop their own culture. A term originally
used in the 1970s to discuss the incorporation of immigrants into
Western European countries and the United States.
Multi-Ethnicity: A concept which explicitly rejects the idea of full acculturation and
assumes that different ethnic and language groups will live in the same
state and sustain their different languages and cultures. Recognition of
multi-ethnicity demands a level of sensitivity and accommodation by
all groups to the demands of the others. In political terms, this means
a degree of power sharing, along the lines of consociationalism.
Nation-State: A fusion of two dissimilar principles, the one political and territorial, the
other historical and cultural. The ‘state’ element signifies the modern,
rational, autonomous state that came to fruition in the early modern peri-
od in Europe. The ‘nation’, defined as a named human community with
a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and standardised mass
culture, possessing a single territory, includes elements of ethnic cultur-
al and ‘civic’ features. The great majority of so-called nation-states are
poly-ethnic in composition. The homogeneous nation-state remains a
powerful, though no longer universal, political ideal.
Nationalism: A political doctrine and sentiment that suggests that the legitimate polit-
ical unit is coextensive with the national unit. On this theory, legiti-
macy and political propriety are violated if some members of a given
nationality are incorporated in political units dominated by other
nationalities, or if their own unit has an excessive number of members
drawn from other nationalities.
Official Language: The language used by the state and agents of the state for government
purposes and in its communication with citizens. The designation of
the majority language as the only ‘official’ language often excludes
minority individuals and groups from the public sphere and often
makes the relationship between minorities and government officials
and institutions more difficult.
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Ombudsman/
Ombudsperson: An official authorised by statute to investigate complaints from citizens
about improper, unfair or discriminatory treatment by public servants
and state authorities. He or she reports to the legislature and is inde-
pendent of the political executive and the bureaucracy. In general terms,
the Ombudsperson stands as an impartial intermediary between the
bureaucracy and the individual citizen.
OSCE: Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe. Created origi-
nally as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) in the early 1970s as a forum for dialogue and negotiation
between East and West in the Cold war period. The CSCE functioned
as a conference of 35 States until 1990. Today the OSCE has 53
Participating States from Central Asia to North America. Areas of
activity include questions related to security in Europe, cooperation
in economics, science and technology, environment and humanitar-
ian and other fields.
Parallel Bureaucracy: A system in which the state administration is ‘shadowed’ and controlled
by the administration of the leading political party at most or all lev-
els of the hierarchy.
Parliamentary System
of Government: A system in which the government derives its mandate solely from the
parliament. There may be a separate presidential office, the incumbent
of which is indirectly elected or appointed.
Political Participation: The act of taking part in the formulation, passage or implementation
of public policies. This broad definition applies to the activities of any
person, whether an elected politician, a government official or an ordi-
nary citizen, who is active in any way in the production of policy with-
in any type of political system. Some scholars add that participation
must be voluntary and genuine.
Politicisation of
Public Administration: System of management of public administration in which appoint-
ments, recruitment and dismissal of civil servants is dependent main-
ly on their political affiliation rather than on professional competence.
The degree to which an administration is politicised is determined both
by the hierarchical level down to which political motives are the pre-
dominant element in the recruitment, promotion and dismissal process,
and by the degree to which political motives influence these decisions.
Presidential System
of Government: A system in which the president appoints and heads the government.
Public Administration: Institutional arrangements for the provision of public services, incor-
porating the complex of agencies, authorities and enterprises, the for-
mal rule structures, mixes of instruments and conventions of behav-
iour which describe the organisational means of service delivery.
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Public Policy: A purposive course of action taken by public persons, groups or the
government within a given field addressing some problem or matter
of public concern.
Public Services: Services and goods provided to the public to meet different social needs
that cannot be delivered by individual efforts. Traditionally, public ser-
vices were provided by community institutions; in modern societies, 
they are provided by the state, and in post-industrial societies they are
provided by the state, the private sector and non-profit organisations.
Public Sector: That part of the political economy controlled or funded by the gov-
ernment—national, state, provincial or municipal.
Racism: An ideology proposing a hierarchy of groups based on racial charac-
teristics that legitimises exclusion of and discrimination against racial
groups perceived as inferior. Racism as a doctrine makes an associa-
tion between race and social, cultural and moral worth.
Regionalisation: A concept referring to the creation of a new level in a state’s territori-
al organisation. Regional institutions can vary widely in terms of bod-
ies, responsibilities and powers, but they are always superimposed on
existing local institutions. They can be defined broadly, including
regions that are merely subordinate levels of the central government,
or narrowly, whereby the only expression of regionalisation is the region
as a territorial authority.
Rule of Law: A political ideal to which a state’s constitutional arrangements should
give effect. At its most basic, the concept merely implies a preference
for law and order as opposed to anarchy and strife. Generally, the con-
cept implies also what is sometimes called the principle of legality: that
government must be conducted according to law. Most formulations
of the concept go even further and include a moral or political content
in order to guarantee that fundamental values are not infringed.
Secession: The act of leaving a federation or confederation. For the purposes of
this book, the term is often used with reference to fears of central gov-
ernments of secession by territorially compact minorities
Segregation: The establishment by law or by custom of separate institutions of edu-
cation, separate facilities of leisure and recreation, and perhaps even
separate kinds and places of work, for people belonging to different
groups, usually defined in terms of race, caste or ethnicity. Integration
aims at reversing segregation.
Self-Determination: A doctrine justifying the autonomy and independence of an individ-
ual or group conceived as possessing a distinctive identity and free-
will. Inherent ambiguities in the term include the question of who
exactly constitutes the ‘self’ (e.g—the national) and to what degree the
self can ‘determine’ its status, condition or future (i.e.—whether it auto-
matically extends to full territorial independence).
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Self-Government: A condition in which an individual or collectivity manages his/her own
affairs and resources, and is solely responsible for his/her actions and
destiny. More narrowly, a doctrine commending the virtues of auton-
omy or living according to one’s distinctive ‘inner rhythms’, which
require freedom from external constraints.
Semi-Presidential System
of Government: A system of government which has a dual executive, based on differ-
ent electoral mandates. The system has a directly elected president as
well as a government dependent upon the support of the parliament.
Separatism: A movement that takes as its starting point the principle of self-deter-
mination of peoples, and the opinion that sovereignty over a given ter-
ritory is only legitimate when it results from the consensus of those
people living within that territory. Separatists generally regard the state
as an institution of national self-organisation, and therefore ethnic
homogeneity and cultural consensus become ideological elements for
the political and territorial separation based on these criteria.
Sovereignty: The condition of exercising supreme authority. A sovereign may be an
individual person or a collective identity. In the modern era, a term
generally applied to states. ‘State sovereignty’ can be defined as either
legal or political freedom from external control. In recent years, the
nature of state sovereignty has changed as states are increasingly inte-
grated in supranational organisations.
State: In its modern definition as a form of political association was general-
ly agreed upon in the nineteenth century, though the term still eludes
specific definition. States have a distinct territorial character, sovereign
authority from both an internal and external standpoint, resources of
physical power at their disposal, a legal personality, and are distin-
guished by bonds among their members. Without question, contem-
porary forces, such as globalisation are changing the nature of the state,
its boundaries and the relationship between states and citizens.
Statutory Instruments: The rules, regulations and orders made by the executive under desig-
nated legislative authority.
Subsidiarity: Principle stating that decisions should be taken at the lowest appro-
priate level. Subsidiarity is commonly argued to be the best form of
governance to address minority/majority issues.
Territoriality: An emotional or passionate connection or bond with a particular ter-
ritory or ‘homeland’. Territoriality is a powerful component of nation-
al identity, and its presence or absence is sometimes used to distin-
guish between ‘nations’ and ‘ethnic groups’.
Top-Down Policies: Policies or policy programmes designed an initiated by the central gov-
ernment—i.e., state-directed policies. Top-down policies are imple-
mented but do not originate at the local level.
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Transparency: The duty of those responsible for the management of resources to
report, openly and fully, on their intended and actual use of those
resources. Without transparency, there can be no true accountability.
Unitary System of
Government: A unitary government is characterised by a single level of government for
the entire country. There are no regional or local governments acting inde-
pendently of the national government. The national government usually
delegates specific powers to locally constituted bodies or functionaries
who are responsible to the national government for their action. The most
emulated example of this form of government is the French system.
United Nations (UN): Formally established in October 1945, in the aftermath of the Second
World War, when its basic constitutive instrument, the UN Charter,
entered into force for the 51 founder states. The UN is comprised of
special agencies, funds and programmes and among its central organs
are: the General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, International
Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
Xenophobia: A psychological concept describing certain persons’ disposition to fear
or abhor other persons or groups perceived as outsiders.
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